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Propositions 
  1. Corruption is the absence of collective identity. (this thesis) 
 2. The only way to understand collective organizing processes is to become part of them.   (this thesis) 
 3. ‘Development’ and ‘money’ are concepts associated to very specific ways of thinking.         4. There are as many types of intervention as there are realities. 
 5. Whoever is free of intervention, let him be the first to accuse his neighbour of being an intervenor. 
 6. A PhD thesis should be written in the candidate’s native language and then translated.   
 7. Money is a means to weaken the spirit. 
 8. Collective action is a need.       Propositions belonging to the thesis entitled   “Going for the dough: Negotiated interventions in the Ciénega de Zacapu, Mexico”  Fidencio Servín Juárez  Wageningen, 6 February 2018. 
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INTRODUCTION2	
	
	
Governmental	planned	development	intervention	in	Ciénega	of	Zacapu,	Michoacán		
This	 study	 is	about	 the	 implementation	of	a	 regional	development	program	 in	Michoacán,	
Mexico,	from	2002	to	2005.	The	program,	which	comprised	a	participatory	approach	to	the	
introduction	of	greenhouses	for	the	production	of	tomatoes	through	hydroponic	systems,	was	
promoted	by	the	Subcomité	de	Planeación	para	el	Desarrollo	Regional	(SUPLADER)3.	The	public	
policy	from	which	the	program	derived	foresaw	the	instrumentation	of	projects	with	a	high	
level	 of	 investment.	 The	 greenhouses,	 for	 example,	 were	 projected	 to	 cost	 close	 to	 USD	
200,000	each.	In	order	to	finance	the	program,	the	policy	stated	that	investment	would	be	
obtained	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 public	 and	 private	 funding.	 In	 this	 setup,	 the	 State	 of	
Michoacán	would	provide	30%	of	program	costs,	beneficiaries	would	participate	by	financing	
10%	 in	 kind,	 while	 the	 remaining	 60%	 would	 be	 provided	 by	 private	 credit	 sources.	
Greenhouse	 tomatoes	would	 be	 grown	 through	 hydroponic	methods	 –	 implying	 technical	
skills	and	experience	that	were	non-existent	in	the	region	at	the	time.	In	addition,	the	program	
would	 only	 be	 open	 to	 farmers	 willing	 to	 form	 a	 Sociedad	 de	 Producción	 Rural	 (SPR)4.	
Practically,	this	entailed	the	formation	of	collective	production	units	capable	of	dealing	with	
governmental	and	banking	agents	to	access	public	funding,	credit,	technical	advice	and	the	
compulsory	collateral	that	was	required	to	obtain	these	resources.	
Beneficiaries	would	establish	SPRs	which	implied	that	they	had	to	deal	collectively	with	
financial	specialists,	greenhouse	experts	and	governmental	institutions.	In	addition,	they	had	
to	 fulfil	 other	 institutional	 requirements	 to	 be	 able	 to	 have	 access	 to	 the	 30%	 of	 the	
government’s	fund,	and	also	to	secure	a	mechanism	for	tomato	merchandising.	
In	order	to	be	eligible	for	program	resources,	the	SPRs	needed	to	create	a	second-level	
organization,	 an	 Unión	 de	 Sociedades	 de	 Producción	 Rural	 (USPR)5.	 Since	 some	 of	 the	
beneficiaries	had	previous	experience	in	organizing	and	participating	in	programs	similar	to	
the	one	promoted	by	SUPLADER,	they	could	count	on	an	extensive	network	of	relationships	
within	 governmental	 agencies	 and	 private	 institutions.	 As	 a	 result,	 these	 individuals	were	
intent	on	taking	up	the	management	of	the	individual	greenhouse	projects	and	to	define	the	
internal	agenda	of	the	SPRs,	which	in	turn	created	a	certain	degree	of	ambivalence	vis-à-vis	
the	SUPLADER	program	in	some	of	the	SPRs.	This	ambivalence	-	and	sometimes	even	outright	
suspicion	and	animosity	-	was	furthermore	fuelled	by	complicated	and	non-transparent	State	
regulations	 that	 allowed	 for	 program	 involvement	 of	 non-governmental	 organizations	 and	
consultancy	bureaus	in	pursuit	of	their	own	interests	by	using	particular	strategies.	
																																																						
2	This	manuscript	is	an	improved	version	of	the	manuscript	submitted	in	June	2017.	I	have	added	this	Introduction	
to	separate	research	questions	and	methodology	from	the	historical	description	of	development	planning	in	
Michoacán	which	has	been	retained	as	Chapter	1.		
3	Planning	Sub-Committee	for	Regional	Development,	SUPLADER	by	its	acronym	in	Spanish	
4	Rural	Production	Society.	
5	Union	of	Societies	for	Rural	Production.	
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In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 USPR,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 State’s	 regulatory	 framework	 and	
private	 interests	sharply	contrasted	with	 the	means	of	 the	beneficiaries,	who	nevertheless	
managed	to	reinterpret	the	regulations	and	interests	of	such	‘external’	actors	to	their	own	
convenience.	This	situation	very	much	resembles	Long	and	Long’s	(1992;	2007)	argument	that,	
in	 the	 context	 of	 development	 interventions,	 actors	 always	 negotiate	 their	 way	 through	
institutional	designs	and	projects	so	as	to	‘retool’	or	reshape	them	according	to	their	needs	
and	experience.		
	 The	present	study	seeks	to	understand	how	actors,	and	the	mechanisms	that	 invite	
them	to	take	a	certain	course	of	action	operate,	and	how	programs	and	development	projects	
come	to	obey	different	objectives.	In	the	process	plans	and	projects	become	disarticulated,	
thus	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	multiplicity	 of	 discourses	 justifying	 or	 denouncing	 particular	 forms	 of	
regional	 development	 that,	 in	 turn,	 appeal	 to	 different	 regulations	 or	 post-planning	
adjustments	(see	Chapters	1	and	7).	These	adjustments	explain	why	some	projects	are	not	
carried	out,	while	others	are.		
One	needs	to	keep	in	mind,	though,	that	SUPLADER’s	policy	was	not	at	random.	It	was	
the	political	result	of	a	faction	within	SUPLADER	which	aimed	at	the	inclusion	of	development	
subjects	 who	 had	 previously	 been	 invisible	 to	 the	 State	 –	 thus	 modifying	 top-down	
intervention	strategies	from	within	(Escobar,	2011).	Yet,	the	inclusion	of	these	members	of	
civil	 society	 into	 the	 SUPLADER	 program	 brought	 to	 light	 the	 contradictions	 between	 the	
conditions	set	by	the	State	to	carry	out	the	program,	and	the	actors’	practices.	Indeed,	and	as	
I	will	show	throughout	this	thesis,	the	image	of	orderly	and	vertical	State	planning	contrasted	
significantly	 with	 the	 messy	 character	 of	 intervention	 practices	 and	 negotiations.	 In	 this	
particular	case,	it	points	to	the	paramount	importance	of	pursuing	“the	dough”	(la	lana	or	the	
cash)	in	development	intervention.		
	
Historically,	the	relations	of	power	and	domination	that	accompanied	the	modernization	of	
the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	 implied	a	series	of	structural	changes	that	reflect	 the	way	 in	which	
planned	 intervention	 was	 conceived.	 Indeed,	 the	 Ciénega	 region	 has	 been	 subject	 of	 a	
succession	of	development	projects	focusing	on	economic	growth	through	the	introduction	
of	agricultural	modernization	in	the	context	of	power	struggles	over	access	to	resources.	The	
greenhouse	projects	that	are	the	focus	of	this	thesis	were	imbued	with	precisely	these	power	
relationships	 that	 were	 subject	 to	 political	 expediency	 and	 couched	 in	 terms	 that	 were	
suitable	 for	 institutional	 agents	 and	 alien	 to,	 especially,	 organized	 farmers’	 groups.	 In	
particular,	 these	 power	 relations	 were	 strongly	 linked	 to	 corporatism,	 a	 form	 of	 sectoral	
organization	introduced	during	the	Lázaro	Cárdenas	del	Río	Administration	between	1934	and	
1940	(Benítez,	1984).	Corporatism	required	community	strengthening	and,	in	some	cases,	the	
expropriation	 of	 the	means	 of	 production	 and	 its	 transfer	 to	 social	 groups	 (e.g.	 the	 ejido	
system)	 backing	 the	 State.	 In	 this	way,	 strong	 political	 alliances	were	 forged	 between	 the	
Institutional	Revolutionary	Party	(PRI)	and	its	clients.	Corporatism	implied	strong,	vertical	links	
between	 local	 trade	 unions	 and	 virtually	 all	 types	 of	 local	 associations	 with	 national	
institutions	such	as	Workers’	Union	(CTM),	the	National	Peasant	Confederation	(CNC),	and	the	
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Railroad	 Workers’	 Union	 (STFRM).	 This	 clientelist	 mode	 of	 organization	 was	 the	 pillar	 of	
Mexican	modernization,	 and	ensured	 that	most	 economic	 activities	 remained	under	 some	
form	of	governmental	control.	Some	of	these	characteristics	of	the	Mexican	State	are	still	in	
place,	even	though	corporatism	was	superseded	by	neoliberalism	in	the	1980’s.	A	case	in	point	
may	be	observed	in	Michoacán	during	the	administration	of	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel	(Governor	
of	Michoacán	from	2002-2008	and	son	of	former	President	Lázaro	Cárdenas	del	Río)	when	
public	policies	were	still	based	on	participatory	approaches	 that	carried	 their	 social	 justice	
message	to	development	programs.			
	 Neoliberalism	proposed	abandoning	the	economic	model	of	the	State	intervention	and	
the	welfare	State	on	grounds	of	 its	 inefficiency,	corruption,	 ‘obesity’,	and	corporatism.	The	
new,	neoliberal	policies	proposed	to	reduce	the	presence	of	the	government	in	the	daily	life	
of	its	subjects,	promising	to	restore	the	allocative	power	of	the	market	to	distribute	resources	
according	 to	 the	 efficiency	 and	 productivity	 of	 different	 economic	 actors	 (Meyer,	 1995).	
During	a	period	of	roughly	10	years	(1985-1995)	70%	of	Mexican	parastatals	were	dismantled	
or	privatised	and,	through	amendments	to	the	Constitution	(notably	Article	27	which	relates	
to	land	ownership),	formerly	inalienable	ejido	land	became	marketable.		
From	the	beginning	of	the	new	millennium	to	this	day,	neoliberal	public	policies	have	
undermined	 social	 and	 economic	 institutions,	 and	 three	 successive	 administrations	 have	
turned	 a	 blind	 eye	 on	 planned	 development.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 distribution	 of	 wealth	 has	
become	very	skewed	and	concentrated	in	a	small	group	linked	to	the	State.	Paradoxically,	in	
Mexico	the	so-called	withdrawal	of	the	State	coincided	with	the	strengthening	of	democracy.	
However,	as	Meyer	(1995)	argues,	the	State	has	not	stopped	participating	or	intervening	in	
development	programs.	What	characterizes	the	present	Mexican	State	is	that	it	orchestrates	
development	in	a	way	as	to	legitimize	itself	vis-à-vis	a	society	that	has	suffered	the	ravages	of	
recent	economic	and	social	change.	On	the	other	hand,	the	State	policies	identified	by	Morgan	
(1997)	 are	 associated	 with	 a	 complex	 network	 of	 international	 capitalist	 interests.	 These	
networks	support	capital	investment	as	a	way	to	propel	development.	
	
	
Research	approach	
The	 use	 of	 a	 participatory	 approach	 in	 planned	 development	 intervention	 is	 increasingly	
common	in	rural	areas	in	Mexico	(Mora,	1985;	Bernkopfová,	2011;	Barton	&	Merino-Pérez,	
2004;	Beaucage,	2007;	Zazueta,	1995).	The	approach	enrols	actors	in	intervention	processes	
where	they	had	 limited	 influence	before.	However,	participation	 is	also	a	process	whereby	
actors	influence	and	share	control	over	other	actors’	initiatives,	decisions,	and	development	
resources	(Cooke	and	Kothari,	2001).	
Some	approaches	to	group	participation	for	development	have	been	encouraged	by	
government	institutions,	yet	these	are	only	vaguely	concerned	with	how	intervening	agencies	
and	beneficiaries	 interact	with	one	another,	and	how	these	interactions	feed	back	into	the	
participatory	approaches	 themselves.	 Long	&	Long	 (1992)	and	Zazueta	 (1995)	address	 this	
concern	 through	 an	 actor-oriented	 perspective,	 re-conceptualizing	 the	 implementation	 of	
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programs	 and	 projects	 by	 describing	 how	 actors	 use	 their	 repertoires,	 focusing	 on	 the	
changes,	 continuities,	 discontinuities,	 and	 conflicts	 that	 occur	 at	 the	 interface	 between	
beneficiaries	and	intervening	parties	(Long,	2001).	
I	 agree	with	 statements	 (e.g.	Diego	1997)	which	propose	 that	 certain	elements	are	
central	 to	 the	 trajectories	 of	 projects,	 such	 as	 beneficiaries’	 organizing	 capacity	 and	
participation	 in	 decision-making,	 participation	 and	 support	 by	 public	 officials,	 inclusion	 of	
external	advisors,	establishment	and	training	of	associations	and	cooperatives,	choosing	the	
appropriate	beneficiaries	or	political,	economic	and	institutional	support.	What	seems	to	be	
key	to	the	successful	implementation	of	development	projects	is	the	initiation	of	processes	
that	bring	together,	recognize,	and	approve	the	conceptions	and	ideas	of	all,	often	conflicting	
interests	in	a	project	–	thus	creating	scenarios	that	allow	for	interactions	between	different	
actors	(Zazueta,	1995).		
Often,	 actors	 had	 previous	 experience	 with	 similar	 participatory	 projects,	 which	
strengthened	the	repertoires	they	used	to	manage	and	resignify	new	projects,	like	in	the	case	
of	the	greenhouses.	In	this	thesis,	I	use	key	concepts	like	agency,	knowledge	and	interface,	
associations,	 and	 organizing	 processes	 taken	 from	development	 theories	 such	 as	 those	 of	
Escobar,	 Long’s	 actor-oriented	 approach	 and	 Latour’s	 actor-network	 theory	 to	 analyze	
processes	 linked	to	participatory	 intervention	 in	the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	region.	 I	especially	
focus	on	the	notion	of	organizing	processes	(Nuijten,	1998).		
I	take	into	account	the	criticism	about	assumptions	that	justify	planned	intervention	as	
a	mode	or	strategy	for	development.	Because,	intervention	processes	then	take	the	form	of	
policy	development	carried	out	through	direct	and	indirect	controls,	which	limit	the	autonomy	
of	 those	 involved	 (Escobar,	 1997).	 This	 discussion	 remains	 relevant,	 especially	 under	 the	
prevailing	neoliberal	model	 in	which	planned	 intervention	 is	 still	 on	 the	map.	 I	 agree	with	
Escobar	when	he	states	that:	
	 	 	 		 		 		 	 	
The	general	question	[this	case	study	raises]	is	the	circulation	and	effects	
of	languages	of	development	and	modernity	in	different	parts	of	the	Third	
World.	The	answer	to	this	question	is	specific	to	each	locality—	its	history	
of	immersion	in	the	world	economy,	colonial	heritage,	patterns	of	insertion	
into	development,	and	the	like	(2011:49).	
	 	 	 	 	
The	 Actor-Oriented	 Perspective	 proposed	 by	 Norman	 Long,	 allows	 me	 to	 focus	 on	 the	
knowledge	produced	by	the	actors	involved	in	development	projects,	as	well	as	the	arenas	
and	interfaces	in	which	they	have	been	involved	through	participatory	development	planning.	
The	greenhouse	project	was	conceived	as	part	of	a	macro-governmental	development	project	
of	 the	 government	 of	Michoacán	 in	which	 planners	 proposed	 an	 intervention	 based	 on	 a	
model	 in	which	 individuals	were	expected	 to	be	 interested	 in	productive	projects	 through	
collective	forms	of	organization	(SPRs	and	USPRs).	However,	the	planners	did	not	take	into	
account	 interactions	between	stakeholders,	or	 the	way	 in	which	they	would	mobilize	 their	
skills,	 agency,	 experience	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 collective	 projects,	 and	 how	 this	 would	
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intervene	 with	 the	 planned	 objectives.	 But	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 project	 had	 the	
capabilities	and	resources	that	allowed	them	to	negotiate	with	others,	both	within	and	outside	
of	the	project,	to	influence	the	directionality	and	intentionality	of	the	intervention.	From	their	
point	of	view,	the	assembly	of	collectives	was	nourished	by	the	contributions	of	these	other	
actors	who,	 in	their	 interactions,	appealed	to	their	 lifeworlds	and	 livelihoods,	as	well	as	 to	
their	cultural	repertoires	and	experiences	(Long,	2001).	
The	socio-technical	trajectories	of	the	greenhouse	project	were	captured	with	the	aid	
of	 actor-network	 theory	 (Latour,	 1999)	 because	 of	 the	 importance	 it	 places	 on	 flows	 of	
resources	and	the	strengthening	of	networks	and	groups.	Actor-network	theory	allows	me	to	
look	into	the	way	actors	put	together	their	projects	through	heterogeneous	means.	In	other	
words,	 how	 they	 put	 forward	 their	 strategies	 to	 strengthen	 the	 networks	 linked	 to	 their	
projects.	 I	 am	 also	 following	 actor-network	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 clarify	 how	 networks	 are	
restructured	so	as	to	make	possible	the	appropriation	of	governmental	resources.	The	study	
also	uses	Latour’s	(1999)	notion	of	associations,	as	well	as	the	notion	of	translation	proposed	
by	Callon	(1986)	to	understand	the	processes	of	enrolment,	displacement	and	substitution	
that	go	on	in	organizing	processes.	The	notion	of	translation	emphasizes	the	continuity	of	the	
displacements	and	transformations	that	occur	 in	the	organizing	process	of	 the	greenhouse	
project	(see	Chapters	6	and	7),	while	enrolment	as	a	process	does	not	imply	nor	exclude,	pre-
established	roles.	To	describe	enrolment	is	thus	to	describe	the	multilateral	negotiations,	trials	
of	strength	and	tricks	that	accompany	translation	and	enable	actors	to	achieve	their	objectives	
(Callon,	1986:10).	
As	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 this	 study,	 actors	 assembled	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 had	
different	 motivations	 for	 becoming	 enrolled	 in	 'development'.	 “Going	 for	 the	 dough”	 or	
pursuing	the	cash	flows	involved	in	the	organizing	processes,	tries	to	analyze	how	these	are	
deployed	 to	 access	 governmental	 resources	 for	 greenhouse	 production	 of	 vegetables.	 To	
achieve	their	mission,	actors	had	to	engage,	collaborate,	enrol	and	fight	other	actors	seeking	
the	same	objective.	In	other	words,	actors	did	not	play	the	roles	attributed	to	them	by	the	
development	 program.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 formed	 teams	 and	 coalitions	 to	 achieve	 a	
diversity	of	objectives	-	but	mostly	in	pursuit	of	the	money.	
In	her	study	of	ejidos	in	Jalisco	Nuijten	(1998),	following	Long's	perspective,	recounts	
how	in	the	organizing	practices	revolving	around	the	ejido	and	its	administration,	groups	of	
ejidatarios	 established	 relations	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 ejido.	 I	 thus	 understand	
organizing	 practices	 to	 include	 activities	 that	 may	 involve	 so-called	 ‘outsiders’.	 Indeed,	
organizing	practices	imply	that	actors	acknowledge	that	their	objectives	cannot	be	achieved	
individually.	As	such,	collective	actions	are	the	manifestation	of	agreements	between	actors.	
The	construction	of	these	agreements	involves	a	succession	of	multiple	negotiation	processes	
and	interfaces	aimed	at	defining	the	objective	and	how	to	achieve	it.	In	this	sense,	organizing	
practices	are	the	manifestation	of	agency,	and	the	organizing	process	is	the	way	to	coordinate	
those	practices	in	order	to	achieve	a	goal.	
For	 all	 these	 reasons,	 what	 I	 have	 called	 “going	 for	 the	 dough”	 entails	 several	
meanings.	For	the	promoters	in	charge	of	planning	it	is	the	means	to	accomplish	a	planned	
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intervention	project;	for	collectively	organized	farmers	it	is	a	means	to	help	achieve	their	own	
objectives;	 for	 private	 agents	 it	 signifies	 a	 business	 opportunity;	 while	 for	 the	 local	
government	it	contributes	to	the	successful	implementation	of	a	political	model	for	Ciénega	
de	Zacapu’s	development.	What	they	all	have	in	common	is	that	the	pursuit	of	the	cash	tries	
to	justify	‘development’	in	their	own	different	terms.		
	
	
Research	questions	
This	study	aims	to	answer	questions	about	the	organizing	processes	associated	with	actors	
and	collectives	linked	to	the	greenhouse	project	in	the	Zacapu	region	of	Michoacán.	The	study	
looks	at	the	greenhouse	project	as	a	part	of	the	SUPLADER	program	during	the	period	2003-
2005.	The	main	research	question	is:		
How	do	stakeholders	organize	themselves	around	the	greenhouse	project,	and	how	do	they	
redefine	the	local	government’s	vision	of	planned	development?	
	
From	the	main	question,	the	following	sub-questions	are	derived:		
1. How	and	when	does	actors’	agency	become	evident	in	collective	negotiations?		
2. How	do	the	different	interfaces,	which	arise	from	the	interaction	between	different	
actors	involved	in	the	greenhouse	project,	unfold?		
3. How	do	network	resources	contribute	to	the	support	of	actors’	projects?		
	
	
Objectives	
This	research	is	guided	by	the	understanding	and	analysis	of	the	development	intervention	
processes	linked	to	the	greenhouse	project	of	the	SUPLADER	program	in	the	Zacapu	region	of	
Michoacán.	In	particular,	the	study	aims	to:	
1)	Understand	the	organizing	processes	derived	from	the	setting	up	of	collectives	in	
order	to	appropriate	the	economic,	political	and	social	resources	arising	from	the	greenhouse	
project.	
2)	Identify	the	networks	that	join	together	the	collectives	through	their	participation	
in	the	greenhouse	project,	in	order	to	understand	their	potential.	
3)	Understand	 the	 interfaces	present	 in	 the	development	of	 the	projects,	and	 their	
relevance	for	collective	decision-making.	
	
	
Methodological	perspective	
This	case	study	focuses	on	the	region	of	the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	and	seeks	to	understand	the	
organizing	processes	that	occurred	between	2003	and	2005	with	regards	to	the	greenhouse	
project	proposed	by	the	SUPLADER	for	the	region	Zacapu.	For	the	purpose	of	this	PhD	study,	
and	 following	 Zazueta	 (1995),	 I	 needed	 to	 be	 closely	 involved	with	 the	 trajectories	 of	 the	
greenhouse	projects,	in	order	to	unravel	such	interaction	processes.	I	wanted	to	bring	to	light	
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the	 ‘hidden’	 intervention	 practices	 that	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 development	 intervention,	
revealing	the	actors’	room	for	manoeuvre	and	clever	use	of	resources.	I	became	interested	in	
the	dynamics	of	the	organizing	processes	that	arose	from	the	planned	intervention	project	for	
regional	 development	 that	 involved	 the	 establishment	 of	 28	 greenhouses	 due	 to	 the	
challenges	involved.	The	project	was	basically	financed	by	governmental	resources	allocated	
by	 SUPLADER,	 and	 through	 its	 participatory	 approach	 it	 would	 imply	 an	 impact	 on	 eight	
municipalities.	In	this	sense,	the	28	greenhouses	became	a	scenario	for	public	participation	in	
decision-making,	as	well	as	different	kinds	of	technological,	organizational,	financial,	political,	
historical,	and	cultural	processes.		
Before	I	became	involved	with	this	research,	I	mainly	considered	organizing	processes	
to	 be	 associated	with	 the	 consolidated	 collectives	 that	were	 formally	 recognized	 and	 had	
organizational	 experience.	 After	 reflecting	 upon	 the	 SUPLADER	 proposal,	 I	 realized	 that	
associations	 occurred	 everywhere	 and	 that	 they	 could	 also	 lead	 to	 the	 consolidation	 of	
different	or	new	collective	entities,	as	will	be	seen	throughout	this	study	(see	Chapters	2,	5	
and	7).	Project	activities	had	already	started	when	I	became	involved.	In	the	initial	stages,	the	
research	consisted	in	following	the	actors	and	collecting	relevant	ethnographic	information.	
The	 original	 intention	was	 to	 study	 the	 organizing	 and	 political	 processes	 in	 Coeneo	 (see	
Chapter	 2)	 in	 association	 with	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 using	 participant	 observation	
techniques.		
	However,	when	the	SPRs	began	to	be	formed,	and	some	of	the	actors	realized	that	I	
had	skills	that	could	be	useful	for	the	project,	like	my	agronomic	knowledge,	administrative	
capabilities	 and	origin	 from	 that	 region,	 they	 enrolled	me	 in	 SPR	 Laredo6	 and,	 later	 in	 the	
project	for	the	28	greenhouses	and	the	USPR	Asociación	(See	Chapter	2).	Membership	of	the	
Asociación	allowed	me	to	observe	and	understand	the	processes	within	it	and	the	negotiations	
of	the	greenhouse	project.	So	far,	the	research	had	focused	on	political	processes,	networks	
and	organizing	forms	in	the	municipality	of	Coeneo.	However,	the	actors	of	SPR	Laredo	decided	
to	take	a	look	at	the	greenhouse	project,	and	allowed	me	to	enrol	as	an	extension	to	their	
networks.	At	that	time,	I	considered	networks	as	temporary,	unstable,	broad,	and	complex	
organizational	 processes	 and	 difficult	 to	 understand,	 and	 I	 hesitated	 how	much	 all	 of	 this	
would	facilitate	or	complicate	my	research.	But	I	accepted	the	challenge.	
Consequently,	I	became	closely	involved	with	the	project	and	its	actors.	They	knew	and	
consented	to	my	intention	to	write	a	PhD	thesis	about	the	process.	The	greenhouse	project	
used	public	funds,	and	the	program	related	documents	I	use	belonged	to	the	public	domain,	
																																																						
6	I	began	the	fieldwork	in	collaboration	with	a	single	actor	(Rafa)	who	I	knew	for	a	long	time.	He	introduced	me	
to	his	networks	of	 family,	 friends,	 and	 relatives,	 and	he	bonded	me	with	other	actors	and	 resources	 in	his	
network.	In	this	way,	I	met	El	Campeón,	and	other	actors	who	shared	capacities	and	resources,	to	carry	out	
collective	 actions,	 political	 processes,	 cultural,	 organizing	 practices.	 This	 process	 of	 entanglement	 or	 being	
enrolled	in	a	collective,	allowed	me	to	learn	about	and	become	involved	in	one	of	the	components	of	the	MAA	
–	the	greenhouse	project.	
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so	 in	 a	 sense,	 data	 are	 public.	 But	 I	 acknowledge	 the	 potential	 ethical	 dilemma,	 where	
sensitivities	may	arise	in	my	description	of	their	actions	and	interaction	processes.	I	therefore	
decided	to	change	the	real	names	of	the	actors	involved	so	as	to	guarantee	their	anonymity.	
The	 greenhouse	 project	 gave	 me	 the	 opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 process	 of	
project	development	by	way	of	an	action-research	(Reason	&	Bradbury,	2008;	Brydon-Miller,	
et	al.,	 2003).	 The	design	of	 this	 thesis	 therefore	 focuses	on	pragmatic	 and	 solution-driven	
research	rather	than	on	testing	theories.	I	would	accompany	the	actors	and	join	the	collective,	
which	allowed	me	to	access	relevant	and	first-hand	information.	But	I	acknowledge	that	this	
probably	may	have	altered	the	dynamics	of	the	processes	that	had	already	begun,	and	which	
I	have	described	in	full	detail	in	the	research	chapters.	The	absence	of	an	"all-seeing	eye"	that	
perceives	the	multiple	events	of	a	puzzle	not	yet	designed,	coupled	with	the	unpredictable	
actions	of	the	actors,	added	to	my	unfamiliarity	with	the	development	scenarios.	Immersed	in	
my	 quest	 to	 follow	 the	 actors,	 this	 brought	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 describing	 the	 partial	
realities	during	my	fieldwork,	and	discover	how	these	began	to	cohere.		Apart	from	the	huge	
advantage	 of	 such	 participatory	 action	 research,	 I	 am	 also	 aware	 of	 the	 risk	 that	 my	
involvement	might	have	biased	research	results.	However,	the	greenhouse	project	was	not	a	
pre-configured,	turn-key	project,	and	throughout	the	thesis	I	show	how	actors	continuously	
enrolled	other	actors	 in	pursuit	of	their	own	objectives	-	and	this	also	applies	to	myself.	 In	
other	words,	individuals	and	collectives	were	very	much	in	control	of	their	own	actions.		
My	close	encounter	also	implies	that	this	thesis	has	elements	of	an	autoethnography	
(Blanco	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Chang,	 2008).	 This	 research	method	 autoethnography	 allowed	me	 to	
include	personal	experiences	and	autobiographical	reflections.	It	was	necessary	to	enhance	
my	 experiences	 as	 a	 researcher,	while	 giving	 priority	 to	 practice.	 These	 experiences	were	
collected	by	me	as	an	ethnographer	and	a	researcher,	in	a	specific	social	and	cultural	context.	
At	 the	same	time,	 it	enabled	me	to	critically	 reflect	upon	my	 interaction	with	 the	process.	
Thus,	the	ethnography	and	story-gathering	were	carried	out	using	descriptions	in	which	I	have	
tried	hard	to	escape	potential	bias.	
This	research	deliberately	uses	few	theoretical	concepts	and	principles.	This	is	in	line	
with	an	actor-oriented	approach,	which	prefers	local	histories	whose	framework	is	defined	by	
the	actors	and	not	by	the	investigator;	also,	it	makes	use	of	reflexivity	to	provide	relevance	
and	 significance	 at	 a	 local	 level	 (Hammersley	&	Atkinson,	 2007;	 Barley,	 2004).	 In	 order	 to	
describe	the	interactions	in	more	depth,	the	case	study	method	(Mitchell,	1983)	was	used	to	
bring	 together	 interfaces	 reflected	 through	narratives	 (Grillo,	 1997)	deployed	 in	meetings,	
interviews	 and	 informal	 gatherings,	 in	order	 to	 identify	 the	 configuration	 and	 scale	of	 the	
formal	organizing	processes	recognized	by	the	State,	such	as	statutes	and	standards	used	in	
the	SPRs	and	USPR.	
The	 actor-network	 approach	 was	 used	 to	 understand	 the	 actors’	 participation	 in	
collective	decision-making,	 their	organizing	processes,	 and	 the	 link	between	networks	and	
meanings	in	producer	associations,	government	agencies,	and	companies	in	the	technology	
and	 agricultural	 sectors.	 In	 this	 approach,	 I	 myself	 as	 a	 researcher	 is	 only	 one	 additional	
element,	immersed	in	the	dynamics	of	the	actions,	and	“potentiated”	by	the	actor-network	
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and	circumstances.	The	actor-network	approach	facilitates,	enables,	and	provides	flexibility	
and	reflexivity	to	incorporate	elements	that	were	not	foreseen,	to	the	point	of	restructuring	
the	expected.	My	fieldwork	was	thus	not	a	laboratory	to	prove	pre-established	theories,	but	
became	a	space	for	reflecting	on	them.	This	included	the	perception	of	the	social	as	something	
non-homogeneous	which	can	be	reassembled	in	any	given	state	of	things	(Latour,	2005).	To	
gather	information	on	collective	associations,	Latour	recommends	that:	
 
[We	must	try]	"to	follow	the	actors	themselves’,	that	is	try	to	catch	up	with	their	often	
wild	innovations	in	order	to	learn	from	them	what	the	collective	existence	has	become	
in	 their	 hands,	 which	 methods	 they	 have	 elaborated	 to	 make	 it	 fit	 together,	 which	
accounts	could	best	define	the	new	associations	that	they	have	been	forced	to	establish"	
(Latour,	2005:	12).	
 
The	ethnographic	fieldwork	generated	a	large	amount	of	unstructured	information	of	events	
and	situations	that	I	have	registered	digitally	and	organized	at	the	end	of	the	day	in	my	field	
journal.	 Institutional	and	project	documents	and	materials,	once	analyzed	and	 interpreted,	
were	included	and	helped	to	support	the	facts	and	descriptions.		
Case	studies,	such	as	the	ones	presented	in	this	thesis,	only	represent	a	snapshot	of	
the	total	social	scenario	of	the	greenhouse	project.	When	describing	the	structural	events	in	
the	discussions	of	the	individual	or	collective	actors,	I	aim	to	explain	a	more	complex	event:	
collective	processes	provided	with	emergent	organizing	 forms,	 identified	with	a	model	 for	
regional	development.	This	view	allows	me	to	expand	the	scenario	and	include	the	State,	its	
institutions,	 and	 strategies	 to	 design	 and	 try	 to	 implement	 planned	 development.	 Actors,	
beyond	being	subjects	of	top-down	development,	also	reinterpret,	associate,	and	adapt	the	
resources	provided	to	the	collective	development	project.	
The	myth	of	planned	development	collapses	when	the	actor’s	practices	and	networks	
are	displayed.	En	pos	de	 la	 lana	 (“in	pursuit	of	 the	dough”)	 reflects	how	actors	 strategize,	
organize,	perceive,	reinterpret,	and	enrol	in	development	from	their	different	perspectives,	
and	 it	 articulates	 organizing	 processes.	 “The	 dough”	 appears	 as	 the	 financial	 resource	 to	
realize	the	planned	project,	but	it	also	represents	an	immediate	attribute	to	the	actor's	needs.	
Although	the	multiple	perceptions	seem	to	be	incompatible	with	the	pre-established	planning,	
this	is	not	entirely	true	since	through	negotiation,	different	projects	can	develop.	In	the	game	
of	the	two	USPRs,	the	Asociación	and	Productos	Inocuos	(see	Chapter	6),	access	to	the	money	
becomes	the	reward	for	the	coalition	of	actors	that	allocate	it.	Associations	give	the	network	
a	 cohesiveness	 that	 supports	 the	 actors	 and	 allows	 them	 to	 keep	playing.	 The	 interaction	
processes	are	qualified	neither	by	the	money	or	the	project	and	its	attainment,	nor	by	the	
results	of	SUPLADER’s	regional	planning.	The	repercussions	of	the	organizing	processes	are	
historical	and,	like	development,	remain	unquantifiable.	
In	Chapter	1	I	present	a	historical	account	of	development	planning	in	the	Ciénega	de	
Zacapu.	 The	 actors	 and	 their	 networks	 are	 immersed	 in	 this	 historicity,	 which	 allows	 to	
understand	 their	 actions,	 the	 relations	 between	 them,	 and	 the	 way	 they	 mobilize	 their	
resources.	These	historical	processes	are	interpreted	in	a	continuum	where	the	relations	and	
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the	events	of	the	past	define	the	present	(Chassen-Lopez,	2004).	The	six	research	chapters	
show	the	trajectories	followed	by	those	involved	in	the	greenhouse	project,	the	conformation	
of	their	networks	and	associations,	and	how	the	organizing	practices	relate	and	adapt	to	local	
conditions	to	consolidate	and	search	to	realize	their	objectives.		
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CHAPTER	 1.	 	 	 PUBLIC	 POLICY	 AND	 PLANNED	 INTERVENTION	 AS	 A	 KEY	 FOR	 REGIONAL	
DEVELOPMENT	IN	MICHOACÁN	
	
	
Introduction		
This	chapter	presents	some	historical	aspects	of	the	Ciénega	region	to	introduce	the	different	
processes	of	planned	intervention	promoted	by	the	State	that	have	taken	place	in	the	region,	
together	with	the	institutional	organization	associated	with	the	planning	of	the	greenhouse	
project.		Originally	the	Zacapu	region	consisted	of	a	series	of	swamps	and	lagoons	that	were	
drained	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century.	Land	Reform	Laws	(1876-1910)	led	to	changes	in	land	
ownership,	privileging	the	establishment	of	haciendas.	This	was	followed	by	land	reforms	in	
the	1930s	that	favoured	the	formation	of	ejidos	and	the	mestizo	population	(to	the	detriment	
of	 Indigenous	people).	With	corn	as	the	staple	crop,	 traditional	 forms	of	production	 in	the	
Ciénega	continued	until	the	middle	of	the	1980's	when	mechanization	was	introduced	into	
the	 region.	After	much	political	 strife	 in	 the	early	20th	 century,	 the	Federal	Planning	 Law,	
which	 sought	 to	 incorporate	 democratic	 elements	 in	 the	 public	 administration,	 was	
established	in	1983.	
By	the	1980s,	planning	in	Michoacán	was	in	charge	of	the	State	and	represented	by	the	
Secretariat	 of	 Planning	 and	 Development	 (SEPLADE).	 Supervised	 by	 SEPLADE,	 in	 Zacapu	
Ciénega	 SUPLADER	 02	 represented	 the	 regional	 development	 program	 which	 focused	 on	
participatory	planning,	and	which	introduced	a	leftist	approach	to	development	in	Michoacán.	
Figure	1.1	shows	the	interrelationships	between	institutions	and	strategies,	starting	from	the	
community	up	to	the	federation.	SUPLADER	received	development	project	proposals	(figure	
1.3),	outlining	operational	rules	and	establishing	the	institutional	guidelines	for	stakeholder	
participation.	 Gonzalo,	 the	 SEPLADE-Zacapu	 delegate,	 would	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	
greenhouse	project.	
	
	
Chronicle	of	a	new	planned	development	intervention	
Nowadays,	 in	 reviewing	 history,	 one	 realizes	 that,	 in	 a	 government	 effort	 to	 stimulate	
productivity	and	economic	development	in	the	Ciénega,	Indigenous	people	who	gave	life	to,	
and	kept	possession	of	the	Ciénega	were	left	out	of	its	planned	development	initiatives.	At	the	
end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	before	being	drained,	the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	was	used	by	the	
inhabitants	that	surrounded	their	marshes	and	small	lakes.	The	drying	up	of	the	Ciénaga	was	
due	to	a	process	of	modernization	that	started	at	 the	turn	of	 the	20th	century.	Due	to	the	
intervention	of	 the	 State	 the	Ciénega	was	 chosen	 to	 become	 the	 site	 of	 capitalist	 domes.	
Spanish	investors	were	supported	and	financed	by	the	local	governments	in	turn	to	carry	out	
economic	 and	 infrastructure	 projects	 for	 development.	Modernization	manifested	 itself	 in	
different	ways,	for	example	with	the	arrival	of	the	railroad	that	connected	the	Ciénega	with	
the	 centre	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 railroad	 constituted	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	means	 of	
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communication	that	the	settlers	established	with	modernity	and	technological	development.	
It	also	created	the	basis	for	the	migratory	flows	into	the	region.	
Although	communities	such	as	Naranja,	Tiríndaro	and	Tarejero	appear	as	protagonists	
in	the	struggle	for	possession	and	rights	of	the	Ciénaga	before	and	after	the	land	had	been	
drained,	these	were	not	the	only	ones	established	there.	In	the	concessionary	ranches	around	
the	Ciénega	the	 landless	peasants	and	workers	who	used	the	resources	obtained	from	the	
marshes	to	complete	their	subsistence	and	their	opposition	to	desiccating	the	Ciénaga	were	
not	considered,	since	from	a	legal	perspective	they	did	not	have	any	rights.	For	this	reason,	
the	negotiation	for	the	drying	up	was	between	the	haciendas	and	the	federal	government,	
which	at	the	time	favoured	the	drying	companies	headed	by	the	Noriega	family	which	ended	
up	getting	most	of	the	usufruct	of	the	Ciénaga.	
This	 form	 of	 land	 ownership	was	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 revolutionary	 processes	 that	
convulsed	the	Ciénega,	and	although	the	haciendas	were	invaded	and	many	were	burned,	the	
land	distribution	was	not	modified,	since	only	a	small	endowment	was	given	to	 the	native	
communities.	Although	land	redistribution	did	not	produce	great	advances,	the	revolutionary	
process	had	an	impact	among	the	people	of	the	Ciénega,	who	participated	in	the	revolution	
and	 adopted	 a	 position	 of	 “rights	 won".	 Although	 they	were	 not	 granted	 the	majority	 of	
settlements	 and	 communities	 that	 were	 newly	 established,	 it	 was	 enough	 to	 have	 the	
endowment	made	in	the	1920's	to	the	communities	of	Villa	Jiménez,	Tiríndaro	and	Naranja	in	
order	to	raise	hopes	that	the	hierarchical	model	of	land	tenure	which	prevailed	in	the	region	
and	in	the	rest	of	the	country,	would	change.	
It	was	until	the	reforms	promoted	by	Lázaro	Cárdenas	del	Río,	between	1934-1940,	
that	 the	 changes	 that	 gave	 origin	 to	 the	 ejidos	 were	 propitiated.	 However,	 productive	
organization,	water	management,	and	the	interrelation	between	communities	and	between	
actors	are	a	continuation	of	the	prevailing	social	relations	of	the	haciendas.	In	fact,	the	ejidos	
are	 based	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 territories	 of	 the	 haciendas,	 and	 the	 beneficiaries	were	 their	
previous	workers.	In	this	way,	historical	processes	are	part	of	a	continuum	of	transformations	
induced	by	the	actors,	but	also	by	the	historical	and	social	conditions	prevailing	in	each	region.	
In	this	sense,	the	modernizing	model	promoted	by	Porfirio	Díaz	and	initiated	by	Benito	Juárez,	
was	replicated	in	a	very	particular	way	in	the	Ciénega.	Previously,	State	driven	intervention	
policies	 had	 favored	 the	 attainment	 of	 economic	 benefits,	 based	on	 a	 capitalist	 economic	
model,	in	the	interests	of	local	people.	
	
	
Local	development	history:	The	modern	machinery	in	the	Ciénega	of	Zacapu	
Before	1890,	the	Zacapu	Ciénega7	consisted	of	a	series	of	swamps	and	lagoons8	which	housed	
some	endemic	species.		The	swampy	areas	of	the	marsh	were	the	habitat	of	a	wide	variety	of	
																																																						
7	When	referring	to	the	hydrologic	basin.	
8	Some	that	are	still	prevalent	are	Laguna	de	Zacapu,	Bellas	Fuentes,	Alberca	de	los	Espinos,	Laguna	de	Tarejero,	
Los	Cortijos,	Laguna	de	Ojo	de	Agüita,	Las	Pompas	del	Durazno.	
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fauna,	such	as	the	white	native	basin	fish,	freshwater	turtles,	freshwater	prawns,	clams,	and	
snakes.	 In	 the	area	of	tulares,	migratory	species	such	as	 the	Canadian	duck	and	the	White	
Heron	were	found,	and	they	used	the	area	as	spawning	sites.	This	ecosystem	interacted	with	
species	living	on	the	hillsides	nearby,	such	as	deer,	armadillos,	badgers,	coyotes,	and	wildcats.		
	As	a	result	of	thousands	of	years	of	sedimentation	(Williams	1996)	natural	resources	
rich	 in	 humidity	 and	 organic	 matter	 in	 the	 lacustrine	 areas	 provided	 river	 towns	 such	 as	
Naranja,	Tiríndaro,	Zacapu	and	Tarejero	Island	with	ideal	conditions	for	hunting,	fishing	and	
agriculture.	The	production	of	mats,	chairs	and	other	derivatives	of	the	tule	plant	represented	
the	livelihoods	of	its	inhabitants.		Wild	or	cultivated	herbs	associated	with	the	Ciénega	formed	
part	of	the	diet	of	the	locals,	which	was	based	on	corn.	The	ways	of	living	of	the	Michoacán	
Indigenous	people	in	this	region	was	similar	to	its	neighbours	of	Pátzcuaro	and	Cuitzeo.	
The	biodiversity	 and	 livelihoods	were	 affected	by	 the	 changes	 in	 the	possession	of	
natural	resources.	The	first	non-Indigenous	usufruct	in	the	area	took	place	in	1541,	when	the	
nephew	of	Hernan	Cortés	received	a	Royal	Grant;	later,	King	Carlos	III	created	a	decree	to	use	
Indigenous	 properties	 that	 were	 in	 "dead	 hands”.	 The	 decree	 intended	 to	 stimulate	 the	
economy	as	well	 as	 to	provide	 food	 for	peoples’	 survival	 and	maintenance	 (Castro-Lemus,	
2010:38).	 Legal	 alternatives	 were	 sought	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 conflicts	 arising	 from	 the	
appropriation	of	natural	resources;	however,	these	mechanisms	benefited	landowners	only,	
and	native	communities	received	derisory	sums	in	return	for	their	properties.	
During	the	period	of	Porfirio	Díaz	(1876-1910),	the	Reform	Laws	enforced	by	Juárez	led	
to	 changes	 in	 land	 ownership,	 which	 privileged	 colonizing	 companies.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
communities	were	deprived	of	their	 lands	at	the	mercy	of	new	interpretations	of	the	laws.		
Additionally,	 foreigners	(Spanish),	and	mestizos	were	given	financial	and	 legal	assistance	 in	
order	 for	 them	 to	 obtain	 large	 farms.	 Special	 attention	 was	 given	 to	 companies	 such	 as	
Noriega	y	Compañía,	so	that	they	would	carry	out	improvements	like	drainage	(Reyes-García,	
1982).		A	third	of	these	lands	was	handed	over	without	further	formalities	to	the	companies,	
while	the	rest	of	the	land	could	be	acquired	at	low	prices.		
In	this	context,	the	first	federal	concession	was	awarded	in	1886	to	Manuel	Vallejo.	He	
encountered	opposition	from	the	landowners	surrounding	the	Ciénega,	in	particular	from	the	
purépecha	Indigenous	community	of	Tarejero,	which	held	possession	of	much	of	the	land.	In	
1896,	the	concession	was	transferred	to	a	Spanish	family	named	Noriega,	who	had	a	friendly	
relationship	with	President	Díaz.	Negotiations	with	the	nine	haciendas	affected	by	the	work	
specified	 that	 they	would	 yield	 ten	 percent	 of	 that	 property	 to	 the	Noriegas.	Meanwhile,	
bordering	issues	with	Tarejero	were	solved,	and	it	allowed	that	its	territory	became	part	of	
the	process	for	draining	the	Ciénega.	For	this	purpose	the	Noriegas,	with	significant	capital,	
established	techniques	of	draining	and	using	channels	which	fed	the	Angulo	and	the	Patera	
rivers.	These	channels	were	a	natural	path	to	the	lowest	part	of	the	Ciénega	(known	as	vado	
de	Aguilar),	to	the	current	settlement	of	Villa	Jiménez.	
After	 the	drainage,	 12,000	hectares	were	 allocated	 to	 the	haciendas,	 and	only	 400	
hectares	 were	 assigned	 to	 affected	 communities	 (Reyes-García,	 1982).	 	 Later,	 the	 main	
shareholder,	Alfredo	Noriega,	directly	bought	parts	of	the	haciendas’	territory	with	a	low-cost	
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financing-cum-credit	structure.		He	took	advantage	of	the	ambiguity	in	the	terms	of	legalized	
expropriation	 matter	 enacted	 by	 the	 Colonization	 and	Wasteland	 Laws	 (1883	 and	 1894),	
especially	 the	 alienation	 of	 public	 lands,	 which	 allowed	 private	 companies	 to	 measure,	
subdivide	and	occupy	lands	that	were	allegedly	public,	ignoring	their	possession	by	Indigenous	
people	(Castro-Lemus,	2010:38).	
The	entrepreneurial	vision	of	transforming	wetlands	into	agricultural	land	undertaken	
by	the	Spaniards	and	rulers	in	Mexico	contrasted	with	the	land	use	practices	established	by	
the	 purépecha	 communities.	 The	 processes	 of	 accumulation	 and	 over-exploitation	
transformed	lifestyles	and	established	power	relationships	between	the	settlers	and	colonists.		
The	laws	originating	in	Spain	with	the	intention	of	generating	wealth	were	reinterpreted	and	
applied	in	this	region.	
In	 1910,	 27%	 of	 the	 national	 territory	 was	 transferred	 to	 private	 companies	
represented	by	20,000	landowners	of	mestizo	or	foreign	blood,	concentrating	land	in	less	than	
five	percent	of	the	population	(Friedrich,	1981).	In	the	Ciénega,	the	24%	was	transferred.	The	
land	was	divided	between	nine	haciendas	that	together	possessed	more	than	34,000	hectares.	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 State’s	 refusal	 to	 restore	 the	 communities’	 possession	 of	 their	
territories,	the	struggle	to	restore	them	began.		Since	the	beginning	of	the	project	to	drain	the	
Ciénega,	 the	 agrarian	 leader	 Joaquín	 de	 la	 Cruz,	 originally	 from	 Naranja,	 had	 promoted,	
without	success,	the	restitution	of	land	to	the	purépecha	communities	affected,	since	he	was	
one	of	the	few	people	who	understood	the	language	in	which	the	laws	had	been	written,	and	
the	 first	 person	 who	 obtained	 a	 professional	 degree	 and	 became	 a	 judge	 (Castellanos-
Guerrero	and	López	y	Rivas	1991).	
Meanwhile,	the	wealth	of	the	land	in	the	Ciénega	favoured	the	cultivation	of	maize	by	
the	haciendas,	turning	the	land	into	the	Mexican	food	basket9.	Siltation	(López	et	al.	2008)	
was	also	implemented	in	areas	of	the	Ciénega	by	storing	and	using	the	water	that	accumulated	
every	year	because	of	stormwater	runoff	ending	up	 in	 the	basin	system.10	 	Simultaneously,	
road	 infrastructure	was	 increased,	as	well	as	 immigration	 from	neighbouring	 states.	These	
processes	had	a	high	cost,	as	they	affected	both	biodiversity	and	the	forms	of	cohabitation	
that	had	prevailed	in	the	municipalities	of	Coeneo,	Zacapu	and	Huaniqueo.	
The	land	in	the	Ciénega	was	cultivated	in	two	ways:	a	part	that	was	in	the	periphery	
was	 rented	 to	 the	 indigenous	peoples;	 these,	 in	 return,	had	 to	provide	 two-thirds	of	 their	
product	as	usufruct	payment	to	the	haciendas.		In	a	short	period,	this	way	of	production	was	
replaced	by	a	second,	which	included	mestizo	labourers	brought	in	from	outside,	who	were	
more	loyal	to	the	landlord	and	stayed	at	the	haciendas.		The	acasillados	(bonded	labour),	as	
they	 were	 called,	 "despised	 anyone	 who	 spoke	 Tarascan"	 and	 mestizo	 foremen	 treated	
indigenous	workers	cruelly	and	dismissively	(Friedrich,	1981:65).	
																																																						
9		Currently,	corn	is	still	the	main	crop,	followed	by	lentils,	beans	and	various	forages.	
10	This	technique	allowed	one	to	store	rainwater	that	runs	off	a	part	of	the	marsh	in	the	rainy	season	(May	to	
September);	 in	October,	 it	 is	 released	 in	 coordination	between	various	 communities	 in	 the	municipality	of	
Coeneo,	Jiménez	and	Huaniqueo.		Retained	moisture	is	used	in	early	December.		This	area	is	the	main	producer	
of	lentil	nationwide;	before	1970,	wheat	was	grown.	
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The	first	two	decades	of	the	20th	century	were	full	of	political	and	revolutionary	riots.		
This	situation	did	not	alter	the	agrarian	structure	in	the	Ciénega	and	landowners.		After	they	
learned	how	to	cope	with	these	vicissitudes,	they	consolidated	their	power.		By	then,	Joaquín	
de	 la	 Cruz	 had	 formed	 local	 groups	 of	 agraristas11,	 together	 with	 leaders	 such	 as	 Severo	
Espinoza	of	Tiríndaro	and	Juan	Cruz	of	Tarejero.		In	1920,	Joaquín	de	la	Cruz	was	murdered	by	
his	own	escort	of	soldiers,	who	were	bribed	by	landowners.	
The	struggle	for	land	was	continued	by	Primo	Tapia,	born	in	Naranja	on	June	9,	1885,	
who	received	the	teachings	of	his	uncle	Joaquín	de	la	Cruz.	Primo	Tapia	settled	in	the	United	
States	 (1907-1920)	 and	 from	 there	 he	 participated	 in	 social	 organizations	 linked	 to	 the	
movement	 of	 the	 brothers	 Flores	Magón	 (Castellanos-Guerrero	 and	 López	 y	 Rivas,	 1991).		
Upon	return,	Primo	Tapia	founded	the	League	of	Agrarian	Communities	in	1922	by	political	
and	organizational	means.	 It	wielded	the	rights	of	possession	and	use	of	natural	 resources	
prior	to	the	Ciénega	draining.	Applications	for	land	now	included	groups	of	mestizos	occupying	
concessions	from	the	surrounding	haciendas.		The	fertile	land	of	the	freshly	drained	Ciénega	
was	the	treasure,	and	the	political	struggle	to	get	it	was	constantly	suppressed	by	the	army	at	
the	service	of	the	landowners.	
As	a	result	of	the	organization	in	the	region,	Villa	Jiménez	received	his	provision	of	land	
in	1920	as	an	ejido.12	In	contrast	to	communities	that	had	been	stripped	of	their	right	to	the	
land	and	who	had	maintained	a	constant	 struggle	 to	 recover	 it,	Villa	 Jiménez	entered	 into	
conciliatory	 negotiations	 with	 the	 State.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 negotiated	 with	 the	
landowners	to	affect	the	surrounding	haciendas	and	use	this	route	as	a	safety	valve	for	the	
social	 pressure	 exerted	 by	 the	 agraristas,	 headed	 by	 Primo	 Tapia,	 who	 promulgated	 the	
elimination	of	ethnic	differences	 in	the	pursuit	of	the	land.	The	confrontation	of	the	Primo	
Tapia	group	with	the	landowners	and	the	intervention	of	President	Calles	caused	the	murder	
in	1926	of	the	social	leader	by	the	army	in	the	El	Chirimoyo	area	of	Laredo,	a	municipality	of	
Coeneo.		
In	the	next	decade,	various	political	changes	occurred	in	Michoacán,	and,	as	in	other	
parts	 of	 the	 country,	 ejido	 were	 established	 in	 the	 Ciénega	 through	 encouragement	 by	
president	Lázaro	Cárdenas	del	Río	(1934-1940).	The	State	contributed	to	the	formation	of	the	
ejido,13	although	it	presented	its	alternating	or	combined	facets	of	a	repressive,	altruistic	and	
beneficiary	body.	This	process	established	close	links	between	the	State	and	the	ejidos	in	the	
Ciénega.	 Traditional	 forms	of	 production	 in	 the	Ciénega	 continued	until	 the	middle	of	 the	
																																																						
11	In	the	Ciénega,	it	was	the	agraristas	who	fought	for	the	distribution	of	the	land	held	by	the	haciendas.	
12	The	State	allocated	a	portion	of	land	to	each	ejidatario,	which	was	indivisible	and	non-transferable.	Sometimes	
common	use	land	was	allocated,	providing	a	proportional	percentage	to	each	ejidatario	without	measures	or	
adjacencies.	
13	When	 the	 titles	 are	 assigned	 to	 the	ejidatarios,	 they	 receive	 the	usufruct	 rights	 to	of	 the	 land,	which,	 by	
Mexican	law,	does	not	mean	that	they	are	the	owners	of	private	property,	but	that	they	are	able	to	rent	and/or	
sell	it	in	agreement	with	the	assembly	of	ejidatarios.		Exceptions	to	this	include	resources	managed	together	
such	as	water,	access	roads,	and	inhabited	areas.	
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1980's	when	mechanization	 came	 into	 the	 area;	 the	 first	 tractors	 replaced	 the	 tronco14,	 a	
technique	that,	in	turn,	had	replaced	the	oxen	yoke.	As	before,	corn	is	still	produced	today,	
only	 now	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 machinery.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 absence	 of	 crop	 rotation	 had	
impoverished	the	land,	and	the	swampy	terrain	required	continuous	maintenance	channels	
that	allow	for	sufficient	water	drainage.	In	essence,	in	the	Ciénega,	techniques	involving	the	
management	 and	 conservation	 of	 the	water	 using	 siltation	 prevail	 (Palerm	 and	Martínez,	
2000),	 and	 is	 now	 run	 by	 the	 new	owners,	 the	ejidatarios.	 But	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 benefits	
obtained,	 the	 use	 of	 machinery	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 channels	 is	 expensive.	
Consequently,	many	channels	have	disappeared,	causing	the	water	to	stagnate	and	affect	the	
crops.	
Transforming	 the	 Ciénega	 was	 a	 modernizing	 action	 that	 generated	 a	 process	
accelerated	by	the	exploitation	of	the	natural	resources	of	the	region,	which	 in	turn	 led	to	
other	 phenomena	 such	 as	 human	 settlements,	 the	 cacique	 struggle	 for	 power,	 conflicts	
between	 communities	 and	 private	 owners,	 ethnic	 conflicts,	 political	 reforms	 of	 land	
ownership,	legislative	and	regulatory	changes,	infrastructure	development,	and	technological	
changes.		Together,	these	conditions	laid	the	foundations	for	modernizing	the	architecture	of	
the	region	(Mummert	1994).	
Planned	intervention	for	draining	the	Zacapu	Ciénega	was	negotiated	with	the	State,	
and	was	 justified	 by	 taking	 a	 historical	 perspective	 of	 economic	 development.	 Today,	 this	
vision	 prevails,	 and	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 reform	 of	 Article	 27	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 which	
intends	 to	 decompose	 the	 ejido	 and	 its	 organizing	 forms	 and	 is	 deemed	 by	 many	 to	 be	
consistent	with	a	logic	that	favours	the	accumulation	of	wealth.	
The	modernization	 project	 reflects	 the	 image	 of	 benefits	 supported	 by	 the	 use	 of	
technology	and	economic	growth,	reaffirming	the	supremacy	of	the	material	and	individual	
values	on	the	collective.	This	neoliberal	policy	requires	that	the	State	extend	its	functions	as	a	
body	 of	 parliament,	 establishing	 agreements	 between	 stakeholders,	 even	 though	 they	
represent	 private	 or	 public	 institutional	 actors	 'enhanced'	 by	 their	 authority	 and	
representation.	These	structures	retain	the	directive	to	formulate	and	implement	mandated	
policy,	and	hold	interference	capabilities	through	an	elaborate	monitoring	infrastructure.	
	
	
Participatory	development	in	Michoacán	
During	the	government	of	Cárdenas	del	Río	(Benítez,	1984),	the	Law	on	General	Planning	of	
the	Republic	from	1930	was	implemented.		After	several	years	of	interruption,	and	in	order	to	
establish	 the	norms	and	 the	basic	principles	 for	 the	planning	of	development,	 the	Federal	
Planning	Law,	which	sought	to	incorporate	democratic	elements	in	the	public	administration,	
was	passed	by	the	Congress	of	the	Union	on	December	29,	1982.		
																																																						
14	Consisting	of	an	iron	plough	pulled	by	two	horses	or	mules.		Being	lighter,	horses	replaced	the	oxen	fit	for	the	
hillside	zone,	and	now	in	the	marsh,	the	fertile	land	could	be	cultivated	with	more	ease.		However,	the	team	
was	used	at	first	to	open	agricultural	land	for	the	first	time.	
	 17	
In	1983,	based	on	Articles	26	and	115	of	the	Constitution,	as	well	as	on	Article	2	of	the	
Planning	Law,	the	jurisdiction	of	the	States	through	the	State	Planning	Law	was	established.		
At	the	municipal	level,	the	basic	laws	of	planning	gave	powers	to	State	and	municipal	public	
administration,	seeking	thereby	to	plan	and	manage	activities	that	allowed	the	attainment	of	
development	 together	with	 federal	development	plans.	 	Currently,	 the	National	 System	of	
Planning	(SNP)	coordinates	these	actions	through	the	National	Development	Plan	(PND).	This	
means	promoting	 the	 transfer	of	 responsibilities	 from	 federal	and	State	 levels	 to	 the	 local	
level,	 coordinating	 programs,	 policies	 and	 criteria	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 the	
respective	levels.						
For	 its	 part,	 the	 Development	 Plan	 2002-2008	 of	 the	 State	 of	 Michoacán	 (PDEM)	
retained	the	importance	of	the	integral	process	of	democratic	and	participatory	planning	and	
intended	 to	 implement	 its	 planning	 system	 accordingly.	 One	 of	 the	 cornerstones	 of	 the	
PDEM15	was	the	promotion	of	citizen	participation	in	transversal	axes	of	government	policy	
and	 development,	 to	 promote	 self-diagnosis	 and	 alternative	 planning	 activities,	 trying	 to	
articulate	them	with	State	government	agencies.	
Planning	 in	Michoacán	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 State	 System	 of	 Democratic	 Planning	
(SEPD),	 through	 the	 Planning	 Committee	 of	 the	 State	 of	 Michoacán	 (COPLADEM),16	
represented	by	the	Secretariat	of	Planning	and	Development	State	(SEPLADE).17	The	SEPLADE	
was	the	agency	in	charge	of	organizing	and	shaping	the	integral	development,	starting	from	
the	design	and	direction	of	the	plans	prepared	by	the	COPLADEM.	
At	 the	 regional	 level,	 SEPLADE	 was	 coordinated	 with	 SUPLADER	 to	 promote	
development	 programs	 that	 incorporated	 citizens’	 proposals	 following	 a	 bottom-up	
development	 approach.	 As	 for	 the	 municipalities,	 Committees	 of	 Municipal	 Planning	
(COPLADEMUN)	 and	 the	 Municipal	 Council	 for	 Sustainable	 Rural	 Development	 (CMDRS)	
established	new	guidelines	 for	 the	municipal	development	plans.	Within	 the	communities,	
however,	the	organization	of	internal	forums	were	articulated	with	government	institutions	
in	 the	 follow-up	 of	 the	 programs	 of	 community	 development,	 such	 as	 Community	
Development	 Committees	 (CODECO).18	 Fig.	 1.1	 shows	 the	 interrelationships	 between	
institutions	and	strategies,	starting	from	the	community	up	to	the	federation.	
In	 the	 study	area,	CODECO	membership	and	 their	promoters	were	proposed	by	 the	
municipalities,	and	the	works	were	determined	by	the	planning	of	CMDRS	under	an	outline	of	
privileges	 for	 political	 purposes,	which	 in	 turn	were	 sponsored	by	 the	 city	 council.	 Even	 if	
organized	 groups	 of	 the	 ejido,	 in	 practice,	 represented	 CODECO,	 their	 interventions	
contravened	the	ways	the	community	was	organized.	
																																																						
15	See	Ley	de	Planeación	del	Estado	de	Michoacán	de	Ocampo,	2003.	
16	Constituted	in	1981	D.O.F,	February	5,	1981.	
17	Official	Gazette	of	the	Federation.	April	17th,	1989.	
18	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development	 (SEDESO)	 coordinated	 the	 CODECO	 in	 Michoacán.	 Locally	 the	 ejido	
assembly	or	community	were	the	highest	authority,	 the	representatives	of	CODECO	should	be	coordinated	
with	the	municipal	authority	linked	to	SEDESO	to	perform	their	work	or	action	(Rojas-Fajardo,	2008).	
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The	state	government,	represented	by	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel19,	trying	to	get	away	from	the	
vertical	programming	of	actions,	activities,	projects	and	public	works	in	Michoacán,	put	into	
practice	for	the	first	time	in	the	history	of	the	institution,	the	regionalization	of	the	budget	
(Gobierno	 del	 Estado	 de	 Michoacán,	 2003).	 It	 was	 based	 on	 the	 1981	 regional	 division,	
consisting	of	ten	regions.	From	2002	onwards,	they	thought	that	these	regions	should	be	a	
space	of	socio-governmental	participation,	relying	on	regional	 forums	for	participation	and	
citizen	consultation,	in	order	to	reach	SUPLADER’s	agreements	in	a	coordinated	way	(Fig.	1.1).		
Identified	as	a	participatory	budget	model,	it	intended	to	involve	the	government	and	
citizens	 in	 the	 planning	 of	 the	main	works	 and	 programs	 in	 the	 region,	 generating	 a	 self-
sustaining	model	 that	would	decrease	social	 inequality.20	Therefore,	 the	 institutions	of	 the	
State	 and	 federal	 governments	 such	 as	 SEDAGRO21,	 SEPLADE,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	
Livestock,	 Rural	 Development,	 Fishing	 and	 Food	 (SAGARPA),	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Social	
Development	(SEDESOL),	the	Fideicomisos	Instituidos	en	Relación	con	la	Agricultura	(FIRA)22,	
FIRCO23,	the	National	Water	Commission	(CONAGUA),	the	Rural	Development	Districts	(DDR),	
and	CADER24	were	 involved.	The	concerted	actions	would	be	part	of	the	Annual	Operation	
Plan	(POA),	and	would	integrate	the	Budget	of	Expenses	of	the	state	of	Michoacán.25	
																																																						
19	2002-2008	period.	
20	National	Development	Plan	2002-2006	of	the	State	of	Michoacán.	
21	Ministry	of	Agricultural	Development.	
22	Agriculture	Trust	Funds.	
23	Shared	Risk	Trust	Fund.	
24	Center	for	Rural	Development	Support.	
25	Mimorelia.com,	September	22,	2004.	
Figure	1.1	Levels	of	responsible	institutions	of	planning	in	México	
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Resources	 for	 SUPLADER	 came	 from	 a	 loan	 of	 USD	 120	 million	 requested	 by	 the	
government	 of	 Lázaro	 Cárdenas	 Batel	 to	 the	 Inter-American	Development	 Bank	 (BID)	 and	
approved	by	the	State	Congress.	The	loan	would	be	destined	for	six	years	and	allocated	to	the	
ten	regions	through	the	respective	SUPLADER.		
Amendments	to	the	Law	on	Public	Debt	of	the	state	of	Michoacán26	enabled	the	state	
government	to	get	into	debt	and	pay	the	lenders	through	the	public	funds.	In	this	way,	the	
government	 of	 Cárdenas	 Batel	 tried	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 the	 regions	 through	
SUPLADER,	supervised	by	SEPLADE	–	the	agency	responsible	for	planning	–	and	in	coordination	
with	the	executing	institutions	of	the	three	levels	of	government.	
SUPLADER	-02	in	Zacapu	Ciénega	represented	a	regional	development	program,	which	
intended	to	articulate	intermediate	institutions	created	by	the	Mexican	State,	and	focused	on	
participatory	planning.	Thus,	government	institutions	and	citizens	were	expected	to	interact.	
At	the	municipal	 level,	SUPLADER	should	be	coordinating	with	COPLADEMUN,	CMDRS,	and	
CODECO	planning.	At	 the	regional	 level,	 it	 should	be	coordinating	with	 institutions	such	as	
DDR,	 CONAGUA,	 Secretariat	 of	 Communications	 and	 Public	 Works	 (SCOP),	 SEDESOL,	 and	
others.	
Each	 agency	 of	 the	 federal	 and	 state	 government	 had	 separately	 established	 its	
strategy	and	development	planning	of	the	Zacapu	region.	The	mandate	of	SUPLADER	was	to	
establish	 the	 necessary	 links	 to	 coordinate	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 planned	 development.	 This	
initiative	intended	to	enhance	the	scope	of	regional	projects,	allowing	the	co-investment	of	
different	financial	sources.	For	this	purpose,	the	guidelines	of	SUPLADER	demanded	that	in	
order	 to	 obtain	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 Regional	 Development	 Fund	 (FDR)	 the	 beneficiaries	
should	cover	a	percentage,	which	had	to	be	higher	than	the	35%	investment	of	the	other	levels	
of	the	government	invested.		
From	my	perspective,	 SUPLADER	 introduced	 the	 “leftist”	 approach	of	 the	new	PRD	
government	 in	Michoacán,	 represented	 by	 the	 grandson	 of	 Cárdenas	 del	 Río	 (a	 symbolic	
character	 of	 the	 state	 and	 country	 in	 general)	 and	 other	 planners	 associated	 with	 this	
government.	The	State	pretended	to	build	an	agenda	through	its	institutions	and	guidelines,	
so	that	the	regional	stakeholders	would	participate	in	it.	Although	in	theory	the	agenda	should	
be	created	jointly,	in	practice	the	people	who	administered	the	resources	proposed	their	own	
agenda.	 The	 dynamic	 generated	 from	 these	 conditions	 means	 that	 sometimes	 the	
organization	 for	 the	 development	 incorporates	 the	 planning	 strategies	 with	 “social	
participation”.	However,	this	can	contribute	to	generate	conditions	not	provided	by	the	policy	
of	the	State,	in	which	the	State	intervenes	to	set	planning	priorities.	
Associated	with	SUPLADER	 in	Michoacán,	 regionalization	was	due	 to	a	process	 that	
identified	 geographical	 areas	 as	 regions	 considered	 useful	 to	 define	 policies	 for	 regional	
development,	which	was	conceived	as	"a	sustained	and	 localized	process	of	social	change,	
which	intended	to	achieve	a	permanent	progress	in	the	region,	in	the	community	as	a	whole	
and	as	an	individual"	(Boisier,	1991:187).	This	approach	should	be	associated	with	a	territory	
																																																						
26	Reforms	published	in	the	Official	Gazette	on	August	18,	2003.	
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identified	as	a	region27	which	would	serve	as	a	spatial	reference.	According	to	Boisier	(1991),	
the	region	should	represent	an	element	of	identity,	which	contributes	to	balance	the	socio-
spatial	equation.	Additionally,	endogenous	development	should	emerge	as	a	property	of	the	
complex	system	of	social	interactions	and	material	resources.	
From	the	perspective	of	the	State,	planning	should	only	be	set	up	via	their	institutions,	
which	 cover	 different	 areas.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 SUPLADER	 in	 state	 planning	
granted	a	 re-signification	 for	 regional	development,	without	pretending	 that	 the	emerging	
new	 stakeholder	 -	 SUPLADER	 –	 would	 modify	 the	 existing	 political,	 organizational	 and	
administrative	forms	of	the	State	in	the	region28.	
 
 
Mapping	the	institutional	arena	
The	planners	of	SEPLADE	claimed	that	the	existing	shortcomings	to	boost	production	in	the	
Ciénega	was	due	to	a	disarticulation	in	the	use	of	resources.	Faced	with	this	situation,	SEPLADE	
proposed	the	alternative	of	discussing	actions	to	gain	strategic	influence	in	the	region.		
Planners	tried	to	concentrate	the	resources	from	the	dependencies	in	different	levels	
of	 government	 through	 a	 unique	 planning	 coordinated	 by	 SEPLADE	 and	 articulated	 with	
SUPLADER	in	the	regions.		
To	coordinate	a	policy	for	regional	development,	SUPLADER	negotiated	with	regional	
stakeholders,	which	represented	the	governmental	offices	at	the	municipal,	state	and	federal	
level,	 together	with	 civil	 society	 organizations.	 The	 statutes	 of	 SUPLADER	 established	 that	
decisions	would	be	made	collectively	among	the	members	of	the	SUPLADER.	
SUPLADER	integrated	social	and	private	organizations,	and	the	representation	of	the	
three	 levels	 of	 government,	 and	 intended	 to	 incorporate	 citizen	 participation	 into	 the	
processes	 of	 planning	 by	 using	 democratic	 procedures	 of	 discussion	 leading	 to	 consensus	
(Gobierno	del	Estado	de	Michoacán,	2003).	Thus,	SUPLADER	(SUPLADER	2002)	established	its	
policy	in	the	manual	of	procedures	for	work	and	regional	actions	in	the	internal	statutes,	the	
terms	of	reference	of	projects,	the	axes	of	regional	development,	in	the	format	of	the	project	
evaluation,	in	the	policies	for	investment,	and	in	the	proceedings	of	the	assembly.	
Within	SUPLADER,	the	assembly	formed	by	the	members	of	the	subcommittee	was	the	
highest	authority	and	had	the	right	to	speak	and	vote.	The	president-elect	of	the	assembly	
should	be	a	representative	of	civil	society.	The	secretary	was	the	regional	delegate	of	SEPLADE.	
In	addition,	50	%	of	the	votes	came	from	municipalities	of	the	region,	state	agencies,	and	the	
federation.	The	other	50%	was	made	up	by	the	sectors	of	civil	society,	represented	according	
to	a	certain	proportion	in	the	rules	of	procedure.	In	the	event	of	a	tie,	the	President	would	
cast	a	vote.	
																																																						
27	A	 region	means	a	geographic	area	defined	by	 its	degree	of	homogeneity	or	heterogeneity	 in	addressing	a	
particular	issue.	Regions	are	not	generic,	closed	areas.	Rather,	they	help	to	understand	the	complexity	of	the	
territory	for	the	purpose	of	intervention.	
28	At	municipal	 level,	 stakeholders	 are	 organized	 in	 the	CMDRS;	 it	 is	 common	 that	 the	 council	 is	 a	 space	of	
confluence	between	communities	through	their	representations	for	resolution	of	issues	of	common	interest.	
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It	 was	 decided	 that	 the	 subcommittee	 (SUPLADER)	 should	 define	 strategies	 to	
implement	specific	policies	that	serve	as	pillars	of	regional	development,	 involving,	for	this	
purpose,	municipal	presidents	and	officials	of	the	various	institutions	in	the	region	and	other	
organized	 stakeholders.	 This	 “participatory”	 structure	 pretended	 to	 enable	 citizen	
involvement,	 avoiding	 controversies	 in	 the	 regional	 planning	 proposed	 by	 government	
structures.			
SUPLADER	 and	 CMDRS	 considered	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 officials	 of	 the	 inter-
secretarial	 commission,	 which	 represented	 the	 institutions	 at	 state	 and	 federal	 levels.	
However,	 SUPLADER	 also	 incorporated	 stakeholders	 with	 a	 public	 and	 private	 regional	
presence	(see	Figure	1.2).		
	
	
Resources	 for	 SUPLADER	 coming	 from	 the	 Regional	 Development	 Fund	 (FDR)29	 were	
considered	as	“seed”	capital,	and	they	would	return	once	capitalized	by	the	project	in	order	
to	 generate	a	multiplier	 effect	on	 the	 regional	 investment.	 Program	 resources	 for	 studies,	
works	and	actions	contributed	60%	of	the	total	cost,	while	to	acquire	machinery	came	up	to	
50%.	The	minimum	contribution	from	beneficiaries	would	be	35%,	and	could	be	in	the	form	
of	money,	labour,	raw	material	and/or	other	inputs,	including	other	complementary	sources	
of	financing.	
Upon	 receipt	of	 the	 technical	application	of	a	proposed	 investment	with	a	 regional	
impact,	 SUPLADER	 presented	 it	 in	 the	 assembly,	 where	 it	 was	 evaluated,	 hierarchized,	
validated	 and,	 where	 appropriate,	 approved.	 Then,	 the	 technical	 secretary	 of	 SUPLADER	
delivered	 the	 file	 to	 the	 corresponding	 agency	 to	 obtain	 the	 technical	 opinion.	 From	 that	
moment	on,	SEPLADE	was	 in	charge	of	managing	the	approval	and	release	of	 the	 financial	
																																																						
29	Law	published	in	the	Official	Gazette	of	the	State	on	17	January	2003.	Decree	No.	259.	
Figure	1.2		Formation	of	one	SUPLADER	
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resources.	Once	the	structure	for	regional	development	was	established	in	SUPLADER,	the	call	
for	 submission	 of	 project	 proposals	 would	 start	 (Fig.	 1.3).	 At	 the	 time	 of	 receiving	 the	
proposals,	the	process	to	manage	resources	in	accordance	with	the	relevant	regulations	would	
begin.	 This	 linear	 sequence	 implied	 that	 a	 proposal	 could	 not	 advance	 to	 the	 next	 stage	
without	completing	the	previous	one.		
	
	
The	goals	of	 the	SUPLADER	 institutions	should	be	responsive	 to	 the	specific	needs	of	each	
region.	SEPLADE	coordinated	and	led	the	process	of	construction	of	the	SEPD,	and	constituted	
the	SUPLADER	institutes	in	the	ten	regions	of	the	state:	Morelia-Centro,	Zacapu,	Pátzcuaro-
Zirahuén,	Bajío,	Oriente,	Tierra	Caliente,	Costa,	Meseta	Purépecha,	Valle	de	Apatzingán	and	
Ciénega	de	Chapala.		
The	formation	of	the	ten	SUPLADER	took	place	in	a	similar	way	in	each	region,	with	
SEPLADE	 coordinating	 and	 establishing	 the	 criteria	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 formation.	 During	 its	
formation,	SUPLADER	outlined	its	operational	rules	and	officials	induced	and	established	the	
institutional	guidelines	for	stakeholder	participation.	
These	outlines	(Fig.	1.3)	represent	the	conditions	and	actions	for	accessing	SUPLADER	
resources	carried	out	by	a	representative	stakeholder	linked	with	SUPLADER	Zacapu.	The	ten	
SUPLADER	in	Michoacán	generated	different	maps,	depending	on	the	stakeholders	involved.	
They	simplified	the	representation	of	the	mobilization	of	stakeholders,	without	showing	the	
indirect	 associations	 and	 networks	 established	 among	 the	 groups.	 As	 will	 be	 seen	 later,	
Definition	 of	 the	 axes	 of	 regional	
development	
Call	 for	 the	 presentation	 of	
proposals	
Technical	 validation	 of	 proposals	 by	 the	
normative	department	
Revision	 and	 evaluation	 by	 the	
respective	commission	
	
Presentation	 of	 results	 of	 the	
plenary	revision	
	
Plenary	 prioritisation	 based	 on	 the	 axes	
and	available	resources	
 
Presentation	of	proposals	in	terms	
of	reference	
	
Presentation	 before	 assembly	 for	 the	
approval	of	proposals	
Management	 for	 the	approval	 and	 release	
of	resources	
Execution	of	works	and	actions	
 
Figure	1.3	Authorization	process	of	a	SUPLADER	project	
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SUPLADER	boosts	the	associations	and	the	participation	of	institutional	and	non-institutional	
spaces.		
SUPLADER	Zacapu,	the	focus	of	this	research,	was	formed	in	October	2002	and	covered	
the	 municipalities	 of	 Churintzio,	 Coeneo,	 Huaniqueo,	 Jiménez,	 Panindícuaro,	 Purépero,	
Tlazazalca	and	Zacapu	(Fig.	1.4).	This	SUPLADER	started	with	an	initial	budget	of	USD	2	million	
from	FDR;	a	similar	amount	was	scheduled	for	the	five	subsequent	years.	
By	being	an	innovative	proposal	in	the	region,	those	involved	with	SUPLADER,	including	
municipalities,	 were	 unaware	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 transfer	 and	 operation	 thereof.	 In	
practice,	 the	 representation	 of	 citizens	 in	 SUPLADER	 Zacapu	 was	 based	 on	 the	
recommendations	 of	 the	municipal	 president	 and	 of	 SEPLADE,	 under	 the	 name	 of	 "direct	
invitation".	Finally,	SUPLADER	membership	and	citizenship	were	configured	through	political	
negotiation.	
	
	
The	SUPLADER	of	Zacapu	region,	the	actor’s	scenario	
In	2003,	the	offices	rented	by	the	SEPLADE	of	the	Zacapu	region	were	located	near	the	bus	
station,	in	the	same	building	that	housed	the	Civil	Court	(2nd	floor),	as	well	as	the	offices	of	
the	Institutional	Revolutionary	Party	(PRI)	which	were	on	the	1st	floor.	An	anachronistic	sign	
Figure	1.4		The	municipalities	forming	SUPLADER	02	
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could	be	seen	on	the	facade	of	the	building:	COPLADE30,	as	well	as	the	coat	of	arms	of	the	state	
of	Michoacán.	The	location	and	appearance	of	the	state	agency	had	not	changed	under	the	
new	 state	 administration,	 and	 the	 meanings	 granted	 previously	 still	 prevailed.	 This	 was	
convenient:	whoever	would	like	to	visit	SEPLADE’s	office	would	surely	look	for	these	points	of	
reference.	
Gonzalo31	occupied	the	position	of	SEPLADE-Zacapu	delegate.	Gonzalo	had	been	the	
municipal	president	of	Zacapu	(1993-1995)	and	a	federal	congressional	representative	in	the	
seventh	district	representing	the	Party	of	the	Democratic	Revolution	(PRD)	in	the	LVII	federal	
legislature	(1997-2000).	Rafael	Lp	-	who	supported	Gonzalo	in	both	campaigns	-	worked	as	a	
technician	 of	 the	 SEPLADE-Zacapu.	 As	 a	 congressman,	 Gonzalo	 met	 the	 governor	 of	
Michoacán,	 anthropologist	 Lázaro	 Cárdenas	 Batel.32	 According	 to	 Gonzalo,	 development	
policies	in	line	with	the	social	organization	in	the	region	02	could	generate	a	social	dynamic.	
To	him,	social	deprivations	were	the	result	of	inequality,	and	the	problem	had	to	be	tackled	
from	the	root	(generating	jobs	in	the	marginalized	and	migrant-expelling	communities),	thus	
promoting	self-employment	through	productive	projects	with	social	enterprises.		
Gonzalo	 (López,	 2006)	was	 convinced	of	 the	 ideological	 and	political	 importance	of	
class	 struggle,	 one	 of	 the	Marxist	 ideas	 and	 materialistic	 theories	 about	 accumulation	 of	
capital,	 and	 struggle	of	opposites.	His	 affinity	with	Cuba	and	 the	 former	 Soviet	Union	had	
formed	his	 ideas.	He	said	he	was	a	defender	of	the	equal	distribution	of	resources,	and	he	
argued	that	the	means	of	production	derived	from	the	proceeds	of	the	FDR	could	strengthen	
social	relations	linked	to	the	production	and	marketing	stages.	
The	 other	 technician	 of	 SEPLADE	 in	 Zacapu	 was	 René	 Sosa,	 who	 had	 ties	 to	 state	
government.33	Cristi	 from	SPR	Biotecnológicos	supported	René	as	his	assistant;	 in	order	 to	
support	 René,	 Cristi	 interfered	 by	 managing	 some	 requests	 that	 were	 originally	 sent	 to	
SEPLADE	and	SUPLADER.	By	these	means,	René	performed	political	proselytizing	since	early	
2003.	 This	 raised	 the	 discontent	 of	 the	 municipal	 presidents	 of	 Coeneo,	 Purépero,	 and	
Tlazazalca	who	disapproved	the	'interference'	by	an	official	of	SEPLADE	in	their	municipalities.	
Rafael	 Lp	 -	 another	 technician	 of	 SEPLADE	 -	 had	 his	 contacts	 in	 state	 government;	
among	them	was	Julio	Moguel	Viveros,	a	former	professor	at	the	UNAM	in	Mexico	City	and	
now	 an	 officer	 of	 SEPLADE.	Moguel	 participated	 in	 the	 administration	 of	Mexico	 City	with	
																																																						
30	State	Committee	for	Planning	of	the	State	of	Michoacán.	
31	Gonzalo	is	kin	of	Primo	Tapia	de	la	Cruz.	See	Friedrich	(1981)	and	López	Castellanos	(1991).	
32	Lázaro	Cardenas	Batel	was	federal	deputy	for	the	XII	Electoral	District	of	Michoacán,	Apatzingán,	from	1997	
to	2000	and	coordinator	of	federal	deputies	of	the	PRD	in	Michoacán	LVI	Federal	Legislature.	In	2000,	he	was	
elected	 Senator	 of	 the	 Republic	 by	 the	 state	 of	 Michoacán	 (LVII	 legislature).	 He	 was	 member	 of	 the	
commissions	of	Indian,	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	Affairs	and	External	Relations.	He	chaired	the	Committee	
on	International	Non-Governmental	Organizations.	As	deputy	and	senator,	he	participated	in	the	work	of	the	
Latin	American	Parliament,	chairing	the	Committee	on	Political	Affairs.	In	2001,	he	won	the	governorship	of	
Michoacán	and	became	the	first	non-PRI	governor	of	that	state.	His	term	ended	in	2008.	
33	His	brother	Rogelio	Sosa	Pulido	served	as	undersecretary	of	higher	and	middle	Education	in	Michoacán,	and	
his	sister-in-law	Fabiola	Alanis	Samano	as	Director	of	Planning	in	the	SEDESO.	
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Cuauhtemoc	Cárdenas	(father	of	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel),	and	like	other	former	collaborators,	
he	obtained	a	position	in	the	government	of	Lázaro	Cardenas	Batel	in	Michoacán.	
Party	affiliation	also	defined	the	establishment	of	SUPLADER.	The	municipal	presidents	
of	Zacapu,	Churintzio,	Tlazazalca,	 Jiménez	and	Huaniqueo	 represented	PRD,	while	Coeneo,	
Purépero	and	Panindícuaro	were	attached	to	PRI.	To	set	up	SUPLADER	and	grant	memberships,	
each	representative	met	the	general	guidelines	of	participation,	one	of	which	specified	that	
an	 officer	 or	 municipal	 president	 (mayor)	 could	 not	 occupy	 the	 presidency	 of	 SUPLADER.	
Despite	this,	Dr.	Samuel	Campos,	president	of	Zacapu	was	elected	as	president	of	SUPLADER	
Zacapu.	
The	intention	was	that	the	stakeholders	of	civil	society	in	SUPLADER	proposed	regional	
projects,	following	the	regulations.	However,	they	did	not	respond	to	the	call	for	proposals.	It	
was	 then	 considered	 that	 councils	 could	 also	 promote	 'the	 merits'	 of	 SUPLADER.	 Taking	
advantage	 of	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 involved	 municipalities,	 Rafael	 Lp	 and	 René	 Sosa	
included	 beneficiaries	 in	 SUPLADER	 projects	 -	 even	 some	 close	 relatives	 –	 and,	 as	will	 be	
discussed	below,	these	actions	pre-configured	the	involved	networks.		
Federal	institutions	represented	in	SUPLADER	Zacapu	like	CONAGUA,	SAGARPA,	FIRCO,	
and	 FIRA	were	 in	 charge	 of	 their	 corresponding	 regional	 representation.	 The	 government	
institutions	of	Michoacán	involved	in	SUPLADER	were	SEPLADE,	the	Ministry	of	Agricultural	
Development	 (SEDAGRO)	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Communications	 and	 Public	 Works	 (SCOP).	
Although	they	were	implementing	institutions	for	SUPLADER	projects,	their	interventions	in	
the	assemblies	were	discrete;	in	contrast,	SEPLADE	was	the	instance	that	regularly	established	
the	agenda.	
Before	 a	project	 could	be	 considered	 viable	with	 SUPLADER,	 it	 should	 comply	with	
certain	conditions	established	in	the	rules	of	operation.	To	obtain	a	favourable	opinion	of	the	
review	 committee	 of	 SUPLADER,	 the	 project	 should	 incorporate	 information	 provided	 by	
specialists	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 project,	 which	 would	 justify	 the	 technical	 and	 economic	
feasibility.	SUPLADER	had	been	consolidated	as	a	complex	space	of	negotiations,	representing	
a	 filter	 to	 define	 who	 entered	 or	 not	 into	 the	 game	 of	 associations	 and	 permeated	 the	
development	 planning	 in	 the	 region.	 If	 a	 player	 wanted	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 participatory	
development,	 a	 project	 should	 be	proposed	 to	 other	 regional	 players,	 trying	 to	 enroll	 the	
largest	possible	number	of	stakeholders,	including	members	of	SUPLADER.	Negotiations	did	
not	always	occur	in	a	preconceived	arena;	instead,	they	often	took	place	'behind	the	scene'.	
Strategies	negotiated	previously	favoured	some	stakeholders	over	others,	including	members	
of	SUPLADER,	officials,	and	stakeholders	involved	in	SEPLADE.	
Gonzalo	 knew	 the	 difficulties	 and	 limitations	 of	 SUPLADER,	 its	 strategy	 for	 the	
development	 of	 the	 Ciénega	 focusing	 on	 the	 Alternative	 Agricultural	Model	 (MAA),	 and	 a	
series	of	integrated	projects	proposed	to	SUPLADER	and	its	review	committee.	
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The	Modelo	Alternativo	Agropecuario:	Outlining	the	Ciénega’s	development	
SUPLADER’s	 proposal	 for	 the	 Zacapu	 region	 was	 considered	 a	 social,	 productive	 and	
technological	 transformation,	 involving	 the	 launch	 of	 some	 projects	 that	 formed	 the	
Alternative	Agricultural	Model	(MAA).	See	figure	1.5	below.			
The	model	 proposed	 by	 a	 group	 of	 officials	 from	 SEPLADE	 Zacapu	was	 headed	 by	
delegate	Gonzalo.	The	'top-down'	approach	proposed	by	SEPLADE	Zacapu,	representing	the	
perception	 held	 by	 regional	 development	 officials,	 was	 articulated	 in	 coordination	 with	
government	institutions	and	local	stakeholders	from	SUPLADER.	To	implement	MAA	projects,	
the	 collective	 and	 social	 organizing	 of	 the	 participants	 was	 required.	 The	 mobilization	 of	
resources	 intended	 a	 social	 change	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 aim	 was	 that	 regional	 planning	 of	
SUPLADER	would	 boost	 the	 Alternative	 Agricultural	Model	 (MAA),	 with	 the	 support	 from	
specialists	of	some	universities	-	such	as	Chapingo	-	and	others	of	Cuban	origin.34	
	
Figure	1.5		Components	of	the	Alternative	Agricultural	Model	(MAA)	
	
	
	
	
Among	 the	 projects	 integrated	 in	 the	 MAA	 was	 the	 production	 of	 biological	 and	 organic	
fertilizer	-	with	the	collaboration	of	Cuban	experts	-	at	low	cost	and	with	high	efficiency	for	
local	crops,	mainly	maize.	Other	projects	were	the	production	of	vegetables	in	the	greenhouse	
and	hydroponics,	self-employment,	improved	breeding	of	goats	and	sheep,	the	creation	of	a	
																																																						
34	The	relationship	between	Cuba	and	the	Cárdenas	family	begins	with	Lázaro	Cardenas	del	Río,	who	supported	
the	socialist	regime	of	Fidel	Castro.	The	Cárdenas	family	forged	closer	ties	with	that	country,	with	the	marriage	
of	Cárdenas	Batel	with	the	Cuban	Mayra	Coffigny.	
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Centre	for	Agricultural	Research	(CIDAG),	and	promoting	micro	savings	oriented	to	reinvest	
resources	by	partners	at	low	interest	rates.	
Along	the	axis	of	the	planning,	the	project	constitutes	the	planning	unit	that	complies	
with	goals	and	objectives.	Some	SUPLADER	members	believed	that	the	MAA	projects	were	
out	of	context,	and	lacked	the	beneficiaries	to	drive	them.	Such	was	the	case	of	centres	for	
research	and	technological	development	which	had	no	scientific	support	 for	start-ups.	The	
project	about	goats	and	sheep	stood	out	as	a	simple	delivery	of	packages	of	animals,	not	as	a	
long-term	project	that	would	include	monitoring.		
The	 self-employment	 project,	 which	 initially	 had	 no	 beneficiaries,	 concerned	 the	
participation	in	training	courses	that	would	trigger	productive	activities	considered	successful.	
Later	we	will	see	that	instead	it	involved	the	political	training	of	actors	linked	to	the	network	
of	 SEPLADE.	 The	 organic	 and	 biological	 fertilizer	 plants	 were	 a	 source	 of	 resources,	 and	
provided	recognition	for	some	stakeholders,	while	the	benefits,	dissemination	and	follow-up	
arising	from	its	ongoing	implementation,	were	bounded	by	those	involved	in	its	management	
strategies.	
Despite	some	criticism	within	SUPLADER,	the	MAA	was	validated	in	the	consultative	
commission	and	obtained	the	approval	vote	by	negotiation	of	members	inside	of	SUPLADER.	
The	impact	of	MAA	projects	covered	eight	municipalities	initially	depending	on	the	ability	of	
the	 presidents	 to	 promote	 them	 in	 the	 communities.	 SEPLADE	meanwhile	 highlighted	 the	
benefits	of	the	model	in	the	ejidos	and	organizations	in	the	region,	promoting	the	organization	
and	collective	participation,	 indicating	 that	 to	be	considered	as	beneficiaries	of	MAA,	 they	
should	develop	a	project	with	regional	impact	and	submit	it	to	SUPLADER.	
From	a	 'top-down'	development	perspective	MAA	appeared	a	 coherent	 and	 logical	
plan,	 but	 it	 also	 reflected	 the	 particular	 vision	 of	 a	 group	 of	 actors	 who	 negotiated	 the	
implementation	of	the	projects	with	the	State,	justifying	them	with	goals,	scope	and	planned	
objectives.	The	approach	of	participation	and	cooperation	associated	with	organizations	can	
lead	to	a	misinterpretation	of	forms	of	control	based	on	rules,	including	collective	actions	that	
require	 discipline	 and	 control.	 A	 collective	 perceived	 in	 this	 way	 is	 the	 result	 of	 its	 own	
dynamism,	and	the	social	construction	comes	from	the	interaction	of	the	whole	process	of	
transformation,	which	includes	moving,	acting,	interacting	and	self-generating	(Clegg,	1990).	
	
Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 shows	 the	 institutional	 hierarchy	 associated	 with	 the	 planning	 of	 the	
greenhouses’	project.		The	State	institutions	for	regional	development	are	clearly	embedded	
in	the	regional	physical,	social,	and	political	history	of	 the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	region.	Their	
programs	and	projects	are	embedded,	as	Escobar	(1997)	points	out,	in	intervention	processes	
which	take	the	form	of	policy	development	and	use	direct	and	indirect	controls,	thus	limiting	
the	autonomy	of	those	involved.	
	After	much	social	and	political	strife	in	the	20th	century,	in	2002	a	significant	change	
that	 was	 expected	 to	 transform	 the	 political	 and	 social	 conditions	 took	 place	 in	 the	
government	of	Michoacán.	The	new	State	government,	represented	by	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel,	
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assumed	 a	 historic	 and	 ideological	 commitment	 associated	 with	 the	 achievements	 of	 his	
grandfather,	such	as	agricultural	modernisation,	social	justice,	the	promotion	of	the	economic	
and	social	organization	and	the	distribution	of	wealth.	A	response	to	these	demands	was	the	
adoption	of	a	participatory	rural	development	model	–	thus	creating	SUPLADER.	
However,	 in	 practice	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 participatory	 intervention	 model	
appeared	to	be	complicated,	as	 it	was	contradicted	by	traditional	forms	of	top-down	State	
that	 applied	 a	 rigid	 definition	 of	 implementation	 mechanisms.	 Thus,	 the	 participation	 of	
stakeholders	 from	 civil	 society	 was	 limited	 to	 the	 field	 of	 social	 practices	 such	 as	 the	
legitimation	 of	 the	 planning	 and	 policy	 of	 the	 government.	 SUPLADER,	 claiming	 to	 be	
participatory,	 established	 mechanisms	 to	 coordinate	 actions	 associated	 with	 a	 territorial	
space	without	first	considering	the	lifeworlds	of	local	actors	and	their	communities.	When	one	
intervenes	 in	 local	 arenas,	 negotiation	 with	 stakeholders	 is	 required	 through	 federal	
institutions,	municipalities,	communities,	and	the	networks	that	are	present	in	each	region.	In	
this	 sense,	a	planning	process	 that	pretends	 to	modify	 the	 lifeworlds	of	 the	 involved	 local	
actors	must	be	agreed	upon	from	the	beginning	and	thus	be	bottom-up,	rather	than	following	
the	top-down	State	model.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Zacapu	 region,	 the	 Alternative	 Agricultural	 Model	 (MAA)	 was	
identified	as	a	strategy	to	support	the	local	vision	of	development.	However,	the	design	and	
validation	 of	 this	 strategy	 did	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 local	 actors’	 perspectives,	 their	
networks	and	 their	willingness	 to	become	part	of	a	 foreign	development	strategy.	Despite	
some	criticism	within	SUPLADER,	the	MAA	model	was	approved.	Facing	a	predetermined,	top-
down	development	strategy,	the	room	for	manoeuver	of	local	actors	vis-à-vis	external	actors		
was	called	into	question	from	the	beginning.	In	the	following	chapters,	the	capacities	of	actors	
and	their	networks	to	mould	regional	development	from	below	–	and	outside	of	organizations	
like	SEPLADE	-	will	be	described.	
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CHAPTER		2	 THE	 GREENHOUSE	 DEVELOPMENT	 PROJECT:	 ACTOR	 ENROLMENT	 IN	
NETWORKS		
	
	
	
Introduction		
This	chapter	deals	with	the	greenhouse	development	project	as	a	case	study.	It	deals	with	the	
construction	of	the	SPRs	by	the	local	councils	upon	recommendation	of	SUPLADER	and	of	the	
Asociación	as	the	organization	and	consolidation	of	the	various	SPR’s	and	networks	linked	to	
the	 greenhouse	 project.	 The	 members	 of	 the	 SPRs	 and	 the	 Asociación	 are	 regarded	 as	
beneficiaries	of	the	SUPLADER	program.	I	describe	the	organizational	processes	by	which,	in	a	
first	phase,	ten	pilots	were	identified.	In	a	second	phase	project	funds	were	initially	proposed	
to	be	spread	among	28	SPRs	–	of	which	eight	were	later	excluded.	The	chapter	shows	how	
municipal	actors,	through	the	SPRs,	actors’	networks,	and	external	agents	all	strategize	and	
propose	ways	to	get	into	the	Asociación’s	game	–	which	I	have	called	“going	for	the	dough”.	
In	other	words,	I	describe	how	municipal	actors	tried	to	access	or	redirect	the	flow	of	project	
money	to	suit	their	own	interests,	often	through	membership	of	networks	that	existed	prior	
to	the	project.	SPR	representation	in	the	Asociación	is	a	point	of	concern	in	this	respect.			
	
	
The	project	profile		
Within	the	State	and	regional	regulations	of	the	Michoacán	government	(2002-2008),	group-
based	 participation	 was	 established	 as	 a	 basic	 premise	 for	 development.	 In	 2002,	 this	
perspective	was	incorporated	into	the	creation	of	SUPLADER	(SUPLADER,	2002).	The	regional	
unit	of	SEPLADE	02,	with	its	headquarters	in	Zacapu,	aimed	to	coordinate	the	planning	actions	
of	the	projects	submitted	to	SUPLADER	alongside	the	municipal	governments	involved.	In	this	
way,	SEPLADE	became	a	gateway	to	the	projects	of	the	regional	actors	who	were	associated	
with	the	development	context	promoted	by	SUPLADER.		
There	 appeared	 to	 be	 no	 records	 of	 hydroponic	 farming	 in	 the	Ciénega	 of	 Zacapu	
region,	 considering	 that	 agricultural	 development	 in	 the	 region	 had	 been	 corn	 and	 lentil	
production	(Rionda	1986;	Servín-Juarez,	1995).	Nevertheless,	 this	technique	was	chosen	to	
manage	the	greenhouse	project	with	tomatoes	and	it	made	up	one	of	the	guiding	principles	
of	the	Modelo	Alternativo	Agropecuario	(MAA)	that	was	launched	between	2003	and	2005.		
In	 order	 to	 encourage	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 SUPLADER	
recommended	that	the	local	councils	should	be	the	ones	to	boost	the	consolidation	of	the	first	
10	 Rural	 Production	 Societies	 (Sociedades	 de	 Producción	 Rural	 or	 SPR)	which	 allowed	 the	
direct	involvement	of	some	of	the	municipal	officials,	in	addition	to	those	close	to	SUPLADER	
(employees	and	those	recommended	by	the	municipalities)	and	to	SEPLADE	(external	agents	
that	acted	as	intermediaries).	This	last	point	contravened	one	of	the	requirements	needed	to	
form	a	 SPR,	which	 established	 that	 government	officers	were	not	 allowed	 to	 be	 involved.	
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Another	condition	was	that	candidates	for	the	membership	of	an	SPR	should	be	involved	in	
activities	related	to	agriculture	or	 livestock.	The	vast	majority	of	 the	actors	 involved	 in	the	
greenhouse	project	did	not	fulfil	such	requirements.	This	led	to	a	series	of	conflicts	of	interest	
among	the	beneficiaries	of	the	project	and	SUPLADER,	as	well	as	a	fight	for	the	resources	from	
the	Regional	Development	Fund	(FDR)	allocated	to	Zacapu’s	Ciénega.		
The	operational	rules	specified	the	characteristics	of	the	project	participants,	as	well	
as	the	guidelines	that	should	be	followed	in	order	to	be	considered	beneficiaries.	Firstly,	the	
various	individual	projects	were	linked	to	working	groups,	and	afterwards	to	a	SPR.	Together,	
these	shaped	the	second	 level	association	of	SPRs,	 the	Union	of	Rural	Production	Societies	
(Unión	de	Sociedades	de	Producción	Rural	or	USPR),	also	named	Unión	de	Invernaderos	Ruta	
de	la	Libertad35.	Hereafter	I	will	call	the	union	the	Asociación.	It	was	hoped	that	through	this	
formal	concept,	SUPLADER’s	resources	could	be	accessed,	as	well	as	the	other	resources	that	
were	specified	in	the	project’s	financial	outline.	Once	the	SPRs	and	the	Asociación	fulfilled	the	
requirements	 requested	 by	 SUPLADER	 to	 implement	 the	 project,	 the	members	 would	 be	
considered	as	SUPLADER’s	beneficiaries.		
The	 Asociación	was	 in	 charge	 of	 managing	 the	 resources	 among	 the	 government	
agencies	 to	 build	 a	 half-hectare	 facility	 of	 USD	 150,000.00	 per	 greenhouse.	 The	 SPRs	
recognized	by	SUPLADER	wanted	to	benefit	from	one	of	the	10	first	greenhouses.	For	these,	
SUPLADER	contributed	USD	100,000.00	for	each	facility,	which	would	be	used	to	establish	a	
greenhouse	in	each	one	of	the	eight	municipalities	of	Region	02	(Zacapu	and	Jiménez	would	
benefit	from	two	facilities).		
This	resource	distribution	within	SUPLADER	resulted	from	the	direct	influence	of	the	
officials	of	 the	Zacapu	SEPLADE,	and	 the	political	negotiation	 carried	out	by	 the	municipal	
presidents	 of	 the	 eight	 municipalities	 inside	 the	 subcommittee	 (SUPLADER).	 Therefore,	
SUPLADER	was	not	far	off	the	proposed	approaches	for	regional	development	in	other	regions	
of	Mexico	(Martínez	&	Servín,	1998).	Thus,	the	resources	would	be	allocated	following	several	
institutional	regulations,	especially	in	case	of	those	projects	that	took	into	account	a	mix	of	
resources,	such	as	the	greenhouse	project.		
 
 
The	rules	of	collective	participation:	The	creation	of	SPR	Laredo	
This	 section	 describes	 the	 processes	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 SPR	 Laredo,	 located	 in	 the	
municipality	 of	 Coeneo.	 It	 also	 describes	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 actors,	 their	 lifeworlds	 and	
collective	practices.	Certainly,	historicity	of	the	networks	encourages	interaction	and	sharing	
of	resources,	thus	generating	coordinated	actions	of	support	and	collaboration.	These	factors	
were	instrumental	in	the	case	of	Laredo’s	group’s	involvement	in	the	greenhouse	project,	and	
may	reflect	the	multiplicity	and	heterogeneity	of	the	network.	The	connection	with	Laredo’s	
																																																						
35	Greenhouse	Association	Freedom	Route.	
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group	members	was	made	through	Rafa36,	a	former	junior	high	school	classmate	of	mine	in	
Coeneo.	In	July	2003,	Rafa	introduced	me	to	Polo	-	who	wanted	to	consolidate	his	candidacy	
for	municipal	president	in	the	upcoming	PRD37	elections.	I	also	met	El	Campeón,	a	social	leader	
and	State	government	agent.	Rafa’s	father,	a	well-known	business	person	and	stock	breeder	
also	joined	the	group,	as	well	as	two	other	members	of	the	community	of	Laredo	who	worked	
in	the	agricultural	sector.38	The	first	four	members	had	experience	in	management,	and	they	
thought	that	the	setting	up	of	an	SPR	association	for	the	greenhouse	project	would	be	a	good	
way	to	manage	broader	projects	such	as	cattle	rearing,	milk	production	and	the	purchase	of	
animal	packages	offered	by	programs	like	SEDAGRO,	SAGARPA,	SEDESOL	and	SUPLADER.		
Starting	 from	 the	 year	 2000,	 the	 operation	 rules	 of	 federal	 programs	 in	 charge	 of	
institutions	 like	 SAGARPA,	 FIRCO,	 SEDESOL,	 among	 others,	 included	 new	 guidelines	 to	
regulate	the	participation	of	groups	in	government	programs.	Since	then,	groups	had	to	be	
legally	constituted	in	accordance	with	the	official	associative	figures,	such	as	the	SPRs,	as	well	
as	having	a	RFC	(taxpayer’s	registry)	and	abide	by	guidelines	and	internal	statutes	of	operation.	
Some	 apparent	 advantages	 for	 groups	 (such	 as	 SPRS)	were:	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 authorized	
amounts	of	investment,	training	and	continuity	of	the	project,	the	possibility	to	enter	into	joint	
ventures,	and	tax	deduction.	For	these	reasons,	the	Laredo	group	decided	to	register	as	formal	
association.	
The	 formation	 of	 SPR	 Laredo	 accomplished	 several	 objectives	 for	 its	 members;	
furthermore,	 it	was	expected	 that	 the	SPR	would	produce	 its	own	alternatives	 in	order	 to	
negotiate	resources	 from	the	government’s	 institutions.	The	activities	within	the	SPR	were	
related	 to	 the	 activities	 the	 members	 carried	 out	 in	 their	 day-to-day	 work;	 thus,	 the	
interaction	among	the	Laredo	group	members	was	related	to	members’	individual	projects.		
Within	the	wider	network,	each	partner	had	his	independent	activity;	yet,	all	members	
had	known	each	other	for	many	years.	The	network	thus	reinforced	members’	actions.	For	
example,	to	support	Polo	in	his	candidacy,	the	network	provided	relations	and	occasionally	
resources	like	vehicles	and	financing;	also,	the	network	supported	efforts	by	El	Campeón,	and	
organized	 spaces	 for	 meetings	 and	 proselytizing.	 For	 example,	 upon	 the	 initiative	 of	 the	
majority	of	the	members	of	the	group,	they	presented	themselves	at	the	Expoferia,	which	was	
considered	an	opportunity	to	display	their	products	and	services	at	a	public	event	of	regional	
and	State	significance.	The	Laredo	group	was	involved	in	the	organization	and	promotion	of	
the	event,	and	joined	other	support	networks	of	traders,	farmers	and	political	actors.	
The	Laredo	group	was	unaware	of	the	process	that	was	needed	to	be	registered	as	an	
SPR,	which	is	why	they	asked	for	my	support.	For	three	months,	I	had	collaborated	with	the	
																																																						
36	I	began	the	fieldwork	in	collaboration	with	a	single	actor	(Rafa)	whom	I	knew	for	a	long	time.	He	introduced	
me	to	his	networks	of	family,	friends,	and	relatives,	and	he	bonded	me	with	other	actors	and	resources	in	his	
network	(see	footnote	in	the	Methodology	section	of	the	INTRODUCTION).			
37	Party	of	the	Democratic	Revolution.	
38	The	members	of	an	SPR	should	devote	themselves	to	an	agricultural	activity.	Although	there	was	no	proper	
verification	 at	 the	notary	 public,	when	 the	 SPR	 requested	Alianza	 resources,	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 submit	 a	
written	statement	issued	by	the	ejido	authorities	for	each	member.	
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group	to	organize	the	Expoferia	in	Coeneo,	closely	following	initiatives	of	Polo	to	obtain	his	
candidacy	for	the	PRD,	as	well	as	the	activities	of	the	group	in	negotiations	for	government	
projects.	The	constitution	of	an	SPR	would	be	a	way	 to	give	 them	something	 in	 return	 for	
support	 for	 my	 research.	 To	 create	 the	 SPR	 Laredo,	 the	 public	 notary	 required	 the	
authorization	 by	 the	 Secretariat	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 (SRE).39	 To	 obtain	 authorization,	 each	
member	taking	part	in	the	SPR	needed	to	provide	an	official	ID,	a	copy	of	their	birth	certificate	
and	a	document	accrediting	him/her	as	an	agricultural	producer.		
The	 managing	 committee	 of	 the	 Laredo	 group	 was	 constituted	 in	 a	 meeting,	 and	
included	a	president,	a	secretary,	a	treasurer	and	a	supervisory	sub-committee.	The	members	
proposed	me	as	president,	Polo	(El	Campeón)	as	secretary,	and	Rafa	as	treasurer,	while	Polo	
and	Rafa´s	father	would	be	part	of	the	supervisory	sub-committee.40	All	this	was	recorded	in	
the	meeting’s	proceedings	(23/09/2003).	El	Campeón	was	put	in	charge	of	submitting	these	
proceedings	at	the	Notary	Office	119	located	in	the	city	of	Zacapu.	
From	the	group’s	perspective,	I	had	properly	interpreted	the	bureaucratic	processes	
and	obtained	permissions	and	protocols	 to	 form	the	SPR.	The	actors	considered	that	 I	had	
skills,	initiative	and	willingness	to	contribute	with	the	SPR’s	deployment.	I	considered	the	SPR	
as	a	formal	group	with	little	collective	activity,	and	with	which	I	had	constant	interaction.	After	
working	with	the	group	for	four	months,	they	invited	me	to	join	the	SPR	as	a	member.	From	
my	 perspective,	 the	members	 choose	me	 as	 SPR	 president	 because	 of	my	 availability	 and	
previous	 participation.	 Agreeing	 to	 collaborate	 with	 the	 SPR,	 required	 critical	 reflection,	
though.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 would	 allow	 me	 to	 incorporate	 relevant	 information	 from	
institutions	involved	that	would	be	useful	for	my	research.	Also,	it	helped	me	to	understand	
organizing	and	political	processes	regarding	their	networks.		
Once	the	dossier	had	been	completed,	El	Campeón	took	it	to	the	Notary.	The	person	
in	 charge	 of	 the	 notary	 office	 verbally	 stated	 that	 the	 capital	 stock,	 built	 from	members’	
contributions,	was	non-existent,	and	said	that	this	did	not	matter	since	it	was	only	specified	
in	the	government’s	nominal	requirements	–	which	were	usually	not	fulfilled.	
A	 similar	 process	 was	 performed	 for	 the	 Secretariat	 of	 Finance	 and	 Public	 Credit	
(Secretaría	de	Hacienda	y	Crédito	Público	or	SHCP)	for	which	the	procedure	was	carried	out	at	
the	Zacapu	office.	The	person	 in	charge	of	 the	SHCP	 in	Zacapu,	who	had	knowledge	of	 the	
processes	carried	out	by	other	SPR’s,	helped	us	fill	in	the	required	forms	and	register	the	SPR	
as	a	corporate	entity.	It	was	suggested	by	the	representative	from	the	SHCP	that	a	bi-annual	
and	annual	tax	return	form	had	to	be	filled	in.	However,	the	issue	of	tax	returns	and	obligations	
was	 not	made	 totally	 clear	 to	 the	 SPR	members.	 After	 ten	working	 days,	 the	 Federal	 Tax	
Registry	(RFC)	was	obtained	(with	the	SPR’s	address	for	tax	purposes).	SHCP	personnel	would	
verify	 the	data	 in	 the	 following	days.	According	 to	government	 regulations,	 the	RFC	was	a	
requirement	and	had	to	match	with	the	business	activity	and	corporate	purpose	stated	by	the	
SPR.	The	SPR	Laredo	was	finally	registered	at	the	Public	Registry	of	Commerce	as	of	September	
																																																						
39	The	SPR	as	a	corporate	entity	should	register	with	a	unique	ID	that	did	not	contravene	existing	ones.	
40	According	to	the	general	internal	regulations,	the	representation	of	a	SPR	is	held	by	the	managing	committee,	
but	under	certain	situations	the	president	can	represent	the	SPR.	
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19,	2003.	The	whole	procedure	cost	USD	120.00	plus	USD	300.00	for	extra	expenses	which	
were	covered	jointly	by	members	-	though	it	was	Rafa	who	contributed	most.		
For	members	the	creation	of	the	SPR	seemed	like	any	another	requirement.	However,	
this	process	implied	the	acceptance	of	some	of	the	State’s	rules,	including	control	mechanisms	
that	allowed	government	institutions	to	carry	out	monitoring	and	control	within	the	group.	It	
implied	that	inputs	and	outputs	should	be	promptly	declared	for	taxes.	Using	their	databases	
and	systems,	the	government	could	review	the	amount	of	resources	allocated	to	the	SPR	from	
different	 sources.	 In	 this	 way,	 digital	 systematization	 facilitated	 intervention	 into	 the	
collectives,	violating	in	a	certain	way	their	autonomy.	
In	2003,	the	SPR	Laredo	participated	in	the	organization	of	the	Expoferia	Coeneo.	The	
event	 had	 the	 purpose	 of	 launching	 Polo	 into	 local	 politics.	 All	 the	 members	 of	 the	 SPR	
collaborated	in	a	different	way,	providing	the	venue	for	the	event	in	the	local	livestock	place,	
inviting	other	exhibitors,	and	broadcasting	the	event.	The	Expo	organization	had	begun	three	
months	earlier,	and	had	mainly	been	funded	by	Polo	and	Rafa.	During	the	event,	the	members	
presented	different	initiatives	and	events	by	themselves:	wine	in	fruits,	toast,	cattle	and	feed,	
cultural	activities	and	sports.	Several	members	of	Coeneo’s	municipality	and	the	region	joined	
this	event.	At	the	Expoferia,	Gonzalo,	Rene	Sosa	and	Rafa	(SEPLADE)	presented	the	Modelo	
Alternativo	Agropecuario	(MAA).	During	the	event,	the	SPR	Laredo	was	invited	to	participate	
in	MAA	projects.	The	SPR	took	an	interest	in	some	of	the	projects,	such	as	those	of	organic	and	
biological	fertilizers,	goats	and	sheeps,	and	the	greenhouse	project.	
Members	 of	 the	 SPR	 divided	 the	 participation	 in	 committees	 to	 encompass	 the	
different	projects.	El	Campeón	and	Rafa	joined	the	fungi	project,	Polo	the	biological	fertilizers	
one,	Rafa	the	goats	and	sheep	project,	and	El	Campeón	and	myself	 joined	the	greenhouse	
project.	In	weekly	meetings,	the	commissions	presented	their	progress,	and	the	requirements	
were	presented	 to	meet	each	project,	 then	 the	alternatives	discussed	upon	which	 the	SPR	
would	decide	to	continue	or	not	with	the	project.	
The	actions	carried	out	by	the	Laredo	group	were	brought	to	the	direct	attention	of	
the	 municipal	 government,	 which	 was	 at	 the	 time	 backed	 by	 the	 Partido	 Revolucionario	
Institucional	 (PRI)	 and	 which	 wanted	 to	 keep	 political	 power	 in	 the	 municipality.	 The	
confrontation	among	some	of	the	SPR	Laredo	members,	including	Polo,	Rafa	and	El	Campeón	
was	rooted	in	their	opposite	political	affiliation	(PRD).	The	disagreements	were	presented	to	
SUPLADER	by	Coeneo’s	municipal	president,	who	stated	that	the	diffusion	of	the	MAA	was	an	
interference	with	local	development	-	coordinated	by	the	Consejo	Municipal	para	el	Desarrollo	
Sustentable	 (CMDRS)41.	 In	 SUPLADER,	 the	municipal	 presidents	 of	 Purépero,	 Jiménez	 and	
Panindícuaro	agreed	with	the	point	of	view	of	Coeneo’s	municipal	president.		
	Because	of	this,	SEPLADE	recommended	that	SPR	Laredo	should	have	the	support	of	
the	local	council.	Yet,	opposition	to	the	Laredo	group	was	fuelled	through	CMDRS,	which	had	
the	 support	 of	 State	 and	 federal	 institutions.	 Their	 justification	 was	 the	 absence	 of	 an	
																																																						
41	Municipal	Council	for	Sustainable	Rural	Development.	
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application	form	and	a	project	form	from	SPR	Laredo	in	CMDRS.42	In	this	way,	the	resources	
and	the	planning	handled	by	CMDRS	allowed	the	stakeholders	to	be	identified	locally	and	at	
the	 same	 time	 made	 it	 easier	 to	 intermingle	 personal	 and	 group	 interests	 for	 funding	
applications,	providing	evidence	of	the	existence	of	coalitions	that	granted	personal	privileges	
and	facilitated	the	setting	up	of	similar	groups	while	restricting	others.		
Some	facts	that	demonstrate	the	above	problem	are	that	the	goats	and	sheep	project	
(SUPLADER)	was	not	promoted	in	the	municipality;	the	day	scheduled	for	delivery	in	Zacapu	
some	trailers	with	the	best	animals	were	sent	to	Coeneo	and	Purépero.	In	Coeneo,	the	council	
gave	 the	 animals	 to	 people	 close	 to	 the	municipality.	 In	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 the	 SPR	
Coenenses	was	 formed	by	officials	 and	 family	members	of	Coeneo’s	 council,	which	at	 the	
same	time	hindered	the	participation	of	the	Laredo	SPR.		Likewise,	the	organic	fertilisers	were	
only	 negligibly	 distributed	 in	 the	municipality.	 In	 order	 to	 distribute	 the	 resources	 among	
producers	related	to	the	council,	recovery	the	production	costs	was	avoided,	noting	that	 it	
was	a	project	with	government	funds.	In	relation	to	the	fungi	and	the	greenhouse	project,	the	
council	intervened	to	dismantle	some	participating	networks	(see	Chapter	4).		
In	 my	 view,	 the	 confrontation	 with	 the	 municipal	 government	 of	 Coeneo	 did	 not	
benefit	 the	Laredo’s	projects.	The	Laredo	SPR	was	considered	to	be	 in	competition	for	the	
resources	authorized	by	SUPLADER	for	the	SPR	Coenenses.	In	addition,	it	did	not	look	like	it	
was	CMDRS’	priority	to	incorporate	SUPLADER’s	development	philosophy	into	its	plans.	This	
notwithstanding,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	MAA	project	was	boosted	by	SUPLADER,	SEPLADE	
decided	to	include	SPRs	such	as	Laredo.	
As	stated	before,	one	of	the	requirements	to	take	part	in	the	greenhouse	project	was	
to	be	registered	as	a	SPR.	Although	SPR	formation	did	not	guarantee	access	to	resources	to	
establish	a	greenhouse,	for	SEPLADE	it	was	a	strategy	which	intended	to	consolidate	a	type	of	
prompted	development	that	sought	to	produce	greater	consistency	in	the	organizations	and,	
at	the	same	time,	bring	certainty	to	the	project.	
	
Shaping	the	greenhouse	project:	The	redefined	planned	intervention		
In	2002,	SEDAGRO	had	authorized	USD	200,000.00	for	the	building	of	ten	greenhouses	(half	a	
hectare	 each)	 in	 the	 Numarán	municipality	 in	Michoacán	 (Bajío	 Region).	 The	 greenhouse	
beneficiaries	were	advised	by	 the	business	consulting	 firm	 led	by	 JLB	 (or	“El	Gachupín”)	of	
Spanish	 nationality	 and	 who	 claimed	 to	 represent	 the	 Spanish	 company	 ULMA.43	 The	
construction	of	a	half-hectare	greenhouse	was	valued	at	USD	150,000.00.	The	actors	inferred	
JLB’s	intention	of	selling	an	expensive	greenhouse.	JLB’s	firm	intention	of	managing	the	project	
was	clearly	shown	after	the	lack	of	results	and	due	to	the	expenses	of	those	involved.	Because	
																																																						
42	 The	 CMDRS	 kept	 a	 dossier	 containing	 all	 the	 groups’	 applications,	 the	 beneficiaries’	 register	 and	 the	
requirements	to	access	the	resources	for	the	various	institutions.	
43	Spanish	Company	that	manufactures	industrial	materials	with	a	special	section	that	focuses	on	agriculture.	On	
ULMA’s	website	(www.ULMA.com),	there	was	no	statement	about	JLB	acting	as	their	representative	in	Mexico,	
neither	at	the	Spanish	Embassy	in	Mexico.	
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of	 this	 situation,	 the	 beneficiaries	 did	 not	 continue	with	 the	 start	 of	 the	 project,	 and	 the	
greenhouse	project	in	Numarán	failed.		
Meanwhile	 in	 the	 Zacapu	 Region,	 the	 SEPLADE	 delegate	 stated	 that	 the	 State	
government	had	given	 the	green	 light	 to	authorize	 resources	 for	 ten	 SPRS	 to	 test	how	 the	
project	would	 run	with	 these	 pilot	 greenhouses.	 The	 local	 councils	were	 to	 supervise	 the	
greenhouses	in	their	municipalities	(Gonzalo,	18/08/2003,	SEPLADE	office).	SUPLADER	Zacapu	
looked	after	the	planning	and	approved	the	authorization	of	USD	500,000.00	for	the	project	-	
to	be	distributed	among	the	eight	municipalities	that	were	part	of	it	(USD	50,000.00	for	each	
greenhouse;	 Zacapu	 and	 Jiménez	 would	 have	 two).	 The	 beneficiaries	 were	 expected	 to	
contribute	 with	 an	 initial	 amount	 of	 USD	 15,000.00	 per	 SPR.	 It	 was	 expected	 that	 the	
greenhouses	would	be	independent	from	one	another,	and	that	they	would	be	located	on	lots	
belonging	to	each	SPR,	which	were	to	be	well	situated	(i.e.	with	access	routes	and	good	water	
quality	to	supply	the	greenhouses).	It	was	expected	that	these	pilot	greenhouses	would	serve	
as	triggers	for	similar	projects	in	the	region.		
In	addition,	the	representative	of	SAGARPA44	made	a	verbal	commitment	to	support	
the	management	of	the	project’s	equipment	and	training,	claiming	that	he	would	reduce	the	
obstacles	faced	by	the	Rural	Alliance	(Alianza	para	el	Campo	or	Alianza).	45	Furthermore,	the	
delegate	of	Zacapu	region	managed	to	have	the	financial	resources	not	used	for	the	Numarán	
project	 to	 be	 re-allocated	 to	 the	 Ciénega	 greenhouse	 project.	 The	 secretary	 of	 SEDAGRO,	
Silvano	 Aureoles,	 then	 committed	 himself,	 through	 a	 letter	 of	 intent,	 to	 allocate	 USD	
200,000.00	for	the	Asociación,	in	support	of	the	greenhouse	project	in	the	Zacapu	region.		
This	was	 how	 the	 Asociación,	 that	 had	 thus	 far	 only	 existed	 on	 paper,	 came	 to	 be	
considered	a	beneficiary.	Until	that	time,	the	Asociación	had	not	existed,	but	in	an	attempt	to	
redirect	the	project	money	or	the	"dough"	(la	lana),	SEPLADE	officials	proposed	the	name	of	
the	Association	out	of	the	blue.	In	this	way,	the	Numarán	project	resources	were	assigned	to	
the	 Zacapu	 project	 -	 at	 least	 on	 paper.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 eligible	 to	 receive	 the	 resources	
committed,	 the	 Asociación	 should	 be	 established.	 Also,	 to	 access	 the	 resources	 from	
SEDAGRO,	 SUPLADER	 and	Alianza,	 the	 beneficiaries	 should	 be	 organized	 as	 an	 SPR.	 Some	
actors,	such	as	SEPLADE’S	delegate	Gonzalo,	considered	that	the	funds	allocated	to	MAA	should	
be	recycled	-	that	is,	recovered	and	reused.		
When	the	business	consulting	firm	led	by	JLB	found	out	about	the	greenhouse	project	
in	 La	 Ciénega,	 they	 offered	 their	 services	 to	 the	 beneficiary	 group	 to	 help	 them	 establish	
themselves	as	an	SPR	and	then	form	the	USPR/Asociación.	This	guaranteed	that,	as	a	second	
level	organization,	the	USPR	could	negotiate	the	resources	on	behalf	of	each	SPR	that	was	part	
of	it.	JLB’s	firm	came	in	with	yet	another	idea	how	to	access	project	funding.	They	stated	that	
																																																						
44	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	Livestock,	Rural	Development,	Fisheries	and	Food.	
45	 Alianza	 required	 members	 experience	 in	 greenhouse	 production.	 The	 authorized	 amount	 for	 equipment	
varied	 and	 for	 the	 Project	 there	 was	 a	 need	 of	 USD	 25,000.00,	 without	 considering	 the	 payment	 for	 the	
project’s	technical	services,	training,	besides	the	option	of	mixing	resources.				
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they	had	the	support	of	some	officers	from	SEDAGRO,	SAGARPA,	FIRCO	and	FIRA,	as	well	as	the	
technicians	working	with	them,	certified	as	Professional	Service	Providers.	
JLB’s	 proposal	 considered	 new	 funds	 could	 be	 committed	 by	 the	 government	
institutions	he	had	relations	with,	and	increased	the	investment	to	USD	220,000.	SUPLADER	
and	 SEDAGRO	 were	 to	 put	 in	 USD	 70,000.00,	 Alianza	 another	 USD	 45,000.00,	 and	 FIRCO	
another	USD	15,000.00.	FIRA	could	provide	a	financial	guarantee	as	a	back-up	for	the	bank’s	
loan.	JLB’s	firm	intended	to	create	a	trust	fund	to	concentrate	government	funds	for	obtaining	
a	credit	line	with	ULMA	in	order	to	finance	greenhouse	construction	costs.	Greenhouse	gains	
would	serve	to	pay	the	interest	and	investment	capital.		
In	order	to	manage	the	resources,	the	requirements	for	the	project	would	include	a	
supplier	company	in	charge	of	providing	advice	about	the	commercialisation	and	production	
process,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 commercialization	 commitment	 (through	 Letters	 of	 Commitment),	
financial	projections,	business	plans,	and	inputs.	A	Professional	Service	Provider	(PSP)	should	
be	in	charge	of	the	training,	which	would	validate	the	project	in	order	to	be	recognized	by	the	
established	governmental	agencies.	The	government	funds	were	considered	non-recoverable	
funds,	while	the	beneficiaries	would	contribute	in	kind	by	providing	the	plot	of	land	and	the	
material	conditions	to	establish	the	greenhouse.	
JLB	was	a	white	man46,	a	Spaniard	of	about	50	years	old,	who	usually	wore	a	suit,	and	
who	 inspired	 confidence	when	he	 spoke	using	professional	 language,	 accompanied	by	 the	
appropriate	 gestures	 and	 body	 language.	 His	 firm	 promoted	 the	 technological	 change	 to	
hydroponics	and	 indoor	gardening.	The	 technologies	 should	be	acquired	 in	a	package	 that	
offered	resource	management,	technology	acquisition,	the	setting-up	of	the	greenhouse,	and	
the	marketing	of	the	tomatoes.	The	firm	named	this	package:	Turnkey.	Based	on	this	scheme,	
the	SPRs	would	provide	half	a	hectare	of	accessible	land,	with	electricity	and	a	deep	well	with	
clean	 water.	 The	 technological	 package	 guaranteed	 that,	 in	 the	 eight	 months	 of	 the	
production	cycle,	the	greenhouse	would	produce	200	tons/ha	of	tomatoes	with	a	fixed	pre-
established	trading	price	for	the	whole	year.	It	was	stated	that	“It	is	necessary	to	change	the	
mentality	of	the	peasant,	to	give	him	an	entrepreneurial	vision,	because	the	objective	is	to	
establish	a	little	company”	(Lira,	JLB	firm,	10/10/2003,	SEPLADE	office).		
JLB	proposed	that	the	Spanish	Company	ULMA	should	be	the	greenhouse	supplier,	and	
offered	to	provide	training	in	Spain.	He	proposed	that	two	agronomists	per	ten	greenhouses	
would	be	trained	under	the	condition	that,	in	order	to	have	a	stronger	commitment,	the	two	
agronomists	should	be	part	of	the	project.	Under	this	premise,	ULMA	and	the	people	trained	
by	the	company	would	be	in	charge	of	the	technical	aspects,	and	the	beneficiaries	could	be	
involved	(if	they	wished	to)	in	the	farming	work	(or	otherwise	this	could	be	assigned	to	a	third	
party).	After	four	years,	the	ten	greenhouses	would	become	the	property	of	the	SPRs	and	they	
would	 be	 managed	 directly	 by	 the	 members.	 This	 scenario	 implied	 that,	 during	 the	
amortization	 of	 the	 capital,	 the	 members	 would	 appoint	 JLB’s	 firm	 to	 manage	 the	
greenhouses.	By	using	the	argument	of	filling	the	technological	gap	in	the	technical	operations	
																																																						
46	Mexican	society	 is	quite	 racist.	Unfortunately,	 the	 rural	population	 in	certain	 regions	 tends	 to	 respect	 the	
opinion	of	white,	non-indigenous	persons	over	that	of	other	ethnic	groups.			
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proposal,	it	was	specified	that	JLB’	Business	Consulting	Firm	would	be	in	charge	of	the	project.	
JLB	stated	that:	
	
The	responsibility	of	the	beneficiaries	is	to	make	sure	that	the	production	is	carried	out	
as	planned,	using	the	automated	greenhouse´s	sophisticated	instruments,	taking	care	of	
the	 food	 safety	 of	 the	 project,	 and	 receiving	 support	 from	 trained	 technicians	 that	
provide	advice.	(JLB,	22/08/2003,	SEPLADE	office).		
 
This	approach	required	a	change	in	perspective	from	the	traditional	way	of	working	that	would	
include	the	use	of	a	computer47,	the	knowledge	of	chemical	compounds	and	accounting.	There	
was	a	plan	to	set	up	a	supplier	company	responsible	for	stockpiling	the	region’s	product	and	
verifying	the	correct	handling	of	the	products	that	would	be	transported	to	Spain.	The	supplier	
company’s	plan	stated	that	for	four	years	(the	duration	of	the	contract	with	the	Asociación)	
JLB’s	company	would	buy	the	tomatoes.	The	cost	of	the	supplier	company	was	USD	2.5	million,	
of	which	the	producers	would	own	49%	of	the	shares.	JLB	stated	that:	
 
The	financial	credit	will	be	obtained	through	a	 loan	from	a	Spanish	bank	at	5%	annual	
interest,	subject	to	European	inflation,	which	according	to	statistics	is	very	low,	and	this	
applies	to	the	purchase	of	the	supplies.	The	agreed	purchase	price	shall	be	five	pesos	(50	
USD	 cents)	 per	 kilo	 of	 tomatoes.	 After	 four	 years,	 the	 greenhouse	 payment	 will	 be	
amortized	(JLB,	10/10/2003,	SEPLADE	office).		
 
To	overcome	farming	risks,	the	project	considered	an	insurance	for	production.	Regarding	this	
demand,	 the	 firm	 leaned	 towards	 the	 support	 of	 SEPLADE’s	 regional	 delegate.	 JLB	 openly	
expressed	 his	 confidence:	 “Although	 he	 has	 a	 different	 professional	 background	 [doctor],	
Gonzalo	[SEPLADE’s	delegate]	is	interested	in	the	project	and	has	in-depth	technical	knowledge	
of	agriculture”	(JLB,	18/08/2003,	SEPLADE	office).	During	the	informative	meetings,	Zacapu’s	
SEPLADE	 official	 often	 invited	 the	 project’s	 participants	 to	 clarify	 any	 queries	 they	 had	
regarding	the	project	with	the	JLB’s	firm	personnel,	saying:	“So	you	don’t	have	to	ask	me	later”	
-	demonstrating	his	unfamiliarity	with	 the	 subject.	 Some	of	 the	members	asked	about	 the	
equipment	and	the	life	expectancy	of	the	materials	that	were	being	used.		JLB	answered	the	
questions	related	to	his	area	of	expertise	and	avoided	the	technical	aspects	he	did	not	know	
about	by	stressing	the	responsibility	that	the	producers	had	in	taking	care	of	the	quality	and	
the	innocuousness	of	the	product	(JLB,	18/08/2003,	SEPLADE	office).		
It	was	clear	that	the	government	agencies	involved	were	not	aware	of	the	technical	
and	financial	details	of	the	project,	and	that	they	would	rather	wait	to	see	the	result	instead	
of	openly	getting	 involved	 in	 the	matter.	 They	were	not	 ready	 to	make	any	 commitments	
																																																						
47	As	Leeuwis	(1993)	points	to,	during	innovation	process,	the	meanings	are	‘negotiated’	rather	than	transferred	
or	subjectively	interpreted.	In	this	case	JLB’S	firm	wanted	to	transfer	a	technological	knowledge	system.	The	
automated	greenhouse	would	use	an	integrated	computer,	which	could	resolve	greenhouse	functions	through	
sophisticated	software.		
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outside	the	regulations	that	they	represented	and	stated	that,	in	order	to	have	access	to	the	
project’s	resources,	the	groups	must	be	formed	as	SPRs	and	become	legal	entities.	
	
 
The	Asociación:	A	network	that	connects	collectives		
When	the	greenhouse	project	became	known	in	Region	02,	several	applications	were	received	
from	organized	groups	that	came	from	the	eight	municipalities	that	sought	to	be	beneficiaries	
of	SUPLADER-02.	The	interested	parties	argued	that	the	project	had	not	been	made	known	in	
the	communities	and	that,	according	to	SUPLADER	regulations,	they	had	the	right	to	take	part	
in	it.	Certain	actors	linked	to	SEPLADE	and	SUPLADER	took	advantage	of	this	situation,	such	as	
Rafa	and	René,	who	were	keen	to	strengthen	their	political	networks.	As	technicians	of	the	
Zacapu	SEPLADE,	they	promoted	the	project	among	their	networks;	both	stated	they	had	the	
knowledge	and	mechanisms	to	obtain	the	resources	from	SUPLADER	by	predicting	success	in	
their	negotiations.	As	 a	 result	of	 this	process,	 the	SPRs	Biotecnológicos,	Bajo	 Invernadero,	
Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres,	Los	Pinos	and	Purépero	were	created.		
Although	the	application	was	available	to	any	group	that	fulfilled	the	requirements,	
selection	filters	were	set	up	within	SEPLADE	with	the	aim	of	consolidating	a	collective	that	was	
ideologically	compatible	with	the	new	‘left	wing’	government	in	Michoacán.	The	MAA	projects	
would	 lay	 the	 productive	 and	 organizing	 foundation	 for	 local	 development.	 Although	 the	
SEPLADE-02	 planners	 believed	 that	 ideological	 formation	 among	 the	 members	 was	
fundamental	 to	 accomplish	 unity	 in	 the	 project,	 this	 was	 not	 possible	 because	 the	 MAA	
projects	 were	 not	 associated	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 negotiations	 between	 the	 involved	
networks	caused	actors	with	dissimilar	approaches	to	join.	As	a	result,	there	were	mechanical	
engineers,	managers,	teachers,	cattle	farmers,	auto	parts	sellers,	agricultural	workers,	social	
leaders	 and	 housewives,	 among	 others,	 in	 the	Asociación.	 Cognitive	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	
tomato	production	showed	how	planners	(SEPLADE-SUPLADER)	gave	preference	to	networks	
before	the	feasibility	of	the	project.	Many	members	of	the	SPRs	did	not	have	the	resources	
needed	 to	 implement	 the	 project	 (land,	 capital,	 experience).	 Despite	 the	 diversity	 of	
participants,	in	the	mid-term	it	was	expected	that	there	would	be	cohesion	among	the	actors	
for	sharing	the	SPR	resources.	
Despite	not	being	a	government	official	was	a	requirement	to	take	part	in	an	SPR,	the	
local	councils	nominated	government	officials	and	relatives	to	become	members	of	SPR’s.	Both	
the	municipal	president’s	son	and	another	municipal	authority,	linked	to	one	of	the	wealthiest	
families	of	the	municipality	of	Coeneo	that	worked	in	the	lentil	hoarding	business,	were	part	
of	 the	 SPR	 called	 Productos	 Coenenses.	 In	 90%	 of	 the	 SPR’s	 there	 was	 participation	 from	
government	officials.	SEPLADE	and	members	of	SUPLADER,	especially	those	representatives	of	
the	local	councils,	approved	that	strategy,	and,	by	being	both	judge	and	jury,	they	hindered	
citizens’	participation	 in	 the	program.	 In	 this	way,	 the	beneficiaries	were	suggested	by	 the	
local	municipality	and	accepted	by	SUPLADER.	The	argument	given	was	the	plan	to	make	a	pilot	
greenhouse	in	each	municipality,	which	is	why	the	application	invitation	did	not	go	beyond	
the	local	council	at	that	time.	SEPLADE’s	technician	stated	that:		
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They	can	implement	the	greenhouse	without	any	problem,	because	they	have	the	money	
to	 do	 so.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 bring	 about	 technological	 change	 in	 the	 region	 with	 the	
greenhouse	project.	Let	the	farmers	see	that	there	are	other	ways	to	produce	(Rafa	Lp,	
22/08/2003,	SEPLADE	facilities).	
 
Huaniqueo’s	town	council	authorized	the	management	expenses	and	the	contribution	of	USD	
15,000	for	the	project,	and	the	councils	of	Jiménez,	Coeneo,	Churintzio,	Purépero,	Tlazazalca	
and	Zacapu	authorized	a	 similar	amount	as	well.	 From	 the	municipalities’	perspective,	 the	
implementation	of	a	greenhouse	pilot	in	each	municipality	contributed	to	the	development	of	
subjects	as	precursors	of	the	project.	Nevertheless,	these	activities	hid	processes	of	exclusion	
and	intervention.	For	instance,	the	municipality	of	Jiménez	(which	financed	the	two	SPRs	of	
Caurio	and	Copándaro)	rejected	a	request	for	a	similar	amount	to	go	to	the	Los	Pinos	group,	
claiming	the	lack	of	sufficient	funds.	Later	it	transpired	that	El	Chacho	(Jimenez’s	municipal	
president)	 had	 not	 authorized	 the	 request	 because	 he	 considered	 that	 the	 group	had	 the	
resources	to	finance	the	projects	themselves	and	hence	did	not	need	public	resources.		
The	municipal	president,	who	had	a	political	background	with	the	PRD,	did	not	fully	
identify	with	the	group	members	of	Los	Pinos,	as	they	had	inherited	the	Espinos’	hacienda,	so	
he	thought	they	had	plenty	economic	resources.	However,	the	members	managed	part	of	an	
ejido	and	participated	as	ejido	farmers	in	the	Espinos	community.	The	men	of	the	family	had	
migrated	to	the	United	States	in	search	for	a	better	life	many	years	before.	A	similar	situation	
had	occurred	in	Purépero	with	the	SPR	Purépero	which	was	identified	to	be	in	opposition	with	
the	SPR	Hortipure	which	received	support	from	the	local	council.	The	situations	in	Zacapu	and	
Coeneo	thus	give	a	glimpse	of	the	conflicts	of	 interest	within	the	municipalities	due	to	the	
deliberate	struggle	for	SUPLADER’s	greenhouse	project	resources.		The	situation	did	not	seem	
promising	for	the	SPR’s	that	did	not	have	enough	resources	to	pay	for	the	project	or	to	be	
supported	by	the	local	councils.	Regarding	this	topic,	SEPLADE’s	delegate	said:	
 
This	 project	 [greenhouse	 project]	 is	 meant	 for	 the	 beneficiaries	 who	 contribute	 a	
minimum	of	30%	[USD	45,000.00]	as	SPR,	with	the	intention	of	managing	a	revolving	fund	
and	 generating	 a	 multiplying	 impact	 on	 the	 region	 (Gonzalo,	 22/08/2003,	 SEPLADE	
office).	
 
Due	to	the	growing	number	of	applications	received	by	SEPLADE,	the	delegate,	alongside	the	
municipal	 presidents	 from	 Huaniqueo,	 Zacapu	 and	 Panindícuaro,	 thought	 that	 SUPLADER	
should	support	a	larger	number	of	SPRs	with	resources	from	the	regional	fund.	The	ten	SPRs	
involved	in	the	project	were	not	happy	to	include	more	groups,	arguing	that	it	was	a	pilot	plan	
for	these	ten	sites	-	to	be	promoted	by	their	respective	municipalities.	Yet,	the	initiative	of	
increasing	the	number	of	greenhouses	was	successful	and	the	authorized	amount	rose	to	USD	
600,000	for	the	greenhouses,	increasing	the	goal	to	20	greenhouses.		
This	 process	modified	 the	 initial	 proposal	 of	 building	 ten	 pilot	 sheds	 by	 spreading	
SUPLADER’s	 resources	 among	 the	 20	 SPRs.	 This	 implied	 considering	 alternative	 financial	
sources	as	well	as	settling	the	contribution	of	those	involved	through	government	resources	
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(leverage).	The	modification	of	the	project	goals	created	controversy	concerning	the	criteria	
for	 choosing	 which	 SPRs	 would	 take	 part	 in	 each	 stage.	 The	 resources	 “committed”	 by	
SEDAGRO	for	building	ten	greenhouses,	expressed	in	a	Letter	of	Intent	to	the	Asociación	as	a	
beneficiary	and	for	an	amount	of	USD	200,000,	was	now	being	contested.	There	was	ambiguity	
in	SEDAGRO’s	authorization	since	 it	was	not	 specified	which	SPR’s	 receive	 the	support,	and	
there	were	practices	in	SEPLADE	02	that	favouring	the	SPRs	that	were	nominated	by	the	eight	
local	councils	over	others.		
Two	stages	of	the	project	were	mentioned.	In	the	first	one	only	ten	greenhouses	would	
be	involved;	the	financial	plan	for	this	group	established	that	SUPLADER	would	contribute	with	
USD	30,000	and	SEDAGRO	with	USD	10,000.	With	this	amount	as	guarantee,	twice	the	amount	
would	be	requested	from	FIRA,	meaning	a	total	of	USD	80,000.	With	an	expected	USD	110,000,	
the	 rest	 (USD	30,000.00)	would	be	 requested	 from	FOMICH.	To	manage	 the	project	as	an	
Interregional	FINCA,48	it	was	necessary	to	organize	a	Unión	de	Sociedades	de	Producción	Rural	
(USPR)	that	would	cover	the	various	SPRs	and	participate	in	the	project.		
For	the	second	phase	(which	involved	another	eight	SPRs),	SEPLADE	officials	and	JLB	
proposed	to	manage	the	funds	with	Alianza,	expecting	an	amount	of	USD	40,000	for	each	SPR.	
The	second	phase	was	also	backed-up	by	SUPLADER,	but	without	authorized	funding	-	which	is	
why	the	proposal	did	not	seem	attractive	to	JLB.	SUPLADER	considered	that	project	resources	
should	not	spread	out.	By	increasing	to	20	greenhouses,	it	was	necessary	to	incorporate	other	
strategies	in	order	to	complete	the	project	funds.	JLB	did	not	consider	to	initiate	the	eight	SPRs;	
instead,	the	firm	wanted	to	be	associated	with	the	SPRs	that	already	had	authorized	resources	
only.		
SUPLADER	released	itself	from	the	SPRs	that	managed	the	funds	before	the	Alianza	by	
arguing	that	those	were	programs	that	had	a	different	ruling	and	scope	of	action	(state	and	
federal).	Some	of	the	SPR	members	who	had	previous	experience	in	dealing	with	Alianza	raised	
the	 question	 about	 this	 option,	 stating	 that	 the	 program	was	 not	 liable	when	 authorizing	
higher	amounts	(such	as	the	ones	expected	for	the	project).	They	claimed	that	until	that	date	
(22/08/2003),	 the	 previous	 year’s	 funds	 that	 had	 been	 released,	 had	 not	 been	 yet	 used;	
therefore,	 the	expected	 funding	 for	 this	project	 (if	approved)	would	not	be	delivered	until	
2004.	In	this	regard,	JLB	said:	“Please,	don’t	go	and	spread	this	but	the	governor	[Cárdenas	
Batel])	committed	himself	to	back-up	all	the	Alianza	applications,	to	unblock	them”	(SEPLADE	
office,	22/08/2003).	In	order	to	show	his	relationship	with	the	state	officials,	he	stated:	
 
We	had	to	curse	a	lot,	as	you	say,	because	in	this	country	you	have	to	curse	in	order	to	
get	attention.	We	have	been	negotiating	this	project	almost	a	year,	and	now	we	have	
settled	it	within	one	week	(JLB	Business	Consulting	Firm,	SEPLADE	office,	22/08/2003).		
 
Thus,	it	was	clear	that	the	project	was	already	guaranteed.	The	Firm	offered	its	management	
services	alongside	the	Alianza.	This	meant	USD	450	for	each	SPR	and	an	endorsement	of	USD	
2,500	once	the	funds	had	been	authorized	for	training	and	technical	support.		
																																																						
48	Investment	and	Capitalization	Fund.	
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The	vast	majority	of	representatives	did	not	have	the	project	guaranteed	in	their	SPR,	
nor	had	they	a	clear	view	of	the	organization’s	objective	when	they	decided	to	take	part	in	the	
Asociación.	They	were	told	that	they	must	create	an	SPR	and	then	the	USPR.	But	the	interest	
in	the	project	money	that	came	from	FDR,	and	the	amount	committed	by	SEDAGRO	aroused	
the	 interest	 of	 certain	 actors	 who	 decided	 to	 promote	 the	 negotiations	 through	 the	
Asociación’s	representation	and	not	with	the	SPRs.		
In	order	to	formally	create	the	Asociación,	there	was	a	meeting	on	September	23,	2003	
at	 SEPLADE’s	 headquarters,	 in	 which	 I	 participated.	 Julio	 César	 had	 already	 requested	 the	
registry	at	the	SRE	for	the	corporate	entity	of	the	Unión	de	Invernaderos	Ruta	de	la	Libertad	
USPR.	During	the	assembly,	the	representatives	of	the	SPR	arrived.	Their	appearance	varied	
from	modest	 farmers	 and	 producers	 who	 introduced	 themselves	 with	 a	 clear	 speech,	 to	
merchants	and	professional	people	who	introduced	themselves	by	emphasizing	their	careers.	
The	Asociación	was	the	result	of	gathering	the	SPRs	currently	registered	before	a	notary	public.	
At	the	Asociación’s	assembly,	more	than	one	member	of	each	SPR	was	able	to	participate,	but	
only	one	would	have	the	right	to	vote	(Figure	2.1).		
There	was	not	an	evident	interest	by	the	members	to	preside	the	assembly.	Heredia	
was	nominated	by	Gonzalo	and	he	was	accepted	by	the	majority	of	the	members	to	be	the	
moderator;	also,	two	counters	were	appointed.	Heredia	had	the	unconditional	support	of	four	
representatives	 of	 the	 SPR	 from	 Churintzio.	 Heredia	 represented	 Agrícola	 Heredia,	 while	
Avelino	represented	La	Mesa,	Pedro	Los	Sauces,	and	Rodolfo	Provech.	The	group	of	the	four	 
	
Figure	2.1	SPR	members	of	the	Asociación	
SPR	de	RL	 Representative/	
Community	
SPR	de	RL	 Representative/	
Community	
Marijo	 Espinoza-Zacapu	 Azteca	 Saul-Santa	Gertrudis	
Piedad	Chiquita	 Irma	and	Armando-Zacapu	 Maldonado	 Jesús-Zacapu	
Huaniqueo	 Norberto-Huaniqueo	 Purépero	 Esperanza-Purépero	
Heredia	 Heredia-Churintzio	 El	Fresno	 Manuel-Puruandiro	
La	Mesa	 Avelino-Churintzio	 Jiménez	 Lino-Jiménez	
Los	Sauces	 Pedro-Churintzio	 Hortipure	 Martín-Purépero	
Provech	 Rodolfo-Churintzio	 Biotecnológicos	 Julio,	Cristi-Zacapu	
Tomates	 Andrade-Tlazazalca	 Los	Pinos	 Ampa-Los	Espinos	
del	Campo	 Jaime	-Santa	Gertrudis	 Comanja	 Pancho	-	Comanja	
Delicias	 Manuel	-	Zacapu	 Bajo	Invernadero	 Salas	–	Zacapu	
Puerta	Chica	 Mare,	Gracian-Zacapu	 Laredo	 Fidencio	-	Laredo	
Purépechas	 Abelardo	–	Copándaro	 Agroindustriales	 Zepeda	-	Coeneo	
Cortijo	Nuevo	 Trujillo	–	Cortijo	Nuevo	 La	Jabonera	 Salvador	-	Tlazazalca	
Movimiento	de	
mujeres	
Margarita	-	Zacapu	 Deyna	 Chema	–	Zacapu	
	
SPRs	from	Churintzio	was	small	and	closely	related	through	kinship,	and	only	on	few	occasions	
the	representatives	of	the	Churintzio	SPR	expressed	their	opinion	through	Heredia.	Heredia,	
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around	50	years	old,	had	been	PRD’s	town	municipal	president	of	Churintzio	(1993-1995)49	
and	clearly	had	experience	in	handling	this	type	of	meetings.	
Each	one	of	the	members	introduced	him/herself.	The	first	one	was	Lino	(SPR	Jiménez)	
whose	speech	was	fluid	with	a	correct	use	of	language.	Lino	presented	part	of	his	career,	three	
years	in	a	seminary	and	after	that,	he	had	gone	to	the	USA	to	work	for	two	years.	When	he	
returned	to	Mexico,	Lino	studied	Pedagogy	in	an	Open	University	Program.	Teacher	Esperanza	
(SPR	 Purépero)	 was	 considered	 as	 a	 natural	 born	 leader	 by	 some	 of	 the	 assistants;	 she	
represented	20	members	of	the	municipality	of	Purépero	that	at	the	same	time	were	taking	
part	 in	 a	municipal	 housing	 project	 boosted	 by	 the	 PRD	 and	 René	 (SEPLADE’s	 technician).	
Gracian	 represented	 the	 SPR	 Puerta	 Chica	 that	 was	 formed	 by	 the	 Gutiérrez	 family	 who	
worked	in	a	portion	of	land	located	at	Puerta	Chica	in	Zacapu.	Gracian	had	only	a	small	role,	
his	 sister	Mare	 was	 the	 real	 representative	 of	 the	 SPR;	 she	 was	 devoted	 to	 private	 basic	
education	and	she	leased	a	small	and	central	premise	from	Víctor	(SPR	Maldonado).	Mare’s	
husband	worked	at	a	 factory	 in	the	 industrial	complex	of	Zacapu	and	his	sister	managed	a	
restaurant	 located	 downtown.	 Mare’s	 father	 acted	 as	 treasurer	 in	 an	 SPR	 for	 milk	
pasteurization,	 but	 there	 were	 disputes	 and	 this	 SPR	 closed	 its	 doors.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	
understand	the	historicity	of	the	SPR	participants	and	their	networks,	the	above	description	
serves	as	an	introduction	of	the	actors	and	their	groups.	There	was	a	relationship	between	
them,	which	was	prior	 to	 the	project,	 and	which	ultimately	would	have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	
creation	of	factions	and	associations.	
Don	 Saúl,	 who	 had	 organized	 the	 SPR	 Azteca	 and	 enlisted	 his	 family	 in	 it,	 listened	
attentively	 and	 kept	 the	 proposals	 and	 moods	 of	 the	 participants.	 He	 did	 not	 believe	 in	
projects	boosted	by	the	government,	as	he	did	not	think	they	would	give	solutions	for	regional	
development	nor	obtain	 favorable	 results	by	organizing	 themselves.	 Saúl	 talked	about	 the	
organizational	failure	of	Zacapu’s	pasteurization	factory	and	how	political	actors	had	usurped	
it.	He	also	stated	that	conflicts	of	interest	that	involved	money	always	ended	up	having	terrible	
consequences:	25	years	earlier	he	had	witnessed	how	 the	beneficiaries	of	a	 swine	project	
killed	each	other	 in	order	 to	obtain	 the	 funds	offered	by	 the	government.	He	said:	“When	
words	are	insufficient,	weapons	shall	arise”.		
Jaime	 (Sabor	 del	 Campo)	 was	 Saúl’s	 nephew	 and	 business	 administrator,	 and	 he	
wanted	 to	 work	 in	 the	 greenhouses’	 production	 and	 management.	 Saúl’s	 family	 was	
recognised	in	regional	politics	(that	time	with	the	PRD).	Engineer	Pancho	(SPR	Comanja)	had	
been	municipal	president	of	Coeneo	(1996-1998).	The	members	of	Comanja	pointed	out	that	
they	had	similar	experiences	as	those	told	by	don	Saúl;	they	had	obtained	financing	from	the	
bank	(BANRURAL)	to	put	to	work	a	swine	farm	but	once	the	bank’s	loan	had	been	paid,	the	
SPR	had	had	almost	no	activity.		
The	 SPRs	Deyna,	Maldonado	 and	 Cortijo	Nuevo,	 represented	 by	 Chema,	 Jesús	 and	
Trujillo	 respectively,	 kept	 a	 low	 profile	 at	 the	 meeting.	 They	 held	 positions	 at	 Zacapu’s	
municipality	 and	 the	 invitation	 to	 organize	 their	 SPRs	 came	 from	 Samuel	 Campos,	 then	
																																																						
49	His	nephew	was	municipal	president	of	Churintzio	town	(2002-04).	He	favored	Heredia	in	the	SUPLADER.	
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Zacapu’s	municipal	president	and	SUPLADER’s	president.	Chema	(Deyna)	acted	as	the	town	
hall’s	 sports	promoter;	 Jesús	 (Maldonado)	 as	 the	administrative	head,	 and	Trujillo	 (Cortijo	
Nuevo)	 had	 under	 his	 command	 the	municipality’s	 department	 of	 rubbish	 collection.	 The	
veterinarian	 Espinoza	 (Marijo)	 was	 related	 to	 the	 town	 hall’s	 network	 and	 was	 a	 local	
businessperson;	being	a	close	friend	of	Chema’s	he	had	invited	him	to	the	project.	Chema,	
Jesús,	 Trujillo,	 Armando,	 together	 with	 Irma	 (Piedad	 Chiquita),	 Espinoza	 (Marijo)	 and	 the	
members	of	Puerta	Chica	had	been	visiting	each	other	for	some	time	already.	There	were	also	
Mare	and	Estela	(Puerta	Chica)	who	had	been	acquainted	with	Ampa	and	her	sister	Malla	(Los	
Pinos)	 since	 they	were	 classmates.	 The	 SPRs	 linked	with	 the	municipality	 of	 Zacapu	were	
formed	shortly	before	this	assembly,	however,	among	its	members	were	links	with	other	SPRs	
which	 participated	 in	 the	 project	 such	 as	 Los	 Pinos,	 Marijo,	 Puerta	 Chica	 and	 La	 Piedad	
Chiquita.	 This	 block	of	 SPRs	were	most	 numerous,	 but	 so	 far	 it	 did	 not	 show	 to	have	 any	
organizing	capacity	which	could	benefit	the	Asociación.	
At	first,	I	tried	to	avoid	getting	involved	in	the	Asociación's	management	since	I	was	
struggling	with	the	ethical	 issue	of	participating	without	asking	the	Laredo	SPR	before.	SPR	
Laredo	was	not	considered	among	the	societies	in	the	greenhouse	project	that	were	financed	
by	SUPLADER,	which	meant	that	at	any	time,	the	SPR	could	decide	not	to	participate	 in	the	
project.	For	that	reason,	I	tried	to	be	as	little	noticed	as	possible	in	order	to	prevent	that	my	
participation	would	 interfere	with	the	greenhouse	processes	and	my	research	 in	Coeneo.50	
But	Gonzalo	publicly	asked	me	to	elaborate	on	my	own	background.	Then,	I	introduced	myself	
as	the	SPR	Laredo	representative.		
Once	 the	 word	 was	 given	 to	 the	 moderator,	 the	 third	 point	 of	 the	 agenda	 was	
addressed:	the	election	of	a	president	for	the	Asociación.	Gonzalo	suggested	that	a	capable	
representative	should	be	chosen,	one	that	was	skilled	in	leading	it	successfully	through	the	
negotiations	 and	 the	 project’s	 consolidation.	 I	 was	 nominated	 in	 a	 shortlist	 of	 three	
candidates,	alongside	Heredia	and	another	member.	Heredia	obtained	11	votes	against	the	
eight	 that	 I	 obtained.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 votes	 for	Heredia	 came	 from	 the	 groups	 of	 the	
Churintzio	municipality,	as	well	as	the	SPRs	that	supported	Lino	(Jiménez)	and	Saúl	(Azteca).		
Irma	who	insisted	I	was	the	right	person,	nominated	me	for	the	position	of	secretary,	
and	Lino51	also	nominated	himself	for	the	same	post.	The	voting	favored	Lino,	while	Ampa52	
(Los	Pinos)	was	unanimously	proposed	as	treasurer.	The	statutory	auditing	committee	was	
formed	by	Julio	César	(Biotecnológicos),	Avelino	and	Rodolfo	from	Churintzio.		
																																																						
50	Accepting	a	position	in	the	Asociación	meant	to	focus	on	an	important	part	of	the	network,	trying	to	
understand	the	organizing	processes	and	networks	in	the	context	of	participatory	regional	development.	
51	Lino	 represented	 the	group	 Jiménez;	 the	PRD	ruled	 Jiménez	and	he	had	been	public	 trustee.	His	 link	with	
“Chacho”	[municipal	president	of	Jiménez]	favoured	him	to	be	in	the	first	ten	SPRs.		
52	Ampa	had	an	unfinished	degree	in	administration	and	had	been	a	students’	leader	during	the	creation	of	the	
Emiliano	 Zapata	 high	 school;	 she	 had	 been	 student	 of	 Rafa	 Lp	 at	 the	 time	when	 Gonzalo	was	 the	 school	
director.		
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When	everything	seemed	to	have	been	dealt	with,	the	election	of	the	substitutes	was	
still	unfinished.	So,	we	voted	on	the	proposal	that	those	who	had	had	the	second	place	in	the	
polling	would	hold	those	positions.	The	proposal	was	accepted	unanimously	and	therefore,	
myself,	Esperanza	and	Gracian	were	elected	as	President,	Secretary	and	Treasurer	substitutes	
respectively.	I	then	understood	that	the	network	was	enrolling	me	into	the	project	and	that	
the	SPR	representatives	were	considering	me	as	a	propitious	actor	for	their	purposes.		
The	representation	in	the	Asociación	was	due	to	various	situations	and	the	Asociación's	
president	(Heredia)	was	favoured	by	his	former	lobbying	and	career.	However,	I	believe	that	
Heredia’s	 appointment	 was	 a	 strategy	 of	 Gonzalo	 who	 sought	 to	 position	 himself	 at	 the	
conference	table.	The	relationship	between	Heredia	and	Gonzalo	went	beyond	the	Asociación	
via	SUPLADER,	since	Heredia	was	also	a	member	of	SUPLADER	representing	an	NGO	and	the	
biological	 fertilizers	 SPR	 (MAA).	 Lino	was	 a	 good	 speaker	 so	 he	 could	 be	 useful	 in	 certain	
occasions,	 and	 Ampa	 had	 demonstrated	 to	 have	 administrative	 expertise	 -and	 also	 could	
perform	well	 in	public.	 In	all	 these	cases,	the	existing	network	supported	and	elected	 local	
celebrities	in	the	Asociación’s	positions	with	whom	they	identified.		
When	writing	and	transcribing	the	meeting’s	reports	for	 its	subsequent	signature,	a	
number	 of	 inconsistencies	 were	 detected.	 The	 SPR	 Coenenses	 was	 not	 included	 in	 the	
Asociación’s	deed,	although	they	were	present	at	the	meeting.	The	SPR	Maldonado	had	been	
listed	 twice,	while	Gracian	 held	 the	 position	 of	main	 treasurer	 in	 the	 place	 of	 Ampa	who	
remained	as	substitute.	The	organized	legal	concept	was	a	SPR	instead	of	a	USPR.	The	omission	
of	the	letter	U	in	USPR	implied	that	it	was	only	a	SPR	instead	of	a	USPR.	Such	mistake	was	also	
detected	at	 the	Secretariat	of	Finance	and	 the	Public	Registry	of	Property	and	Commerce.	
Nevertheless,	the	initial	application	for	the	name	before	the	Secretariat	of	Foreign	Affairs	(SRE)	
was	correct,	but	not	so	the	answer	 from	the	Notary	Office	to	the	SRE.	The	Notary	Office’s	
solution	was	to	send	an	explanatory	note	regarding	the	multiple	mistakes	that	were	identified	
in	 the	minutes,	 attaching	 the	 explanatory	 note	 to	 the	 original	minutes.	 The	Notary	Office	
apologized	for	their	mistakes	saying	that	the	applicants	would	ratify	the	minutes.	However,	
the	members	believed	that	the	Notary	Office	did	not	make	a	correct	verification.	Finally,	the	
Asociación	was	registered	under	number	445	(four-hundred	and	forty-five),	volume	15,	before	
the	Notary	Office	119	and	 ratified	 in	 the	Public	Registry	of	Property	and	Commerce	 to	be	
effective	against	third	parties.	
The	organization	and	association	of	the	28	SPRs	in	a	Regional	Greenhouses	Association	
was	news	in	Michoacán,	though	the	organization	was	confined	to	a	strategy	foreseen	by	JLB	
firm	and	SEPLADE	in	Zacapu.	Now,	having	the	Asociación	fully	organized,	it	was	expected	that	
the	funds	for	the	greenhouses	would	start	flowing	through	the	trust	fund.	It	was	also	expected	
that	 the	 collective’s	 representatives	 would	 establish	 negotiations	 with	 the	 appropriate	
government	agencies.	
In	the	information	given	by	JLB,	it	was	not	clear	who	from	the	involved	officials	would	
manage	the	project.	SEPLADE	called	for	participation	but	at	the	same	time	distanced	itself	from	
the	negotiations	that	JLB	suggested.	Soon	thereafter,	it	became	clear	what	this	firm	wanted:	
to	obtain	funding	from	SUPLADER	and	SEDAGRO	by	using	a	concept	such	as	the	newly	created	
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Asociación,	since	in	a	document	issued	by	SEDAGRO	it	was	stated	that	there	would	be	a	support	
of	USD	200,000	for	the	Asociación,	hence	the	interest	in	organizing	it.	While	the	interpretation	
among	the	various	SPRs	varied,	it	was	assumed	that	USD	10,000	had	been	authorized	for	each	
of	 the	 first	 20	 greenhouses.	 The	 SPRs	 all	 wanted	 to	 be	 considered	 among	 the	 first	 20	
associations,	 which	 would	 guarantee	 access	 to	 the	 funds	 authorized	 by	 SUPLADER	 and	
SEDAGRO	for	the	project.	This	prompted	the	actions	in	pursuit	of	the	money,	but	such	“going	
for	the	dough”	also	caused	inevitable	conflict	among	SPRs.		
After	 having	 looked	 through	 the	 Asociación's	 file,	 SEPLADE	 Zacapu	 presented	 their	
selection	of	the	first	20	SPRs	that	would	receive	funding	from	SEPLADE	and	SEDAGRO,	leaving	
behind	 the	 following	 eight	 SPRs:	 Movimiento	 ciudadano	 de	 Mujeres,	 Cortijo	 Nuevo,	 La	
Jabonera,	 Deyna,	 Maldonado,	 La	 Piedad	 Chiquita,	 Purépechas	 and	 Laredo.	 Given	 this	
situation,	the	eight	SPRs	raised	the	question	as	to	the	selection	criteria	applied	by	SEPLADE.	
Gonzalo	stated	that	in	the	first	phase	these	SPRs	had	been	prioritized	in	order	to	stimulate	the	
development	 of	 their	 municipalities.	 With	 the	 Asociación’s	 creation,	 the	 number	 had	
increased	 to	 28	 greenhouses	 of	 half	 a	 hectare	 each.	 However,	 only	 20	 SPRs	 would	 have	
authorized	resources.	The	10	initial	groups	proposed	by	their	city	councils,	were	joined	by	10	
SPRs	 more,	 backed	 by	 the	 SEPLADE.	 Although	 the	 other	 eight	 groups	 were	 part	 of	 the	
Asociación,	 they	were	excluded	 in	 the	allocation	of	 resources.	When	new	applications	and	
groups	were	included	in	the	Asociación,	appealing	to	SUPLADER	regulations	to	be	considered	
as	civil	partners,	funding	policies	started	to	be	disputed.	This	led	to	conflict	and	negotiation,	
as	well	as	 to	 self-management	and	 learning,	outlined	 in	 the	Asociación’s	game	 that	 I	have	
named	“going	for	the	dough”.	
 
 
Conclusion:	Honey	for	bees	
This	 chapter	 has	 described	 the	 politicized	 organizing	 processes	 used	 to	 implement	 the	
greenhouse	 project	 in	 the	 Zacapu	 Ciénega	 region.	 This	 way	 of	 promoting	 top-down	
development	 constitutes	 a	 questionable	 approach	 that	 limits	 development	 and	which	 has	
been	widely	criticized	by	authors	such	as	Escobar	(2011),	Esteva	(2000)	and	Ferguson	(1994).	
I	have	shown	that	the	intervention	by	SEPLADE	and	SUPLADER	were	far	from	a	linear	process	
following	certain	rules;	rather,	it	was	subject	to	an	unpredictable	set	of	actions	and	strategies	
carried	out	by	the	actors	involved	in	the	project.	The	actors	bend	the	rules	in	such	way	that	
they	could	consolidate	their	often	pre-existing	networks.	The	reinterpretation	and	adaptation	
of	the	procedures	allowed	the	actors	to	add	eight	groups	to	the	project,	and	to	modify	the	
amounts	of	project	funds	to	be	invested,	as	well	as	the	conditioning	of	the	project	to	obtain	a	
bank	credit	line,	technical	support	and	the	marketing	of	the	tomatoes.	Funds	and	actors	were	
mobilized	in	order	to	boost	the	constitution	of	28	SPRs	and	the	Asociación.	
‘Development’,	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 project,	 has	 different	 interpretations.	 Initially,	
SUPLADER	considered	to	favour	participating	councils,	and	thus	ensure	the	construction	of	10	
greenhouses	in	the	first	phase.	Greenhouses	would	be	managed	by	the	beneficiaries	of	each	
SPR,	 and	 included	 local	 officials	 and	 their	 families.	 These	 practices	 were	 contrary	 to	 the	
expected	inclusion	and	participation	of	citizens	envisaged	by	SUPLADER.	The	promoters	of	this	
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initiative	justified	by	arguing	for	the	benefits	of	the	project	for	the	region	at	large.	Under	this	
logic,	 the	 suggested	 model	 of	 extension	 meant	 that	 groups	 interested	 in	 replicating	 the	
experience	 should	copy	 implementation	of	 the	greenhouses	by	using	 their	own	 resources.	
However,	because	of	the	high	costs	this	was	impossible	for	applicants	with	little	capital.	An	
option	was	to	work	collectively	by	combining	the	resources	and	capabilities	of	their	networks.	
In	the	absence	of	mechanisms	defined	to	implement	the	project,	stakeholders	enrolled	
the	 JLB	 firm,	 which	 was	 clearly	 after	 the	 money	 (la	 lana)	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 by	
enrolling	 certain	 key	 actors,	 such	 as	 local	 delegate	 (Gonzalo).	 During	 the	 first	 interfaces,	
Gonzalo	and	JLB’s	firm’s	perspectives	on	the	development	project	appeared	compatible.	The	
participation	and	impact	of	these	emerging	actors	was	not	fully	foreseen	in	the	planning.	JLB’S	
firm	adapted	particular	features	to	the	project,	and	introduced	themselves	as	an	alternative	
by	 displaying	 repertoires	 and	 resources	 that	 made	 them	 look	 indispensable	 -	 particularly	
because	 of	 the	 networks	 of	 JLB’S	 firm,	 which	 included	 relationships	 with	 important	
government	actors	and	financial	institutions.	JLB’S	firm	aimed	to	establish	themselves,	not	only	
by	charging	for	the	services	it	provided,	but	also	in	the	handling	of	project	management.	
The	organization	as	SPR	provided	advantages	for	the	project’s	management	but	it	also	
involved	the	legitimization	of	the	groups	facing	governmental	supervision,	which	somehow	
bound	these	organizations	to	the	rules	and	regulations	established	by	the	State	institutions.	
SPR’s	 members	 often	 became	 involved	 without	 too	 much	 knowledge	 about	 the	 project’s	
objectives,	or	the	tomato	farming	production	process.	Their	incorporation	primarily	obeyed	
kinship	 relationships,	 friendship,	 or	 political	 or	 economic	 ties,	 or	 proximity	 to	 SUPLADER	
promoters.	The	project	planners	did	not	consider	the	actors’	previous	trajectories,	some	of	
which	included	participation	in	strong	(political)	networks.	
	The	original	proposal	was	modified	when	the	greenhouses	project	reached	20	groups.	
The	new	participants	assumed	they	were	being	considered	as	civil	partners	by	SUPLADER;	it	
was	then	when	a	conflict	of	interests	related	to	the	access	to	FDR	resources	broke	out	within	
SUPLADER.	The	Asociación	was	one	of	the	arenas	that	validated	the	representation	of	groups	
related	to	different	projects,	even	though	at	first	sight	it	was	only	a	regional	proposal	linked	
to	 the	 Asociación.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 there	 were	 28	 collectives	 or	 SPRs	 and	 several	
individual	projects,	one	for	each	involved	SPR.		All	these	actors,	including	the	20	enlisted	SPRs,	
were	trying	to	benefit	from	the	“dough”,	together	with	JLB’s	firm,	town	halls,	officials	and	their	
related	networks.	The	Asociación	was	organized	as	a	 strategy	 to	access	 the	public	 funding	
verbally	committed	by	SEDAGRO	to	be	used	to	promote	regional	development	through	the	
establishment	of	greenhouses.	Although	different	perspectives	of	the	involved	SPRs	regarding	
the	project	caused	some	diversity	of	opinion	within	the	Asociación,	its	organization	was	never	
at	 stake.	 Nevertheless,	 JLB’s	 firm	 preferred	 to	 shortcut	 negotiations	with	 the	 Asociación’s	
management	committee	in	order	to	get	a	strong	grip	on	the	negotiations.		
I	therefore	agree	with	Long	and	Van	der	Ploeg	(1989)	and	Long	(2001)	who	state	that	
the	 inclusion	of	external	elements	 that	have	 influence	over	actors’	 livelihoods	 is	bound	 to	
shatter	 and	 corrupt	 the	 process	 of	 change	 insofar	 as	 these	 elements	 wield	 political	 and	
economic	power.	 
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This	supports	the	idea	of	a	“battlefield	of	knowledge”	(Long	&	Long,	1992)	in	which	the	
actors’	 understandings,	 interests	 and	 values	 are	 opposed	 to	 one	 another.	 Knowledge,	
dilemmas	 and	 controversies	 are	 captured	 in	 this	 arena,	 represented	 in	 the	 intervention	
processes	by	documents,	regulations,	applications	or	written	statements.	All	of	this	is	imbued	
with	meanings	 and	 social	 practices.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 arena	 that	 the	 oppositions,	 conflicts,	 and	
contradictions	among	the	actors	in	the	greenhouse	project	emerge	with	great	clarity.	 
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CHAPTER	3		 JOINING	WITH	INSTITUTIONS	AND	ACTORS		
	
	
	
Introduction		
This	Chapter	describes	the	internal	organization	of	the	Asociación	and	its	20	member	SPRs,	as	
opposed	to	the	eight	SPRs	which	failed	to	obtain	resources	from	SUPLADER	and	SEDAGRO	and	
hence	 looked	 for	 alternative	 funding	 through	Alianza.	Power	 differences	 and	 conflicts	 are	
evident	 as	 the	 SPRs	 are	 linked	 to	 government	 agencies,	 municipalities,	 communities	 and	
external	agents	(e.g.	JLB’s	firm).	This	ensemble	of	actors	and	resources	is	driven	by	networks.	
In	my	description	of	their	practices,	I	show	the	multiplicity	of	actions	and	interfaces	between	
the	actors.	Also,	 as	 I	 show	 through	 the	 case	of	 La	 Jabonera,	opposition	of	other	networks	
tended	to	obstruct	processes	related	to	the	greenhouse	project.	The	chapter	also	describes	
how	the	various	actors	shield	off	resources	of	projects	intended	for	development,	protecting	
them	 through	 complex	 regulations	 and	 safeguards.	 JLB’s	 firm	 comes	 in	 to	offer	 their	well-
established	 relationships	 with	 the	Alianza	 program	 in	 search	 of	 a	 share	 of	 project	 funds.	
Political,	economic,	historical,	and	personal	networks	link	the	actors	within	and	outside	the	
Asociación,	who	all	have	their	own	motives	and	objectives	to	participate,	not	in	the	least	in	
pursuit	of	project	money.	Whether	or	not	SPRs	are	eligible	to	receive	funding	from	Alianza	
depends	on	the	operational	rules	and	the	way	power	holders	inside	the	organization	interpret	
them	in	order	to	support	or	reject	applications.	Also,	there	appear	to	be	“backdoors”	available	
to	actors	like	El	Campeón	who	hold	exclusive	memberships.		
	
			
Alianza	and	actors’	networks	
The	eight	SPRs	 that	were	not	with	the	Asocición	and	had	no	resources	 from	SUPLADER	and	
SEDAGRO,	started	looking	to	compensate	for	an	initial	investment	with	similar	amounts	from	
the	 Program	 for	 Countryside	 Alliance	 (Alianza	 para	 el	 Campo	 or	 Alianza).53	 After	 the	
Asociación	had	revised	the	rules	of	operation	for	managing	the	resources	of	Alianza,	JLB’S	firm	
recommended	 that	 an	 SPR	 could	 participate	 with	more	 than	 six	 active	 partners	 who	 had	
developed	a	project	and	were	supported	by	a	PSP.	The	PAPIR	and	PRODESCA54	subprograms	
could	provide	the	equipment	and	training	required,	as	long	as	the	applications	were	admitted	
to	the	Support	Centre	for	Rural	Development	(Centro	de	Apoyo	al	Desarrollo	Rural	or	CADER)	
at	the	registration	desk	of	Alianza.	The	reception	of	applications	for	the	program	of	the	year	
																																																						
53	The	Program	for	the	Countryside	Alliance	was	established	in	1996	and	revised	in	2003	as	Alianza	Contigo;	it	
has	 its	 origin	 in	 the	 Law	 of	 Sustainable	 Rural	 Development.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 Livestock,	 Rural	
Development,	Fisheries	and	Food	(SAGARPA)	established	the	standards	of	the	Alianza	program	based	on	Rural	
Development	Districts	(DDR)	and	Centres	for	Rural	Development	Support	(CADER).	
54	 Rural	 Investment	 Projects	 (PAPIR)	 and	 the	 Capacity	 Building	 Program	 in	 Rural	 Areas	 (PRODESCA);	 the	 first	
encourages	 investment	 in	 capital	 goods	 production	 projects	 with	 the	 application	 of	 technologies	 and	
productive	restructuring;	the	second	focuses	on	technical	assistance.	
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2003	was	about	to	close	and	JLB’s	firm	started	with	the	process	of	completing	the	file	for	eight	
SPRs	(figure	3.1)	involved	in	the	management.		
 
Figure	3.1	The	eight	SPRs	involved	in	the	negotiations	with	Alianza	
																											SPR	 Representative/Community	
	Purépechas	 	Abelardo	-	Copándaro	
	Deyna	 Chema	-	Zacapu	
	Maldonado	 	Jesús	-	Zacapu	
Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	 Margarita	-	Zacapu	
Cortijo	Nuevo	 Trujillo	-	Zacapu	
Laredo	 Fidencio	-	Laredo	
Piedad	Chiquita	 Irma	&	Armando	-	Zacapu		
	
The	amount	requested	from	PAPIR	was	USD	40,000	for	the	building	of	the	greenhouse,	which	
met	 the	 regulations:	 not	 to	 exceed	 the	 60%	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 greenhouse.	 For	 the	
implementation	of	the	project	through	PRODESCA,	the	amount	of	USD	2,500	for	each	SPR	was	
requested;	this	would	cover	the	process	of	resource	management,	supplier	election,	and	the	
tracking	of	the	investment	process	prior	to	the	operation.	The	previous	would	be	supervised	
by	the	Quality	Centre	for	Rural	Development	(Centro	de	Calidad	para	el	Desarrollo	Rural	or	
CECADER),	 a	 branch	 organization	 of	 PRODESCA	 in	 charge	 of	 supporting,	 supervising	 and	
evaluating	the	professional	services	granted,	which	implied	giving	the	rights	to	JLB’s	firm	for	
greenhouse	production	and	training.	A	collaborator	of	the	firm	surnamed	Lira	would	bring	the	
registry	as	a	PSP	and	would	endorse	the	project	with	USD	2,500	per	SPR.	
JLB’S	 firm	was	 financed	 in	 this	 way,	 since	 only	 data	 from	 his	 collaborator	 Lira	 was	
entered	as	a	PSP	 in	 the	 field	of	 training.	This	amount	of	USD	2,500	per	greenhouse	would	
emerge	on	behalf	of	the	PSP,	but	it	required	the	signature	of	the	representative	of	the	SPR	to	
ensure	that	he	or	she	was	authorized	to	provide	the	service.	The	training	proposal	specified	
that	the	members	would	form	groups	for	training	and	advice	and	would	be	linked	to	JLB’S	firm	
as	advisors.			
SEPLADE’s	delegate	in	Zacapu	then	proposed	me	as	a	liaison	–	something	JLB’S	firm	did	
not	like.	Lira	tried	to	prevent	me	from	being	involved	in	the	project	and	therefore	preferred	
not	to	contact	me	for	meetings.		I	felt	that	they	did	not	want	me	inside	the	project	since	JLB’S	
firm	wanted	to	remain	in	full	control	of	activities,	and	SEPLADE´s	manoeuvre	to	place	me	as	a	
liaison	could	obstruct	it.	Clearly,	SEPLADE´s	recommendation	was	not	based	on	my	training	as	
an	agronomist,	as	there	were	other	members	with	such	a	profile.	
Alianza	 management	 required	 that	 the	 production	 project	 should	 be	 linked	 to	 an	
agricultural	activity,	and	that	it	had	not	received	support	from	Alianza	for	the	same	purpose	
in	the	past	two	years.	The	SPR	which	requested	the	support	had	to	follow	the	track	of	a	joint	
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participation	scheme,	using	the	legal	concept	of	SPR	formation.55		An	SPR	being	a	legal	figure	
and	representing	an	organized	group,	the	authorized	amounts	were	increased.	In	addition,	if	
the	majority	of	the	SPR	members	were	female	(like	in	the	case	of	SPR	Piedad	Chiquita)	Alianza	
allocated	more	resources.	Because	the	opportunity	to	submit	the	applications	to	CADER	would	
close	in	five	days,	the	submission	of	the	applications	of	the	eight	SPR	with	Alianza	was	urgent.	
Therefore,	the	legal	representatives	of	the	SPR	had	to	complete	a	huge	expedient	for	each	SPR	
member.	Although	the	requirements	seemed	insurmountable	in	so	little	time,	Lira	offered	to	
fulfil	the	process.		The	application	had	a	cost	of	USD	300	and	another	USD	150	for	each	SPR	
for	Alianza	negotiations.	Moreover,	a	compensation	of	USD	300	was	agreed	for	Cristi	 (SPR	
Biotecnológicos)	 as	 assistant,	 who	 would	 help	 by	 filling	 out	 the	 eight	 files.	 Heredia,	 the	
president	of	the	Asociación,	endorsed	the	process	by	writing	a	letter	requesting	the	payment	
for	the	eight	SPRS	involved	in	the	process.	
For	the	building	of	the	greenhouse,	it	was	required	to	certify	the	legal	ownership	or	
possession	of	the	land	considered	in	the	project:	an	area	of	5,100	m2,	a	valid	permit	issued	by	
the	National	Water	 Commission	 (CONAGUA)	which	 stated	 the	 amount	 of	 cubic	meters	 of	
water	 (preferably	 from	 a	 deep	well	 due	 to	 sanitary	 reasons)	 expected	 to	 be	 used	 by	 the	
project.	The	project	documents	presented	by	JLB’S	firm	to	the	Asociación,	which	now	included	
the	20	SPRs,	would	serve	as	a	basis	for	the	eight	SPRs	managed	by	Alianza.		The	documents	
included	a	common	format	for	technical	specifications	of	social	and	environmental	 impact,	
but	with	different	locational	and	personal	details	of	the	beneficiaries.	For	the	most	part,	the	
project	was	 cloned	 -	meaning	 that	 only	 the	 name	 of	 the	 SPR	 that	 appeared	 in	 the	 digital	
application	was	replaced.	Also,	 the	 list	of	SPR	members,	 the	FODA	analysis	of	 its	Strengths,	
Weaknesses,	Opportunities,	Threats,	and	the	location	shown	in	a	sketch	manually	prepared	
by	the	representative	of	the	SPR	were	changed.	The	rest	of	the	applications	remained	equal.	
Finally,	a	copy	of	the	map	showing	the	 land	where	the	greenhouse	would	be	 installed	was	
attached	as	well	as	a	copy	of	the	permit	issued	by	the	CONAGUA.	Here,	a	difficulty	was	faced	
because	some	concessions	were	collective ejido’s	or	small	properties,	and	a	commitment	of	
the	management	responsible	for	the	mobile	resources	should	be	annexed	that	ensured	the	
availability	of	water	during	the	productive	stage	of	the	greenhouse.	
On	the	27th	of	September,	2003,	Lira	called	me	to	show	the	project	documents	with	
the	cover	page	of	the	SPR	Laredo	that	I	represented.	It	was	a	folder	of	100	sheets,	some	of	
them	printed	 in	colour,	with	diagrams,	charts,	and	tables;	 they	had	changed	some	specific	
data	 for	 the	 SPR,	 though	 the	 outline	 format	 and	 information	 of	 the	 INEGI	 municipal	
environment	were	the	same.	Unfortunately,	Lira	insisted	in	charging	the	negotiation	fees	even	
before	 JLB’S	 firm	 had	 completed	 the	 job,	 showing	 the	 letter	 signed	 by	 the	 Asociación’s	
president	and	addressed	to	each	representative	of	the	eight	SPR.	Once	the	USD	150	were	paid,	
Lira	issued	a	receipt.	The	receipt	was	quite	informal	since	it	was	handwritten	and	Lira	signed	
it	 on	behalf	 of	 JLB’S	 firm.	 The	date	 (August	 15,	 2003)	 that	was	printed	on	 the	 format	was	
																																																						
55	The	legal	figure	brings	elements	of	greater	identification	with	the	State,	unlike	established	groups.	
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scratched	and	“October	27”	was	crudely	written	on	top	of	it.	From	my	perspective,	this	receipt	
had	no	legal	or	accounting	validity.	
Before	handing	over	the	document,	still	holding	it	in	his	hand,	Lira	said	he	needed	the	
payment	for	the	writing	of	the	document,	because	the	second	stage	(the	processing	of	the	
credit)	had	already	started	and	 thus	 the	provision	of	USD	300	was	also	due.	 	Although	his	
attitude	was	challenging,	I	decided	to	ignore	it	and	asked	him	to	hand	me	a	valid	legal	receipt,	
since	I	would	not	accept	an	informal	handwritten	paper.	The	SPR	had	a	legal	personality	and	
the	fiscal	authorities	required	invoices	that	fulfilled	their	requirements.		Lira	reacted	abruptly:	
	
Lira:	"I	cannot	give	to	you	the	document	you	request	because	the	money	from	the	credit	
application	will	be	returned	once	the	application	is	processed."	
Fidencio:	"What	if	the	credit	for	the	SPR	does	not	apply	for	some	reason?"	
Lira:	"In	that	case,	the	investment	that	has	been	made	will	be	lost.	Some	risk	is	taken	in	
these	projects,	don’t	you	think?"	(SEPLADE	office,	27/10/2003)	
	
The	USD	300	for	the	international	credit	management	was	backed	by	a	document	indicating:	
“Proof	of	payment	for	photocopying,	stationery,	and	editing	and	assembling	the	projects”.	To	
probe	what	knowledge	Lira	had	of	the	credit	management,	 I	 invited	him	to	expand	on	the	
information	of	the	scheme	to	be	used.	Lira	said:	
	
…The	loan	will	be	managed	by	the	ULMA	Company	in	Spain	through	the	European	Union,	
and	Alianza	will	only	serve	as	guarantor	for	the	loan,	and	will	be	dealt	by	a	direct	transfer	
between	the	European	Union	and	Alianza.	You	would	not	understand	how	a	loan	of	this	
nature	is	managed.	(SEPLADE	office,	27/10/2003)	
	
Lira	assured	me	that	the	money	destined	to	manage	the	loan	(USD	84,000	for	the	Asociación	
as	a	whole)	would	be	returned	after	obtaining	the	credit,	and	that	support	by	SUPLADER	would	
be	given	to	JLB’S	firm	as	collateral;	otherwise,	any	further	doubts	should	be	consulted	with	
Gonzalo.	Lira	thus	implied	that	Gonzalo,	as	a	representative	of	SEPLADE,	supported	JLB’S	firm’s	
negotiations.	 It	 aimed	 to	 involve	 the	 resources	 of	 Alianza	 as	 a	 guarantee	 to	 solve	 an	
international	 loan	 with	 a	 decontextualized	 figure	 (the	 EU).	 	 According	 to	 the	 regulations,	
Alianza	managed	its	own	objectives	and	targets,	set	out	in	a	particular	project,	with	resources	
concentrated	in	a	trust	fund	that	would	be	released	to	the	greenhouse	supplier.	
The	tone	of	Lira’s	voice	attracted	the	attention	of	the	members	present	in	the	corridors	
of	the	SEPLADE	office,	and	they	came	to	see	what	was	happening.	Lira’s	strategy	was	clear:	
overcome	any	objection	I	or	the	governmental	authorities	had	regarding	the	participation	of	
JLB’S	 firm	 in	 the	 project,	 and	 spreading	 the	 image	 Gonzalo	 and	 some	 members	 had	
disseminated	about	me.	Rafa	Lp	(technician	of	SEPLADE)	tried	to	mediate,	but	his	intervention	
was	not	very	successful.		After	a	while,	we	agreed	with	Lira	that	the	SPR	Laredo	would	pay	the	
cost	of	the	project	and	that	he	would	provide	a	legal	receipt	for	the	payment	we	made	at	JLB’s	
office.	The	circumvention	of	tax	payments	by	JLB’S	firm	was	linked	to	strategies	to	avoid	any	
type	of	 legal	 responsibility.	To	deflect	attention,	 Lira	 said	 that	 it	was	not	 the	 right	 time	 to	
	 53	
consider	these	issues	since	the	negotiations	were	already	at	an	advanced	stage	and	time	was	
pressing;	Gonzalo	approved	of	this	assessment.	
The	 next	 day,	 another	 objection	was	made.	 Cristi	 urgently	 came	 looking	 for	me	 to	
inform	me	that,	apparently,	my	property	did	not	meet	the	required	dimensions	of	20	meters	
wide	 and	 that	 I	 should	 check	 that	with	 Lira.	A	 few	days	before,	 I	 had	 confirmed	 this	 field	
measurements	as	20	meters	wide	(although	my	property	measured	19.89	meters,	only	11	cm	
less	 than	was	 required).	 Therefore,	 it	would	 be	 necessary	 to	 draw	 another	 sketch,	 obtain	
another	property	title,	anew	permission	by	CONAGUA	and	a	new	endorsement	of	the	collective	
authority	 to	use	 that	 land.	 The	SPR	 Laredo	 thus	 selected	another	 field	 and,	once	 the	new	
documents	were	handed	over	to	Lira,	he	looked	at	them	and	paid	more	attention	to	the	sketch	
of	the	plot	of	land.		This	sketch	was	hand-drawn	and	gave	a	macro	level	picture,	specifying	the	
location	of	the	greenhouse	within	the	community.	Lira	asked	me	if	 it	was	more	than	half	a	
hectare;	I	said	that	it	was	5,600	m2.	He	saw	the	elongated	shape	of	the	land	and	told	me	that	
the	greenhouse	would	have	to	be	a	little	elongated,	but	that	there	was	no	problem:	he	even	
suggested	putting	other	measurements	 in	order	 to	meet	 the	 requirements	of	Alianza,	and	
then	I	could	use	another	field.	
The	FODA	analysis	presented	consisted	of	two	pages	and,	when	I	asked	Lira	about	the	
meaning	of	the	letter	"A"	(which	stands	for	amenazas	or	threats)	he	consulted	with	Zepeda	
(SPR	Agro-industriales),	who	was	in	another	room.	He	was	not	happy	because	it	meant	going	
the	extra	mile	for	an	activity,	which	would	serve	very	little	because	the	bureaucrats	refused	
to	read	these	lengthy	comments	when	reviewing	the	files.	
While	the	project	file	was	processed	at	SEPLADE’s	office	in	Zacapu,	Zepeda	complained	
about	the	number	of	documents	that	he	had	to	fill	out	for	the	project,	since	the	members	that	
he	represented	amounted	to	200.	Zepeda	explained	to	Lira	that	he	had	previously	consulted	
with	the	authorities	of	the	CADER	on	the	file	of	his	SPR,	and	the	officials	insisted	on	a	file	of	
200	members	with	the	requested	documentation.	It	was	necessary	that	Zepeda	settled	the	
issue	with	the	head	of	CADER	so	that	he	could	sign	as	a	representative	of	a	group	of	12	people	
participating	in	the	project,	therefore	being	able	to	complete	that	information.	Zepeda	stated	
that	the	greenhouse	project	was	just	one	of	many	projects	that	the	SPR	Agro-industriales56	
participated	in.	Lira	said	that	it	was	indistinct	which	partners	of	Zepeda's	SPR	were	considered	
for	the	project.	He	expressed:	“For	me,	this	is	business,”	implying	that	he	was	in	it	mainly	for	
the	money.		
Alianza	requirements	were	expressed	in	a	table	contained	in	the	project	documents	
made	 by	 JLB’S	 firm	 for	 each	 SPR.	 The	 SPR	 representative	would	 collect	 the	 documentation	
requested,	and	it	was	common	that	the	all	members	of	the	SPR	would	attend	the	process	to	
complete	it	to	ensure	that	they	would	not	have	to	travel	back	to	the	communities	for	missing	
data.	However,	 Cristi	 requested	 the	members’	 documents	 that	 had	been	previously	 taken	
																																																						
56	This	SPR	had	experience	in	project	management	related	to	the	production	and	marketing	of	duckweed	in	the	
swamp.	In	addition,	it	had	links	with	institutions	such	as	the	CADER,	SEPLADE	and	some	municipalities.	
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away,	and	emphasized	the	urgent	need	to	deliver	them,	which	resulted	into	a	chaos	with	many	
members	having	to	consult	with	Cristi	on	particular	cases.	
Jesús,	the	representative	of	the	SPR	Maldonado,	was	in	the	same	situation.	In	an	effort	
to	 cover	 his	 bonds	 as	 a	 senior	 officer	 in	 Zacapu,	 he	 was	 nominated	 to	 act	 as	 a	 legal	
representative	of	the	SPR	and	get	resources	from	Alianza.	He	now	demanded	a	fee	for	signing	
the	application.	In	these	cases,	Cristi	was	supported	by	Pancho57	(SPR	Comanja)	and	by	Zepeda,	
who	were	both	agricultural	engineers	with	experience	in	SPR	management.	Both	suggested	
reaching	an	agreement	with	the	current	representative.	Once	the	funds	had	been	obtained,	it	
would	be	necessary	to	make	an	adjustment	in	the	SPR	management	committee	through	an	
Assembly	Act	notarized	and	registered	 in	the	commercial	registry.	Chema	(SPR	Deyna)	and	
Trujillo	(SPR	Cortijo),	who	appeared	as	legal	representatives	in	their	respective	SPRs,	had	not	
had	that	problem	as	civil	servants	of	the	municipality	of	Zacapu	since	they	were	responsible	
for	Sports,	and	the	Cleaning	department,	respectively,	and	it	seems	they	did	not	care	about	
the	conflict	of	interest	with	being	members	of	the	SPR.	
Cristi	 often	 made	 recommendations	 to	 the	 SPRs	 without	 consulting	 the	 CADER.	
Consequently,	the	CADER	rejected	various	documents	in	the	file.	 	This	happened	with	Irma,	
who	represented,	along	with	her	husband	Armando,	the	SPR	La	Piedad	Chiquita.	Irma	arrived	
from	CADER	and	went	to	look	up	information	about	the	water	concession	she	shared	with	her	
neighbour,	Espinoza	(SPR	Marijo).	Irma	and	Armando	had	decided	to	sell	a	fraction	of	the	farm	
they	owned	on	 the	outskirts	of	 Zacapu,	 and	with	 it,	 a	part	of	 the	water	 rights	 granted	by	
CONAGUA;	now	the	documents	did	not	reflect	these	new	conditions.	Cristi	claimed	that	Irma's	
SPR	should	present	the	authorization	referring	to	the	size	that	the	SPR	currently	had	-	the	latter	
being	a	requirement	by	Alianza.		
Cristi	and	Lira	also	helped	in	shaping	the	file	of	the	SPR	La	Jabonera	of	the	municipality	
of	Tlazazalca.	Roberto58,	who	represented	the	SPR,	was	accompanied	by	two	members,	and	
they	were	all	dressed	in	the	typical	way	of	their	region:	hat,	blue	jeans,	boots,	and	plaid	shirts,	
just	like	the	group	members	of	Copándaro	(SPR	Purépechas)	represented	by	Abelardo.	Despite	
the	one	hour	distance	between	Zacapu,	Tlazazalca,	and	Copándaro	members	were	eager	to	
apply	and	quickly	provided	the	documents	and	data	for	their	file.		Abelardo	supported	his	son,	
an	agronomist	graduate	based	in	Morelia;	the	SPR	La	Jabonera	also	had	a	similar	support.	As	
Roberto	said:	
 
For	these	procedures,	an	agricultural	engineer	from	the	community	[Tlazazalca]	used	to	
help	us	[SPR	La	Jabonera]	59	but,	due	to	the	lack	of	opportunities,	he	eventually	left	to	
																																																						
57	Pancho	had	been	municipal	president	in	Coeneo	and,	representing	a	SPR,	he	had	participated	in	BANRURAL	and	
sand	mining	projects	in	the	Comanja	community,	municipality	of	Coeneo.	
58	He	was	also	president	of	the	Tlazazalca	livestock	association.	
59	The	partners	are	identified	with	the	term	"community"	instead	of	ejido.		The	latter	was	a	construction	of	the	
Mexican	State,	and	was	associated	with	existing	references.	 	 In	 this	way,	 the	community	 included	 features	
broader	 than	 the	ejido,	which	 is	 associated	with	 the	 rights	 to	 the	 resources	 allocated	 by	 the	 State	 to	 the	
ejidatarios.	
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the	United	States.	We’ve	talked	with	him	and	he	is	waiting	for	a	favourable	response	to	
manage	the	greenhouses	so	that	he	can	come	back	(Roberto,	SPR	La	Jabonera,	Tlazazalca,	
27/10/2003).	
	
Tlazazalca	is	a	municipality	with	high	rates	of	emigration,	including	professionals.	Tlazazalca	
belonged	 to	 another	 demarcation	 of	 CADER;	 the	 file	 of	 La	 Jabonera	 would	 have	 to	 be	
submitted	to	the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro.	However,	the	operating	rules	of	Alianza	did	not	
specify	that	municipalities	should	support	an	application.	The	CADER	of	Tanganccuaro	insisted	
that	 the	 initiative	 should	 first	 be	 approved	by	 the	Municipal	 Council	 for	 Sustainable	 Rural	
Development	(CMDRS)	and	incorporated	into	municipal	planning,	although	the	municipality	
did	not	provide	resources	for	the	project.	Similar	cases	–	like	that	of	SPR	Laredo	-	happened	
during	the	negotiations	of	Alianza.	
The	municipalities	of	Zacapu,	Tlazazalca	and	Jiménez	did	not	have	any	objection	giving	
their	permission	to	the	respective	SPRs,	while	the	municipality	of	Coeneo,	due	to	the	political	
differences	with	some	members	of	the	SPR	Laredo,	did	not	agree	to	support	the	request	of	
that	SPR.	The	members	thought	that	the	current	municipality	of	Coeneo	denied	the	support	
to	the	communities	that	did	not	vote	for	PRI	in	the	municipal	election.	This	conjecture	derived	
from	the	declaration	of	the	then	municipal	union	leader	in	the	community	of	Ojo	de	Agüita.	
Before,	Rafa	(SPR	Laredo)	had	submitted	a	request	to	Alianza	to	acquire	a	milking	machine	
and	was	not	notified	by	the	municipality	of	the	satisfactory	process	of	the	negotiations,	so	
CADER	had	only	notified	the	beneficiaries	through	municipality.	CMDRS	revised	Rafa's	request	
and	determined	that	it	could	not	be	granted	because	the	request	did	not	need	the	support,	
although	 the	 beneficiary	 was	 committed	 to	 contribute	 with	 the	 specified	 amount	 -	 thus	
following	 Alianza’s	 guidelines.	 This	 caused	 arguments	 between	 Rafa	 and	 the	 municipal	
president	of	Coeneo.	
When	 I	 interviewed,	 together	 with	 some	 members	 of	 SPR	 Laredo,	 the	 municipal	
president	of	Coeneo	(Raúl)	and	explained	the	benefits	that	the	greenhouse	would	have	for	
the	 municipality,	 he	 expressed	 his	 perception	 of	 municipal	 development,	 giving	 us	 as	 a	
reference	a	roof	tile	producer	of	the	community	of	Matugeo,	who	was	well	accepted	at	the	
regional	and	state	markets.	Raúl	explained:	
	
A	priest	in	the	Comanja	community	produced	honey	and	he	did	very	well.	However,	other	
individuals,	 upon	 noticing	 the	 profitable	 activity	 of	 the	 priest,	 invested	 in	 the	 same,	
bringing	in	bees	that	competed	and	damaged	the	ones	of	the	priest.	This	activity	then	
stopped	 being	 profitable	 for	 him.	 Another	 case,	 the	 Agua	 Caliente	 [mushrooms]	
greenhouse	 supported	by	 the	 same	municipality:	 once	 it	was	working	 and	producing,	
several	people	interested	in	producing	mushrooms	emerged,	which,	without	a	doubt,	will	
flood	 the	 local	market.	 The	 same	 happened	with	 the	 fattening	 of	 calves	 for	meat	 in	
several	communities	of	the	municipality,	and	now	it	stopped	being	a	good	business	due	
to	 the	 saturation	 of	 the	 regional	market.	 It	 is	 better	 that	 the	 tile	 producer	 does	 not	
disclose	 his	 activity	 because	 there	 are	 interested	 people	 who	 haunt	 opportunities	 of	
where	to	invest	(Raúl,	municipality	of	Coeneo,	3/10/2003).	
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The	 perception	 of	 the	 municipal	 president	 of	 Coeneo	 was	 related	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	
market	niches	without	showing	the	strategies	to	consolidate	a	project.	For	the	office	on	duty,	
the	greenhouses	should	be	introduced	in	Coeneo	in	a	restrictive	way,	giving	privilege	to	the	
SPR	Coenenses	that	was	already	involved.	With	the	intention	of	bringing	the	matter	of	the	
project	in	front	of	the	other	members	of	the	municipality,	the	municipal	president	invited	us	
to	 the	 next	 town	 hall	 meeting.	 That	 day,	 and	 after	 listening	 to	 that	 request,	 the	 council	
manifested	 that	 they	 knew	 nothing	 of	 the	 issue	 and	 that	 the	 settled	 commitments	 with	
Alianza	from	the	municipality	should	only	come	from	the	CMDRS.	The	“endorsement”	of	the	
Municipal	Council	increased	the	autocratic	levels,	thus	all	projects	in	the	suburbs	that	would	
involve	a	state	and	federal	management	should	be	registered	and	endorsed	by	the	Municipal	
Council	and	the	approval	would	proceed	when	the	project	was	seen	to	be	in	accord	with	the	
Municipal	 Development	 Plan.	 In	 the	 process,	 the	 municipality	 reviewed	 the	 beneficiary’s	
records	and	then	consulted	with	the	ejido	authority.	After	this,	feasibility	of	the	project	was	
reasserted	and	 resources	were	granted.	When/if	 the	ejido	was	 involved	 in	using	collective	
resources,	 the	 ejido	 commissioners,	 the	 vigilance	 councils	 or	 municipal	 authorities	 would	
intervene	as	the	trustees.	
Meanwhile,	trustee	Elsa	(from	Coeneo)	did	not	recognize	El	Campeón	of	SPR	Laredo	as	
an	 agricultural	 producer,	 and	 denied	 her	 signature	 on	 the	 requested	 document.60	 	 It	 was	
necessary	for	Rafa	to	go	and	see	her	so	she	could	sign	and	seal	the	documents	of	El	Campeón,	
arguing	that	the	request	was	specified	to	belong	to	an	“organization,	group	or	be	a	producer”;	
in	this	case	El	Campeón	belonged	to	a	group	(an	SPR).		In	the	document,	it	was	stated	that	the	
person	 interested	 had	worked	 in	 peace	 and	 in	 harmony	with	 the	 community.	 Finally,	 the	
trustee	acknowledged	the	inclusion	of	El	Campeón	thanks	to	the	intervention	of	Rafa,	who	
was	a	 recognized	 trader	 in	Coeneo,	as	well	as	 the	Ruíz	and	Lagunas	 families	 (the	 trustee's	
families)	who	were	friends	with	each	other.	Obtaining	the	guarantees	involved	political	action	
e.g.	 facing	 the	municipal	 authorities.	 Some	 SPRs	 in	 the	municipalities	would	manage	 their	
project	outside	the	CMDRS.		El	Campeón,	who	was	part	of	SPR	Laredo,	knew	the	requirements	
of	Alianza	and	was	committed	to	talk	to	the	functionaries	of	CADER	to	look	for	a	solution.	
After	delivering	the	documentation	to	Cristi,	she	insisted	that	there	was	information	
missing	from	SPR	Laredo,	so	I	proposed	that	together	we	would	set	up	a	file	for	Alianza.		In	a	
few	minutes,	we	filled	in	forms	and	completed	the	application.	After	this,	Cristi	distributed	
this	file	so	it	could	serve	as	a	guide	to	the	other	SPR	representatives.		Gonzalo,	who	was	aware	
of	the	advance	payments	and	having	noticed	the	deficiencies	in	the	filling	out	of	the	files,	now	
doubted	of	the	efficiency	of	Cristi	for	this	purpose.	In	Gonzalo's	opinion,	the	actions	of	the	
managers	delayed	the	process	and	generated	confusion	amongst	the	members.	Lira,	in	a	rush	
to	complete	the	paperwork	and	be	paid	for	his	services,	did	not	pay	attention	to	details	in	the	
requirements	requested	in	SAGARPA	offices.	After	gathering	the	necessary	documents,	six	SPR	
files	were	finished	and	ready	for	Alianza:	Deyna,	Maldonado,	Laredo,	Cortijo,	Piedad	Chiquita,	
																																																						
60	El	Campeón	was	not	an	ejidatario;	he	occasionally	helped	a	farm	owned	by	the	Ruiz	family.	
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and	Purépechas.61	Lira	added	the	number	onto	the	applications;	this	number	was	held	as	a	
Professional	 Service	 Provider	 (PSP),	 recalling	 that	with	 this,	 the	 SPRs’	 commitment	would	
validate	the	USD	12,500	authorized	funds,	which	would	be	contributed	by	Alianza	in	relation	
to	the	payment	of	the	six	projects.	The	next	day,	the	representative	of	each	of	the	SPRs	would	
deliver	the	file	to	CADER.	
The	strategies	used	by	JLB's	office	 in	the	making	and	caring	of	the	copyrights	of	the	
project’s	document	would	leave	the	SPR	dependent	on	JLB’S	firm	in	front	of	Alianza	and	other	
associated	agencies.	 The	absence	of	 the	 legal	personality	of	 JLB’S	 firm	contrasted	with	 the	
constitutional	requirements	requested	for	the	SPR	by	the	involved	instances,	as	JLB’S	firm	did	
not	 exist	 legally.	 The	 State	 facilitated	 these	 mechanisms	 and	 even	 promoted	 them,	
establishing	ambiguous	regulations	 that,	 in	practice,	were	salvable	 to	private	advisers	who	
knew	 the	Alianza	 programs	 in	detail,	 adjusting	 the	 regulations	and	covering	 the	necessary	
requirements	through	a	payment	at	the	expense	of	the	beneficiaries.	In	the	amount	requested	
from	government	programs,	the	payment	made	in	advance	was	not	done	to	the	advisers,	nor	
was	any	authorization	of	resources	ensured.	Although	the	described	negotiations	appeared	
as	linear	and	consecutive,	they	were	not;	instead,	they	were	a	series	of	coordinated	processes	
that	relied	on	links	to	networks	involved	as	a	firm	or	as	PSP	that	were	needed	to	validate	the	
application.	
	
	
Negotiations	with	Alianza	
When	it	was	agreed	to	process	the	Alianza	request	at	the	desk	of	CADER,	Lira	assisted	as	PSP	
associated	with	the	project.	It	was	foreseen	that	JLB’S	firm	would	support	the	representatives	
of	the	six	SPRs	in	the	presentation	of	the	documents;	the	regulations	stated	that	there	would	
be	a	personalized	negotiation.	Donaciano	was	in	charge	of	the	desk	of	Alianza	and	a	secretary	
helped	him	to	capture	the	data	from	the	applications	in	a	computer	system	designed	for	this	
purpose.	The	officials	would	check	the	information	of	the	manually	completed	forms,	as	print-
outs,	and	would	thereupon	put	them	into	a	digital	format.	This	task	not	only	duplicated	the	
work	done	previously	by	Cristi,	it	also	made	the	processing	task	more	time	consuming,	sloppy	
and	 tedious,	 given	 the	 little	 legible	 handwriting,	 and	 sometimes	 incomplete	 information.	
Entering	 the	 information	 into	 the	 computer	 system,	 however,	 enabled	 to	 compare	 the	
information	 with	 large	 databases	 from	 other	 government	 instances	 such	 as	 PROCAMPO,	
Alianza,	 CONAGUA,	Hacienda	 (RFC)	 and	Renapo62	 (CURP),	 and	 look	 for	 compatibility	 and/or	
overlaps.	
While	this	was	happening,	some	SPR	representatives	conversed	with	CADER	officials.	
Irma,	who	was	a	long-time	friend	of	Donaciano,	explained	the	situation	related	to	the	water	
issue	 to	him.	Donaciano	checked	 Irma’s	CONAGUA	concession	and,	after	he	consulted	with	
CONAGUA’s	secretary,	he	finished	and	filed	the	water	request	of	Irma’s	SPR.	While	awaiting	
																																																						
61	Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	was	not	filed	and	La	Jabonera	was	not	accepted.	
62	National	Population	Registry.	
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their	turn	at	the	desk,	Chema	(Deyna)	and	Jesús	(Maldonado)	conversed	cordially	with	Rojas,	
the	person	responsible	for	CADER.	Chema	knew	him	from	a	long	time	ago	and	he	introduced	
Jesús	 to	him.	Rojas	 listened	attentively	 to	 the	 story	of	 the	 SPR	 -	 among	others	 its	wish	 to	
change	the	representative	in	favour	of	Jesús.	Rojas	suggested	proceeding	with	the	application	
as	the	nominee	had	signed	it,	and	implement	the	change	once	the	money	was	authorized.	
Rojas	explained	that	money	 (for	buying	materials)	would	be	allocated	to	the	SPR	and	that,	
although	 the	 authorization	 letter	 would	 be	 issued	 with	 the	 name	 of	 the	 previous	 legal	
representative	of	the	SPR,	this	could	later	be	changed	by	means	of	ratification,	which	would	
be	an	internal	procedure	and	would	not	alter	the	authorization.	
Outside	CADER's	office,	El	Campeón	(SPR	Laredo)	waited	his	turn	to	talk	to	Rojas.	When	
he	 met	 him,	 he	 identified	 himself	 with	 his	 state	 government	 official’s	 credential63	 and	
explained	what	had	happened	in	Coeneo	related	to	the	endorsement	of	the	Laredo	project.	El	
Campeón	expressed	that	some	networks	supported	him,	including	his	relationship	with	Leonel	
Godoy	(former	secretary	of	the	government	of	Michoacán	and	national	president	of	the	PRD),	
and	governor	Cardenas	Batel’s	family	-	relationships	that	were	established	back	in	the	1970s.	
Once	Rojas	had	superficially	reviewed	the	file	properly	ordered	and	presented	by	El	Campeón,	
he	said	he	had	no	objection	accepting	Alianza's	request.	He	explained	that	although	it	was	
intended	to	keep	municipality	coordination	at	the	CMDRS,	the	negotiations	with	Alianza	were	
independent.	 Rojas	 then	 interrupted	Donaciano	 for	 a	moment	 and	 asked	 him	 to	 properly	
attend	El	Campeón.	By	that	moment,	Abelardo	(SPR	Purépechas)	was	approached	by	Lira,	who	
had	noticed	 the	attention	given	 to	El	Campeón	 and	expressing	his	dissatisfaction	with	 the	
apparent	 attention	 he	 received.	 Rojas	 emphasized	 El	 Campeón	 was	 an	 agent	 of	 the	
government64	 and	 advised	 Lira	 “not	 to	 behave	 with	 arrogance".	 Once	 calmed	 down,	 Lira	
checked	on	El	Campeón’s	relationship	with	me	and	the	government,	asking	El	Campeón	about	
me.	Skilfully	El	Campeón	replied:	"At	this	moment	Inge	Fidencio	is	having	interviews	with	some	
people	of	the	Morelia	City	Government".	El	Campeón	said	this	in	a	loud	voice	so	the	people	
present	 could	 hear	 him.	 This	made	 Lira	 even	more	 nervous.	 It	was	 a	 clever	 strategy	 of	El	
Campeón	to	endorse	me	with	the	present	SPRs	and	JLB's	firm,	seeking	to	facilitate	efforts	with	
CADER.	Meanwhile,	as	we	were	at	CADER’s	office,	Lira	did	not	stop	telling	El	Campeón	to	be	
																																																						
63	It	was	common	for	El	Campeón	to	be	present	at	CADER	to	manage	or	follow	up	third	parties’	requests.	
64	El	Campeón	worked	at	a	gas	station	in	Lázaro	Cardenas	city;	there	he	met	Cuauhtemoc	Cárdenas’	nephew,	
Cárdenas	Solorzano.	El	Campeón	then	became	a	gardener	at	Cuauhtemoc	Cardenas'	house,	where	he	related	
to	Leonel	Godoy.	When	Godoy	was	secretary	of	 the	Government	 (Lázaro	Cardenas	Batel’s	Administration),	
conflicts	arose	in	the	colony	where	El	Campeón	lived.	People	had	bought	plots	and	began	to	build	their	houses.	
After	a	few	years,	the	owner	who	had	sold	the	land	died	without	issuing	the	corresponding	deeds.	Then	the	
son	of	a	local	cacique	tried	to	seize	the	land	and	evict	the	settlers.	The	struggle	for	the	defence	of	the	colony	
began.	 As	 the	 conflict	 grew,	 El	Campeón	was	 identified	 as	 leader	 of	 the	movement,	 receiving	 threats	 and	
pressures.	El	Campeón	relates:	“I	was	arrested	because	of	being	identified	as	a	leader	[I	do	not	consider	myself	
a	 leader].	Since	 I	was	tortured	and	threatened	of	death,	 I	didn't	complain,	 I	 remained	silent.	Then,	 I	 forgot	
about	the	beatings	and	I	got	Goosebumps	seeing	800	people	cooperating	to	pay	the	bail	outside	the	delegation.	
To	 cheer	me	 up,	 people	 said	 I	was	 being	 considered	 as	 a	 champion	 -	 "El	 Campeón".	 At	 this	 point,	 Godoy	
intervened	and	appointed	El	Campeón	as	government	assistant.	
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quiet.	After	the	application	was	admitted,	a	control	sheet	representing	an	initiated	procedure	
to	Alianza	was	obtained	through	CADER's	office.	This	occurred	to	the	six	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	
which	 attended	 the	 CADER	 located	 in	 Zacapu.	 The	 SPR	Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	
represented	by	Margarita	did	not	present	any	documents	for	the	greenhouse	project;	they	
had	more	interest	in	the	mushroom	project.	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 help	 provided	 by	 Zacapu's	 CADER,	 in	 Tangancícuaro	 the	 SPR	 La	
Jabonera’s	file	was	not	accepted.	At	that	time,	the	members	of	the	SPR	had	assured	Cristi	and	
Lira	that	the	file	would	not	be	accepted	in	Tlazazalca,	because	they	were	members	of	the	PRD	
and	the	people	responsible	of	Tlazazalca's	CADER	were	PRI	supporters.	JLB’S	firm	had	not	paid	
attention	to	these	details,	ensuring	that	the	application	would	be	submitted	to	CADER's	office	
without	problems.	However,	the	head	of	CADER	refused	to	receive	the	application	arguing	that	
the	water	concession	did	not	meet	the	requirements	for	the	project.	The	stakeholders	had	
included	a	permit	to	use	water	from	a	dam	close	to	the	terrain	supposed	to	be	used	to	build	
the	greenhouses.	The	water	use	permit	was	not	 issued	by	CONAGUA,	but	by	 the	municipal	
authority.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 get	 the	 SPR's	 documents	 admitted,	 the	municipal	 president	 of	
Tlazazalca65	went	 to	 the	CADER	 in	Tangancícuaro	 to	 testify	he	had	granted	permission,	but	
CADER'S	 official	 declined	 the	 document	 arguing	 that	 Alianza's	 terms	 specified	 the	 water	
authorization	should	come	from	CONAGUA.		
Although	 the	 operational	 rules	 in	 Alianza	 program	 were	 established,	 there	 was	
evidence	 that	 those	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 them	 at	 CADER	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	
interpret	them	in	such	way	that	they	could	support	or	reject	applications	according	their	own	
criteria.	 Of	 course,	 this	 decision	 was	 based	 on	 the	 relationship	 that	 existed	 between	 the	
actors.	The	power	associated	with	those	responsible	for	processing	the	requests	of	Alianza	in	
both	CADERs	(Zacapu	and	Tangancícuaro)	was	different.	In	Tangancícuaro,	the	actors	of	SPR	
La	Jabonera	were	aware	of	the	inherent	historicity	of	who	would	not	accept	their	file	(CADER	
officer).	 The	 capabilities	 of	 the	 SPR	 La	 Jabonera	 were	 not	 enough	 –	 and	 neither	 were	
Asociación’s	or,	for	that	matter,	JLB’S	contacts.	The	official	did	not	openly	deny	support	to	the	
SPR	-	he	only	made	an	interpretation	of	Alianza	procedures	and	rules	in	such	way	that	he	made	
them	coherent	with	his	political	inclination.	
	
	
The	Asociación	and	its	project	
The	20	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	had	the	resources	committed	by	the	Secretariat	of	Agricultural	
Development	(SEDAGRO)	and	SUPLADER.	In	the	Constitutive	Act	of	the	Asociación,	equal	rights	
and	obligations	were	established	 for	 all	 partners.	 Yet,	 inside	 the	newly	 formed	Asociación	
there	 were	 different	 perceptions	 and	 purposes:	 for	 the	 SPRs	 it	 formed	 a	 mechanism	 for	
representation	 and	management,	 for	 some	 implementers,	 a	 strategy	 of	 how	 to	meet	 the	
targets	set	in	the	projects;	on	his	part,	for	JLB	the	Asociación	meant	a	way	to	benefit	from	the	
funds	of	the	authorized	project.	For	planners	such	as	Gonzalo,	the	Asociación	should	promote	
																																																						
65	The	municipal	president	of	Tlazazalca	participated	in	SPR	La	Jabonera.	
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regional	development,	while	other	partners	considered	the	SPR	and	Asociación	a	way	to	access	
the	cash	flows	from	the	project.	Development	intermediaries	‒ like	JLB’s	firm	– were	also	after	
the	 project	money	 and	 the	 services	 they	 provided	 should	 be	 paid	 immediately,	while	 the	
beneficiaries	would	have	to	wait	for	the	results	of	the	project	negotiations	to	access	the	cash.	
However,	a	successful	outcome	of	the	negotiations	did	not	assure	obtaining	project	funding.	
There	were	no	linear	processes	specified	in	the	regulations	which	gave	room	for	shortcuts	to	
be	used	by	actors	and	networks	to	reach	their	goal.	
Due	to	comments	made	by	officials	such	as	the	president	of	Tanhuato,	it	was	suspected	
that	Silvano	(from	SEDAGRO)	was	hesitant	about	JLB	firm's	intentions	and	would	thus	intend	
to	keep	track	of	what	JLB	was	doing	in	the	region.	Apparently,	JLB	had	a	history	of	borrowing	
money	from	groups	by	using	a	standard	project	document,	and	make	between	USD	200	and	
400	 from	 each	 organized	 SPR	 with	 it	 (arguing	 that	 he	 could	 obtain	 resources	 from	 the	
government	in	order	to	build	the	greenhouses).	However,	once	his	strategy	had	shown	not	to	
be	effective	in	one	State,	he	had	moved	to	other	States	and	again	worked	together	with	the	
officials	 in	 charge.	 Despite	 these	 facts	 the	 Asociación	 recognized	 JLB’s	 ability	 to	 dazzle	
resources	as	Lino	(Asociación‘s	secretary)	said:	
	
Let	 JLB	 work	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 project’s	 resources.	 He	 "weighs	 heavily"	 [he	 is	
important]	there,	and	he	is	doing	his	job.	Once	he	helps	us	obtaining	federal	and	state	
resources,	and	based	on	proposals,	we	decide	 if	we	work	with	him	or	not	 (Lino,	Road	
Zamora-Zacapu,	09/12/2003).		
 
JLB’S	firm	was	consistent	with	the	required	conditions	of	the	project	before	they	predicted	that	
government	 funds	 would	 serve	 to	 endorse	 a	 loan	 from	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	
greenhouses	 provider.	 Now	 they	 stated	 the	marketeer	would	 follow	 that	 financing	 route;	
while	for	the	project,	it	was	proposed	to	open	a	trust	fund	to	deposit	the	money	authorized	
by	 FIRCO,	 FIRA,	 SEDAGRO,	 SUPLADER,	Alianza,	 the	 Joint	 Fund	 for	 Industrial	 Development	 of	
Michoacán	(FOMICH),	as	well	as	the	partners’	contributions.	The	amount	handled	would	be	
part	of	the	Shared	Risk	Trust	(FINCA).	In	talks	held	in	August	2003	with	JLB,	he	said:	
	
Liquid	guarantees	with	 the	Fideicomiso	de	Riesgo	Compartido	 (FIRCO)	will	be	achieved	
through	the	support	of	Mendoza	Zazueta	as	CEO.	By	having	these	liquid	guarantees	we	
will	head	to	FIRA	to	manage	FINCA	-	they	have	already	successfully	evaluated	the	project	
(JLB,	SEPLADE	office,	22/08/2003).	
 
This	was	reiterated	by	showing	a	letter	signed	by	a	FIRA	officer	residing	in	Morelia.	To	open	
the	trust	fund	a	minimum	deposit	of	USD	800	was	required	by	the	Asociación,	plus	a	monthly	
payment	of	USD	150.	For	 this	purpose,	a	 form	used	by	 the	 trust	obtained	 from	the	BBVA-
Bancomer	 bank	 adapted	 to	 the	 Asociación	 and	 the	 resources	 SEDAGRO	 promised	 were	
presented.	 There	 were	 doubts	 about	 the	 trust	 JLB	 proposed	 for	 the	Asociación,	 involving	
governmental	offices.	On	September	9,	2003	a	representation	of	the	Asociación	went	to	the	
Bancomer	branch	 in	Zacapu	where	bank	manager	Toño	met	 them	 in	a	hurry	 since	he	was	
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about	to	go	out	to	eat.	Toño	was	a	member	of	SPR	Puerta	Chica.66	He	said	he	had	reviewed	
the	agreement	and	although	he	was	not	totally	convinced,	he	considered	that	this	should	be	
reviewed	by	the	Bank's	lawyer	to	get	a	better	opinion.	Ampa	(from	SPR	Los	Pinos)	who	was	
present,	was	not	satisfied	with	the	response	of	the	executive	of	the	Bank	and	said:	
	
It	is	strange	that	a	bank	executive	[Toño]	shows	such	little	interest	in	signing	a	trust	for	
almost	USD	two	million,	arguing	that	he	has	to	have	lunch.	I	have	worked	at	banks,	and	I	
do	 not	 understand	 how	 little	 importance	 is	 given	 to	 the	 Asociación's	 trust	 (Ampa,	
Bancomer-Zacapu,	09/12/2003).		
 
The	Asociación	had	agreed	to	request	USD	100	per	SPR	to	start	a	trust	fund.	The	last	week	of	
2003	USD	2,000	were	collected	and	the	Asociación	opened	an	account	at	the	BBVA	Bancomer	
branch	in	Morelia.	JLB	helped	to	speed	up	the	process	of	opening	the	account,	which	normally	
takes	a	month,	achieving	 it	 in	 less	 than	a	week.	With	this	step,	members	who	had	not	yet	
contributed	were	put	under	pressure	by	making	them	understand	that,	within	a	 few	days,	
SEDAGRO	and	other	departments	would	transfer	the	money	to	the	Trust	Fund;	if	they	had	not	
yet	paid	their	contribution	by	then	they	would	be	excluded	from	the	SPR	project.	
JLB	sought	to	obtain	an	account	for	the	Asociación.	the	financial	resources	would	be	
deposited	 there,	 arguing	 that	 the	 price	 for	 steel	 (an	 essential	 element	 in	 greenhouse	
construction)	would	possibly	increase	by	the	end	of	the	year,	and	that	he	wished	to	respect	
the	price	agreed	with	ULMA	in	Spain.	Hence	the	haste	for	the	opening	of	the	trust	fund,	while	
in	the	meantime	he	requested	a	monetary	advance	from	the	treasurer	of	the	Asociación.	
The	Asociación	 consulted	about	 the	 trust	 fund	with	René	 from	FOMICH.	The	official	
offered	to	review	the	trust	documents	and	deliver	his	observations	as	soon	as	possible.	Lino	
(Secretary	of	 the	Asociación)	 considered	 that	 JLB	 knew	 the	document	more	precisely	 than	
René,	who	would	not	contribute	much.	Lino	said:	
	
At	an	earlier	meeting,	René	[from	FOMICH]	and	JLB	have	discussed	the	trust.	JLB	silenced	
René	with	his	arguments	in	the	presence	of	FIRA	and	FIRCO.	After	that,	they	went	to	eat	
all	together	(Lino,	FOMICH	office,	9/12/2003).	
 
This	 hinted	 that	 JLB	 could	 better	 handle	 the	 situation	 because	 he	 knew	 how	 to	 persuade	
officials,	and	project	negotiations	would	be	carried	out	in	a	more	informal	way.	As	stated	later,	
some	officials	felt	comfortable	establishing	negotiations	while	enjoying	a	meal	at	restaurants	
in	Morelia.	
However,	not	all	 the	 institutions	enrolled	 in	 the	project	considered	 JLB’s	 leadership	
appropriate.	Rogelio	(from	FIRCO),	after	a	meeting	in	Zacapu,	would	later	say	that	there	was	
little	 participation	 from	 producers,	 and	 that	 they	 (FIRCO)	 would	 see	 from	 afar	 how	 this	
initiative	(the	greenhouse	project)	would	develop.	Gonzalo	considered	that	Heredia,	being	the	
																																																						
66	The	group	was	named	after	the	small	town	closest	to	Zacapu	city.	
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Asociación's	president,	should	participate	in	the	Asociación’s	efforts	to	change	the	perception	
on	institutions	like	FIRCO.	Gonzalo	explained:	
	
Heredia	after	being	municipal	president	[of	Churintzio]	adopted	the	habit	of	using	others	
for	his	own	affairs.	If	Heredia	seeks	to	work	with	the	Asociación	he	must	do	it	like	in	any	
committee,	and	accompany	JLB	in	the	negotiations	in	front	of	the	institutions	like	FIRCO,	
SEDAGRO,	FIRA,	and	FOMICH	(Gonzalo,	SEPLADE	office,	26/01/2004).	
 
Gonzalo	 also	 felt	 that	 by	 allowing	 JLB	 to	 interact	with	 the	 SPRs	 he	was	 undermining	 their	
presence	in	the	Asociación	-	which	could	cause	the	slow-down	of	negotiations	due	to	lack	of	
participation.	JLB’	stakeholders	pledged	to	release	the	Letter	of	Intent	about	the	USD	200,000	
for	the	20	greenhouses	supported	by	SEDAGRO	and	to	deposit	them	at	the	Asociación's	trust.	
In	this	Letter,	the	names	of	the	SPRs	that	would	benefit	were	not	mentioned,	except	Ruta	de	
la	Libertad	USPR.	At	SEPLADE's	level,	the	20	SEDAGRO	SPRs	were	already	being	considered,	in	
contrast	to	the	eight	which	followed	Alianza’s	management.	
Although	 FOMICH	 would	 give	 its	 reply	 regarding	 the	 Trust	 within	 three	 days	 (on	
December	23,	2003),	JLB	called	for	an	urgent	meeting	in	Morelia.	The	subject	of	the	meeting	
was	the	signing	of	the	Letter	of	Intent	by	SEDAGRO's	secretary	(Silvano).	The	form	used	for	the	
document	had	been	designed	by	JLB’S	firm,	requesting	that	the	treasury	of	Michoacán	manage	
the	 payment	 of	 the	 financial	 resources	 committed	 to	 the	Asociación.	 The	 document	 was	
signed	by	the	Asociación's	representatives	and	it	was	intended	that	SEDAGRO	would	sign	it	too.	
Gonzalo	considered	appropriate	that	I	were	present	at	the	meeting	were	JLB,	Lira	and	another	
engineer	from	the	firm	would	be	present.	Foreseeing	that	my	presence	would	have	an	adverse	
effect,	I	remembered	Gonzalo	about	the	incident	with	Lira	several	days	earlier,	motivated	by	
the	management	in	front	of	Alianza.	Gonzalo	was	calm,	and	said:	
	
Indeed,	they	told	me	you	and	Lira	had	an	argument.	I	think	you	were	right	to	know	more	
of	the	project	management.	For	this	reason,	some	members	of	the	Asociación	agree	that	
you	should	be	present	at	this	meeting	in	Morelia.	First,	you	must	listen	carefully	to	the	
speakers	and	then	raise	a	concern	from	your	side.	It	is	important	that	you	are	present	on	
topics	we	don't	know	anything	about	(Gonzalo,	SEPLADE	office,	4/11/2003).	
 
The	 enrolment	 process	 of	 SPRs	 in	 the	 Asociación	 was	 actively	 supported	 by	 the	 SPR	
representatives.	However,	the	chain	of	intermediaries	was	reduced	to	a	few	spokesmen,	in	
this	case	JLB’S	firm	and	the	Asociación‘s	managing	committee.	They	would	be	responsible	of	
negotiating	resources	for	the	Asociación	with	SEDAGRO.	However,	Gonzalo	did	not	agree	to	
this	situation,	so	he	recommended	that	I	should	travel	with	Ampa,	treasurer	of	the	Asociación,	
to	 the	 scheduled	meeting.67	We	drove	 from	Zacapu	 to	Morelia,	 and	during	 the	 trip	Ampa	
agreed	that	the	information	about	JLB'	office	was	ambiguous.	If	the	project	did	not	prosper,	
																																																						
67	At	that	moment,	I	better	understood	the	strategy	of	the	Ministry	of	Planning	and	State	Development	(SEPLADE)	
to	enrol	me	in	the	project:	namely	as	a	means	to	counter	the	influence	of	JBL’s	firm.		
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Ampa	planned	to	return	to	Querétaro.	At	the	time,	she	sought	to	help	manage	the	SPR,	she	
presented	 herself	 without	 being	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Los	 Pinos	 SPR.	 This	 caused	 conflicts	 in	
Ampa's	mind,	because	from	the	Asociación’s	perspective	she	had	been	foolish	when	she	was	
appointed	 as	 the	 Asociación's	 treasurer	 without	 being	 a	 member	 of	 an	 SPR.	 Outside	 the	
Asociación's	assembly,	with	the	consent	of	Ampa	and	the	managing	committee,	a	solution	was	
found	by	 registering	Gracian	 (SPR	 Puerta	 Chica)	 as	 title	 holder	 and	 a	 substitute	 for	Ampa.	
Although	the	Asociación’s	 internal	 regulations	regarding	the	membership	considered	these	
changes	(letting	Ampa	formally	be	the	substitute	treasurer),	 in	practice	she	was	the	acting	
treasurer.	This	situation	should	have	been	referred	to	by	the	assembly	of	the	Asociación;	this,	
however,	was	not	done	because	of	Ampa's	uncertainty	as	to	be	willing	to	appear	even	as	a	
substitute.68	
Gonzalo	and	Heredia	also	travelled	together	to	Morelia;	Gonzalo	had	made	Heredia	
aware	about	the	events	including	the	mistrust	around	JLB’S	firm.	Gonzalo	intended	to	inform	
the	Asociación's	partners	before	JLB’S	firm	would	urge	them	to	sign	a	document.	However,	like	
Lino	(the	secretary),	Heredia	insisted	that	we	would	let	JLB’S	firm	receive	the	project	resources	
because	he	trusted	JLB’S	firm's	contacts.	When	JLB	arrived	at	the	SEDAGRO	offices,	he	was	harsh	
to	some	members	of	the	Asociación	who	had	not	been	invited	to	the	meeting,	as	he	seemed	
aware	of	the	mistrust	aroused	against	him.	While	we	were	waiting	for	Gonzalo	and	Heredia,	
Ampa	 and	 I	 took	 the	 opportunity	 to	 eat	 at	 a	 restaurant	 across	 SEDAGRO.	 Lira	was	 having	
breakfast	there,	and	when	he	noticed	our	presence	he	asked:	"And	you,	what	did	you	come	
for?	The	meeting	does	not	involve	all	members	of	the	Asociación".	We	argued	that	we	had	
been	notified	about	it;	Ampa	said	that	we	should	be	present	in	our	role	as	deputies	(i.e.	as	
president	and	treasurer	of	the	Asociación).		
Gracian,	who	had	just	come	to	the	meeting,	signed	the	document	form	used	by	the	
Trust	as	treasurer	of	the	Asociación.	This	document	was	given	to	SEDAGRO's	lawyer,	but	the	
signatures	 of	 the	 three	 SEDAGRO	 officials	 appeared	 to	 be	 missing.	 It	 was	 signed	 by	 the	
managing	 committee	 only,	while	 the	missing	 officials	 never	 came	 to	 the	meeting.	 So,	 the	
commission	moved	to	the	office	of	SEDAGRO's	secretary,	looking	for	Silvano	(Secretary)	or	his	
assistant,	Wilfrido,	but	neither	of	them	were	available	at	that	time.	After	waiting	for	hours	at	
the	reception,	Silvano’s	secretary	appeared	and	told	us	that	the	meeting	was	postponed	to	
the	next	Wednesday.	This	situation	was	expected,	since	there	was	no	appointment	confirmed	
by	the	officials,	and	it	was	difficult	for	them	to	attend	and	sign	a	document	that	had	not	yet	
been	 reviewed	 by	 SEDAGRO's	 legal	 department.	 JLB	 supposed	 that	 the	 document’s	
management	 (after	being	signed)	could	easily	be	paid	by	the	state	treasury	by	moving	the	
resources	committed	to	the	Asociación	by	SEDAGRO	to	the	Trust.	Apparently	JLB’S	firm	were	
managing	 resources	 that	 way,	 regardless	 of	 the	 regulations.	 In	 any	 event:	 the	 procedure	
appeared	to	be	that	the	firms	should	get	related	to,	and	reach	verbal	agreements	with,	high	
level	officials	and	then	force	the	low-level	ones	to	perform	the	operational	actions	–	while	also	
																																																						
68	I	found	it	after	Ampa	showed	up	on	Credit	Bureau,	and	I	did	not	wish	to	damage	the	Asociación	dossier	by	
requiring	where	the	information	could	be	verified.	
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trying	to	formalise	agreements	in	the	Trust’s	template,	thus	imposing	the	production	of	an	
ambiguous	document	from	SEDAGRO's	Secretary.	
	
	
Conclusion	
The	 registration	 process	 described	 for	 Alianza	 corresponds	 with	 federal	 policies.	 State	
planning	seem	linear,	developing	in	stages	and	with	a	scope	aimed	to	keep	continuity.	Despite	
the	regulations,	however,	the	officers	in	charge	(for	example	at	CADER)	are	shown	to	apply	
personal	 and	 ambiguous	 criteria	 for	 the	 admission	 of	 SPRs.	 Informal	 relations	 with	
departmental	 officials	 appear	more	 relevant,	 often	 bypassing	 bureaucratic	 hierarchies.	 An	
example	 of	 this	 was	 El	 Campeón,	 who	 was	 associated	 with	 both	 government	 and	 non-
governmental	networks.	
	 Managing	project	resources	involved	negotiation	in	different	arenas	and	institutions	
that	were	not	considered	from	the	outset,	such	as	for	example	the	municipalities	and	CMDRS.	
However,	 in	practice	 the	 links	between	SUPLADER,	 the	project	and	 the	municipalities	were	
indivisible.	The	historicity	of	the	actors	and	their	political	and	ideological	networks	defined	the	
support	to	certain	SPRs	in	the	project.	The	twenty	SPRs	recommended	were	favoured	with	the	
resources	of	their	municipalities,	SUPLADER	and	SEDAGRO,	while	the	eight	remaining	SPRS	had	
to	find	alternative	paths	to	obtain	sufficient	resources.	In	the	absence	of	a	clear	path,	the	eight	
SPRs	depended	on	the	services	offered	by	JLB’S	firm.	
In	the	case	of	the	Asociación,	JBL’s	firm	and	SEPLADE	tried	to	organize	the	project.	JLB’s	
firm,	 especially,	 was	 relevant	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 project	 because	 of	 the	 firm’s	
acquaintance	 with	 networks	 that	 facilitated	 the	 processing	 of	 the	 applications	 and	 the	
adequate	 structuring	 of	 the	 project;	 this,	 in	 turn,	 would	 guarantee	 funding	 from	 several	
government	programs.	 Some	Asociación’s	members	 hoped	 that	 the	 skills,	 knowledge,	 and	
links	 of	 JLB’S	 firm	with	 officials	 and	 program	 orchestrators	would	 be	 beneficial	 to	 get	 the	
project	money	for	the	Asociación;	others	doubted	the	firm’s	strategy.		
As	the	project	progressed,	the	strategies	used	by	JLB‘s	firm	became	visible,	especially	
their	 interest	 in	 project	 money.	 Asociación	members	 were	 ambiguous:	 the	 management	
committee	 proposed	 that	 JLB’s	 firm	 continue	 with	 the	 management	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
Asociación,	while	other	partners	began	 to	doubt	 the	effectiveness	of	 JLB‘s	 services.	At	 the	
same	 time,	 actions	 of	 the	 eight	 SPRs	 that	were	 not	 united	 in	 the	Asociación	 appeared	 to	
require	 a	 lot	 of	 re-interpretation	 of	 their	 objectives,	 and	 needed	 to	 resolve	 unexpected	
obstacles.		
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CHAPTER	4	 IDENTIFYING	WITH	THE	GREENHOUSE	
	
	
Introduction	
Chapter	4	looks	at	the	movements,	feelings,	and	actions	of	the	28	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	and	
Alianza	regarding	the	growing	unease	with	the	interventions	by	JLB’s	firm,	and	the	need	to	
search	 for	 alternative	 service	 providers.	 Identifying	 with	 their	 own	 greenhouse	 project	
includes	 understanding	 about	 what	 a	 greenhouse	 or	 hydroponic	 vegetable	 production	 is	
supposed	to	be	and	do.	Since	most	members	of	the	28	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	and	Alianza	
have	no	clue	about	this,	visiting	other	greenhouses	enables	them	to	compare	features,	such	
as	automation,	food	safety	conditions,	and	the	aesthetic	quality	of	the	buildings.	However,	
when	different	groups	meet	and	networks	are	extended,	for	example	between	Zacapu	and	
Coeneo,	it	may	also	lead	to	friction	–	often	because	of	individual	behaviour.	The	visits	however	
do	have	the	important	function	of	showing	the	gap	between	the	reality	of	plant	production	
conditions	and	human	actions	and	the	ideal	greenhouse	model	proposed	by	an	experienced	
firm	 like	 JLB’s.	Members	 of	 the	Asociación	 started	 inviting	 other	 technical	 partners,	which	
ended	up	in	dividing	the	Asociación	between	SPRs	that	went	along	with	ACEA	which	providing	
a	“real”	type	greenhouse,	and	those	who	continued	with	JLB’s	firm	and	preferred	to	build	on	
an	“ideal”	type	greenhouse.	
	
	
Exchange	of	experiences:	Interaction	between	networks	
In	late	2003,	the	Asociación’s	members	held	a	meeting	at	the	SEPLADE	offices;	some	of	them	
expressed	their	feelings	of	distrust	towards	JLB.	Gonzalo	explained	that	in	the	Tanhuato	and	
Ecuandureo	municipalities,	located	in	the	SEPLADE	region	of	Zamora,	a	collective	greenhouse	
project	had	been	implemented,	which	JLB	had	advised	on.	After	a	while,	those	involved	had	
moved	away	from	JLB	and,	in	coordination	with	the	municipalities,	had	taken	control	of	the	
resources	 for	 the	 greenhouses.	 To	 find	 out	 more	 details	 about	 what	 had	 happened,	 the	
Asociación	agreed	to	arrange	a	meeting	with	the	municipal	president	of	Tanhuato	(Ramón)	
and	the	SEPLADE	delegate	in	Zamora	(Muñiz).		
The	president	of	the	Asociación	(Heredia)	was	visibly	upset	by	the	change	of	direction	
the	 assembly	 had	 taken	 by	 starting	 an	 investigation	 into	 the	 background	 of	 JLB's	 firm	 in	
another	 region,	 and	 argued	 he	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 attend	 the	 meeting	 on	 the	 day	 they	
arranged	for	him	to	talk	to	Ramón	and	Muñiz,	due	to	prior	commitments.	Therefore,	I	was	
appointed	to	take	up	that	task	as	acting	president	of	the	Asociación,	and	the	secretary	(Lino)	
offered	to	accompany	me.	
Tanhuato	is	located	on	the	border	with	Jalisco.	Upon	arrival,	we	introduced	ourselves	
at	the	local	council	and,	as	Gonzalo	had	suggested,	we	referred	to	SEPLADE	of	Zacapu.	Ramón	
appeared	to	be	a	calm	and	receptive	man	and	seemed	to	speak	with	sincerity.	He	explained	
that	during	a	greenhouse	exhibition	he	had	attended,	he	had	learned	about	other	options	for	
building	greenhouses	-	different	to	those	offered	by	JLB.	In	a	similar	way	to	Zacapu,	JLB's	firm	
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had	approached	the	Tanhuato	groups	to	manage	the	greenhouse	project.	The	firm	became	
involved	using	its	network,	which	included	officials	from	higher	levels	of	government	agencies.	
Ramón	told	us	that	JLB	had	also	proposed	in	Tanhuato	the	3.5%	annual	interest	scheme	to	be	
managed	by	the	European	banks,	with	only	a	30	percent	liquid	guarantee.	This	scheme	was	
similar	to	the	one	proposed	in	Zacapu.		
During	 the	 management	 period,	 Ramón	 had	 noticed	 a	 comment	 made	 by	 Silvano	
Aureoles69	in	relation	to	JLB	saying	that	he	had	left	discontented	groups	in	Zacatecas.	From	
that	point	onwards,	Ramón	together	with	the	parties	involved	began	to	make	inquiries	about	
JLB;	they	asked	at	the	Spanish	Embassy	and	found	no	information	that	identified	him	as	the	
ULMA	agent	or	anything	about	a	company	called	ULMA.	Ramón	recounted	what	had	been	said	
by	Lupita	Sánchez,	private	secretary	of	the	governor	(Cárdenas	Batel)	regarding	JLB:	Lira	(JLB’s	
partner)	often	showed	off	 in	 front	of	Lupita	Sánchez,	who	was	his	neighbour	 in	La	Piedad,	
Michoacán,	bragging	about	the	cars	and	the	luxury	homes	he	had	as	a	result	of	working	with	
greenhouses	in	Michoacán	(Municipality	of	Tanhuato,	03/12/03).	
Ramón	 said	 that	 the	 firm	had	also	managed	 similar	projects	 in	 states	 like	 Tabasco,	
Jalisco,	and	Aguascalientes,	and	he	stated	that	they	had	pocketed	money	from	producers	(in	
his	case	it	had	been	USD	250	per	group).	With	the	Asociación,	the	amount	had	even	been	USD	
450	per	group.	The	project	document	was	the	same,	and	several	officials	had	already	seen	it;	
its	 review	was	mixed,	 ranging	 from	 good	 to	 a	 badly	 "cloned”	 project.	 The	 strategy	 of	 the	
Tanhuato	groups	had	been	to	slowly	move	away	from	JLB	and	his	firm,	and	not	making	a	fuss	
about	it.	By	doing	this	they	had	tried	to	remain	on	good	terms	with	JLB.	
Once	the	situation	of	the	project	funds	in	Tanhuato	was	analyzed,	the	partners	decided	
to	decrease	the	SEDAGRO	resources	by	direct	administration,	and	then	allocate	them	directly	
to	each	group,	without	a	bid	or	tender.	Producers	contributed	30	percent,	which	amounted	
to	USD	80,000	for	five	greenhouses,	by	signing	an	agreement	with	SEDAGRO	and	then	the	FIRA-
Banco	del	Bajío	scheme	was	put	forward.	This	strategy	allowed	them	to	directly	reduce	the	
money	from	the	state	treasury,	avoiding	to	spend	the	USD	2,000	to	form	the	Trust	without	
JLB’s	 interference.	 Now	 the	 partners	 sought	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Rural	 Government	 Bank	
(Financiera	Rural),	which	did	not	ask	for	a	 liquid	guarantee;	 in	addition	to	this,	 they	would	
participate	 in	 added	 value	 schemes	 such	 as	 canneries	 and	 a	 distribution	 company.	At	 this	
stage,	it	was	feasible	to	be	supported	by	the	Shared	Risk	Trust	(FIRCO),	leaving	as	collateral	the	
invoice	of	a	tractor	or	other	personal	property.	
Lino	listened	attentively	and,	as	usual,	he	wrote	down	every	detail	in	his	book.	Ramón	
gave	us	reports	on	alternative	suppliers	of	greenhouses	like	Inverca,	ACEA,	and	MSC	(Spain).	
Other	companies,	such	as	New	Growing	System	(NGS)	guaranteed	the	sale	of	the	produce	and	
stated	 that	 they	 could	 work	 with	 FIRA	 projects.	 In	 Ramón’s	 opinion,	 ACEA	 (Agricultural	
Extension	 and	 Construction	 Consultants)	 offered	 the	 best	 price/quality	 balance.	 ACEA	 is	 a	
Mexican	 company	 located	 in	 Texcoco,	 with	 several	 years’	 experience	 in	 the	 greenhouse	
																																																						
69	Ministry	of	Agricultural	Development	(SEDAGRO).	
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market.	They	offered	half-hectare	greenhouses	for	USD	118,000.70	Ramón	provided	us	with	
information	about	ACEA’S	representative,	Vicente.	He	recommended	discretion,	as	he	did	not	
want	to	have	disagreements	with	JLB,	who	apparently	had	important	links	to	the	federal	and	
state	 governments.	 Ramón	 had	 heard	 JLB	 mention	 his	 friendship	 with	 Mendoza	 Zazueta	
(SAGARPA),	as	well	his	links	with	the	National	Agricultural	Confederation.	After	confirming	to	
Ramón	that	the	information	would	be	used	carefully	in	our	project,	we	left	for	Zamora.	
In	Zamora,	we	had	an	interview	with	the	SEPLADE	delegate	of	that	region,	Muñiz.	He	
was	a	man	of	about	45	years	of	age,	who	seemed	good-natured	and	approachable,	dressed	in	
a	suit	and,	although	he	had	a	political	appointment,	he	kindly	offered	to	take	us	to	the	Atacheo	
greenhouses.	Muñiz	put	us	in	contact	with	Nacho,	the	project	manager,	whom	we	met	a	few	
minutes	later.	We	introduced	ourselves	to	Nacho	and	explained	to	him	the	reason	for	our	visit;	
he	also	appeared	attentive	and	approachable.	Nacho	had	had	a	management	training	and	was	
a	 specialist	 in	 irrigation	 systems.	Nacho	explained	 that	 the	Atacheo	groups	were	 linked	 to	
PYMEXPORTA,	 a	 decentralized	 office,	 subsidized	 by	 the	 federal,	 state	 and	 municipal	
governments.	 PYMEXPORTA	 offered	 advice	 to	 groups	 for	 consolidating	 their	
commercialization	 plans	 through	 contact	with	Daniel	Díaz	 Barriga.	 These	 types	 of	 services	
were	mainly	offered	in	Zamora	for	agricultural	and	vegetable	production.	We	then	heard	him	
speak	 about	 “Soulfresh”	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 which	 supervised	 vegetable	 crops,	 and	 the	
government	support	provided	prior	to	the	sale	of	the	product	by	means	of	working	capital.	
The	 National	 Institute	 of	 Forestry,	 Agriculture	 and	 Livestock	 (INIFAP)	 and	 FIRA	 had	
supported	 the	 training,	 while	 the	 integrating	 company	 was	 being	 formed.	 This	 included	
training,	counselling	and	the	reuse	of	resources	within	the	company.	The	greenhouse	project,	
as	well	as	others	in	Atacheo,	was	driven	by	the	priest	of	Atacheo,	Father	Marcos.	In	this	case,	
programs	like	the	3x1	program71	with	migrants’	resources	were	available.		
When	 we	 arrived	 at	 the	 greenhouses,	 we	 were	 surprised	 by	 their	 size	 and	 good	
construction	quality.	It	was	also	the	first	time	we	had	seen	the	production	of	vegetables	in	a	
controlled	environment.	Therefore,	we	were	able	to	validate	that	what	JLB	had	mentioned	in	
theory	(and	which	ACEA	now	showed	in	reality),	and	aligned	with	the	needs	of	the	producers	
in	the	region.	The	building	was	less	automated,	but	it	had	mechanization.	Nacho	offered	to	
give	us	a	talk	in	the	Asociación	and	to	receive	visits	from	the	SPRs	in	Atacheo.	Lino	then	said	
he	was	surprised	by	the	greenhouses	and	that	the	news	would	be	welcomed	by	the	members	
of	the	Asociación.	Personally,	I	was	under	the	impression	that	the	information	learned	that	
day	did	not	surprise	Lino	at	all.	He	was	more	interested	in	having	the	information	to	discuss	
or	 process	 it	 later	 on	 in	 order	 to	 draw	 conclusions.	 In	 my	 opinion,	 I	 considered	 it	 an	
achievement	for	the	project	to	be	able	to	cultivate	products	like	tomato,	eggplant	and	chili	in	
the	greenhouse	in	the	way	the	producers	from	Atacheo	had	organized	themselves	to	get	the	
																																																						
70	These	greenhouses	were	semi-automatized;	they	did	not	have	a	computer	nor	the	sensors	they	needed	to	
carry	out	programmable	tasks.	
71	In	this	program,	the	migrants	participate	in	the	Economic	Development	Fund	and	put	in	a	quarter,	while	three	
levels	of	government	put	in	the	other	three	quarters.	
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project’s	resources,	based	on	the	description	from	the	municipal	president	of	Tanhuato	and	
confirmed	by	the	delegate	of	Zamora.	
When	we	arrived	at	SEPLADE	in	Zacapu,	I	had	an	in-depth	conversation	with	Gonzalo	
about	 what	 we	 had	 learned	 in	 Tanhuato	 and	 Atacheo,	 and	 he	 said	 that	 it	 confirmed	 his	
suspicions	about	the	project	and	that	now	we	had	reasons	to	refute	JLB’S	firm	and	propose	
alternatives.	Gonzalo	 had	measured	 the	 political	 cost	 of	 doing	 so.	 Lino	 proposed	 that	 the	
greenhouses	would	be	built	with	ACEA	while	JLB	would	manage	the	federal	resources.	Gonzalo	
looked	 at	 him	 and	 said,	 "You	 did	 not	 understand	 anything.	 The	 municipal	 president	 of	
Tanhuato	 has	 completely	 cut	 JLB	 out	 by	 ignoring	 him	 and	 they	went	 their	 separate	ways	
(SEPLADE,	03/12/03)”.	It	seems	that	Lino	had	its	own	perspective	regarding	JLB’s	interference,	
and	had	decided	to	be	on	his	side,	despite	the	arguments	obtained	that	day.	This	evidenced	
the	 different	 realities	 among	 the	 involved	 actors,	 Gonzalo,	 the	 municipal	 president	 of	
Tanhuato	and	Lino,	and	how	they	perceived	JLB’s	interference	in	different	ways.		
	
	
Identifying	with	a	greenhouse	
During	the	interview	with	Nacho	in	the	Atacheo	greenhouses	we	established	contact	so	that	
the	Asociación	 groups	 could	 visit	 the	 facilities.	 Now	 the	 partners	 of	 the	Asociación	 could	
compare	preconceived	features,	such	as	automation,	food	safety	conditions,	and	the	aesthetic	
quality	of	the	building.	Most	of	the	Asociación	members	who	visited	Atacheo	had	not	seen	
greenhouses	before,	much	fewer	had	seen	greenhouses	of	these	dimensions,	nor	had	anyone	
seen	 hydroponic	 vegetable	 production.	 These	 facilities	 reflected	 the	 usefulness	 and	 space	
required	to	cultivate	in	protected	environments.	The	initial	interpretation	of	a	greenhouse	had	
come	from	the	commercial	results	spoken	about	by	JLB,	but	with	the	intention	of	being	carried	
out	satisfactorily	under	his	management	only.	
To	 verify	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 greenhouses	 visited	 were	
presented.	At	 the	end	of	 an	Asociación	meeting	 in	 Zacapu,	Rafa	 Lp	 (a	 SEPLADE	 technician)	
introduced	 me	 to	 his	 wife	 Margarita,	 representative	 of	 the	 group	 Citizen	 Women’s	
Movement.72	Her	sister,	Violeta,	and	Reina,	from	the	Naranja	community,	accompanied	her.	
They	formed	the	executive	board	for	a	group	of	20	women,	who	sporadically	attended	the	
Asociación's	meetings.	 This	 SPR	wanted	 to	do	a	 tour	of	 the	Atacheo	greenhouses,	 and	we	
agreed	to	go	the	following	Saturday	morning	(on	January	4,	2004).	We	agreed	with	Polo	(SPR	
Laredo)	that	we	could	take	his	truck	to	Zamora,	and	we	picked	up	Rafa	Lp73	and	the	women's	
group	 at	 his	 house.	 The	members	 arrived	 punctually	 for	 the	 appointment	 and	while	 they	
waited,	they	chatted	and	drank	coffee	and	tea.	Rafa	Lp	and	Polo	already	knew	each	other	and	
																																																						
72	The	SPR	was	referred	to	as	the	Women’s	group.		
73	Those	that	knew	about	Rafa	Lp’	background	argued	that	he	used	the	projects	managed	by	the	government	for	
his	own	benefit.	
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had	seen	each	other	for	political	matters	within	the	PRD	party.	The	SPR	Bajo	Invernadero74	(of	
which	Rafa	Lp'	father	was	a	member’)	also	attended	the	visit.	
Upon	arriving	in	Zamora,	Nacho	and	Vicente	(representing	ACEA)	were	waiting	for	us,	
and	allowed	us	to	shoot	videos	inside	the	greenhouses.	They	were	interested	to	see	how	the	
progress	was	going	for	the	selection	of	the	company	that	would	build	the	greenhouses.	I	told	
them	we	were	still	reviewing	proposals	from	suppliers	and	that	we	would	decide	on	one	of	
them	in	a	few	days’	time.	I	pointed	out	that,	in	the	Asociación	so	far,	the	impact	of	the	Spanish	
greenhouses	 had	 been	 notorious.	 To	 this	 regard,	 Rafa	 Lp'	 father,	 who	 had	 a	 small	 family	
business	 dedicated	 to	 processing	 plastic,	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 strengthening	 the	
creation	of	Mexican	products	 to	 create	 jobs,	 economic	 impact	 and	 confidence	 in	our	own	
country’s	 businesses.	 Those	 present	 agreed	 that	we	 should	 design	 a	 joint	 strategy	 among	
stakeholders	to	boost	the	Mexican	company	ACEA.	Vicente	said	that	ACEA	was	certified	as	ISO	
9000,	and	they	would	keep	the	cost	the	same	as	the	greenhouses	of	Atacheo.	Meanwhile,	
Nacho	offered	to	train	partners	in	Atacheo	and	pay	them	while	learning.	
When	we	left	the	greenhouse,	another	group	from	La	Piedad	was	coming	in	that	had	
more	experience	working	with	greenhouses.	The	atmosphere	between	the	newcomers	and	
their	hosts	was	clearly	easy	going	and	stress-free.	This	visit	seemed	to	convince	even	more	
members	of	the	Asociación	to	get	involved	in	the	ACEA	greenhouse	project.		
After	showing	the	video	to	members	of	SPR	Laredo,	Rafa	 (SPR	Laredo)	proposed	to	
collect	ten	percent	of	the	SPR	contribution	for	the	project.	Polo	meanwhile	proposed	to	invite	
more	 people	 from	 Coeneo	 to	 see	 the	 Atacheo	 greenhouses	 and,	 at	 the	 end,	 praised	 the	
participation	of	the	women’s	group	from	Zacapu.	
Seeing	 a	 real	 greenhouse	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 SPRs’	 members.	 Interaction	 with	 the	
greenhouse,	the	living	entities	and	technology	changed	the	perspective	of	those	involved	and	
helped	 to	 strengthen	 the	 project,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 Later	 on,	 we	would	 see	 the	
learning	experience	led	to	rearrangements	to	adapt	to	this	new	reality	learning.	It	was	in	this	
way	that	the	collective	was	continuously	re-formed,	 in	each	 instance	needing	to	rearrange	
their	 conceptions	 of	 what	 they	 already	 knew,	 because	 the	 previous	 definition	 had	 lost	
relevance	for	understanding	the	current	one.	
	
	
Disagreements	among	the	networks	
Polo	told	Gloria	and	her	daughter	about	the	Atacheo	greenhouses,	showing	them	pictures	of	
our	visit,	while	Rafa	did	the	same	with	El	Campeón.	A	few	days	later,	the	greenhouse	project	
was	known	about	in	Coeneo.	This	suited	Polo,	because	the	people	in	Coeneo	considered	Polo	
was	 supporting	 and	 looking	 for	 new	 projects	 like	 greenhouses75.	 El	 Campeón,	 in	 turn,	
promoted	the	project	among	people	with	 low	socio-economic	status.	Several	women	were	
																																																						
74	The	family	of	Rafa	Lp	was	part	of	the	SPR	Bajo	 Invernadero.	They	were	well-known	business	people	 in	the	
clothing	industry	in	the	city	of	Zacapu.	His	father	managed	a	small	plastic	recycling	plant.	
75	Polo	sought	the	municipal	presidency	of	Coeneo.	
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interested	in	visiting	the	greenhouses	in	Atacheo.	In	talks	between	El	Campeón	and	Rafa	Lp	76	
it	was	agreed	that	there	would	be	a	visit	for	those	interested	on	Sunday,	February	1,	2004.	
The	group	that	Margarita	represented	in	Zacapu	would	be	the	link	with	the	group	of	women	
in	Coeneo.	
Besides	the	visit	to	the	greenhouses,	we	scheduled	an	interview	with	Father	Marcos	
from	Zamora,	so	that	he	could	share	his	experience	about	the	greenhouse	project	in	Atacheo.	
Rafa	Lp	proposed	to	 invite	the	group	of	women	from	Coeneo	to	see	the	Atacheo	projects.	
Meanwhile,	 Polo	 sought	 to	 consolidate	his	 networks	promoting	 technological	 alternatives,	
and	El	Campeón	sought	to	consolidate	real	and	immediate	alternatives	for	women	of	limited	
resources	 in	Coeneo.	Each	of	them	talked	to	me	separately.	The	three	actors	agreed	that	 I	
should	 be	 the	 link	 between	 the	 group	 of	 women	 from	 Zacapu	 and	 Coeneo	 and	 Nacho	
(greenhouse	administrator	in	Atacheo).	I	confirmed	the	visiting	dates	with	Nacho,	and	a	day	
before	with	 the	 actors	 from	Coeneo.	As	we	had	done	 the	 previous	 time,	we	would	 go	 to	
Zacapu	and	the	two	groups	would	attend	Atacheo	together.	On	the	day	we	had	agreed	to	
leave	Coeneo,	I	waited	for	a	group	of	ten	women	at	eight	o'clock.	El	Campeón	coordinated	the	
group's	departure,	stating	that	several	of	the	women	who	needed	the	support	of	the	project	
were	single	mothers	who	would	travel	with	their	babies.	
Given	this	new	eventuality,	we	sought	alternatives.	The	price	of	traveling	in	the	combi	
from	the	Zipiajo	community	was	quoted	at	USD	80	for	less	than	a	200km	round	trip.	We	opted	
to	take	Polo's	car	and	another	one	provided	by	Luz	(one	of	the	Coeneo	group	members),	which	
her	husband	would	drive.	El	Campeón	said	that	Luz	had	not	attended	previous	meetings.	El	
Campeón	warned	that	it	was	possible	that	the	PRI	would	send	some	"ears"	(informers),	which	
was	 common	 in	 these	 movements.	 I	 consider	 that	 the	 municipal	 president	 of	 Coeneo	
recognized	the	interest	of	those	promoting	visits	to	greenhouses	in	Atacheo	and	denied	any	
type	of	support	for	the	greenhouse	project,	because	his	political	position	of	the	project.	
When	we	arrived	at	the	greenhouses	in	Zamora,	Nacho	showed	interest	and	was	as	
approachable	as	ever,	and	despite	having	another	commitment,	he	postponed	it	to	coordinate	
the	visit	to	the	greenhouse.	While	Nacho	attended	to	the	Coeneo	group,	 I	went	to	get	the	
Zacapu	group	to	let	them	know	we	had	already	arrived.	The	Zacapu	group	was	surprised	to	
see	me.	They	were	in	the	parish	talking	to	Father	Marcos,	a	man	in	his	forties,	tall	in	stature,	
with	a	frank	and	determined	look.	His	motto	was	to	support	those	who	wanted	to	support	
themselves.	He	had	managed	to	set	up	several	productive	projects	that	aimed	to	create	better	
living	conditions.	Rafa	Lp	associated	Father	Marcos	with	liberation	theology	and	claimed	that	
he	had	a	direct	link	with	Martha	Sahagún,	a	native	of	Zamora	and	wife	of	President	Fox.	The	
priest	had	been	a	liaison	and	an	example	of	the	progress	of	greenhouse	projects	in	the	region	
of	Zamora.	Father	Marcos	apologized,	he	had	mass	in	a	few	minutes,	and	only	could	continue	
the	 conversation	after	 two	o’clock	 in	 the	afternoon.	Meanwhile,	we	 could	 visit	 the	 turkey	
production	project	that	he	had	been	counselling.	The	group	of	women	from	Zacapu	wanted	
Father	Marcos	to	be	one	of	their	advisers.	
																																																						
76	They	met	a	long	time	ago	in	the	Communist	Party	of	Mexico	(PCM),	and	then	in	the	PRD.	
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When	we	were	left	alone	and	had	let	them	know	that	the	Coeneo	group	had	arrived	
at	 the	greenhouses,	 I	 had	 the	 impression	 that	 the	presence	of	 the	Coeneo	group	was	not	
wanted.	That	morning	I	had	tried	to	communicate	via	cell	phone	with	Rafa	Lp	to	coordinate	
the	visit	to	the	greenhouses,	but	he	did	not	answer	-	which	I	found	odd	since	he	was	disciplined	
in	that	sense	and	tried	to	have	his	phone	close	by	whenever	there	was	a	meeting.	When	in	
Atacheo,	I	asked	Rafa	Lp	about	the	unfulfilled	appointment;	he	apologized	saying	he	had	left	
his	phone	at	home.	Then	we	moved	to	the	greenhouses	and	the	Coeneo	group	was	returning	
with	several	boxes	of	tomatoes	and	chilies	that	they	had	asked	Nacho	“for	free”.	This	was	the	
first	time	it	happened.	When	the	Zacapu	group	arrived,	the	Coeneo	group	mistook	them	for	
government	representatives,	especially	Margarita,	because	of	her	elegant	dress	and	manner	
of	speaking.	Luz	asked	them,	"How	much	support	will	you	(the	government)	give	me	to	build	
my	house	greenhouse?	Will	the	greenhouses	be	given	away?"	Margarita	(SPR	Women’s	Citizen	
Movement)	was	upset	and	could	not	hide	her	anger;	she	asked	me	to	move	away	a	little	with	
her	and	told	me:	“We	must	agree	among	advisors,	this	group	will	only	be	given	the	relevant	
information	after	we	have	talked"	(Atacheo,	01/02/04).	
Some	Zacapu	group	members	came	to	ask	me	about	 the	behaviour	of	 some	of	 the	
women	in	the	Coeneo	group,	and	I	told	them	that	the	relationship	between	the	two	groups	
should	be	established	between	them,	and	the	support	requests	would	be	as	they	decided.	
However,	some	women	of	the	Coeneo	group	had	hoped	to	secure	support	there	and	then	for	
the	greenhouses,	and	some	others	expected	distribution	of	cement	or	food,	clearly	searching	
for	 personal	 gain.	 Rafa	 Lp	 said:	 "René	 Sosa	 [SEPLADE	 technician	 and	Rafa’s	 colleague]	was	
wrong	to	promise	to	give	them	cement	in	Coeneo,	and	apparently	they	are	associating	us	with	
him"	(Atacheo,	01/02/04).	
It	seemed	that	some	women	of	the	Coeneo	group	sought	to	frustrate	the	participation	
of	their	group	in	the	initiative	of	the	projects.	The	origin	of	that	behaviour	was	associated	with	
their	individual	networks.	It	had	become	an	obvious	strategy	of	some	of	the	Coeneo	women	
to	avoid	linking	the	Coeneo	group	members	with	the	group	of	women	from	Zacapu.	
Opinions	 about	 the	 day	 continued	 when	 we	 went	 to	 see	 the	 turkey	 production	
projects,	bred	 in	both	a	modern	and	modest	manner.	Various	producers	and	stakeholders	
attended;	the	project	served	as	a	demonstration	module.	Luz'	husband	approached	the	place	
where	the	turkeys	were	kept	and	tried	to	take	some	to	the	trunk	of	his	car;	he	went	to	look	
for	the	person	in	charge	in	order	to	do	this,	and	when	he	was	unable	to	find	him,	he	gave	up	
the	attempt.	When	Reyna	saw	this,	she	said	to	me,	"It	 is	not	appropriate	that	we	take	the	
Coeneo	group	 to	see	Father	Marcos.	Luz	confuses	 the	other	women,	and	access	 to	Father	
Marcos	is	not	suitable,	not	until	we	strengthen	the	group"	(Atacheo,	01/02/04).	
After	spending	some	time	on	the	farm,	we	decided	to	return	to	Coeneo	and	eat	on	the	
way	back.	We	agreed	that	everyone	would	pay	for	his	or	her	own	food.	We	stopped	at	Plaza	
Tangancícuaro	where	they	sold	birria	 tacos.	After	eating,	Luz	asked	Margarita	 loudly	 if	 she	
would	pay	the	bill.	This	time,	Margarita	could	stand	it	no	more	and	was	visibly	upset.	I	did	not	
hear	everything	said	by	Margarita	because	I	was	further	behind	with	Gloria	and	her	daughter.	
When	we	arrived,	Margarita	was	seriously	at	odds	with	Luz	and	the	Coeneo	group	in	general.	
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They	 explained	 to	Margarita	 that	 Luz	 liked	 to	 joke	 and	 she	 should	 get	 used	 to	 it.	 Gloria	
supported	Luz,	arguing	that	she	was	involved	a	lot,	and	that	joking	was	part	of	her	character.	
On	the	way	back,	Luz's	husband	filled	up	the	tank	of	his	car	and	asked	for	reimbursement.	
Some	Coeneo	women	disagreed,	arguing	that	the	car	could	not	have	spent	that	much	gasoline	
on	such	a	short	trip,	insinuating	that	Luz	husband	intended	to	benefit	himself.	After	everybody	
contributed,	we	returned	safely	to	Coeneo.	
When	we	were	back	in	Coeneo,	we	talked	about	the	events	of	that	day	with	Polo,	Rafa	
and	El	Campeón.	Polo	and	Rafa	considered	that	the	organizational	structure	of	the	Coeneo	
group	was	established	by	the	municipal	political	PRD	affiliation,	while	El	Campeón	favoured	a	
non-partisan	social	organization.	Meanwhile,	the	Zacapu	group	was	trying	to	integrate	some	
of	the	Coeneo	group	members	into	their	network,	like	Father	Marcos.	For	this	purpose,	the	
women	of	Zacapu	and	Rafa	Lp	agreed	to	have	a	meeting	the	following	Wednesday	in	Coeneo,	
only	inviting	the	leaders	(Sele	and	Gloria).	
Reconciliation	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 of	 Zacapu	 and	 Coeneo	 described	 in	 this	
paragraph	did	not	happen	immediately.	The	rapprochement	between	the	networks	dealt	with	
in	this	section	show	their	fragility,	dynamism,	and	diversity,	as	well	as	how	each	actor-network	
proposes	its	own	strategy,	taking	into	account	its	expanding	network.	It	is	unclear	if	the	alleged	
links	between	Luz	and	other	members	with	the	municipal	president	of	Coeneo	have	influenced	
the	creation	of	premeditated	 friction	with	other	members.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	 there	 is	 the	
willingness	of	Sele	and	Gloria	-	close	to	Polo's	strategy	-	to	join	the	Zacapu	group.	The	political	
actors	from	Coeneo	(Polo,	El	Campeón	and	Rafa)	felt	that	the	participation	of	the	women’s	
group	should	be	confined	to	the	municipal	 level	and	be	included	as	part	of	their	networks.		
They	were	looking	for	immediate	material	benefits,	such	as	tomatoes,	food,	turkeys,	cement,	
and	a	greenhouse.		
	
	
Reconceptualising	the	greenhouse	
Over	 the	 following	 days,	 different	 groups	 from	 the	 Asociación	 continued	 to	 visit	 the	
greenhouses	 in	 Atacheo	 where	 they	 could	 see	 how	 the	 people	 in	 charge	 carried	 out	 the	
pruning	using	3-meter	stepladders,	showing	expertise	when	moving	around	at	 that	height,	
and	 carrying	 out	 the	 trellising,	managing	 the	 plant.77	 Several	women	were	 harvesting	 the	
tomatoes.	In	Nacho's	assessment,	they	had	better	results	when	women	did	this,	as	they	were	
more	 careful	when	harvesting	 and	packaging.	 Each	plant	 at	 the	 time	had	 four	bunches	of	
gradually	 ripening	 fruits	 according	 to	 the	 market	 programming.	 Their	 ripening	 was	 being	
regulated	and	three	types	of	tomatoes	were	being	obtained,	the	first	for	export,	the	second	
for	the	regional	market	and	the	third	to	sell	in	bulk	to	the	local	market.	The	men	carried	the	
tomatoes	and	the	remaining	branches	from	the	pruning	in	wheelbarrows.	It	was	hot	inside;	
																																																						
77	The	steel	cables	held	up	a	series	of	laminated	wires	hanging	from	the	cables,	and	with	which	the	plants	were	
wrapped	around.	The	plant	height	could	be	more	than	3	meters,	depending	on	the	programmed	production	
cycle.	 After	 cutting	 the	 tip	 of	 the	 plant	 and	 pruning	 it,	 growth	 of	 the	 fruit	was	 accelerated,	 and	 different	
nutritional	components	were	used.	This	depended	on	the	plant	phase,	variety	and	other	factors.	
	 73	
there	was	drip-irrigation	and	the	ferti-irrigation	(fertilization	from	local	irrigation)	had	been	
adapted	 by	 Nacho,	 whose	 company	 supplied	 irrigation	 to	 a	 large	 part	 of	 Zamora,	 with	 a	
different	method	of	production,	such	as	macro-tunnels,	shade	mesh	and	open-air.	The	units	
were	five	meters	high	and	had	been	adapted	for	the	area	by	the	supplier	ACEA.	The	overhead	
ventilation	 was	 reinforced	 with	 independent	 vents	 handled	 manually,	 like	 front	 and	 side	
curtains.	The	aisle	was	covered	with	gravel	from	the	region	(tezontle,	a	type	of	red	volcanic	
rock	 that	 absorbs	 excess	 moisture).	 Armando	 (from	 SPR	 Piedad	 Chiquita)	 made	 the	
observation	about	the	amount	of	water	with	nutrients	seeping	from	the	bags	where	the	plants	
were	supported	by	fine	and	medium	grains	of	sand:	"Is	there	no	way	to	recover	the	water	that	
is	being	wasted?”.	The	technician	answered	that	"about	20%	of	the	water	is	drained	inside	the	
greenhouse,	after	being	supplied	to	the	plant	by	drip.	Reuse	would	be	very	expensive;	 it	 is	
preferable	to	give	the	plant	a	new	nutrient	solution"	(Atacheo,	17/12/03).	Armando	was	not	
very	satisfied	with	the	response	but	did	not	press	the	matter	further.	Another	member	of	the	
Asociación,	 Ampa	 (from	 SPR	 Los	 Pinos)	 asked,	 as	we	walked	 around	 the	 greenhouse:	 and	
pointing	to	a	plant	that	looked	less	fresh:	why	is	this	plant	so	sad?”.	"It's	caused	by	people	
brushing	against	it	in	the	aisle",	said	the	technician.		
Later,	in	an	Asociación	meeting,	Ampa	stated	that	the	greenhouse	plants	were	sick	and	
that	 for	 safety	 reasons,	 they	had	 to	 limit	 our	 access	 to	 the	 greenhouse.	 Several	members	
agreed	with	this	comment.	Armando	also	argued	that	a	lot	of	fertilizer	was	being	wasted	and	
the	recovery	method	was	inefficient.	As	for	the	automation,	it	was	inconceivable	that	it	was	
manual	when	it	could	be	automated,	causing	inaccuracy	and	potential	human	error	due	to	
weather	contingencies.	The	height	of	the	greenhouse	was	an	issue	that	was	given	too	much	
attention;	it	should	be	(according	to	the	technicians	from	the	firm)	over	five	meters	high.	The	
greenhouses	in	Atacheo	barely	reached	that	height.78	As	for	commercialization,	this	had	been	
considered	as	an	automated	management	area	where	the	vegetable	was	collected	 in	carts	
moving	on	a	rail	mechanism	 inside	the	greenhouse	and	collected	 in	a	separate	space.	This	
section	should	have	had	a	series	of	mechanized	devices	to	select	the	types	of	tomatoes	and	
send	 them	 to	 the	 packaging	 area.	 Some	members	 of	 the	Asociación	 wondered:	 How	 is	 it	
possible	 for	 the	 Atacheo	 group	 to	 do	 this	 manually	 in	 such	 a	 small	 space,	 covered	 with	
tarpaulin?	
In	 this	 improvised	 area	 for	 selection	 and	 packaging,	 the	 product	was	 selected	 and	
packaged	for	sale,	not	in	big	freight	trucks	that	came	specifically	to	take	them	to	large	markets,	
but	in	small	trucks	belonging	to	the	suppliers	and	partners	that	transported	some	of	the	boxes	
to	the	central	market.	They	even	sold	tomato	boxes	in	the	greenhouse	to	whoever	asked	for	
them.	One	kilo	of	tomatoes	costed	USD	1,	a	higher	price	than	that	offered	by	JLB,	who	intended	
																																																						
78	In	Zamora,	the	temperature	is	higher	than	that	recorded	in	Zacapu.	The	height	of	the	greenhouse	can	dissipate	
the	accumulated	heat	and	reduces	diseases	resulting	from	excess	humidity.	Recycling	nutrients,	as	proposed	
by	Armando,	would	lead	to	a	particular	disease	being	spread	from	a	plant,	derived	from	the	bag	conditions	
where	 the	 fertilizer	 came	 from.	 This	 is	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 adaptation	 processes	 necessary	 to	 recover	 the	
substance	in	the	entire	greenhouse.	The	cement	floor,	as	recommended	by	the	partners,	meant	the	drained	
waste	had	to	be	directed	to	a	recovery	section.	
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to	buy	them	at	50	cents.	For	the	Atacheo	group,	it	would	be	the	third	harvest	and	forecasts	
were	good	in	terms	of	price	and	market	trends.	
JLB	had	also	dealt	with	the	concept	of	food	safety	under	protected	conditions,	relating	
it	to	the	hygiene	practices	of	greenhouse	users.	Unsterilized	people	would	contaminate	the	
greenhouse,	bringing	pests	from	infected	farms	or	places	where	visitors	had	been	before,	and	
pathogens	would	be	transported	via	their	clothes.	On	our	visit	to	the	greenhouses	in	Atacheo,	
shoes	had	been	sterilized,	but	clothes	were	not	covered	with	specifically	prepared	robes;	we	
did	 not	 have	 to	 use	 helmets	 or	 hairnets,	 nor	 had	 we	 been	 told	 not	 to	 touch	 the	 plants.	
According	 to	 the	 partners,	 these	 protective	 measures	 for	 food	 safety	 were	 not	 being	
implemented	in	Atacheo.	
As	for	greenhouse	interaction	with	the	external	environment,	it	was	assumed	that	the	
protective	 screens	 and	 computerized	 and	 automated	 system	 insulated	 external	 elements	
from	the	greenhouse,	ensuring	food	safety.	However,	this	was	difficult	to	obtain,	because	of	
human	interaction	and	the	lack	of	safety	practices.	The	concept	of	biosafety	was	relevant	here,	
especially	if	they	wished	to	export	tomatoes	from	the	greenhouses	to	the	United	States,	as	it	
was	necessary	to	meet	the	biosafety	standards	there.	US	companies	that	imported	tomatoes	
from	greenhouses	in	the	region	through	brokers	tried	to	keep	a	record	of	safety	and	biosafety	
conditions;	this	was	related	to	bioterrorism.	The	product	should	comply	with	supervision	via	
logbooks	including	those	who	had	visited	the	greenhouse.	Yet,	we	had	not	written	down	our	
personal	details,	entry	time,	or	where	we	had	come	from.	The	members	of	 the	Asociación	
considered	these	procedures	unnecessary.	
The	greenhouse	was,	at	that	time,	a	laboratory	where	food	safety	was	important	so	
that	it	could	regulate	itself.	Fertigation	would	give	the	exact	amount	of	nutrients	to	each	plant,	
making	 it	possible	to	have	areas	 in	different	production	stages,	 in	accordance	with	market	
planning.	 It	 could	 also	 have	 different	 varieties	 of	 tomatoes	 or	 other	 plants.	 The	 ability	 to	
manage	a	greenhouse	implied	recognition	of	small	imperfections	of	the	crop,	which	in	turn	
depended	 on	 the	 greenhouse’s	 own	 environment.	 Humans	 should	 then	 help	 to	make	 the	
protected	 environment	 work	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	 coordinated	 programming	 of	 humans,	
living	organisms	and	machines,	which	would	all	carry	out	predetermined	functions.	Tolerance	
for	mistake	and	error	was	not	envisioned	because	those	machines	could	do	the	tasks	more	
accurately	and	efficiently	than	any	human	could.	What	would	happen	if	the	worker	forgot	to	
close	 the	 curtains	 to	 the	 level	 the	 crops	 required?	 The	 operator	 should	 be	 aware	 of	 the	
external	and	internal	conditions	and	factors	such	as	external	and	internal	temperature,	and	
find	 out,	 via	 complicated	 computer	 algorithms,	 the	 correlation	 of	 trends	 and	 impacts	 of	
handling.	We	had	talked	about	implementing	control	mechanisms	to	transfer	information	to	
the	 human	 supervisor	 in	 the	 form	 of	 cameras,	 logs,	 and	 reports.	 These	 methods	 were	
incorporated	by	JLB	to	ensure	proper	functioning	inside	the	greenhouse.	
Elements	that	the	system	could	not	regulate	or	resolve	by	itself	should	be	reported	to	
a	human	expert	to	solve	them.	These	would	then	be	incorporated	to	become	an	intelligent	
system,	independent	of	human	interference.	This	included	the	control	of	vents,	wind	speed	
to	avoid	disasters,	and	regulating	the	amount	of	sunlight	according	to	the	sun's	position.	The	
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aim	was	 to	 reach	 an	 optimal	 conditions	 for	 each	 phenological	 phase	 of	 the	 crop,	 relative	
humidity	outside	and	inside	of	each	area	of	the	greenhouse	and,	of	course,	the	recovery	of	
nutrients	(Armando’s	concern)	that	should	be	recycled	into	the	system	after	chemical	analysis.	
The	tomato	plant	 is	a	 living	being	that	demands	 its	place.	Each	plant,	besides	being	
part	of	a	group,	occupied	a	specific	place	according	to	area,	row,	and	location	number.	The	
tomato	plant	in	a	sheltered	greenhouse	habitat	was	considered	an	achievement;	other	plants	
cultivated	outdoors	sometimes	are	attacked	by	underground	pests	that	feed	on	the	roots	and	
by	the	time	producers	realize	this,	it	is	too	late.	When	it	rains,	the	cold	water	damages	their	
leaves	and	stems	leaving	them	battered;	sometimes	hail	can	hit	them	aggressively.	Plants	that	
survive	these	accidents	are	torn	from	the	ground	and	die	slowly.	Afterwards,	a	machine	cleans	
the	ground,	while	the	sad	producers	look	on	passively.	Inside	the	greenhouse,	the	life	of	the	
plant	is	longer	and	producers	seem	happier.	Plants	outside	enjoy	a	location	in	furrows,	but	
not	each	plant	can	get	the	attention	it	needs,	since	the	soil	is	responsible	for	sharing	out	the	
nutrients	and	water,	supplied	to	other	plants	too.	Instead,	inside	the	greenhouse,	each	plant	
has	its	own	independent	space	and,	if	necessary,	certain	plants	can	be	given	special	treatment.	
Some	of	the	plants,	at	the	first	sign	of	disease,	are	taken	to	"intensive	care"	spaces,	following	
diagnosis	from	a	specialist	who	inspects	them	carefully,	and	sometimes	recommends	playing	
classical	music	in	the	greenhouse,	although	this	can	cause	sniggers	among	the	workers	who	
take	care	of	them.	A	tomato	plant,	although	genetically	identical	to	another	tomato	plant,	is	
not	completely	the	same;	each	one	is	special	because	the	environmental	conditions	to	which	
it	 is	 exposed	 from	 birth	 make	 it	 unique.	 In	 seedling	 greenhouses,	 they	 remain	 heaped,	
increasing	the	competition	between	them.	When	some	seedlings	show	a	nutritional	deficiency	
or	 they	 are	 too	 close	 together,	 they	 are	 removed	 by	 means	 of	 selection.	 They	 are	 then	
transplanted	into	a	private	space	inside	the	greenhouse	and	offered	the	correct	cultivation	so	
that	they	can	become	healthy	and	produce	good	quality	fruits.	Once	the	fruits	ripen,	a	female	
hand	gently	harvests	them.	
The	seedling	stage	usually	takes	place	in	designated	areas.	Experts	in	the	nutrition	and	
handling	of	seedlings	are	not	always	the	same	as	those	in	the	production	stage.	Once	the	plant	
reaches	a	size	of	about	20	cm,	it	is	ready	to	be	transplanted	and	its	origin	is	recorded.	The	bags	
are	 aligned	 in	 matrix	 form,	 which	 allows	 them	 to	 be	 attended	 to	 and	 placed	 inside	 the	
greenhouse	complex.	Irrigation	is	aided	by	the	irrigation	programmer	that	circulates	nutrients	
through	hoses	and	drippers.	In	each	area,	there	are	location	references	that	allow	the	relevant	
reports	to	be	made	by	experts,	such	as	Valadez	(tomato	specialist	technician),	who	generates	
a	precise	recipe	for	a	group	of	plants	or	an	individual	one.	New	replacement	plants	should	be	
compatible	with	what	has	been	established,	considering	the	progress	of	the	group	process,	as	
it	would	be	incompatible	to	put	one	in	the	development	phase	with	one	in	the	production	
phase.	A	solution	to	level	out	the	population	in	both	phases	is	to	bring	plants	from	another	
greenhouse	to	regulate	the	population.	
Apart	 from	the	productive	phase	there	are	other	 factors	 related	to	 the	greenhouse	
which	 are	 carried	 out	 outside	 the	 place	 itself,	 corresponding	 to	 negotiations	 about	 the	
product,	commercialization,	continuous	training	and	capital	amortization;	these	would	be	the	
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tasks	of	specialist	managers.	For	this,	it	was	necessary	for	a	firm	to	make	the	business	plan	
foreseen	 for	 the	 project.	 In	 Atacheo	 consultants,	 such	 as	 Pymexporta,	 did	 just	 this.	 The	
integrating	company,	the	abstract	entity	not	present	in	the	initial	phase	of	the	project,	would	
provide	 supplies	 and	 could	 reconcile	 internal	 and	external	 elements,	material	 and	human,	
with	an	overall	logic	for	the	project.	Thus,	the	human	factor	was	treated	as	an	additional	input	
for	the	greenhouse	and	considered	as	a	human	resource	that	is	trained	to	keep	the	technology	
working;	the	human	was	considered	essential	but	replaceable;	another	cog	 in	the	complex	
wheel	of	controlled	production.	The	technician	should	have	been	trained	as	an	agronomist	or	
agricultural	technician.	That	is	to	say,	configured	beforehand	so	that	the	investment	in	training	
and	allocation	of	functions	would	consume	a	minimum	of	resources.	
With	regards	to	this,	Chema	(from	Deyna)	proposed	that	the	number	of	technicians	
should	 be	 lower	 than	 the	 number	 proposed	 by	 JLB,	 in	 order	 to	 have	 fewer	 specialized	
technicians	 and	provide	niche	 conditions	 for	 those	who	had	 the	 knowledge,	making	 them	
more	difficult	to	replace.	For	this	task,	Chema	already	had	in	mind	her	son-in-law,	Eliseo,	and	
Mr.	 Abelardo	 (from	 Purépechas)	 thought	 about	 his	 son.	 For	 the	 technical	 training,	 I	 was	
proposed	as	a	supervisor,	while	Cristi	and	Ampa	would	perform	as	administrators,	referring	
to	 their	 experience	and	 training	as	 administrators.	Others,	 like	Manuel	Urrutia,	wanted	 to	
work	in	the	greenhouse;	like	the	other	farmers,	that	is	how	they	related	with	the	project.	The	
women	who	visited	the	greenhouse	were	given	the	option	of	working	at	the	various	stages	of	
seedling	selection,	picking	and	pruning	or	of	working	in	the	distribution	company	where	the	
product	is	purified	and	selected.	They	were	the	delicate,	careful	and	sensitive	elements,	which	
allowed	the	product	to	pass	from	the	internal	greenhouse	environment	to	the	external	world.	
The	product	was	designed	to	meet	the	exquisite	taste	of	the	most	demanding	consumers,	with	
different	varieties	of	tomatoes	for	every	occasion;	the	tomatoes	would	reach	the	customer	
with	the	highest	quality	presentation	they	could	imagine.	
Yet,	seeing	the	workers	at	Atacheo	bring	in	the	tomatoes	and	pruned	branches	in	rustic	
wheelbarrows,	maneuvered	by	sweaty	individuals	and	women	in	their	everyday	clothing,	was	
a	 long	 way	 from	 conveyor	 belts	 and	 controlled	 climate,	 the	 optimum	 for	 the	 comfort	 of	
humans.	This	observation	was	not	compatible	with	the	usual	cultural	practices	in	Atacheo	for	
growing	tomatoes.	The	human	factor	was	present	in	many	aspects,	such	as	the	aesthetics	of	
the	shed's	finish.	Imagination	and	some	photos	hid	the	imperfections	of	the	manufacturing,	
and	the	plastic	and	window	shades	which	contrasted	with	the	normal	deterioration	of	 the	
units;	these	materials	suffered	the	harshness	of	the	climate,	seen	from	the	facility.	JLB	said	
that	the	Spanish	plastics	would	be	impeccable	for	five	years	because	they	were	made	through	
complex	biochemical	processes.	
From	JLB’s	point	of	view,	the	Asociación	partners	(many	of	them	producers)	would	be	
special	guests	at	the	greenhouse	that	should	look	radiant	all	the	time.	Whoever	wanted	to	
work	in	farming	activities	inside	the	shed	could	do	so,	although	others	could	be	hired	too.	The	
equity	partners	would	be	the	owners	and	investors	who	would	see	the	greenhouse	as	their	
source	of	income,	without	worrying	about	the	imperfections	of	operation	and	logistics.	
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The	social	construction	that	JLB	made	of	the	technological	layout	of	the	greenhouse	
was	in	many	ways	very	different	from	the	real	ones	seen	in	Atacheo.	ACEA	could	not	build	
something	that	was	beyond	 its	 technological	 reach.	 JLB	argued	that	Spain	was	many	years	
ahead	in	the	construction	of	greenhouses.	As	Even-Zohar	(2005:74)	says:	
	
There	may	be	people	who	have	not	read	poems	whose	authors	have	been	responsible	
for	 introducing	new	elements	 from	a	 foreign	 repertoire	 (either	 through	 translation	or	
direct	adoption),	yet	they	"accept",	so	to	speak,	those	products	because	they	recognize	
the	 people	 involved	 as	 sources	 of	 instruction,	 leadership	 or	 who	 reprimand	 certain	
actions.	
	
Thus,	JLB	moved	away	from	the	Atacheo	sheds,	arguing	that	they	did	not	meet	the	conditions	
required	for	the	project	he	promoted,	and	arguing	that	he	had	the	solution	for	satisfying	what	
the	collective’s	imagination	had	built:	the	ideal	greenhouse,	able	to	adapt	to	each	actor,	in	any	
way	to	their	imagination.	
	
	
The	choice	of	the	greenhouse:	Partnership	according	to	the	supplier	
In	early	2004	the	Asociación	members	visited	different	types	of	greenhouses	built	by	FIRA	and	
located	 in	 Morelia.	 The	 partners	 that	 went	 there	 agreed	 that	 the	 facilities	 were	 mostly	
abandoned	and	neglected.	FIRA	boasted	to	have	the	latest	technology,	but	after	reviewing	in	
detail,	the	partners	admitted	that	national	greenhouses,	in	general,	were	not	at	the	level	of	
those	 coming	 from	 abroad	 –	 according,	 that	 is,	 to	 what	 they	 had	 heard	 from	 JLB.	 Some	
Asociación	members	led	by	Carlos	(from	SPR	del	Campo)	also	organized	to	attend	and	see	the	
greenhouses	of	ULMA	exhibited	at	the	fair	Expo	Culiacán,	Sinaloa,	and	greenhouses	Expo	in	
Irapuato.	
After	 the	members	 saw	some	models	of	greenhouses,	 the	Asociación	was	 ready	 to	
receive	proposals	and	options	by	their	respective	suppliers.	In	the	offices	of	SEPLADE	in	Zacapu,	
greenhouse	companies	 such	as	 the	French	company	Richel,	ALQUER	 (from	Almería,	 Spain),	
some	from	the	United	States	and	ACEA	from	Mexico	itself,	presented	their	plans.	The	Banco	
del	 Bajío	 and	 three	 firms	 that	 presented	 their	 business	 plan	 attended	 the	 meeting.	
PYMEXPORTA	(from	Zamora,	Michoacán)	also	attended	in	order	to	strengthen	agro-business,	
and	Nacho	from	irrigation	systems	was	also	there.	They	all	showed	their	products	and	services	
to	us.	When	JLB	learned	that	the	Asociación	was	considering	other	greenhouse	construction	
companies,	he	suggested	that	"as	long	it	is	not	ACEA:	it's	like	comparing	a	'vocho'	(ACEA)	with	
a	Mercedes-Benz	(ULMA).	I	will	also	present	options,	I	am	interested	in	marketing	and	you	can	
build	the	greenhouse	with	whoever	you	choose"	(JLB,	SEPLADE,	11/12/03).		
With	that	kind	of	comment,	 it	seemed	that	 JLB	had	adapted	to	the	dynamics	 in	the	
Asociación,	and	sought	to	minimize	the	presence	of	ACEA	and	Mexican	technicians	–	yet	still	
he	conditioned	marketing	to	his	proposal.	JLB	claimed	he	would	not	buy	tomatoes	that	did	not	
meet	 the	 quality	 necessary	 to	 comply	with	 the	market;	 also,	 he	 claimed	 copyright	 of	 the	
project	 and	 invalidated	 any	modification	 thereof.	 Furthermore,	 he	 stated	 that	 he	 had	 the	
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backing	of	the	agencies.	However,	and	despite	these	warnings,	the	Asociación	decided	to	look	
into	other	options.	
For	a	month,	the	greenhouse	company’s	representatives	were	showing	their	models	
and	options,	replying	to	customers’	queries,	and	passing	on	to	them	their	experiences	with	
the	 model	 elsewhere.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 suppliers	 was	 Mr.	 Alonso	 (Almería,	 Spain),	
representative	 and	manager	 of	 the	 company	 ALQUER.	 Invited	 by	 JLB,	 the	manager	 visited	
Zacapu	without	knowing	the	project.	He	visited	just	to	gather	information,	but	the	partners	
were	upset	that	Mr.	Alonso	did	not	resolve	specific	doubts.	JLB	suggested	Lino	and	Heredia	to	
help	Mr.	 Alonso	 and	 his	 partners	 to	 explain	 to	 him	 their	 technical	 questions,	 but	 not	 the	
financial	and	cost	concerns.	However,	at	this	point,	the	partners	knew	the	project	better,	and	
could	compare	it	with	what	Alonso	said.	A	mesh	shade,	for	example,	was	ruled	out	due	to	the	
cold	conditions	in	the	region	of	Zacapu.	Richel,	which	had	greenhouses	in	Querétaro,	invited	
the	board	of	the	Asociación	to	visit	its	place	in	the	following	days.		
The	 owner	 of	 ACEA	 (Toño)	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	 husband	 of	 Thalia,	 one	 of	my	 co-
workers	at	the	Colegio	de	Postgraduados.79	Toño	had	been	involved	for	15	years	in	adapting	
greenhouse	technology	to	the	national	needs.	Before	the	meeting	I	had	the	opportunity	to	
chat	with	him	about	 the	project	and	 its	 technology,	and	Toño	said	 that	 this	project	was	a	
pioneer	and	that	the	model	of	organizing	and	consolidation	could	be	used	in	other	parts	of	
the	country.	ACEA	had	greenhouses	in	La	Piedad,	Atacheo	and	Numarán.	Toño	suggested	that	
we	visit	those	located	in	La	Piedad,	because	of	the	good	management	practices	by	Valadez;	
however,	 he	 warned	 me	 that	 it	 concerned	 a	 greenhouse	 of	 higher	 cost	 than	 those	 of	
Atacheo.80	Malla	(Los	Pinos)	said	that	Toño	inspired	her	confidence,	while	Ampa,	a	member	
of	 the	same	group,	 insisted	during	Toño’s	presentation	on	the	participation	of	ACEA	 in	 the	
Trust.	Toño	agreed	to	deposit	five	percent	as	collateral	and	participate	as	a	shareholder.	This	
method	had	already	been	talked	over	with	Malla	and	how	the	scheme	could	be	analysed	and	
insured	in	shared	risk,	similar	to	what	FIRCO	did.	
Toño	recommended	Valadez,	a	specialist	with	nearly	20	years’	experience	of	growing	
tomatoes	in	hydroponic	greenhouses,	for	crop	management.	They	had	collaborated	before	
and	Toño	trusted	him	to	support	this	type	of	social	development	projects.	Valadez	would	also	
become	 responsible	 for	 training	 for	 greenhouse	 production.	 Toño	 considered	 it	 was	
appropriate	 to	 take	 the	minutes	 of	 the	 last	 and	 reconsider	 Valadez’s	 participation.	While	
heating	and	 irrigation	were	proposed	by	Nacho	 in	 collaboration	with	ACEA,	 the	Asociación	
would	 recognize	Nacho’s	management	 capacity,	 and	 despite	 collaborating	with	 ACEA	 they	
would	assign	him	his	own	negotiating	area.	This	time,	Nacho	attended	with	a	group	of	partners	
from	 Atacheo,	 who	 recommended	 to	 produce	 with	 ACEA	 because	 of	 its	 experience	 in	
greenhouse	technology.	
																																																						
79	On	a	visit	to	Thalía's	home,	she	talked	us	about	Toño,	and	how	proud	she	was	of	her	husband	and	his	business.	
80	 The	partners	 associated	 the	 low	 cost	 of	 greenhouse	ACEA	 to	 low	quality	 standards.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Toño	
offered	to	visit	a	greenhouse	that	competed	in	cost	and	quality	with	those	offered	by	(foreign)	competitors.	It	
was	paradoxical	that	he	proposed	a	shed	of	high	cost,	without	the	necessary	funds	being	there.	He	probably	
hoped	the	project	could	somehow	manage	to	pay	the	extra.		
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Before	the	meeting	scheduled	to	choose	the	supplier	of	greenhouses,	I	spoke	by	phone	
with	key	project	actors	to	lobby	in	favour	of	the	proposal	of	ACEA.	Cristi,	which	was	a	good	
ally,	 invited	the	partners	to	SEPLADE	and	told	them	of	the	benefits	of	supporting	a	national	
greenhouse.	Cristi	had	apparently	convinced	Mr.	Abelardo	of	Copándaro	(SPR	Purépechas)	to	
support	the	proposal	of	ACEA,	but	Chema	argued	that	the	son	of	Abelardo	wanted	to	build	
with	 ULMA	 because	 of	 training	 opportunities	 in	 Spain.81	 Ampa	 spoke	 with	 Espinoza	 (SPR	
Marijo)	and	also	convinced	him	to	vote	for	ACEA.	
When	 the	 vote	 took	 place,	 Heredia	 and	 JLB	 proposed	 that	 the	 assembly	would	 be	
entitled	to	vote	only	for	the	20	SPRs	who	had	SEDAGRO	funding.	These	actions	were	intended	
to	block	the	eight	SPRs	that	had	been	included	after	the	project.	Heredia	stated:	"The	Alianza	
groups	 [the	remaining	eight]	are	 in	another	 financing	scheme	and	they	should	respect	 the	
project	as	it	is	set	for	the	Asociación	[the	20	groups]"	(SEPLADE,	12/03/04).	This	made	clear	
that.	for	the	managing	committee	and	JLB	at	least,	the	Asociación	was	composed	of	20	SPRs,	
although	 in	 the	 formation	 there	 were	 28	 SPRs	 specified,	 all	 with	 the	 same	 rights	 and	
obligations	 (see	 Chapter	 3).	 The	 group	 of	 Margarita	 (Citizen	Women)	 did	 not	 attend	 the	
meeting;	Rafa	Lp'	father	(SPR	Bajo	Invernadero),	arrived	in	the	end,	like	Pancho	(SPR	Comanja).	
Those	who	 supported	ULMA	highlighted	 the	nationality	of	 the	builder,	 arguing	 that	
greenhouse	 technology	 came	 from	 Spain	 and	 that	 the	 full	 cycle	 -	 from	 management	 to	
marketing	-	would	be	guaranteed	by	JLB's	office.	The	nationalist	feeling	was	expressed	by	some	
members	who	felt	that	financial	resources	should	be	spent	in	Mexico	and	not	in	Spain.	SPR	
Purépero	would	go	with	ACEA.	Irma	and	her	husband	Armando	(from	Piedad	Chiquita)	said	
there	was	no	experience	in	Mexico	with	ACEA,	that	the	Spaniards	were	the	ones	who	had	the	
experience.	They	 felt	 that	ACEA	greenhouses	were	"crappy"	and	that	 it	was	appropriate	to	
accept	JLB's	proposal	(which	also	guaranteed	access	to	the	international	market).	Moreover,	
we	would	be	partners	with	49%	of	the	shares.	Members	who	had	attended	to	see	the	ULMA	
greenhouses	in	Culiacán	were	in	favour	of	this	provider,	while	the	group	of	Saúl	and	Carlos	
chose	the	French	greenhouse	Richel,	but	 then	cast	 their	vote	 for	ULMA	with	the	argument	
that,	although	they	were	twice	as	expensive	as	ACEA,	it	would	be	worth	the	investment.	The	
position	of	Mr.	Saúl	(from	Sabor	del	Campo)	voted	for	ULMA	saying	that:	"If	I	have	to	spend	
my	little	money,	it's	better	to	spend	it	on	something	good	because	the	materials	are	brought	
from	Spain"	(SEPLADE,	12/03/04).	
Saúl	 accepted	 the	 technological	 dependence	 on	 Spain	 in	 matters	 related	 to	 the	
production	of	greenhouses	and	how	we	should	work	with	the	"originals".	Although	he	and	his	
nephews	would	go	with	JLB's	project,	they	said	that	if	it	was	a	guideline	to	support	the	Mexican	
company	ACEA,	 they	would	do	 it	 in	 the	end,	because	 there	would	not	be	more	options.	 If	
necessary	he	could	negotiate	with	Silvano	Aureoles	of	SEDAGRO.	Ampa	no	longer	mentioned	
the	option	of	the	US	company	because	greenhouses	with	plastic	shade	mesh	did	not	fit	well	
with	 the	 prevailing	 cold	 climate	 in	 Zacapu,	 so	 he	 supported	 the	 option	 of	 ACEA.	 Heredia	
																																																						
81	Abelardo's	son	was	an	agronomist	engineer	and	worked	in	a	village	near	Zacapu.	
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expressed	the	agreement	of	the	four	SPRs	from	Churintzio	and	voted	for	ULMA,	although	he	
said	he	would	negotiate	a	final	offer	with	ULMA,	and	if	it	was	not	good,	he	would	go	with	ACEA.	
Chema	and	Jesús	supported	the	option	of	ACEA.	Manuel	Salas	(partner	of	the	SPR	Bajo	
Invernadero)	consulted	me	and	waited	until	the	end	to	choose	for	ACEA.	 In	the	absence	of	
Julio	César,	the	representative	of	Biotecnológicos,	Cristi	from	the	same	group	voted	for	ACEA.	
She	also	spoke	in	favour	of	Mexican	companies	and	the	commitment	to	support	them.	Irma	
and	her	husband	at	the	end	lined	up	with	the	ACEA	group;	although	they	were	not	convinced	
about	the	quality	of	the	greenhouses,	when	they	noticed	that	the	majority	were	against,	they	
opted	 to	 join	 the	 majority.	 When	 the	 partners	 chose	 a	 provider,	 disagreements	 were	
generated	and	opinions	polarized.		
Some	partners	who	selected	ULMA	as	a	supplier	complained	with	Gonzalo	about	his	
position	in	favour	of	one	of	the	providers	when	he	as	a	delegate	should	have	remained	neutral.	
Some	partners,	particularly	Heredia	(of	Churintzio)	got	into	lengthy	explanations,	arguing	that	
there	was	no	fixed	plan	to	go	with	ACEA,	that	the	negotiations	of	the	greenhouses	had	been	
started	by	the	Spaniards,	and	that	now	there	was	this	other	company	to	make	use	of	what	
had	been	achieved.	
At	this	meeting,	16	of	28	SPR	were	present.	Before	the	meeting,	10	SPR	had	been	in	
favour	of	ACEA,	and	the	other	six	intended	to	choose	ULMA.	The	final	decision	thus	depended	
on	the	choice	of	the	12	SPRS	which	did	not	attend	the	meeting.	During	the	following	days	two	
possible	options	surfaced:	ACEA	with	17	SPRS	and	ULMA	with	11	SPRS.	For	the	group	of	17	SPRS	
the	 option	 entailed	 immediate	 construction	 (like	 I	 had	 discussed	 with	 Gonzalo),	 reusing	
resources	 to	build	more	greenhouses	administered	by	 the	Asociación	or	by	 the	group	that	
decided	to	provide	for	the	construction	under	that	mode.	
Delegates	linked	to	JLB	said	they	would	not	share	the	authorized	support	for	their	SPR	
with	the	other	eight	groups.	This	polarized	the	situation:	of	the	20	groups	that	had	resources	
of	SEDAGRO,	ten	supported	ACEA	and	the	other	ten	supported	ULMA.	JLB’s	plans	to	manage	the	
totality	of	 the	 resources	could	be	modified	knowing	 they	would	not	be	 fully	 invested	with	
ULMA	and	his	project.	It	was	then	agreed	that	the	17	groups	associated	with	ACEA	would	carry	
out	their	paperwork	apart	from	JLB,	and	the	remaining	11	groups	would	continue	with	JLB’s	
firm.	
To	give	continuity	to	the	project	of	17	I	talked	to	Toño	(ACEA),	who	suggested	accessing	
a	plot	of	land	for	the	construction	of	the	greenhouse	owned	by	the	Asociación,	which	would	
work	with	ACEA	and	the	17	SPRs.	I	told	him	that	we	were	in	the	process	to	acquire	some	land	
which	 belonged	 to	 Chava,	 partner	 of	 SPR	 Maldonado,	 and	 that	 we	 had	 the	 granting	 of	
CONAGUA	in	order.	Some	days	later,	we	invited	Toño	to	walk	the	land	in	the	company	of	some	
partners,	and	Toño	expressed	his	satisfaction.	The	plan	was	to	build	independent	sheds	on	
half	a	hectare	of	the	land.	The	next	step	would	be	to	have	it	surveyed,	and	to	submit	to	the	
Asociación	 a	 formal	 proposal	 of	 the	 modules	 with	 the	 technical	 and	 engineering	 design	
completed	by	ACEA.	
Thus,	most	 of	 the	 partners	 of	 the	 Asociación	 chose	 to	 build	 the	 "real"	 greenhouse	
proposed	 by	 ACEA,	 and	 not	 the	 "ideal"	 greenhouse	 proposed	 by	 JLB.	 The	 17	 SPRs	 of	 the	
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Asociación	which,	for	pragmatic	or	political	reasons	tuned	to	the	preferences	and	needs	of	the	
project,	represented	a	sub-project	derived	from	the	first,	and	if	they	would	continue	with	joint	
or	dissimilar	actions	between	factions	of	the	Asociación,	the	organizing	links	would	be	present.	
This	notwithstanding,	a	divisive	factor	could	be	JLB's	firm,	which	had	its	own	perception	of	the	
project.	 The	Asociación	 had	been	 formed	as	manager,	 and	now	was	 involved	 in	managing	
financial	resources	and	emerging	from	as	a	network	of	capabilities	and	resources	able	to	enrol	
actors	 in	 its	project.	However,	 the	choice	of	 the	provider	and	 the	 type	of	greenhouse	had	
polarized	the	situation	in	the	sense	that	the	material	aspect	associated	with	the	interests	of	
the	partners	showed	a	different	picture	than	expected.	
The	Asociación’s	choice	in	favour	of	ACEA	as	the	supplier	of	the	greenhouses	modified	
the	financial	scheme	of	the	project.	The	changes	were	not	compatible	with	the	proposal	of	
JLB's	office,	which	inconsistently	kept	on	increasing	the	price	of	the	greenhouses,	-	justifying	
this	with	external	factors	such	as	the	fluctuation	of	the	Euro	and	market	prices	for	steel.	After	
the	split-up,	the	Asociación’s	management	would	be	independent	from	the	17	SPRS	identified	
with	ACEA.	This	fraction	of	the	Asociación	(still	identified	as	the	Asociación)	won	the	backing	
of	governmental	institutions	like	SEPLADE	and	FOMICH,	which	knew	about	the	bad	track	record	
of	JLB's	firm	in	other	parts	of	the	country.		
The	 Asociación's	 managing	 committee	 sought	 to	 take	 control	 of	 the	 project	
negotiations.	However,	the	dynamics	proposed	by	the	SPRs	linked	to	ACEA	prevailed	and	gave	
a	new	direction	to	the	organization:	17	SPRs	were	in	support	of	the	project’s	option	for	real	
greenhouses,	 while	 the	 others	 continued	 with	 the	 greenhouse	 proposal	 of	 ULMA,	 and	
persisted	in	the	imaginary	rhetoric	of	its	representative.	The	different	expectations	about	the	
project’s	definition	of	goals	led	to	a	split	between	the	SPRs.	This	gave	independence	to	the	17	
SPR	that	identified	themselves	with	ACEA,	and	allowed	to	visualize	a	self-administered	project	
along	the	way.	The	institutions	involved	in	the	project	expressed	their	support	and	willingness.	
The	 SPRs	 that	 remained	with	 JLB	 sought	 their	way	 to	 complete	 their	 project	 -	 leaving	 the	
initiative	to	the	firm.	Is	this	a	case	of	omission	by	convenience?	
	
	
Conclusion	
The	members	of	the	SPRs	united	in	the	Asociación	by	now	had	identified	with	the	greenhouse	
as	 an	 alternative	 livelihood,	 the	 expectation	 of	 an	 improved	 income,	 and	 a	 development	
opportunity.	An	adviser	(like	JLB)	used	his	cultural	repertoire	(Even-Zohar,	2005)	as	a	resource	
to	 position	 himself	 as	 the	 undisputed	 choice.	 This	 strategy	 caused	 technological	 and	
managerial	dependence,	but	 seemed	useful	as	 long	as	 there	was	no	alternative.	However,	
when	members	visited	the	greenhouse	in	Atacheo	where	they	could	interact	with	partners	
and	actually	touch	the	tomato	plants,	they	realized	that	the	concept	of	food	safety	was	a	long	
shot,	and	so	they	reconsidered.	After	these	events,	some	SPRs	preferred	to	stick	to	the	image	
of	an	ideal	greenhouse	presented	by	JLB	and	stay	with	his	firm,	while	others	chose	to	redefine	
their	 image	 of	 a	 greenhouse,	 adapt	 it	 to	 real-life	 conditions,	 and	 accept	 the	 challenge	 of	
transforming	 the	 image	 of	 an	 “ideal”	 greenhouse	 to	 real,	 local	 circumstances.	 Through	
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subsequent	 visits	 to	 greenhouse	 in	 other	 locations,	 new	 scenarios	 of	 acquisition	 and	
reinterpretation	of	knowledge	became	possible.	After	they	had	already	identified	themselves	
with	 that	 abstract	 entity	 called	 “greenhouse”,	 further	 exposure	 to	 real	 greenhouses	 as	
laboratories	of	living	beings	(tomatoes,	insects,	and	micro-organisms	interacting	in	an	open	
system)	did	the	rest.			
Some	SPRs,	driven	by	the	need	to	land	the	project,	now	decided	to	get	involved	in	the	
management	of	a	greenhouse	that	was	different	from	the	one	proposed	by	JLB’s	firm,	while	
other	 SPRs	 preferred	 to	 continue	 with	 the	 more	 advanced	 technological	 option	 that	 JLB	
provided.	Since	the	beginning	of	the	project,	JLB	had	generated	an	“ideal”	configuration	of	a	
greenhouse	that	 included	technological,	social	and	cultural	qualifications	in	terms	of	safety	
regulations,	automation,	and	the	high	demands	of	an	international	market.	This	perception	
was	 far	 removed	 from	 the	 real	 project	 conditions	 of	 the	 greenhouses	 the	 SPRs	 had	 now	
observed	in	other	projects	in	the	Ciénega.	When	they	learned	about	the	alternatives,	support	
for	JLB’s	technological	package	decreased.	As	a	result,	a	split	occurred	between	the	28	groups	
in	the	Asociación,	with11	SPRs	joining	the	and	USPR	Productos	Inocuos	and	continuing	with	the	
original	project	proposed	by	JLB,	and	the	remaining	17	SPRs	remaining	with	the	Asociación	and	
now	partnering	with	ACEA.		
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CHAPTER	5	 IN	SEARCH	OF	A	FINANCIAL	SCHEME	
	
	
Introduction	
In	the	previous	chapter	I	described	how	the	Asociación	split	into	a	collective	of	17	SPRs	that	
remained	with	the	Asociación	and	11	SPRs	that	moved	over	to	the	USPR	Productos	Inocuos.	
After	the	Asociación	had	broken	away	from	JLB’S	firm	early	in	2004,	the	partners	initiated	a	
restructuring	 of	 the	 Asociación.	 This	 phase	 is	 known	 as	 the	 mobilization	 phase	 of	 the	
Asociación,	 led	 by	 the	 groups	 that	 chose	 to	 build	 the	 greenhouses	 with	 ACEA.	 The	 USPR	
Productos	Inocuos	continued	with	JLB’s	firm.	This	chapter	zooms	in	on	that	division,	and	the	
organizational	 processes	 concerning	 the	 Asociación’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 government	
agencies	FIRCO,	FOMICH,	FIRA	and	SEDAGRO,	as	well	as	the	issue	of	the	distribution	of	project	
funds	between	 the	 two	USPRs.	 In	May	2004	an	 important	 step	was	 taken	when	 SUPLADER	
considered	all	28	SPRs	involved	in	the	greenhouse	project	eligible	for	funding.	It	looks	like	the	
technical	process	can	finally	start.		
		
	
FOMICH:	Reviewing	the	Asociación's	project	
At	the	beginning	of	2004,	the	president	of	the	Asociación	 (Heredia)	and	representatives	of	
some	of	 its	 SPRs,	 namely	 Purépero	 (Esperanza),	 Los	 Pinos	 (Ampa),	 Biotecnológicos	 (Cristi),	
Jiménez	(Lino),	Laredo	(me)	and	Huaniqueo	(Norberto)	had	a	meeting	in	the	FOMICH	offices	in	
Morelia.	René	Garcia	and	Efraín	La	Madrid	(FOMICH),	Gonzalo	(SEPLADE)	and	Abel	(SEDAGRO82,	
the	executing	agency)	were	present.	Efraín	acted	as	moderator	and	explained	that	FOMICH	
and	 SEDAGRO	 had	 requested	 references	 of	 the	 ULMA	 company,	 and	 the	 articles	 of	
incorporation	 for	 JLB’s	 firm,	but	 that	so	 far	no	data	were	available.	Now	the	officials	were	
interested	in	the	relationship	and	the	commitments	the	Asociación	had	made	with	JLB.	We	
explained	that	JLB’s	firm	was	interested	in	two	aspects	of	the	Asociación:	the	first	referred	to	
the	payment	of	USD	4,200	for	paperwork	expenses	and	file	management,	and	the	second	to	
USD	 8,400	 for	 credit	 management	 with	 a	 European	 bank,	 as	 specified	 in	 the	 project.	
Financially,	 the	 project	 included	 a	 liquid	 guarantee	 of	 10%	 (equivalent	 to	 USD	 420,000)	
covering	both	the	working	capital	and	the	contribution	in	kind	that	the	partners	would	make.	
The	 FOMICH	 representative	 clarified	 that,	 in	 the	event	of	 requesting	 credit	 from	European	
banks,	the	Banco	de	México	would	not	provide	liquid	guarantee.	This	appeared	to	be	JLB’s	first	
omission:	 he	 had	 defined	 a	 project	 that	 was	 attractive	 and	 expensive,	 without	 high	
contributions	from	the	beneficiary.	
How	far	did	 JLB	want	to	go?	 In	principle,	he	was	willing	to	“clone”	and	manage	the	
same	project	which	had	already	been	submitted	to	the	government	institutions	dealing	with	
requests	 for	greenhouses	and	training.	To	this	effect	 JLB	would	use	his	relationships	 in	the	
different	levels	of	government	and	try	to	handle	the	money	for	greenhouse	construction	with	
																																																						
82	SEDAGRO	was	in	charge	of	the	validation	and	technical	feasibility	of	the	project.	
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ULMA	by	separating	the	SPRs	through	the	trust,	so	that	JLB’s	firm	could	manage	and	administer	
the	 resources	 in	 the	 trust.	 Finally,	he	would	manage	 the	 commercialization	 in	order	 to	be	
involved	in	the	trading	of	the	tomatoes.	In	this	way,	the	SPRs	would	be	the	target	for	obtaining	
government	resources	from	the	financial	institutions	as	well	as	from	the	stakeholders.	
In	 clear	 disagreement	 with	 the	 proposal	 from	 JLB’S	 firm,	 René	 mentioned	 the	
documents	showing	the	firm	as	guarantor,	in	particular	the	letter	of	commitment	to	work	with	
ULMA,	 the	 greenhouse	 construction	 company.	 ULMA	 ambiguously	 committed	 to	 buy	 “the	
product	of	the	greenhouses	of	México”,	without	including	information	of	how	to	contact	the	
company.	The	logo	of	ULMA	appeared	at	the	top	of	the	letter,	and	René	pointed	out	how	easy	
it	was	to	plagiarize	a	logo	of	that	kind.	We	asked	ourselves	if	this	was	how	ULMA	presented	
itself:	with	the	signature	of	somebody	called	“Inker”	as	manager?	
During	the	meeting,	the	members	of	the	Asociación	asked	SEDAGRO	and	SEPLADE	to	
clarify	their	position	in	regards	to	ULMA	and	to	JLB’s	firm.	The	members	explained	that	they	
seemed	confident	about	participating	because	of	the	governmental	agencies	that,	according	
to	JLB’s	firm,	were	involved	in	the	project.	Gonzalo	made	a	fuss	and	said	that	the	governmental	
institutions	should	not	be	held	responsible	for	this	project;	that	if	the	officials	had	been	the	
spokespeople	from	the	beginning,	the	decision	now	would	have	to	be	made	by	the	Asociación.	
Meanwhile,	Efraín	gave	the	impression	he	did	not	want	to	involve	SEDAGRO,	and	did	thus	not	
engage	 in	 the	 conversation.	 The	 officials	 explained	 that	 JLB’s	 firm	 frequently	 showed	
intolerance	in	meetings	with	them,	and	urged	to	put	alleged	“verbal”	commitments	made	with	
government	officials	on	paper.	
The	 alleged	participation	 of	 FOMICH	 (30%	 liquid	 guarantee)	 in	 the	 project	was	 also	
discussed.	René	explained	that	the	rules	of	FOMICH	considered	a	maximum	liquid	guarantee	
of	10%,	in	coordination	with	other	institutions	such	as	FIRA	and	other	banks;	this	would	have	
to	 be	 contributed	once	 the	 credit	 line	was	 authorized,	 and	 served	 as	 backup	 for	 the	 loan	
provided	 by	 the	 financial	 institution.	 FOMICH	 recommended	 concentrating	 the	 project	
resources	in	a	trust.	FIDEX	(simplified	trust)	represented	the	simplest	and	least	formal	way	to	
manage	financial	resources.	Efraín	recommended	the	Asociación	to	“not	get	more	involved	
with	a	project	that	could	turn	out	to	be	risky	for	us.	You	[Asociación]	are	representing	a	group	
behind	you	[he	didn’t	specify	which	group]”	 (FOMICH,	03/11/03).	Efraín	seemed	to	say	that	
there	were	interests	outside	the	partnership	that	were	defining	the	project.	This	perception	
matched	with	officials	from	SAGARPA,	with	whom	the	Asociación	had	had	a	meeting	some	days	
before.	The	partners	stated	that,	once	the	process	would	start,	they	would	seek	the	project	
funds.		
Norberto	(SPR	Huaniqueo)	impulsively	intervened	and	accused	the	officials	present	of	
being	bureaucrats	that	were	stopping	the	progress	of	the	project,	adding	that	this	would	be	
done	any	sort	of	means.	Efraín	asked	him	not	to	get	angry.	With	this	intervention,	the	meeting	
ended.	Although	the	meeting	was	not	encouraging,	Lino	was	still	optimistic	and	expressed:	
“This	does	not	discourage	me;	on	the	contrary,	the	points	raised	here	strengthen	me”.	This	
indicated	 that	 the	 partners	 of	 the	Asociación	 were	 interested	 in	 carrying	 out	 the	 project	
despite	the	opposing	or	discouraging	position	from	some	government	agencies.	At	the	end	of	
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the	meeting,	the	credit	request	letters	were	delivered	to	FOMICH,	addressed	to	Tranquilino	
Nájera,	 the	 FOMICH	 representative.	 The	 Asociación	 requested	 a	 support	 of	 10%	 for	 liquid	
guarantee,	 and	 that	 FOMICH	 appoint	 a	 representative	 for	 the	 Asociación's	 trust.	 Nájera	
accepted	the	request,	and	appointed	René	as	the	liaison	with	the	Asociación.	
Upon	returning	to	Zacapu,	alternatives	to	JLB’s	model	were	discussed.	Members	of	the	
Asociación	argued	that	after	a	 little	more	than	a	year	the	negotiations	had	shown	minimal	
results.	 In	 the	Asociación	 there	 existed	were	 two	 positions:	 the	 first	 was	 to	 let	 JLB’s	 firm	
continue	with	the	negotiations	and	be	assisted	by	the	Asociación’s	managing	committee	when	
required.	Under	 this	proposal,	 the	Asociación	 should	transfer	control	of	 the	shares	 to	 JLB’S	
firm.	The	second	position	 implied	 that	 the	Asociación	would	 initiate	 the	negotiations.	Two	
partners	(SPRs	La	Mesa	and	Sabor	del	Campo)	who	sympathized	with	JLB	would	ask	SEPLADE	
to	 release	 the	 resources,	 saying	 that	 they	would	go	with	 the	option	offered	by	 JBL’s	 firm.	
Gonzalo	answered	that	the	requirements	concerning	the	completion	of	the	financial	resources	
proposed	in	the	project	had	to	be	met	and	submitted	to	SUPLADER.	Pancho	(SPR	Comanja)	and	
Norberto	 presented	 their	 point	 of	 view,	 but	 they	 seemed	 disconnected	 from	 the	 project.	
Heredia	perceived	this	and	accused	them	of	slowing	down	the	meeting.	
Irma	proposed	 to	punish	 the	 absentee	 groups	 (who	 rarely	 attended	meetings)	 and	
even	proposed	putting	them	at	the	very	end	of	the	list	of	the	Asociación’s	privileges	-	with	the	
clear	intention	of	putting	in	their	place	the	SPR	that	she	represented	(Piedad	Chiquita).	This	
would	ensure	a	place	for	Irma’s	SPR	in	the	event	that	the	Alianza	negotiations	of	her	group	
were	unsuccessful.	To	solve	this	point,	Heredia	suggested	to	make	minutes	of	the	meeting’s	
proposals.	Cristi,	who	was	responsible	for	arranging	this,	clarified	that	all	representatives	of	
SPRS	had	been	informed	by	phone	or	notified	through	a	family	about	the	meeting.	
At	the	end	of	the	meeting,	Lino	(the	Asociación’s	secretary)	asked	Gonzalo	to	repeat	
the	five	requirements	requested.83	After	writing	them	down,	Lino	proposed	a	work	schedule	
to	accomplish	them,	but	this	did	not	work	out.	There	was	a	need	for	direction	in	the	actions	
by	the	representatives	of	the	Asociación;	furthermore,	its	leadership	lacked	initiative	-which	
made	them	more	dependent	on	JLB’s	firm	(SEPLADE,	03/11/03).	
	
	
FIRA:	Financial	feasibility	first	 	
As	part	of	the	activities	to	make	links	with	governmental	institutions,	on	January	22,	2004	a	
group	of	five	SPRs	went	to	FIRA’s	office	in	Morelia.	Chema	(Deyna)	got	an	appointment	with	
his	son-in-law	Eliseo	Landín,84	who	had	links	with	officials	from	FIRA	and	FIRCO.	That	day,	we	
travelled	 in	 Chema’s	 truck,	 and	 Jesús	 accompanied	 us.	 Jesús	 had	 worked	 with	 Chema	 in	
Celanese85	and	the	latter	had	encouraged	Jesús	to	continue	studying	industrial	engineering.	
																																																						
83	 a)	 Obtaining	 the	 credit	 line	 that	 would	 support	 investment;	 b)	 Providing	 technical	 advice;	 c)	 Getting	
commitment	letters	for	commercialization	and	supplies;	d)	Having	a	business	plan	and	administration	plan	for	
the	Asociación;	e)	Releasing	the	resources	from	the	agencies.	
84	Agronomist	engineer,	graduated	from	Chapingo.	
85	Textile	factory	located	in	Zacapu,	identified	as	Viscosa	Mexicana	S.A.	
	86	
During	the	trip,	we	talked	about	the	Asociación's	situation,	especially	about	the	groups	that	
continued	with	JLB’S	firm.	Chema,	due	to	his	experience	with	Celanese	and	his	knowledge	of	
social	organizations,	took	advantage	of	this	time	together	to	sound	out	our	points	of	view.	
When	we	got	to	FIRA,	the	delegate	(Monroy)	welcomed	us,	and	then	led	us	to	Eliseo,	
(partner	of	SPR	Deyna	and	SEDAGRO	technician,	and	technician	in	charge	of	the	greenhouses	
in	FIRA).	The	intention	was	to	give	us	a	talk	about	FIRA	and	to	inform	us	of	the	support	that	we	
could	have	for	the	project.	The	talk	was	general,	but	it	focused	on	the	ways	in	which	FIRA	gave	
support	to	associations	like	ours.	However,	the	technician	expressed	himself	ambiguously.	It	
seemed	 like	 this	 type	 of	 talk	 was	 generic	 and	 prepared	 for	 visitors	 without	 any	 specific	
requests.	When	we	asked	him	about	 the	Asociación's	 case	and	how	 to	 land	 the	 resources	
concretely,	he	 said	 that	FIRA	would	be	 interested	 in	 the	Asociación's	project	once	we	had	
obtained	the	bank’s	credit	line	authorized	for	this	purpose.	He	referred	to	PROGOMICH86	and	
an	SPR	called	of	Guayaberos	 located	 in	 the	eastern	region	of	Michoacán;	 they	had	already	
obtained	such	a	credit	line	through	the	Banco	del	Bajío.	
To	find	out	more	about	the	matter,	I	contacted	a	former	colleague	named	Abraham	
who	had	more	 than	20	years’	experience	working	 in	FIRA	organizing	groups.	Abraham	had	
participated	in	the	consolidation	of	PROGOMICH.	After	the	meeting	with	FIRA,	the	partners	of	
the	Asociación	met	with	Abraham	in	a	spa	near	Morelia	together	with	other	FIRA	officials	and	
their	families;	it	was	a	social	gathering.	Abraham	said	that	FIRA	was	an	extremely	rational	and	
practical	 institution	 that	 worked	 in	 an	 apolitical	 way	 and	 with	 a	 perspective	 of	 seeking	
economic	efficiency.	Abraham	said:	“FIRA	uses	1.3	billion	annually,	but	it	does	not	appear	in	
the	press.	Other	institutions	release	5	million	and	they	appear	frequently	on	the	front	page	of	
the	newspapers.”	(Abraham,	20/01/2004).	
When	we	asked	him	about	the	greenhouse	project	of	the	Asociación	and	the	way	JLB’s	
firm	had	managed	it,	Abraham	assured	us	that,	until	now,	FIRA	had	not	yet	taken	into	account	
the	greenhouse	project	of	the	Asociación.	To	be	completely	sure,	he	insisted	on	checking	it	
with	advisor	Polo	Valenzuela,	responsible	for	that	region.	The	technician	in	question	(Polo)	
knew	the	Ciénega	of	Zacapu,	and	had	relatives	in	the	ejido	of	Primo	Tapia.87	Spurred	by	the	
occasion	and	a	little	drunk,	he	confirmed	that	he	did	not	know	about	the	project,	and	said	that	
he	would	 not	 bet	 on	 greenhouses:	 “They	 are	 a	 risky	 investment	 and	 there	 have	 been	big	
failures.	In	Jalisco,	a	company	failed	in	the	technological	management	of	the	greenhouse,	and	
they	went	bankrupt”	(Polo	Valenzuela,	20/01/2004).	In	turn,	Abraham	recommended	that	we	
forget	about	the	“leverage”	(the	State	subsidy),	and	consider	the	project	as	a	profitable	unit.	
During	his	career,	he	had	seen	groups	that	had	received	much	leverage	but	could	not	stand	
drastic	changes	 in	profitability:	“To	avoid	creating	 false	expectations,	you	must	expect	 low	
income	at	the	beginning,	and	wait	for	three	to	four	years	for	the	groups	to	be	consolidated.	
That	is	the	challenge”	(Abraham,	20/01/2004).	
																																																						
86	Guava	Producers	from	eastern	Michoacán.	
87	This	place	was	previously	known	as	the	Chirimoyo,	the	place	where	Primo	Tapia	was	murdered.	
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Abraham	gave	good	advice	about	the	functioning	of	the	organizations	in	terms	of	the	
financial	resources,	institutions	and	commitments;	he	promised	to	get	information	regarding	
organizations	similar	to	the	Asociación	and	how	they	achieved	the	funds	from	FIRA;	also,	he	
would	make	an	appointment	with	 the	directive	board	of	 PROGOMICH.	He	 suggested	not	 to	
include	 bureaucratic	 institutions	 in	 the	 trust,	 and	 also	 stated	 that	 there	were	 actors	who	
wanted	to	make	their	own	projections	of	the	organizations.	To	obtain	the	support	of	FIRA,	the	
project	should	be	profitable	and	have	a	credit	line	by	a	bank;	in	addition,	groups	such	as	the	
Association	should	be	consolidated.	
	
	
Interfaces	between	FIRCO	and	JLB’s	firm	
After	the	meeting	with	FIRA,	we	got	together	with	the	group	that	had	travelled	to	Zacapu	to	
meet	with	FIRCO88	(Morelia).	Rogelio	(a	FIRCO	technician)	met	with	us,	and	we	asked	him	about	
the	participation	of	FIRCO	in	the	greenhouse	project.	FIRCO	was	contributing	‒	in	the	same	way	
as	FOMICH	and	producers	‒	10%	of	the	liquid	guarantee	with	the	purpose	of	making	up	the	
30%	JLB’s	firm	had	foreseen	in	the	project.	After	 listening	to	us,	Rogelio	suggested	that	we	
have	a	meeting	with	the	Asociación	in	Zacapu	to	explain	the	position	of	FIRCO	in	terms	of	the	
project.	
On	January	22,	2004,	there	was	a	scheduled	meeting	with	FIRCO	in	Zacapu	attended	by	
the	majority	of	the	Asociación's	members.	The	meeting	was	fundamental,	since	it	had	been	
clear	 that	 there	 were	 different	 stances	 taken	 in	 previous	 Asociación’s	 meetings.	 Before	
starting	the	meeting,	Chema	told	me	briefly	that	people	at	JLB’s	firm	were	upset	about	our	
visit	to	FIRA	and	FIRCO,	and	that	Lira	(from	JLB’s	firm)	had	told	him	about	meeting	with	these	
institutions	without	JLB’s	firm	being	present.		
We	 waited	 a	 while	 for	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Asociación	 to	 arrive,	 and	 when	 the	
managing	committee	was	set	up,	the	meeting	started.	Lino	gave	the	floor	to	JLB’s	firm	–	which	
had	been	invited	to	present	the	commercialization	project.	JLB	started	with	an	attack	against	
those	who,	according	to	him,	had	retraced	a	big	part	of	the	road	that	he	had	achieved	with	
FIRCO.	As	far	as	we	knew,	JLB’s	firm’s	dealings	with	FIRCO	consisted	of	phone	calls,	meetings	
and	private	meals	with	the	national	director	of	FIRCO.	To	our	knowledge,	there	had	never	a	
formal	agreement.	Rafa	(SEPLADE)	interjected	and	explained	good-naturedly	that	we	had	met	
with	FIRCO	due	to	a	last-minute	invitation	and	that,	since	the	Asociación’s	members	did	not	
have	enough	information,	they	had	decided	to	let	us	know	the	requirements	about	how	to	
participate	 in	 the	project.	FIRCO,	Rafa	continued,	stated	that	 this	conversation	had	already	
taken	place	with	Heredia	as	representative	of	the	Asociación.	However,	up	until	now	Heredia	
had	 not	 passed	 on	 this	 information	 to	 the	Asociación’s	members.	 In	 order	 to	 present	 the	
information,	Rafa	explained,	this	meeting	had	been	called	for.	
																																																						
88	The	objectives	of	FIRCO	included	establishing	lines	and	technical	guidelines	for	the	making	of	management	
plans	of	studies	and	projects	(SAGARPA,	2003;	SAGARPA,	2001).	
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JLB	was	clearly	not	pleased	with	Rafa’s	explanation.		JLB	asked	for	an	explanation	from	
those	who	had	met	with	the	institutions	without	his	approval.	Lino	encouraged	JLB	to	request	
an	explanation.	I	responded	to	JLB	that	there	were	situations	that	did	not	necessarily	need	to	
be	discussed	with	his	firm,	and	that	this	was	a	matter	for	the	Asociación	and	that	later,	if	the	
assembly	thought	it	relevant,	they	would	give	a	detailed	report	of	the	actions	taken	during	the	
visits	to	FIRA	and	FIRCO.	This	made	JLB	even	angrier;	he	said	he	could	not	be	excluded	in	this	
way	 since	 he	 was	 the	 interested	 party	 who	would	 build	 the	 commercialization	 company.	
Although	JLB	was	a	clever	man,	I	think	I	had	caught	him	off-guard.	Rafa	supported	me	and,	in	
a	diplomatic	way,	clarified	that	there	were	some	matters	that	we	should	handle	independently	
from	his	firm.	At	that	moment,	we	were	told	that	the	FIRCO	officials	had	arrived.	They	were	
represented	by	engineers	Domingo	Ruvalcaba	and	Rogelio	Martínez.	 JLB	went	out	to	meet	
them;	 they	 greeted	 the	 people	 from	 the	 JLB’s	 firm	 and	 chatted	 amongst	 themselves.	 JLB	
treated	the	new	arrivals	with	familiarity	to	show	off	to	the	other	attendees	of	the	meeting.	
The	officials	appeared	both	cordial	and	formal,	in	particular	Rogelio	Martínez.	
The	FIRCO	officials	showed	willingness	to	directly	clarify	the	progress	of	the	Asociación	
developed	 by	 the	 JLB	 firm	with	 FIRCO,	 and	 the	 agreed	 commitments.	 Domingo	 Ruvalcaba	
intervened	in	the	assembly	and	immediately	contradicted	JLB.	He	affirmed	that	so	far	there	
had	not	been	any	commitments	between	FIRCO	and	the	Asociación.	JLB	defended	himself	by	
presenting	 old	 documents	 from	 FOMICH	 and	 commitment	 letters	 from	 SEDAGRO	 and	
SUPLADER.	Domingo	Ruvalcaba	clarified	that	FIRCO	should	be	in	contact	with	the	producers,	
then	he	made	a	proposal	of	how	we	could	access	10%	of	the	resources	to	obtain	the	liquid	
guarantee	 of	 the	 credit	 line	 and	 get	 support	 on	 the	 agribusiness	 side.	 FIRCO	 required,	
according	to	its	regulations,	the	cost	of	the	greenhouse	to	be	quoted	by	three	companies,	as	
well	as	a	commitment	to	commercialization	through	Letters	of	Intent,	a	business	plan	and	a	
detailed	description	of	the	process	and	materials	of	the	greenhouse.	After	this	intervention,	
the	FIRCO	officials	ended	the	meeting	and	established	that	the	management	processes	would	
continue	 in	 the	Morelia	 offices.	 Obviously,	 the	 links	 between	 JLB	 and	 FIRCO	 officials	were	
fragile	and	susceptible	to	change.		
At	this	point,	the	secretary	of	the	Asociación,	Lino,	the	representatives	of	the	SPR	Del	
Campo	(Carlos)	and	Jaime	behaved	aggressively	towards	Gonzalo	and	me,	since	they	blamed	
us	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 JLB’s	 firm	had	shown	up	at	 the	assembly.	They	confirmed	 that	ULMA’s	
greenhouse	was	expensive	due	to	the	software	and	they	would	continue	working	with	the	
original	project	proposed	by	JLB’s	firm.	In	previous	meetings,	JLB	had	said	that	the	cost	of	the	
software	was	between	USD	5,000	and	6,000.	However,	now	some	partners	knew	that	it	was	
more	feasible	to	obtain	one	semi-automated	greenhouse	instead	of	the	“ideal”	greenhouse	
proposed	by	JLB‘s	firm	(see	Chapter	4).	Faced	with	the	imminent	defeat	of	representing	the	
Asociación,	JLB	refused	to	leave	the	commercialization	document	that	he	had	presented	in	the	
meeting,	 in	virtue	of	 the	decision	 that	he	would	not	participate	 in	 it,	and	 that	 it	would	be	
presented	 only	 afterwards	 to	 the	 SPRs	 that	 collaborated	 with	 his	 firm.	 Then	 he	 said,	
surprisingly:	“I	accept	that	in	business	sometimes	you	win	and	sometimes	you	lose”.	
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Even	 so,	 JLB	 still	 requested	 USD	 15,000	 for	 each	 SPR	 to	 continue	 managing	 the	
distribution	company	with	resources	from	a	credit	with	Spanish	banks,	which	implied	a	trip	to	
Spain	to	manage	the	training	of	some	partners.	He	would	leave	aside	USD	10,000	for	 living	
expenses.	At	the	time,	some	partners	joked	about	the	proposal	and	showed	how	a	firm	could	
try	to	obtain	money	in	exchange	for	promises	without	any	foundation.	Lira	(from	JLB’s	firm)	
spoke	to	me	to	clarify	that	part	of	the	resources	to	be	obtained	from	the	dealings	with	the	
Alianza	should	go	to	JLB’s	firm.	In	particular,	they	should	assign	what	had	been	specified	in	
the	project,	since	the	information	would	be	verified	by	the	governmental	agencies.	I	answered	
that	we	would	wait	for	the	corresponding	notifications	from	CADER	(part	of	SAGARPA)	and	then	
revise	the	allocation	of	those	resources.	After	this,	the	assembly	was	asked	if	the	decision	of	
whether	or	not	to	work	JLB	could	be	postponed,	since	it	was	after	11	pm	and	everybody	was	
tired.	In	the	end,	JLB	still	offered	to	pay	Gonzalo’s	ticket	to	Spain	-	the	rest	of	us	had	to	pay	for	
our	own	tickets.	JLB	also	said	that,	regardless	of	whether	we	worked	with	him	or	not,	we	would	
remain	friends.	He	then	shook	hands	with	all	of	us.	JLB	knew	that	he	had	lost	the	battle,	but	
not	 the	 war,	 and	 he	 would	 not	 give	 up	 all	 the	 achievements	 he	 had	 obtained	 with	 the	
Asociación.	After	all,	11	out	of	the	28	(39%)	of	the	SPRs	were	still	with	JLB’s	firm.	Besides,	there	
were	still	some	negotiations	going	on	with	Alianza.	
	
	
The	reconfiguration	of	the	Asociación	and	its	resources	
On	February	16,	2004,	without	notifying	 the	Asociación,	 Lino	had	 requested	permission	 to	
create	another	USPR	named	Productos	Inocuos	de	Michoacán.	There	were	already	rumours	
inside	the	Asociación	of	this	new	USPR,	but	there	had	not	been	any	certainty.	On	March	5,	
2004,	we	met	with	Lino	and	Heredia	in	the	offices	of	SEPLADE	in	order	to	clarify	the	matter.	At	
the	beginning,	they	did	not	admit	creating	it,	but	when	faced	with	the	information	from	the	
notary	Ernestina,	they	had	to	acknowledge	it.	It	was	then	agreed	with	Heredia	and	Lino	that	
they	would	have	to	request	a	license	for	an	indefinite	time	period	as	representatives	of	the	
Asociación,	with	the	argument	of	having	other	matters	to	attend	to	in	order	to	avoid	showing	
the	internal	conflicts	to	other	institutions,	which	might	consider	the	fission	as	a	weakness	in	
the	project.	
The	permission	for	the	Asociación’s	representatives	went	ahead.	Thus,	the	managing	
committee	was	assumed	by	the	substitutes:	me	as	president	and	Esperanza	as	a	secretary,	
with	all	grants	that	the	previous	representatives	had	had.	It	was	also	suggested	that	it	would	
not	be	suitable	to	create	another	USPR	by	the	SPRs	members	of	the	Asociación,	since	it	had	
the	 same	 objectives	 as	 the	 Asociación.	 April	 30,	 2004	 was	 set	 as	 the	 deadline	 for	 the	
permission	 of	 the	 president	 and	 secretary	 to	 decide	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 continue	 in	 their	
positions	within	the	Asociación	or	to	quit	permanently.	In	this	assembly,	the	pending	SPRs:	
Deyna	 (Chema),	 Cortijo	 Nuevo,	 La	 Jabonera,	 and	 Movimiento	 Ciudadano	 de	 Mujeres	
(Margarita)	 also	 attended,	 and	 it	 was	 agreed	 by	 majority	 of	 votes	 to	 exclude	 SPR	
Agroindustriales,	for	its	non-participation	in	the	greenhouse	project.	
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On	March	23,	2004,	another	Asociación	meeting	was	held.	One	of	the	objectives	was	
a	change	in	the	Asociación’s	treasurer.	The	assembly	had	the	intention	of	sharing	information	
about	the	previous	managing	committee	(Lino	and	Heredia),	and	taking	a	decision	about	it.	
Before	this	meeting,	on	March	17,	2004,	Heredia	and	Lino	sent	a	letter	to	the	governor,	which	
they	signed	as	representatives	of	the	Asociación.	In	said	document,	they	declared	that	they	
represented	a	new	USPR	called	Productos	Inocuos	de	Michoacán,	with	10	member	SPRs.	The	
SPRs	making	up	Productos	 Inocuos	were	 Sabor	del	 Campo	 (Jaime),	 Purépechas	 (Abelardo),	
Presa	Azteca	(Saúl),	Jiménez	(Lino),	La	Mesa	(Avelino),	Provech	(Rodolfo),	Los	Sauces	(Manuel	
Pimentel),	 Heredia	 (Heredia),	 Tomates	 (José	 Calderón).	 In	 the	 letter,	 Lino	 and	 Heredia	
requested	the	resources	committed	to	these	SPRs,	since	these	represented	the	new	USPR.	The	
Asociación	consulted	a	renowned	lawyer	on	this	matter,	who	gave	his	opinion:	
	
It	is	common	to	look	for	more	than	one	option	(USPR)	to	amass	benefits.	This	highlights	
the	idiosyncrasies	of	the	Mexicans.	I	advise	you	to	hold	an	assembly	and	to	rule,	based	
on	the	regulations	of	the	Asociación,	to	expel	the	involved	SPRs,	specifying	the	reasons	
for	 doing	 that.	 All	 this	 can	 be	 sustained	 by	 the	 articles	 of	 the	 internal	 rules	 of	 the	
Asociación.	(López-Méndez,	Zamora,	22/04/04)	
	
The	partners	considered	that,	at	this	time,	the	priority	was	to	continue	with	the	project,	and	
engaging	in	a	conflict	was	not	beneficial	for	either	party.	As	evidence	of	good	faith	between	
the	 two	USPRs,	 the	 economic	 contributions	 of	 the	 SPRs	 that	made	 up	 the	USPR	Productos	
Inocuos	were	returned	to	Carlos	as	treasurer.	A	letter	addressed	to	SEPLADE	was	then	drafted	
(with	a	copy	to	the	institutions	involved	in	the	project)	where	he	explained	that	it	had	been	
an	initiative	of	the	SPRs	-	the	ones	that	now	formed	the	USPR	Productos	Inocuos	-	to	leave	the	
Asociación.	Each	of	the	USPRs	would	seek	to	implement	the	greenhouse	project	with	their	own	
resources,	adding	that	there	was	no	conflict	of	interest	and	that	the	separation	was	by	mutual	
agreement	due	to	the	type	of	greenhouse	that	each	of	them	wanted.	The	SPRs	that	continued	
with	the	Asociación	remained	with	ACEA,	and	ULMA	worked	with	the	SPRs	of	USPR	Productos	
Inocuos.	
The	USPR	Productos	 Inocuos	was	established	on	March	9,	2004,	and	from	this	point	
onwards	 they	no	 longer	participated	 in	 the	Asociación.	 The	 first	 formal	division	originated	
from	the	disagreements	with	the	proposal	of	JLB’s	firm,	when	choosing	another	provider.	The	
power	relations	did	not	 favour	the	managing	committee	that	supported	 JLB’S	 firm,	nor	 the	
groups	that	tried	to	obtain	resources	from	SUPLADER	in	a	fast	track.	The	decision	of	the	SPR’s	
that	formed	the	Productos	Inocuos	was	to	benefit	from	the	resources	of	SEDAGRO	that	had	
already	been	committed.	Therefore,	JLB’s	firm’s	expectations	of	obtaining	the	resources	from	
the	 Asociación	 were	 fading;	 the	 Asociación	 validated	 the	 authorized	 proposal	 of	 the	
commitment	letter	and	this	was	recognized	by	SEDAGRO.	The	SPRs	united	in	the	Asociación	
did	not	avoid	conflict	to	keep	what	had	already	been	achieved.	In	view	of	these	events,	the	28	
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SPRs	of	the	Asociación	proposed	that	the	SPRs	that	remained	in	the	Asociación	should	be	more	
involved	in	the	project.89		
On	 April	 30,	 2004,	 the	 Asociación	 reached	 the	 deadline	 for	 Heredia	 and	 Lino	 as	
President	and	Secretary,	respectively,	to	decide	if	they	wanted	to	continue	in	the	Asociación’s	
management	committee.	Inside	the	Asociación	the	legal	actions	were	discussed	that	would	
demarcate	 the	 10	 SPRs	 who	 were	 moving	 out.	 They	 were	 looking	 for	 the	 division	 to	 be	
circumscribed	by	the	internal	rules	of	the	Constitutive	Act	and	validated	by	a	Public	Notary.	
The	financial	credit	that	was	managed	by	the	Asociación	would	now	be	shared	among	17	and	
not	anymore	the	28	SPRs,	as	was	still	specified	in	the	Constitutive	Act.	This	implied	that	the	
commitments,	obligations,	and	rights	were	only	for	the	participating	SPRS	and	not	for	all	28	
SPRs	registered	with	the	Asociación.	
To	probe	the	problematic	situation	that	could	be	generated	by	the	legal	scission	in	the	
Asociación,	 Gonzalo	 proposed	 to	 meet	 on	 April	 27,	 2004	 in	 Santa	 Gertrudis	 with	 Saúl,	 a	
member	 of	 SPR	 Azteca	 (part	 of	 Productos	 Inocuos),	 since	 according	 to	 Gonzalo	 he	 had	
experience	and	vision.	That	day,	Saúl	received	Gonzalo	and	me	in	his	house,	and	he	invited	us	
for	dinner.	At	75	Don	Saúl,	as	he	was	called,	was	considered	one	of	the	regional	leaders.	At	
the	beginning	of	 the	meeting	with	him,	he	seemed	to	be	sceptical,	 complaining	about	 the	
bureaucracy	and	the	amount	of	procedures	with	FIRCO.	He	explained	that	in	the	1980s	FIRA	
had	supported	them90	with	credit	for	pig	cooperatives.	Don	Saúl	told	us	that:	
	
I	remember	about	the	different	cooperatives	and	groups	created	during	the	government	
of	President	Luis	Echeverría;	in	those	days,	it	was	only	necessary	to	get	organized	and	to	
form	 a	 group.	 That	 was	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Hungarians	 that	 suggested	 technological	
packages,	 in	 which	 using	 fertilizer	 with	 optimal	 doses	 increased	 the	 production.	
Nevertheless,	organization	was	not	reached	and	the	group	divided.	The	government	bets	
on	the	lack	of	unity;	it	is	like	asking	for	a	residence	permit	at	the	United	States	Embassy:	
they	 do	 not	 deny	 it,	 you	 only	 just	 cannot	 get	 all	 the	 requirements	 together.	 The	
greenhouses	project	is	similar:	we	must	contribute	with	around	USD	40,000.	To	lend	us	a	
similar	amount,	the	bank	asks	us	for	a	guarantee	of	double	this	amount.	If	I	had	what	the	
bank	asks	me	as	a	guarantee	[smile]	then	why	should	I	ask	for	money	and	pay	interest	
over	it?	(Don	Saúl,	10/06/04).	
	
Although	Saúl	betted	on	collective	work,	he	accepted	that	the	conditions	to	get	it	done	were	
not	 present.	 Instead,	 he	 proposed	 to	 work	 with	 family	 groups	 and	 in	 that	 way,	maintain	
cohesion.	“If	I	have	to	fight	with	my	old	lady	[wife],	it	will	be	only	with	her”	–	expressed	Saúl	
emphatically.	
																																																						
89	One	of	the	arguments	made	to	continue	with	JLB	was	that	the	firm	had	prepared	the	project	that	had	involved	
the	institutions,	and	had	implications	for	what	he	had	already	dealt	with	them.	Alianza	had	approved	resources	
for	six	groups,	SUPLADER	for	20	SPRs,	SEDAGRO	came	with	USD	2	million	for	the	Asociación,	while	FIRCO,	FOMICH	
and	FIRA	knew	about	the	project.	
90	 In	the	70-80´s	Saúl	had	participated	 in	cooperatives.	The	result	had	been	poor	management	and	partners’	
corruption.	
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Saúl	perceived	fissures	in	the	Asociación	and	the	SPRs.	Gonzalo	admitted	that	mistakes	
had	been	made,	clarifying	that	 JLB’S	 firm	was	clearly	co-responsible	 for	this.	As	Saúl	 rightly	
observed:	 the	majority	 of	 the	members	must	 have	 taken	 the	 decision	 of	 not	 dividing	 the	
Asociación	 at	 that	 time.	 The	 solution	 for	 the	 project	 would	 lie	 in	 cohesion	 and	 common	
interests,	even	if	the	strategies	that	each	of	the	USPRs	followed	enhanced	the	negotiations,	
so	now	it	was	time	to	be	reunified	again.	
	After	 the	 meeting,	 Saúl	 said	 he	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 re-join	 both	 networks	 (the	
Asociación	and	Productos	Inocuos).	I	agreed	with	Gonzalo	in	appointing	out	Saúl	as	a	key	figure	
inside	the	SPRs	advised	by	JLB’S	firm.	The	outcome	of	talking	with	Saúl	were	reflected	in	the	
visit	that	his	nephew	Carlos	made	to	the	Asociación,	intending	to	probe	the	position	of	some	
of	 the	members	 and	 negotiate	 the	 funds	 to	 build	 the	 greenhouses.	 The	 intention	was	 to	
release	the	resources	of	both	USPRs	into	a	joint	venture.	
A	 few	days	after	approaching	 the	counterpart	 (Productos	 Inocuos),	 and	despite	 the	
previous	negotiations	with	Saúl,	some	of	the	Asociación’s	members	still	considered	the	option	
of	 a	 legal	 rupture	 with	 Productos	 Inocuos	 on	 grounds	 that,	 according	 to	 the	Asociación´s	
regulations,	the	SPRs	that	were	not	collaborating	could	legally	claim	the	resources	given	to	
the	Asociación.	For	this	purpose,	a	committee	was	designated	to	analyse,	judge,	and	propose	
to	 the	meeting	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 rupture.	 On	 April	 20,	 2004	 the	 committee	met,	
including	Armando	(Piedad	Chiquita),	Cristi	(Biotecnológicos),	Ampa	(Los	Pinos),	Mare	(Puerta	
Chica),	Chema	(Deyna)	and	Jesús	(Maldonado).	The	next	step	would	be	to	talk	with	each	SPR	
of	Productos	 Inocuos.	 Jesús	and	Chema,	who	were	members	of	Celanese’s	Labour	Unión91,	
analysed	in	detail	the	possible	consequences	of	the	scission	and	the	way	to	overcome	them.	
Once	the	committee	had	discussed	the	options	-	either	to	expel	all	the	SPRs	together	
or	only	some	of	them	-	it	was	decided	that	Lino	and	Heredia	should	be	expelled	due	to	a	bad	
performance	of	 their	Asociación's	 functions.	They	had	signed	a	 letter	as	representatives	of	
both	the	Asociación	and	Productos	Inocuos	with	the	intention	that	the	resources	authorized	
by	SEDAGRO	and	assigned	to	the	Asociación	would	be	transferred	to	Productos	Inocuos.	Ampa	
proposed	to	dismiss	the	SPRs	as	a	group,	arguing	that	they	did	not	comply	with	the	original	
social	objective	of	 the	Asociación.	 The	 last	word	about	 it	would	 come	 from	 the	members’	
general	assembly.	
The	meeting	held	on	April	28,	2004	was	announced	ex	professo	and	all	28	SPRs	were	
invited.	The	atmosphere	at	the	start	of	the	meeting	was	tense.	Lino	was	very	defensive,	as	he	
could	sense	his	 imminent	destitution-	even	if	 it	was	explained	to	him	that	this	was	not	the	
intention.	The	president	and	the	secretary	of	the	Asociación	had	to	state	a	position	related	to	
their	 participation	 in	 Productos	 Inocuos.	 With	 project	 consolidation	 in	 sight,	 this	 was	 the	
chance	of	re-joining	both	USPRs.	When	the	committee	stated	its	position,	it	considered	that	
negotiations	had	been	conducted	by	the	former	representatives	of	the	Asociación,	with	the	
consent	 of	 the	 dissident	 SPRs.	 These	 SPRs	 were	 looking	 for	 benefits	 from	 the	 resources	
																																																						
91	In	1960	Chema	was	part	of	the	Organization	and	Propaganda	section	of	Celanese’s	Labour	Union,	in	1963	he	
had	been	part	of	the	General	Secretariat	of	this	Union	(Domínguez,	1998).	
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released	by	SEDAGRO	to	transfer	them	through	Productos	Inocuos;	hence,	the	SPRs	involved	
accepted	 the	authorship	of	 the	 letter	 that	was	 sent	 to	 the	 institutions.	Carlos	–	Productos	
Inocuos’	treasurer	-	defended	Productos	Inocuos’	foundation,	keeping	his	right	to	respond	and	
giving	some	additional	information.	Ampa	said	that	the	SPRs	mentioned	before	would	only	be	
in	the	USPRs	that	was	more	convenient	for	them	and	expressed:		
	
Productos	Inocuos	partners	ensure	they	do	not	require	a	bank	credit	for	their	project.	I	
highlighted	to	them	the	existence	of	a	credit	request	signed	by	Lino	and	Heredia	at	Banco	
del	Bajío.	The	bank	executive	[Toscano]	also	explained	that	this	action	was	against	both	
USPRs’	management	rules	(Ampa,	Zacapu,	28/04/2004).	
	
At	 that	 moment,	 a	 harsh	 discussion	 started	 that	 went	 to	 the	 point	 of	 discussing	 the	
convenience	 of	 expelling	 Lino	 and	Heredia.	 The	 central	 argument	was	 that	 they	 occupied	
higher	ranking	positions	of	the	same	level	in	both	USPRs	and	that	this	duplicity	would	bring	
inconveniences	to	the	credit	line	management	of	the	Asociación.	Malla	(Los	Pinos)	and	Mare	
(Puerta	Chica)	agreed	with	the	need	of	expel	them	from	the	Asociación.	
Cristi,	who	had	supported	them	before,	now	argued	that	she	was	being	pressed	by	
Gonzalo	 and	 the	 Asociación’s	 management	 committee	 to	 carry	 out	 “irregular	 actions”.	
Gonzalo	proposed	to	reduce	the	conflicts	until	the	resources	arrived,	and	then	to	allow	each	
USPR	 to	 go	 forward	 with	 their	 own	 project.	 Ampa	 criticized	 the	mediators’	 role	 of	 some	
members	of	the	Asociación	and	suggested	to	expel	them	as	a	group,	including	Abelardo	for	
being	“too	loose-minded”.		
It	was	decided	by	majority	of	votes	 to	expel	all	 SPRs	 that	participated	 in	Productos	
Inocuos	 from	the	Asociación.	 It	was	also	decided	 to	 ratify	 the	management	committee	 for	
three	years.	Once	the	corresponding	assembly’s	certificate	was	formally	registered	in	front	of	
Ernestina,	 the	Notary,	 the	 current	management	 committee	 formed	 by	myself	 (president),	
Esperanza	 (secretary),	 and	Mare	 (treasurer)	 was	 formalized.	 From	 the	 bank’s	 standpoint,	
these	 last	 actions	 gave	 more	 certainty	 to	 the	 project	 and	 allowed	 to	 proceed	 with	 the	
negotiation	to	obtain	the	credit	line.	
Each	group	would	deposit	USD	1,000	in	the	Asociación’s	account;	this	was	considered	
the	economic	contribution	for	its	17	SPRs.	In	May	2004,	the	BBVA,	Bancomer	Zacapu’s	office	
account	received	USD	17,000.	The	authorized	signatures	(two	of	three)	to	use	the	money	in	a	
collective	way	were	Mare,	Chema92,	and	myself.	Another	account	on	Banco	del	Bajío	Morelia	
Las	Americas’	office	had	a	balance	of	USD	108,500	in	May	2004,	while	the	authorized	joint	
signatures	were	those	of	the	management	committee.	
Chema	warned	the	management	committee	by	telling	them:	“Be	careful	when	we	start	
to	 manage	 some	 money	 because	 at	 that	 moment	 the	 conflict	 will	 start”.	 Financial	
administration	 was	 certainly	 a	 complex	 issue.	 For	 some	 of	 the	 Asociación's	 partners,	 to	
																																																						
92	Although	Chema	was	not	a	member	of	the	administrative	board	of	the	Asociación,	he	received	the	support	of	
some	partners	of	Zacapu	to	be	the	third	person.	
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contribute	with	financial	 resources	to	the	project	 implied	a	 formal	commitment	that	could	
cause	internal	conflict	within	and	among	the	SPRs.	
At	 some	 point,	 it	 seemed	 that	 the	 formal	 ejection	 of	 some	 of	 the	 SPRs	 from	 the	
Asociación	was	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 project.	 But	 this	 also	 caused	 conflicts	
between	both	USPRs.	The	intention	was	that	the	resources	managed	by	the	17	SPRs	should	not	
be	shared	by	the	SPRs	that	promoted	an	alternative	project	(Productos	Inocuos).	Within	the	
Asociación	there	was	uncertainty	about	the	project,	particularly	among	those	SPRs	that	had	
so	far	participated	little	in	the	Asociación.93	That	is	why	the	SPRs	that	had	already	made	their	
ten	percent	contribution	to	the	project	briefly	demanded	the	rest	of	the	SPRs	to	do	the	same	
-	causing	conflicts	and	power	within	the	Asociación.	Some	actors	like	Ampa,	Mare	and	Chema	
proposed	deadlines	for	the	SPR’s	contribution	(USD	15,000),	which	was	used	as	commitment	
to	continue	in	the	project.	The	disparity	between	the	SPRs	with	economic	resources	and	those	
without	them	was	too	evident.	Even	if	the	project	specified	the	corresponding	contribution	of	
each	 SPR,	 the	 differences	 in	 planning,	management,	 investment	 and	 authorization	 of	 the	
resources	caused	uncertainty.				
From	my	point	of	view,	 the	Asociación’s	 split	had	 its	origin	 in	 the	different	ways	of	
perceiving	 the	 project.	 Some	 SPRs	 linked	 with	 JLB	 relied	 on	 his	 network,	 resources	 and	
development	 perception,	 while	 the	 SPR's	 who	 remained	 in	 the	 Asociación	 sought	 an	
alternative	development	path.		
	
	
SEDAGRO’s	funding		
The	Asociación	representing	the	17	SPRs	continued	negotiations	with	the	institutions	to	find	
the	necessary	USD	110,000	per	greenhouse,	as	stated	in	the	proposal	of	ACEA.	There	appeared	
to	be	some	incongruence	with	the	original	document	elaborated	by	JLB’s	firm	that	indicated	
projected	 financial	 costs	 of	more	 than	 USD	 200,000,	 while	 ACEA’s	 greenhouse	 costs	 were	
quoted	 to	 be	 significantly	 less.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 SEDAGRO	 had	 already	 authorized	 USD	
200,000	for	the	Asociación,	so	now	Products	Inocuos	claimed	part	of	that	money	for	its	SPRs.	
That	 is	 to	 say,	 they	 claimed	USD	 100,000	 –	which	 corresponded	 to	 the	 10	 SPRs	 now	with	
Productos	Inocuos.	They	anticipated	that	SEDAGRO’s	resources	could	have	been	delivered	to	
the	Asociación	“by	mistake";	in	this	event	the	Asociación	would	have	to	share	the	money	with	
them,	 assuring	 that	 SEDAGRO	would	 label	 the	 amount	 for	 each	 SPR.	 The	members	 of	 the	
Asociación	considered	 that	“…only	 those	 resources	 that	are	 labelled	 for	Productos	 Inocuos	
would	be	destined	for	its	SPRs”	(SEPLADE,	28/04/04).	
At	first,	the	commitment	letter	of	SEDAGRO	was	addressed	to	the	Asociación,	not	to	
Productos	Inocuos.	When	the	latter	separated	from	the	Asociación,	it	sought	to	ensure	that	
resources	might	arrive	under	a	general	label,	and	not	specifically	for	each	SPR.	At	the	same	
time,	the	partners	of	the	Asociación	wanted	to	ensure	that	the	resources	assigned	to	this	USPR	
remained	there.	Norberto	(SPR	Huaniqueo)	stated:	“It	is	very	difficult	that	the	funds	released	
																																																						
93	These	SPRs	were	not	willing	to	 invest	resources	 in	an	uncertain	management,	and	adopted	a	wait-and-see	
position.	
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are	labelled	for	an	USPR	like	the	Asociación.	SEDAGRO	as	an	executing	instance	should	have	
specified	 the	amount	 for	each	SPR	applicant”	 (Norberto,	 SEPLADE	office,	 28/04/04).	On	 the	
other	hand,	and	as	Norberto	said,	in	the	Asociación	there	was	no	conflict	about	identifying	the	
20	SPRs	that	received	funds	from	SEDAGRO,	as	long	as	they	were	specified	or	labelled	for	each	
SPR	in	particular.	Furthermore,	it	was	clear	which	SPR	had	been	initiated	by	Alianza	and	which	
one	by	SEDAGRO.		
To	 speed	 up	 the	 process,	 the	 Asociación	 contacted	 Javier	 Torres,	 director	 of	
Hortofruticultura	of	SEDAGRO	in	order	to	negotiate	with	him	the	letter	of	commitment	that	
SEDAGRO	 would	 have	 to	 sign	 with	 the	 Asociación,	 request	 the	 speeding	 up	 of	 Alianza’s	
process,94	and	a	clarification	of	the	relation	of	JLB’S	firm	with	the	Asociación.	
In	the	past,	another	letter	had	been	sent	to	Silvano	Aureoles,	requesting	to	speed	up	
the	management	of	 the	project.	The	 letter	had	been	channelled	through	Juan	Portillo,	 the	
assistant	of	Torres	Téllez.	Juan	proposed	to	build	greenhouses	of	1,000	m2	to	learn	how	to	
produce	in	a	small	and	cheaper	greenhouse.	Most	of	the	partners	considered	this	a	joke	since	
it	represented	only	a	fifth	of	the	planned	area.	Juan	referred	to	an	individual	named	Salvador	
as	 the	 link	between	SEDAGRO	and	SUPLADER,	and	who	was	 in	charge	of	writing	 the	project	
reports	of	the	Asociación’s	progress.	It	appeared	that	there	were	inconsistencies	between	the	
versions	of	 the	 facts	 and	 the	 reports,	 but	 also	with	 the	director’s	 instructions	which	were	
transmitted	to	the	Asociación.	Salvador	informed	us	that	SUPLADER	had	supported	five	SPRs	
on	 behalf	 of	 Alianza	 and	 that	 we	 had	 requested	 the	 support	 of	 nine	 SPRs	 as	 part	 of	 a	
compromise	with	SEDAGRO.	He	also	mentioned	the	alleged	split	up	of	the	Asociación,	resulting	
in	another	USPR	formed	by	the	11	SPRs	that	still	belonged	to	the	Asociación,	and	represented	
by	 the	 previous	 president	 and	 secretary	 of	 the	Asociación.	 Now	 the	 new	USPR	 (Productos	
Inocuos)	 requested	 the	 resources	 from	SEDAGRO	 for	 their	own	SPRs.	We	explained	 to	 Juan	
Portillo	that	the	information	submitted	to	him	was	incorrect,	and	that	there	was	no	formal	
separation	yet	of	 the	SPRs	 that	 formed	Productos	 Inocuos.	 Juan	Portillo	 indicated	 that	 the	
official	source	of	 information	to	him	was	Salvador	(representative	of	SEDAGRO	in	SUPLADER	
Zacapu)	and	that	we	should	correct	these	imprecisions	with	him.	Ampa	specified:	“To	those	
who	are	here,	we	know	that	Salvador	had	asked	Heredia,	in	the	SUPLADER	meeting	the	day	
before,	how	many	SPRs	he	had	out	of	the	20	original	SPRs,	and	that	they	should	be	supported	
by	the	verbal	commitment	of	Silvano	[Aureoles]”	(Ampa,	SEDAGRO,	13/05/04).	
Salvador	mentioned	that	the	requirements	specified	in	the	project	should	be	covered	
before	 extending	 the	 letter	 of	 commitment	 concerning	 the	 resources	 of	 SEDAGRO.	 It	 was	
necessary	 that	 the	 producers	 and	 other	 institutions	 involved	 provided	 the	 corresponding	
funds,	 including	the	final	endorsement	of	the	bank.	They	had	the	 impression	that	Salvador	
was	betting	that	the	project	would	not	be	realized.	
Later	on,	we	talked	with	Torres	Téllez	about	the	technical	validation	of	the	project,95		
as	well	as	the	support	through	the	letters	of	intent.	About	the	first	aspect	he	said	that	there	
																																																						
94	SEDAGRO	is	part	of	the	Rural	Development	Council.	
95	SEDAGRO	as	the	executing	agency	should	provide	technical	validation	for	SEPLADE	to	release	the	resources.	
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was	 no	 problem,	 since	 the	 project	 had	 been	 evaluated	 favourably	 and	 the	 corresponding	
report	would	be	generated	the	next	Monday.	As	for	the	committed	resources	and	the	letter	
of	intent,	Torres	Téllez	recommended	that	the	funds	be	requested	through	Alianza,	due	to	the	
operational	flexibility	of	the	program.	Juan	Portillo	added:	“Because	the	commitment	letter	
signed	by	Silvano	[SEDAGRO]	has	not	been	updated,	the	financial	resources	committed	to	the	
Asociación	have	already	assigned	to	other	projects	since	 last	January	[five	months	earlier]”	
(Juan	 Portillo,	 SEDAGRO,	 13/05/04).	 Torres	 Téllez	 considered	 the	 possibility	 that	 financial	
support	would	be	granted	through	Alianza,	and	that	this	was	supported	by	resources	from	the	
agriculture	subprogram.	This	involved	speeding	up	the	procedures	and	documents	required	
in	 order	 to	 bring	 them	 to	 CADER	 before	 the	 application’s	 deadline.	 The	 subprogram	 of	
agriculture	varied	slightly	with	the	Program	of	Rural	Support	Investment	Projects	(PAPIR)	of	
2003,	and	it	was	necessary	to	understand	the	operational	rules.	
	
	
Negotiations	with	CADER	
Of	the	eight	applications	submitted	to	CADER	in	2003,	six	had	been	authorized.	Although	one	
authorized	group,	Purépechas,	was	part	of	Productos	Inocuos,	there	were	five	SPRs	which	had	
Alianza’s	support;	the	approved	amounts	were	between	USD	25,000	and	28,000.	They	were	
also	authorized	2,500	of	the	subprogram	PRODESCA;	that	money	should	be	delivered	to	JLB’	
firm	as	Professional	Service	Provider	(PSP).	
In	the	2004	promotion,	ten	SPRs	applied	for	funds	from	CADER	of	Zacapu,	and	two	SPRs	
in	 Tangancícuaro,	 namely	 the	 SPRs	 of	 La	 Jabonera	 and	 Purépero	 –	 for	 a	 total	 of	 twelve	
requests.	In	the	previous	phase,	La	Jabonera	had	paid	management	costs	to	JLB’s	firm;	yet,	he	
had	 not	 provided	 the	 corresponding	 documents	 to	 Tangancicuato’s	 CADER.	 The	 SPR	
Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	(Margarita)	had	not	submitted	their	file	to	CADER	since	
they	had	no	interest	in	the	greenhouse	project.	They	were	interested	in	mushroom	production	
and	prefered	 to	 remain	 an	 independent	 SPR.	However,	Rafa	 Lp,	 an	official	 of	 the	 SEPLADE	
Zacapu	and	husband	of	Margarita,	had	invited	and	included	them	in	the	Asociación’s	project.	
For	 the	2004	promotion	the	relationship	with	 the	CADER	 in	Zacapu	was	good.	Cristi	
(Biotecnológicos)	talked	to	Donaciano,	responsible	for	processing	CADER’s	requests	of	Alianza,	
and	 he	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 new	 applications	 for	 ten	 SPRs.	 Donaciano	 pledged	 to	 support	
whenever	necessary.	Based	on	previous	experience,	 the	Asociación	 improved	 the	 logistics,	
validating	partners’	data	and	quickly	completing	the	application.	Also,	the	documents	of	the	
SPRs	Purépero	and	La	Jabonera	were	gathered	and	submitted	to	the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro.	
Cristi,	 responsible	 for	 completing	 the	 records	 of	 Alianza,	 showed	 no	 significant	
progress.	 Errors	 when	 filling	 out	 applications	 were	 committed,	 and	 although	 occasionally	
some	partners	despaired	due	to	the	load	of	paperwork,	they	were	still	seriously	following	the	
instructions	 that	 Cristi	 gave	 them.	 Cristi	 deftly	 managed	 to	 involve	 members	 of	 other	
committees,	 particularly	 women,	 so	 they	 ended	 up	 supporting	 Cristi	 in	 her	 work.	 It	 was	
necessary	 to	 make	 modifications	 for	 eight	 SPRS,	 such	 as	 changing	 the	 location,	 partners,	
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FODA,96	municipality	resources,	infrastructure,	and	so	on.	I	did	all	this	paperwork	and	It	took	
me	almost	a	week.	Lupita	who	served	as	secretary	of	the	Asociación	and	the	other	members	
helped	me	 entering	 the	 project	 data	 into	 the	 computer.	Meanwhile,	 Vicente	 gave	 us	 the	
necessary	letters	and	signed	the	complete	application	files	as	construction	company	(ACEA).	
Through	Toño	(ACEA)	I	contacted	Valadez	to	obtain	the	necessary	letters	for	training	in	crop	
management.	With	the	support	of	Cristi,	we	obtained	commercialization	engagement	letters	
with	Pymexporta;	meanwhile,	Nacho	(supplier)	quoted	the	irrigation	system	and	heating.	In	
about	ten	days,	we	completed	the	eight	SPRs’	files	that	would	apply	in	Zacapu´s	CADER97;	the	
Purépero	and	La	 Jabonera	SPRs	did	 it	 in	 the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro.	Having	 learned	 from	
previous	 negotiations	with	 CADER,	 the	Asociación	 easily	 submitted	 the	 application	 files	 to	
CADER	by	a	committee	headed	by	Cristi	and	Lupita	(Secretary	of	the	Asociación)	who,	this	time	
closely	working	 together,	 avoided	mistakes	 in	 capturing	 and	 processing	 information	while	
using	the	computer	system	of	Alianza.	 In	this	second	application	to	CADER,	the	partners	no	
longer	 went	 there	 but	 signed	 the	 required	 documents	 at	 the	 Asociación,	 which	 in	 turn	
submitted	them	directly.	At	one	point,	CADER	even	came	to	seek	the	support	of	the	Asociación	
to	 process	 information	 requests	 outside	 the	Asociación,	 establishing	 a	 kind	 of	 convenient	
collaboration.	
Only	a	few	days	before	the	closure	of	the	promotion,	Roberto	(SPR	La	Jabonera)	arrived	
at	the	Asociación’s	offices	and	reported	that	the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro	had	given	the	PAPIR’s	
form,	 when	 the	 Asociación	 had	 agreed	 that	 they	 would	 receive	 the	 format	 given	 by	
Agriculture,	as	it	was	requested	by	us.	The	SPR	La	Jabonera	had	shown	their	willingness	to	find	
solutions,	but	without	results;	Roberto	also	stated	that	CADER	had	for	a	long	time	refused	to	
receive	the	request	of	La	Jabonera.	We	identified	a	couple	of	requirements	that	were	lacking,	
and	which	prevented	the	records	to	be	received	from	this	institution.	
The	Asociación	decided	to	support	the	SPR	of	La	Jabonera,	and	the	next	day	we	met	in	
the	CADER	of	Tangancícuaro	with	the	managing	committee	of	this	SPR.	We	awaited	Roberto’s,	
and	 Humberto	 (a	 CADER	 official)	 told	 us	 to	 hand	 over	 the	 documents,	 and	 suggested	 to	
Roberto	that	the	application	had	to	be	submitted	to	PAPIR	 -	arguing	that	there	were	more	
resources	 in	 CADER’s	 program.	 Apparently,	 in	 Tlazazalca	 the	 applications	 had	 not	 been	
submitted	to	PAPIR.		
After	 negotiating	 for	 a	 while	 with	 Humberto,	 he	 agreed	 to	 review	 Roberto’s	
application.	After	waiting	half	an	hour,	the	official	said	that	the	land-use	agreement	signed	
between	the	owner	and	the	SPR	had	not	been	endorsed	by	a	notary	public.	The	municipal	
president	of	Tlazazalca	ratified	this	document	and	Roberto	told	me	that	the	owner	of	the	land	
was	 in	the	United	States.	Although	the	owner	would	arrive	 in	a	 few	days,	 the	deadline	for	
submitting	the	complete	application	would	close	the	next	day.	The	possibility	that	the	public	
trustee	ratified	the	agreement	was	quite	unlikely	since	there	were	frictions	of	a	political	nature	
between	the	municipal	president	of	Tlazazalca	-	who	was	a	member	of	the	SPR	of	La	Jabonera	
																																																						
96	Strengths,	weaknesses,	opportunities	and	threats	analysis.	
97	The	SPRs	Margarita	and	Bajo	Invernadero	decided	not	to	submit	a	request.	
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-	and	the	public	trustee	who	belonged	to	SPR	Tomates	Michoacanos	(from	Productos	Inocuos).	
The	only	viable	option	was	Ernestina	(the	notary).	That	same	day,	June	28,	Roberto	went	to	
see	her	with	a	copy	of	Tlazazalca’s	deed,	 together	with	a	copy	of	 the	 land	 title	where	 the	
greenhouse	was	to	be	established.	In	that	document,	the	measurements	and	boundaries	were	
written	 down.	Malla	 (Los	 Pinos)	 negotiated	with	 Ernestina	 to	 obtain	 the	 signature	 of	 the	
owner	of	the	land,	with	the	possibility	to	send	him	the	document	by	courier.	
In	the	afternoon,	we	went	to	Tlazazalca	and	explained	Roberto	about	the	document.	
He	had	a	good	relationship	with	the	owner	of	the	land	and	her	family.	The	son	of	the	owner,	
knowing	the	situation,	had	proposed	to	talk	to	his	mother	by	phone;	she	suggested	that,	given	
the	urgency,	Roberto	had	her	absolute	trust,	and	his	son	could	ratify	the	land-use	agreement.	
The	son	ratified	what	the	owner	had	previously	signed	without	even	reading	the	document,	
saying	he	was	aware	of	the	deal	between	his	mother	and	the	SPR	La	Jabonera.	The	next	day	
(the	deadline)	the	notary	approved	the	signatures.	We	travelled	to	Tlazazalca	to	deliver	the	
document,	while	by	mistake	Roberto	went	to	pick	it	up	in	Zacapu.	We	spoke	with	Humberto,	
notifying	him	that	we	had	the	land-use	agreement	signed	by	the	notary.	We	proposed	to	bring	
the	 missing	 document	 to	 CADER,	 but	 Humberto	 refused,	 indicating	 that	 only	 the	 legal	
representative	of	the	SPR	could.	We	requested	that	we	could	allow	Roberto	to	take	it	the	next	
day,	and	appeal	to	SEDAGRO’s	officials	to	advocate	in	receiving	the	documents	of	the	SPR.	We	
said	this	because	Humberto	himself	had	previously	hinted	that	the	missing	documents	could	
be	submitted	the	next	day.	
The	 next	 day,	 when	 Roberto	 tried	 to	 deliver	 the	 documents	 to	 CADER,	 Humberto	
refused	to	receive	them,	stating	that	the	deadline	had	already	passed.	That	day	Roberto	found	
Esperanza	of	the	SPR	Purépero,	who	had	handed	in	her	application	a	week	earlier,	without	
including	the	corresponding	land-use	agreement.	A	farmer	from	the	town	of	Coeneo	who	had	
overheard	the	conversation	said:	"When	it	comes	to	simplify	the	filling	out	of	forms	 in	the	
CADER,	 I	better	give	a	tip	 to	 its	personnel.	 I	do	not	know	how	to	do	 it."	 (Alvaro,	29/06/04,	
SEPLADE).	This	was	evidence	that	there	was	room	for	maneuverer	with	CADER	officials,	and	
that	 it	 was	 preferable	 to	 maintain	 a	 good	 relationship	 with	 them,	 which	 simplified	 the	
necessary	steps	-	as	we	had	already	experienced	in	the	CADER	of	Zacapu.	
Roberto	 (SPR	La	 Jabonera),	who	had	 joined	 the	PRD	and	chaired	 the	 local	 livestock	
association	of	Tlazazalca,	attributed	Humberto’s	 lack	of	cooperation	to	his	and	Humberto’s	
political	preferences.	According	to	Roberto,	Humberto	favoured	requests	of	PRI	and	frustrated	
PRD	ones.	On	the	other	hand,	teacher	Esperanza	(Purépero),	military	and	president	of	the	PRD	
in	 Purépero,	without	 any	 problem	 had	 handled	 SPR	 Purépero’s	 file	 in	 the	 same	 CADER	 of	
Tangancícuaro.	Esperanza	attributed	it	to	the	successful	management	of	her	network,	which	
included	officials	of	SEDAGRO,	and	in	particular	Pedro	Loya	(close	to	Silvano	Aureoles)	-	but	
also	because	her	SPR	was	from	Purépero	(another	municipality).	
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SUPLADER:	The	arena	where	the	private	transcends	the	public	
At	the	beginning	of	May	of	2004,	we	held	a	meeting	at	SUPLADER	in	Coeneo.	This	time,	the	
SPRs	were	consolidated	and	had	redefined	the	negotiations	with	SUPLADER.	Heredia	and	Lino	
(Productos	Inocuos)	had	put	on	some	pressure	through	the	municipal	presidents	of	Churintzio	
(a	 nephew	 of	 Heredia)	 and	 Jiménez	 to	 hold	 this	 meeting	 and	 include	 the	 draft	 of	 the	
greenhouses’	 project	 in	 the	 agenda.	 The	 meeting	 was	 attended	 by	 Lino	 (Jiménez),	 Saúl	
(Azteca),	and	the	municipal	presidents	of	Tlazazalca,	Jiménez	and	Coeneo	(our	host).	There	
was	marked	 polarization	 and	 tension	 during	 the	meeting,	mainly	 among	members	 of	 the	
USPRs.	We	had	been	invited	by	Gonzalo	to	strengthen	the	position	of	the	eight	SPRs	that	did	
not	have	financial	resources	from	SUPLADER	and	to	defend	the	already	approved	funding	for	
the	project.	The	meeting	indeed	addressed	the	issue	of	the	project	of	the	greenhouses,	but	
the	 municipal	 president	 of	 Coeneo	 suggested	 this	 issue	 had	 to	 be	 discussed	 in	 a	 special	
meeting.	His	proposal	intended	to	block	the	participation	of	the	members	of	the	two	USPRs	
from	SUPLADER’s	agenda.		
Faced	with	the	intervention	of	Ampa,	the	president	of	Coeneo	twisted	and	changed	his	
path,	 inviting	 everybody	 to	 continue	 the	 session	 in	 good	 terms.	 When	 Heredia	 and	 Lino	
participated,	they	tried	to	convince	the	audience	that	they	had	been	subject	to	pressure	in	
their	USPR	(Productos	Inocuos)	from	Zacapu’s	SEPLADE.	Gonzalo	(delegate	of	SEPLADE)	clarified	
the	situation	by	showing	some	documents	that	there	had	been	no	such	pressure,	arguing	that	
the	SPRs	themselves	had	chosen	different	providers	of	greenhouses	(ACEA	and	ULMA),	and	
that	this	could	not	be	interpreted	as	a	division	within	the	Asociación;	instead,	it	had	been	due	
to	different	projects	set	up	from	different	perspectives.	Gonzalo	read	a	letter	sent	to	Silvano	
Aureoles	 and	 another	 to	 Torres	 Téllez,	 secretary	 and	 head	 of	Hortofruticultura	 (SEDAGRO)	
respectively,	referring	the	matter.	Meanwhile,	the	president	of	Coeneo	claimed	that	he	had	
not	been	taken	into	account,	and	more	than	once	he	alluded	to	the	political	overtones	of	the	
project.	Meanwhile,	Carlos	(a	member	of	JLB’S	firm)	demanded	the	payment	for	the	Alianza	
dealings	 (PRODESCA).	 Carlos	 implied	 that	he	 could	 sue	 the	 SPR	 for	not	 complying	with	 the	
provisions	 of	 the	 project.	 During	 the	meeting,	 the	 support	 of	 Salvador	 (SEDAGRO’s	 link	 in	
SUPLADER)	to	JLB’S	firm	was	evident.	Salvador	recommended	negotiating	the	debt	with	JLB’S	
firm	 and	 pay	 the	 part	 that	 could	 hinder	 the	 procedures	 for	 authorship	 and	 committed	
resources	from	the	project.	Gonzalo	told	Salvador	it	was	Productos	Inocuos,	working	with	JLB’S	
firm,	that	had	gone	its	own	way.	It	would	be	desirable	to	respect	each	USPR	in	their	choice	of	
project	and	selected	supplier;	and	that	each	SPR	–	through	its	representative	-	analysed	the	
construction	options	and	the	commitments	outlined	by	the	requirements	of	the	agencies.	
After	discerning	the	conflicts	of	the	Asociación	in	front	of	SUPLADER	and	clarifying	this	
point,	SUPLADER	ratified	the	20	SPRs	that	already	had	regional	financial	support,	remembering	
what	belonged	to	the	Asociación,	as	well	as	the	amount	authorized.	In	order	to	evaluate	the	
finances	that	were	already	authorized	for	other	SPRs,	it	was	proposed	to	also	support	the	eight	
SPRs	managed	by	Alianza.	The	vote	was	favourable	to	accept	this	proposal	and	it	was	agreed	
to	assign	each	of	the	eight	SPRs	an	amount	of	USD	20,000	for	the	greenhouse	project.	Gonzalo	
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left	 happy	 after	 the	 meeting:	 28	 SPR	 had	 been	 considered	 for	 funding	 by	 SUPLADER.	 An	
important	step	in	the	project	had	been	taken.		
The	 committee	 meeting	 proposed	 by	 the	 municipal	 president	 of	 Coeneo	 at	 the	
meeting	of	SUPLADER	in	Coeneo	was	held	two	weeks	later	in	the	SUPLADER	in	Huaniqueo.	The	
idea	was	to	analyse	the	problem	of	transferring	funds	from	the	institutions	for	the	greenhouse	
project.	In	order	to	analyse	the	progress	in	the	greenhouses	project	of	both	USPRs,	SUPLADER	
appointed	a	special	committee	composed	of	 Janet	 (from	the	municipality	of	Panindícuaro)	
who	represented	civil	society,	and	the	municipal	president	of	Huaniqueo	(Armando	Hurtado)	
who	 represented	 the	 government.	 	 This	 committee	met	with	 two	 representatives	 of	 each	
USPR,	 Irma	 and	 Jesús	 from	 the	Asociación,	 and	 Carlos	with	 another	member	 of	Productos	
Inocuos.	After	reviewing	each	file	of	the	SPRs	in	both	USPRs,	the	committee	concluded	that	
the	Asociación	showed	significant	advance.	Carlos	expressed:	“Experience	in	the	dealings	of	
the	Asociación,	is	a	door	that	we	(Productos	Inocuos)	can	open	in	the	meantime”	(Huaniqueo,	
30/05/04).		
Some	members	of	SUPLADER	agreed	to	start	the	construction	of	the	greenhouses	with	
the	 available	 resources	 from	 SUPLADER,	 SEDAGRO	 and	 Alianza.	 However,	 other	 members	
intended	 to	 associate	 the	 negotiations	 to	 a	 private	 credit	 line.	 After	 evaluating	 the	
intervention	of	JLB’S	firm,	Gonzalo	was	convinced	that	JLB’S	firm	intended	to	keep	the	dough	
for	them.	To	prevent	this	from	happening,	Gonzalo	suggested	reporting	the	situation	in	the	
Asociación	to	all	members	of	each	SPR.	Gonzalo	stated	that	JLB’S	firm	could	still	influence	some	
groups	of	the	Asociación.	When	I	asked	which	SPRs	he	was	thinking	about,	he	replied:	“the	SPR	
Los	Pinos”,	adding	that	the	project’s	success	or	failure	depended	on	the	Asociación.	
	
	
Struggling	with	bureaucratic	processes	
The	Asociación	listed	the	urgent	issues:	it	was	necessary	to	gather	the	necessary	documents	
to	release	the	credit	line	from	the	Bank	-	including	the	legal	aspects	and	the	implications	of	
handling	a	credit	line	for	its	members.	The	best	alternative	plot	would	be	identified	to	build	
the	greenhouse,	as	an	option	for	the	SPRS	that	did	not	meet	the	criteria	of	their	respective	
field.	The	accounts	of	the	Asociación	and	the	SPRs	as	a	whole	should	be	in	order	to	complete	
the	 pending	 applications	 to	 the	 Alianza	 program.	 To	 this	 effect,	 the	 Asociación	 formed	
commissions.	Ampa	and	Cristi	would	be	in	charge	of	the	marketing	letters	with	Pymexporta,	
Nacho	(irrigation	provider),	Malla	(Los	Pinos)	and	Mare	(Puerta	Chica)	collaborated	with	the	
accounting	firms	for	the	documents	the	bank	requested,	while	Julio	César	(Biotecnológicos),	
Norberto	 (Huaniqueo),	 Campeón	 (Laredo),	 and	 others	 supported	 us	 occasionally	 on	 the	
project	adjustments	of	each	SPR.	Vicente	(ACEA’s	technician)	would	provide	an	advisory	and	
training	plan.	
The	institutions	requested	a	more	specific	document	than	the	one	presented	earlier.	
The	new	project	document	intended	to	stick	to	the	different	standards	and	operating	rules	of	
the	institutions	involved,	particularly	of	FIRCO.	Inside	the	Asociación	there	was	a	debate	about	
the	claim	to	intellectual	property	of	the	project	made	by	JLB’S	firm.	The	SPRs	that	were	with	
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JLB’S	firm	affirmed	that	the	Asociación	did	not	own	it	and	that	authorship	belonged	to	the	firm,	
while	the	Asociación	’s	members	asserted	that	the	payment	made	to	this	firm	gave	them	the	
rights	to	use	 it.	As	a	result,	 it	was	proposed	to	elaborate	a	new	project	according	to	FIRCO	
regulations,	and	in	which	the	needs	of	the	17	SPRs	were	reflected.		This	new	document	was	
used	for	the	negotiations	with	Alianza,	and	served	as	a	reference	to	the	institutions	involved	
in	the	project.	This	meant	elaborating	17	different	project	documents,	in	accordance	to	what	
Rogelio	of	FIRCO	specified.	This	institution’s	office	would	back	up	ten	percent	of	the	bank	credit	
line	requested.	Vicente	(the	ACEA	technician)	and	me	would	prepare	a	project	that	included	
the	 financial	 requirements	 for	 ACEA’S	 greenhouses.	 Also,	 the	 costs	 from	 another	 three	
companies	 were	 included,	 as	 well	 as	 commitment	 letters	 for	 input	 supply	 and	
commercialization,	and	water	permits	from	CONAGUA.	For	this	purpose,	work	meetings	were	
held	with	Rogelio	(FIRCO).	Project	validation	of	the	17	SPRs	in	front	of	FIRCO	was	conducted	in	
stages;	 the	Asociación’s	 partners	 provided	 the	 necessary	 documentation	 to	 rearrange	 the	
project,	 while	 the	 management	 committee	 made	 the	 adjustments	 according	 to	 FIRCO’S	
regulations.	 The	 workload	 was	 exhausting.	 Due	 to	 the	 efforts	 made	 with	 Alianza,	 Irma’s	
project	was	 the	 first	 one	 to	 get	 an	 evaluation.	Her	 group,	 La	 Piedad	Chiquita,	 had	 almost	
completed	the	record.	Ampa	did	not	agree	on	the	order	of	attention,	and	argued	that:	
 
Current	partners	of	La	Piedad	Chiquita	started	after	other	groups,	and	they	also	bought	
the	 actions	 (SPR’s)	 through	 a	 partner	 substitution,	 and	 they	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 the	
Asociación	with	their	administrative	expenses	payment	(Ampa,	Los	Pinos	03/12/04).	
	
In	fact,	Ampa	had	exercised	the	function	of	treasurer	of	the	Asociación,	and	she	was	aware	of	
the	contributions	of	each	SPR.	Although	Irma	and	Ampa	knew	each	other	from	school,	they	
fought	against	each	other	 in	order	to	obtain	a	satisfactory	validation	for	their	own	project.	
Each	 time	 the	 technician	 reviewed	 Irma’s	 record,	 he	 pointed	 to	 new	 adjustments.	 For	
example,	in	Irma’s	SPR	four	partners	were	included	that	were	not	accredited	as	agricultural	
and	livestock	producers.	Irma	presented	letters	written	by	the	municipal	authority	stating	the	
contrary,	 but	 according	 to	 FIRCO	 these	were	not	 valid:	 they	 should	have	been	 issued	by	 a	
collective,	 like	an	ejido	authority,	or	by	a	small	 land-holding	authority.	Rogelio	also	verified	
CONAGUA’s	permission	and	the	financial	proposal	for	greenhouse’	production.	In	this	respect,	
the	project	elaborated	by	JLB’S	firm	mainly	contained	gross	estimations	and	did	not	give	any	
details	about	the	interaction	between	supply	and	resource	flows	during	annuities.	FIRCO	also	
requested	to	have	three	different	quotations	of	greenhouse	costs	and	letters	of	support	to	
ensure	commercialization	next	to	signed	agreements	with	technicians	specialized	in	tomato	
cultivation.	After	the	third	version	of	the	project	was	delivered	to	Rogelio,	he	said	we	had	75%	
progress	 in	 FIRCO’s	negotiations.	 Irma	was	alarmed	and	argued	 that	other	 institutions	had	
previously	validated	the	project,	without	considering	the	things	FIRCO	pointed	out.	She	said:	
“There	are	so	many	project	requirements	and	remarks	of	not	meeting	them.	I	hardly	see	how	
FIRCO	will	give	us	the	validation	before	the	end	of	this	month	[there	were	20	days	remaining]”.	
Some	of	the	partners	were	evidently	under	pressure	due	to	the	dates	stipulated	by	SUPLADER	
to	obtain	all	documents	endorsed	by	the	competent	instances.		
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What	happened	with	 FIRCO	was	 repeated	 in	 the	negotiations	with	Banco	del	Bajío.	
After	having	overcome	many	obstacles	during	the	project	negotiations	with	institutions,	and	
due	to	the	time	pressure	to	apply	for	the	resources,	members	partners	expressed	the	need	of	
contracting	an	advisory	firm	that	could	support	our	actions	and	help	interpret	the	different	
regulations.	Vicente	had	been	told	about	this	since	early	March	2004,	but	he	had	expressed	
that	 Toño	 from	 ACEA	 considered	 that	 the	Asociación	 should	 be	working	with	 Valadez,98	 a	
tomato	cultivation	expert.	According	to	Vicente:	
	
Valadez	is	working	with	an	advisory	firm	called	Abaco,	integrated	by	Fernando	and	Félix.	
They	 advise	 people	 about	 the	 projects,	 and	 they	 also	 offer	 to	 negotiate	 to	 get	 the	
necessary	 resources.	 Once	 the	 project	 is	 being	 executed,	 Valadez	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
training,	production	and	cultivation	management.	I	think	that	Valadez	would	participate	
only	with	Abaco,	as	they	are	a	team.	(Vicente	03/11/04).	
 
Through	the	trust	bonds	established	with	ACEA,	Vicente	proposed	a	new	strategy.	He	knew	
about	JLB	quitting	the	Asociación,	and	about	the	need	of	adjusting	the	project	document	to	
proceed	 with	 the	 financial	 proposals.	 Abaco,	 like	 JLB,	 was	 hunting	 for	 projects	 related	 to	
greenhouses,	 and	 both	 firms’	 business	 cards	were	 usually	 distributed	 among	 government	
offices.	Unlike	JLB’s	firm,	Abaco	was	referred	to	the	ACEA	network	via	Valadez.	The	Asociación	
needed	to	be	able	to	count	with	the	support	of	an	advisory	firm	to	conclude	the	project	and	
to	understand	the	different	regulations.	Therefore,	Abaco	appeared	to	be	a	viable	option	for	
the	Asociación.		
In	March	2004	Vicente	(ACEA’S	representative)	had	been	contacted	in	order	to	finish	a	
work	 plan,	which	 included	 greenhouse	 quotations,	 authorized	 letters	 by	Alianza	 to	 ACEA’S	
providers.	The	work	plan	included	training	and	supplies	included.	Vicente	(ACEA)	said:	
 
I	understand	that	Nacho	wants	to	be	 included	 in	the	greenhouses	construction	and	 in	
tomato	 cultivation.	 From	 my	 standpoint,	 Nacho	 is	 careless	 about	 greenhouse	
management	[production],	so	I	recommend	Gerardo99	as	production	expert.	He	already	
manages	 greenhouses	 in	 Morelia’s	 region	 and	 he	 could	 be	 the	 group’s	 head	 and	
coordinate	 the	 advisory	 group’s	 performance	 related	 to	 the	 Asociación	 (Vicente,	
05/23/04).	
 
Vicente	thus	expressed	his	interest	in	enhancing	his	network	by	showing	deficiencies	of	others	
who	could	compete	against	his	proposal.	I	explained	to	Vicente	that	until	now,	the	Asociación	
was	only	considering	Nacho	as	irrigation	and	heating	provider.	This	arrangement	was	made	at	
an	assembly	where	both	Toño	from	ACEA	and	Nacho	had	been	present.	I	highlighted	that	the	
commitment	and	the	trust	of	the	Asociación’s	partners	were	with	ACEA.	At	the	end	of	May	
																																																						
983	Contact	of	ACEA	as	an	expert	on	crop	management	of	tomato.	
99	Chemical	Engineer	Gerardo	was	focused	on	tomato	production	and	commercialization.	Gerardo	had	acquired	
a	greenhouse	from	ACEA.	Gerardo’s	specialty	was	the	nutrition	of	vegetables	inside	greenhouses,	especially	
tomatoes.	
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2014,	I	talked	with	Vicente	again	and	he	confirmed	that	he	wanted	to	leave	ACEA	to	start	his	
own	greenhouse	business,	and	that	he	intended	to	establish	his	customer	network	with	clients	
like	those	of	the	Asociación.	Days	before,	five	SPR	beneficiaries	of	the	Alianza	program	(see	
Chapter	 3)	 had	 agreed	with	 Vicente	 on	 a	meeting	 in	 Zacapu’s	 CADER	 in	 order	 to	 sign	 the	
contracts	 to	 build	 the	 greenhouses	 that	 had	 the	 authorized	 resources	 by	Alianza,	 and	 to	
endorse	 the	 corresponding	 letters	 to	 the	 greenhouses’	 provider.	 The	 appointment	 was	
scheduled	on	June	2,	2004.	Five	SPR	representatives	waited	for	Vicente	for	more	than	an	hour,	
but	he	never	arrived.	When	Rojas	(CADER’s	responsible)	received	us,	he	expected	to	see	an	
ACEA	 representative	 to	 sign	 the	 contracts	 and	 to	 release	 the	 commitment	 letters	 at	 that	
moment.	A	 letter	would	be	written	 to	 the	Operational	 Technical	 State	Unit	 (UTOE)	 as	 this	
ensured	the	correct	use	of	Alianza’s	resources	 involved	in	the	project.	During	the	meeting,	
Vicente	 texted	me	 that	 he	 would	 arrive	 two	 days	 later.	 This	 bothered	 the	 partners,	 who	
expressed	that	ACEA	was	not	that	serious	about	the	project.	Thalia,	Toño’s	wife,	told	me	that	
some	technicians	were	leaving	the	institution	and	it	seemed	that	the	relationship	between	
Vicente	and	ACEA	was	not	good	at	all.	This	partially	explained	Vicente’s	behaviour	 -	acting	
outside	of	the	agreements	between	the	Asociación	and	ACEA.	Apparently,	Vicente	wanted	to	
add	the	Asociación’s	project	to	his	network.		
	
	
Conclusion	
After	 the	10	SPRs	had	 left	 the	Asociación	 to	 join	Productos	 Inocuos,	 rearrangements	were	
made	within	the	Asociación.	There	was	a	verbal	agreement	of	not	harming	each	other	at	this	
stage	of	the	project.	Moreover,	SUPLADER	appeared	to	agree	to	the	funding	of	all	28	SPRs.	The	
strengthening	 of	 the	 Asociación,	 collaborating	 with	 institutional	 networks,	 boosted	 the	
capacities	of	the	actors	as	collective.	Together,	members	liaised	with	all	sorts	of	actors	within	
the	circle	of	government	institutions,	specialists,	and	decision	makers.	The	collaboration	also	
incorporated	political,	economic	and	knowledge	resources.	
For	some	of	the	projects’	actors,	the	institutional	intervention	process	sponsored	by	
SUPLADER	represented	a	common	development	strategy	in	La	Ciénega,	as	interventions	were	
supported	by	the	institutions	involved	in	projects	-	sometimes	favouring	the	private	above	the	
collective.	Some	of	them,	such	as	FOMICH,	FIRCO,	SAGARPA	(CADER)	and	FIRA	had	been	enrolled	
by	 JLB‘s	 firm	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 get	Asociación’s	 resources	 delivered	 to	 the	 trust	 fund.	 The	
meetings	described	in	this	chapter	constituted	the	first	contacts	between	the	Asociación	and	
these	 institutions	without	 JLB	 and,	 unlike	 the	 firm,	 the	Asociación’s	partners	were	 serious	
about	meeting	 the	 requirements	expressed	 in	 the	 institutional	 regulations.	Struggling	with	
bureaucratic	 complexities,	 the	 Asociación	 sought	 to	 enrol	 a	 new	 firm,	 Abaco.	 Unlike	 JLB,	
though,	Abaco	was	backed	by	its	partner,	ACEA.	The	problematic	relationships	with	Abaco	and	
JLB’s	firms	will	be	taken	up	in	the	next	chapter.	
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CHAPTER	6		 BREAKUPS,	ASSOCIATIONS	AND	NETWORK	RECONFIGURATION	
	
	
Introduction	
As	the	SPRs	started	to	get	involved	in	management	actions,	existent	controversies	about	the	
project	became	noticeable.	We	have	seen	earlier	how	17	SPRs	remained	with	the	Asociación	
and	ACEA	as	the	technical	firm,	and	11	SPRs	joined	Productos	Inocuos,	choosing	to	go	ahead	
with	the	greenhouses	proposed	by	JLB‘s	firm.	In	this	chapter,	I	describe	the	network	actions	
and	the	actors	involved	in	different	projects	which	generated	rearrangements,	showing	the	
translations	and	historicity	of	the	actors’	associations.	The	sections	of	this	chapter	show	the	
significance	of	all	the	information,	which	sometimes	means	that	the	chronological	order	of	
the	narrative	has	to	be	sacrificed.	As	the	project	progresses,	organizational	conflicts	become	
more	prominent,	some	caused	by	Abaco’s	technical	firm	stirring	up	strife	between	SPRs	and	
their	members	inside	the	Asociación.	Despite	all	kinds	of	conflicts	about	finances,	on	July	1st	
2004,	SUPLADER	agreed	on	starting	a	pilot	of	five	greenhouses	as	proposed	by	the	Asociación.	
	
	
Negotiations	and	conflicts	on	the	Asociación	
A	 particularly	 relevant	 subject	 in	 governmental	 resource	management	 is	 the	 influence	 of	
external	agents	or	advisers,	public	or	private,	on	the	accomplishment	of	the	projects	in	which	
they	take	part.	These	actors,	even	if	they	are	limited	by	formal	guidelines	from	programs	and	
projects,	have	discretionary	room	for	manoeuvring	in	the	case	of	resource	distribution.	For	
these	 reasons,	 some	 functionaries	 involved	 in	 the	 project	 identified	 themselves	 with	 the	
Asociación;	 hence	 they	 advised	 to	 continue	 the	 project	 without	 JLB’S	 firm,	 while	 other	
functionaries	were	less	outspoken.		
However,	as	the	inception	phase	of	the	project	consolidated	and	resources	started	to	
be	managed	by	the	Asociación,	actors	appeared	to	become	more	interested	in	boosting	and	
concretizing	their	own	projects.	This	showed,	among	other	things,	the	nuances	and	political	
interests	that	were	caused	by	the	splitting	up	of	the	Asociación.	Conflicts	within	the	SPRs	and	
actions	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 project	 pervaded	 the	 Asociación	 and	 reflected	 dissimilar	
objectives	among	members.	This	illustrated	that	organizing	processes	were	not	restricted	to	
the	Asociación	only,	but	that	external	networks	were	also	involved.	Factions	emerged	from	
the	SPRs	and	individual	goals	came	to	the	fore,	creating	new	and	unexpected	dynamics	related	
to	the	different	meanings	associated	with	pursuing	the	dough	(la	lana).		
The	Asociación	had	started	direct	negotiations	with	 the	 institutions	specified	 in	 the	
project	document	(see	Chapter	5).	To	release	the	credit	line	it	was	necessary	to	know	in	detail	
the	 guidelines	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 institutions,	 and	 to	 strengthen	 networks	with	 banking	
agents.	 This	 work	 was	 key	 to	 unlocking	 the	 credit	 in	 accord	 to	 SEDAGRO	 (the	 executing	
institution)	 guidelines.	Meanwhile,	 the	 financial	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 facilitating	 the	
credit	 line	 required	 from	 the	 SPRs	 that	 they	 mustered	 organizing	 experience,	 productive	
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capacities,	 economic	 resources,	 and	 financial	 solvency.	 These	 elements	 were	 cautiously	
evaluated	by	SPRs’	members,	in	the	expectation	of	obtaining	a	lower	interest	rate.		
The	 negotiations	 and	 learning	 processes	 generated	 disagreement	 among	 the	
Asociación’s	members	and,	when	reviewing	the	scope	of	the	project,	it	seems	they	were	going	
full	circle	and	back	to	square	one.	Some	partners	even	considered	that	their	separation	from	
JLB‘s	 firm	was	a	drawback	 to	 the	negotiations.	Meanwhile,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	adviser’s	 firm	
remained	working	with	eleven	of	the	SPRs	 in	the	new	USPR	was	not	totally	 in	 line	with	the	
Asociación’s	 decision	 of	 cancelling	 its	 services	 and	 choosing	 a	 different	 provider	 for	 the	
greenhouses.	Nevertheless,	the	Asociación	considered	that	it	was	inconvenient	to	make	the	
conflict	 transpire	 to	 the	 institutions	 during	 their	 project	 negotiations,	 so	 it	 sustained	 a	
relationship	of	respect	with	the	11	SPRs	(and	with	JLB),	looking	for	a	way	to	end	the	project	in	
a	decent	way.	
It	 was	 expected	 that	 by	 the	 time	 the	 administrative	 requirements	 to	 establish	 the	
financial	 basis	 of	 the	 project	 would	 be	 fulfilled,	 the	 resources	 would	 be	 obtained.	
Nevertheless,	every	step	in	the	process	demanded	an	endless	labyrinth	of	actions.	When	this	
problem	was	put	in	front	of	ACEA,	Abaco	was	recommended	as	a	new	firm	that	seemed	a	good	
alternative,	with	 reliable	personnel.	 The	choice	was	validated	by	 the	Asociación	members’	
assembly.	
Valadez,	Toño’s	close	collaborator	at	ACEA,	suggested	the	new	firm	to	complete	the	
negotiations	with	the	financial	agencies,	which	became	Abaco’s	task.	In	this	chapter,	Abaco’s	
new	proposal	for	a	central,	joint	greenhouse	for	all	SPRs	together	created	tension	between	
collective	and	individual	SPR	projects.	
	
	
Abaco’s	agency	
The	Asociación	had	to	validate	Abaco,	which	was	based	in	Querétaro.	When	we	had	met	on	
November	3rd,	2004	with	Toño	(ACEA)	about	Valadez	and	Abaco’s	 likely	participation	in	the	
project,	we	told	him	about	the	earlier	conflicts	with	JLB’s	firm	and	our	interest	to	avoid	them	
in	the	future.100	Toño	told	us	that	Valadez	suggested	working	with	Abaco	and	that	he	trusted	
it	 a	 lot,	 so	 the	 Asociación	 assembly	 proposed	 to	 contact	 Abaco	 and	 to	 request	 a	 work	
proposal.101	Later,	we	communicated	with	Abaco	by	phone	and	posed	them	some	technical	
questions.	 Besides,	 we	 sent	 them	 (via	 fax)	 FIRCO’s	 observations,	 specifying	 that	 the	most	
important	thing	for	the	Asociación	was	to	adjust	the	project.	
Félix	 and	 Fernando	 represented	 Abaco,	 both	 being	 specialized	 technicians	 on	
greenhouses	sales	and	management.	Valadez,	an	expert	on	tomato	cultivation,	also	had	20	
years	of	experience	 in	hydroponic	cultivation.	Félix	and	Fernando	presented	themselves	as	
experts	in	many	areas	and	ensured	us	(the	Asociación’s	management)	that	they	had	attended	
																																																						
100	The	service	companies	already	existed	before	 the	privatization	of	 the	State’s	 technical	advisory	 functions	
(Diego,	1995)	and	had	been	part	of	a	clientelistic	policy	promoted	by	the	Mexican	State,	and	associated	with	
the	institutions	that	offered	services	to	the	rural	sector.	
101	The	partners	did	not	know	Abaco;	its	recommendation	was	based	on	Toño’s	recommendation.	
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similar	projects	across	Mexico.	Abaco	made	a	commitment	to	elaborate	a	proposal	that	would	
be	 approved	 by	 the	 institutions	 with	 which	 the	 Asociación	 had	 negotiated	 the	 funding,	
including	Banco	del	Bajío.	
Also,	 an	 estimate	 for	 their	 services	was	 requested	 to	 Abaco,	 and	 once	 it	 arrived	 a	
month	 later	we	checked	 it	with	Ampa	and	Chema.	They	were	charging	USD	12,000,	which	
seemed	 excessive	 for	 the	 adjustment	 of	 a	 document	 that	 was	 generated	 within	 the	
Asociación.	From	our	standpoint,	Abaco	did	not	know	about	the	completion	of	the	document	
presented	to	FIRCO.	Days	after	our	review	of	 the	Abaco	proposal,	however,	 the	Asociación	
decided	to	contract	Abaco.	To	elaborate	a	contract,	Abaco’s	Federal	Taxpayer	Registry	(RFC)	
was	 requested	 to	 provide	 proof	 of	 their	 legal	 status,	 but	 it	 appeared	 that	 they	were	 not	
registered	under	that	name.	Even	though	it	was	a	legal	impediment	to	contract	a	company	
that	was	not	properly	registered,	many	members	in	the	meeting	decided	to	proceed	to	sign	
the	agreement,	through	the	managing	committee.	After	a	long	discussion	between	some	of	
the	 partners,	 the	 prepayment	 of	 USD	 12,000	 to	 Abaco	 was	 authorized.	 The	 amount	 paid	
protected	 the	document’s	authorship	and	some	actions	 in	 front	of	Banco	del	Bajío.	Abaco	
requested	the	version	of	the	document	be	modified	and	validated	by	different	institutions	to	
make	the	adjustments.	In	general	terms,	the	original	document	incorporated	information	of	
the	management	 and	 cultivation	 process	 provided	 by	Valadez,	 and	 financial	 requirements	
established	for	a	half	hectare	greenhouse.	
Suddenly,	and	without	consulting	us,	Abaco	modified	the	project,	by	proposing	to	build	
one	large,	central	greenhouses	together,	and	concentrating	the	resources	of	all	SPRs	to	build	
greater	sheds.	Abaco	argued	that	this	project	would	be	more	profitable	and	easier	to	manage	
because	it	would	have	a	single	administration.	Earlier,	Abaco	had	had	a	meeting	with	Gonzalo	
and	got	his	approval,	but	now	Gonzalo	was	not	only	less	convinced	about	building	common	
sheds	and	save	resources,	but	he	also	argued	that	Abaco	had	made	the	project,	so	they	would	
have	to	propose	how	to	implement	it	in	terms	of	infrastructure	and	business	administration.	
In	my	perception,	this	SEPLADE	delegate	did	not	clearly	see	the	impact	of	the	original	project,	
which	was	 considered	 to	 extend	 technological	 knowledge	 in	 different	 communities	 of	 the	
Ciénega.	
Abaco	probably	reckoned	that	it	was	more	likely	to	get	the	technical	validation	from	
the	 institutions	 for	 a	 single	 project	 than	 getting	 17	 separate	 authorizations.	 The	 proposal	
intended	 collaboration	 as	 one	 society,	 which	 would	 bring	 opacity	 to	 the	 greenhouses’	
functioning,	administration	and	participation.	Abaco	wanted	to	disassociate	the	SPRs	and	to	
focus	on	the	Asociación,	in	order	to	influence	the	reorientation	of	previous	objectives	and	to	
negotiate	a	modified	project	with	the	institutions	that,	on	paper	at	least,	offered	economic	
and	 technical	 advantages.	 The	 modification	 to	 have	 a	 central	 project	 was	 against	 the	
meeting’s	agreements	and	what	was	already	accepted	until	that	moment	by	the	institutions	
involved.	 The	 Asociación's	 autonomy	 was	 fragile	 and	 it	 was	 unstable	 vis-à-vis	 imminent	
intervention	and	organizational	reconfiguration.	Formerly	it	had	been	considered	that	each	
SPR	could	manage	its	own	greenhouse	in	a	local	field,	but	now	a	financial	run	was	included	for	
joint	production	in	a	collective	space.	
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Abaco’s	proposal	was	not	in	agreement	with	the	Asociación	and	the	SPRs,	so	the	SPRs	
rejected	 it	 at	 first.	 Nevertheless,	 Zacapu’s	 SPR,	 especially	 Chema	 (Deyna)	 and	 Jesús	
(Maldonado)	supported	the	proposal	for	a	joint	greenhouse	building	and	offered	a	field	that	
was	the	property	of	Jesús’s	family.	Ampa	(Los	Pinos)	was	reluctant	about	it,	saying	the	original	
idea	was	different,	as	each	SPR	should	get	a	greenhouse,	and	that	the	agreed	allocation	of	the	
money	to	the	17	groups	had	to	be	respected.	Chema	tried	to	explain	himself	with	Ampa	in	a	
very	 detailed	 way	 to	 convince	 her	 to	 accept	 the	 joint	 greenhouse.	 Ampa	 seemed	 to	 be	
convinced	when	they	explained	to	her	that	there	was	no	intention	of	keeping	the	authorized	
money	for	SPR	Los	Pinos;	it	was	only	about	a	project	adjustment	to	optimize	the	resources.	
In	 the	 management	 committee,	 the	 need	 to	 keep	 the	 17	 SPRs	 together	 was	
emphasized,	 and	 the	 joint	 building	 was	 proposed	 as	 an	 option.	 On	March	 19,	 2004,	 in	 a	
meeting	it	was	proposed	that	the	discussion	of	the	new	project	should	be	made	within	each	
SPR.	To	this	purpose	another	meeting	was	scheduled	three	days	later.	During	this	meeting,	
the	SPRs	from	Purépero,	Huaniqueo,	Tlazazalca	and	El	Fresno	expressed	that,	apart	from	the	
greenhouse	 itself,	 the	 social	 impact	 on	 their	 municipalities	 had	 to	 be	 considered.	 A	 joint	
building	implied	that	resources	from	many	different	SPRs	would	be	put	together	for	one	large	
greenhouse,	while	the	regulations	of	some	institutions	forbid	to	unify	their	goals.	After	this	
was	said,	a	voting	was	carried	out	and	most	members	agreed	to	build	a	joint	greenhouse,	but	
allowing	the	four	SPRs	mentioned	before	to	build	separately.	
The	project	adjustments	proposed	by	Abaco	presented	different	edges	and	interests	
which	developed	into	some	conflicts	afterwards.	Joining	the	project	implied	that	the	project	
management	of	every	SPR	would	be	concentrated	in	the	Asociación.	Until	then,	the	Asociación	
had	served	as	a	resource	manager,	but	the	new	proposal	implied	that	members	of	individual	
SPRs	submitted	themselves	to	one	organization	-	the	Asociación	–	in	effect	bringing	about	a	
hierarchical	organization.		
The	partners,	under	the	guidance	of	the	Asociación,	decided	to	support	the	option	to	
concentrate	the	greenhouses	in	a	single	location.	An	element	of	consideration	was	that	the	
majority	of	the	SPRs	were	located	in	Zacapu	and	surrounding	areas,	and	that	the	rest	were	
geographically	 distant.	 These	 SPRs	 (Purépero,	Huaniqueo,	 Tlazazalca	 and	 El	 Fresno)	would	
have	 absorb	 the	 expenses	 resulting	 from	 marketing,	 transport,	 administration	 and	
construction	requirements,	and	CONAGUA	permissions,	amongst	others.	Gonzalo	(SEPLADE)	
considered	 that	 business	 consolidation	 would	 reduce	 the	 initial	 risks	 of	 the	 project;	 this	
perspective	was	shared	by	some	institutions	as	well	as	by	the	bank,	while	others	like	FIRCO	
and	FOMICH	were	not	convinced	by	the	idea.	
When	the	first	version	of	the	project	was	presented	to	the	national	FIRCO,	it	generated	
a	controversy	about	Programa	de	Apoyo	para	Acceder	al	Sistema	Financiero	Rural	(PAASFIR)’s	
102	interpretation	of	the	regulation	referring	to	the	maximum	amount	to	be	supported	by	the	
federal	 level	 (15%)	and	the	state	 level	 (10%).	Abaco	skilfully	decided	to	consult	the	person	
who	had	elaborated	the	regulation	at	national	level,	Arronte	of	FIRCO.	Arronte	was	invited	to	
																																																						
102	Support	Program	to	Access	the	Rural	Financial	System.	
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Zacapu	and	participated	in	an	Asociación's	meeting	in	April	2004,	where	Monroy,	Rogelio	and	
Humberto	 (state	 FIRCO	 technicians)	 were	 present.	 The	 PAASFIR	 as	 a	 guarantee	 fund	
contributed	 with	 credits	 to	 supply	 seeds,	 transportation,	 and	 working	 capital.	 Arronte	
explained	that	the	financial	support	was	up	to	15%	of	the	project’s	total	cost;	while	at	state	
level	the	maximum	was	10%.	The	FOMAGRO	program	was	useful	to	expand	business	capacity,	
and	to	constitute	a	para-financial	rural	intermediary,	which	and	was	also	considered.	Arronte	
offered	to	also	support	a	tomato	packaging	project.	
The	meeting	with	Arronte	solved	the	“apparent”	inconsistencies	in	interpretation	of	
the	project	document,	and	made	the	project	validation	procedure	with	FIRCO	more	expedient.	
Arronte	talked	with	Toscano	(Banco	del	Bajío)	to	suggest	the	Asociación	should	get	a	credit	
line.	By	obtaining	the	bank’s	endorsement,	the	bank	would	concentrate	on	the	liquid	collateral	
trust	 of	 FOMICH,	 FIRCO,	 and	 FIRA	 (Chapter	 4),	 which	 would	 in	 turn	 support	 the	 amount	
resulting	 from	 the	bank	 loan.	On	 its	part,	 the	Asociación	negotiated	with	 the	executive	of	
Banco	del	Bajío	(Toscano)	to	take	out	the	mortgages	of	the	SPRs’	goods	and	release	the	loan.	
The	different	 institutions	 involved	 in	the	project	considered	this	as	an	advancement	to	the	
management	and,	even	if	depositing	the	authorized	resources	was	not	in	their	regulation,	the	
project’s	specific	objectives	could	be	adjusted.	
When	Abaco	presented	the	final	version	of	the	project	to	Rogelio	from	FIRCO,	Rogelio	
took	up	contact	with	the	Asociación	to	express	his	negative	views	on	the	building	of	a	joint	
greenhouse.	 FIRCO	 supported	 the	 individual	 greenhouses	 in	 the	 communities,	 privileging	
agricultural	extension	through	pilot	greenhouse	construction.	Although	Abaco	ensured	that	
FIRCO	would	support	the	benefits	of	the	agro-business,	Rogelio	(FIRCO)	declared	that	such	
support	 would	 not	 be	 given,	 so	 FIRCO	 and	 FORMICH	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 withdrew	 their	
support	to	the	new	project	formula	proposed	by	Abaco.		
Abaco’s	 capabilities	 to	 shape	 the	 Asociación’s	 project	 were	 effective.	 Abaco’s	
experience	with	similar	projects	allowed	them	to	break	with	the	previous	schemes	proposed	
by	JLB’s	firm.	However,	Abaco’s	proposal	to	centralise	the	greenhouses,	with	the	Asociación	
as	collective	manager,	was	incompatible	with	the	SPRs’	wishes	of	having	a	greenhouse	each	
for	themselves	-	like	in	JLB‘s	proposal.	However,	their	position	changed	with	time	in	favour	of	
a	joint	greenhouse.	FIRCO	required	17	different	versions	of	the	project	document,	but	in	the	
new	setup	this	was	impossible.	FIRCO	and	FOMICH	were	therefore	temporarily	removed	from	
the	project	document.	According	to	Abaco,	these	institutions	would	be	incorporated	later	-	
after	obtaining	the	credit	line.		
 
	
Land	acquisition:	expanding	the	collective	resources	
The	decision	of	working	in	a	joint	project	made	it	necessary	for	the	Asociación	to	access	land	
that	would	become	property	of	the	17	SPRs.	A	committee	was	formed	to	search	for	a	property	
with	 the	 corresponding	 CONAGUA	 permit	 (an	 authorization	 for	 sufficient	 water	 supply	
required	 for	 greenhouses).	 Gonzalo	 suggested	 buying	 a	 ten	 hectares	 plot	 of	 land	 (USD	
100,000)	located	in	Zacapu	that	was	for	sale	by	Espinoza	(SPR	Marijo)	and	had	a	CONAGUA-
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authorized	 treadmill.	 The	 owner	 requested	 a	 down	 payment	 of	 USD	 5,000	 with	 a	 2.3%	
monthly	interest	until	the	payment	was	fulfilled.	When	Abaco	visited	the	water	source	that	
supplied	Espinoza’s	treadmill,	it	determined	that	it	did	not	offer	the	daily	quantity	of	five	cubic	
meters	of	water	that	was	needed.	Espinoza	argued	that	Abaco	had	calculated	the	volume	in	
the	dry	season	and	that	the	treadmill	could	be	expanded	to	cover	that	volume.	
	Plots	of	land	in	communities	near	Zacapu	were	also	proposed,	with	costs	up	to	USD	
3,000	 per	 hectare,	 but	 negotiations	 with	 the	 community	 authorities	 about	 the	 water	
concession	 of	 a	 deep	water	well	would	 be	 necessary.	 Some,	 like	 Chema	 (Deyna),	 Rafa	 Lp	
(SEPLADE)	and	Abaco	were	against	 this	option,	arguing	 that	 the	25	minutes	distance	 from	
Zacapu	and	the	need	of	negotiating	water	use	with	the	authorities	was	problematic.	Chema	
offered	land	in	Zacapu	(a	property	of	30	hectares	of	a	friend),	with	a	cost	of	USD	10,000	per	
hectare,	but	without	availability	of	water.	
Apart	 from	 the	Asociación,	 Abaco	was	 negotiating	with	 another	 seller,	 Chava	 (SPR	
Maldonado),	who	offered	a	plot	of	12	hectares	for	USD	25,000/ha.	Chava	justified	the	high	
cost	 of	 the	 land	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 had	 CONAGUA’s	 permission,	 which	 would	 serve	 if	
necessary	to	cover	the	needs	of	the	17	sheds.	The	owner	had	acquired	the	land	in	1998	for	
less	than	USD	850/ha,	and	thanks	to	his	contacts	in	CONAGUA	he	had	obtained	a	deep	water	
well	concession	near	to	Carátacua	in	Coeneo’s	municipality.	Now	the	owner	argued	that	he	
had	 invested	 more	 than	 USD	 100,000	 in	 digging	 the	 well.103	 Chava	 expressed	 that	 the	
investment	in	electric	infrastructure	had	been	his,	like	a	triphasic	pump	fed	by	a	network	of	
posts	and	a	 low-price	 transformer	 installed	by	 the	power	company	 (CFE).	The	Asociación's	
partners	 considered	 the	 price	 to	 be	 too	 high,	 arguing	 that	 it	 was	 rural	 land,	 so	 Jesús	
(Maldonado)	 negotiated	 the	 cost	 with	 his	 brother	 Salvador,	 and	 then	 offered	 it	 at	 USD	
12,000/ha.	
Chema	(Espinoza’s	compadre)	was	inclined	to	build	the	greenhouse	on	the	land	offered	
by	Chava,	because	of	his	friendship	with	Jesús.	Chema	tried	to	convince	the	partners	(with	
Abaco’s	help)	about	all	the	advantages	of	Chava’s	land.	Despite	the	cost	difference	with	the	
other	options,	the	majority	of	Zacapu’s	SPRs	chose	to	acquire	10	hectares	of	this	land	and	to	
sign	the	corresponding	letter	of	agreement	(05/11/04).	
Subdividing	of	 the	 land104	was	 a	 very	 expensive	 and	 a	 long	procedure;	 the	process	
should	be	conducted	by	a	specialized	agent	that	would	generate	a	new	map	that	had	to	be	
attached	to	the	document.	The	involved	parties	–	the	Asociación	and	the	seller	-	trusted	that	
the	measurements	indicated	in	the	document	were	correct,	and	they	drafted	an	agreement	
in	which	the	owner	received	two	cubic	meters	of	water	per	day	from	the	well	for	his	farm.	Ten	
of	the	17	SPRs	ratified	the	agreement	before	it	was	signed	by	the	seller	and	the	Asociación’s	
management	committee.	Upon	the	agreement’s	signature,	USD	12,000	were	paid	which	was	
																																																						
103	The	high	cost	of	the	use	of	water	was	a	contradiction	in	the	region.	This	was	the	collector	of	liquid	and	the	
tributaries	were	 at	 a	 few	meters.	 CONAGUA	 denied	 the	 new	drilling	 permits,	 taking	 care	 of	 groundwater	
reserves	that	feed	the	river	Lerma	and	committed	to	the	state	of	Guanajuato.	
104	The	landowner	decided	to	keep	two	hectares	with	a	farm	he	had	built,	also	with	right	of	way	and	the	right	to	
use	water	from	the	well.	
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the	equivalent	to	10%	of	the	commercial	price	of	the	land.	Some	of	the	SPRs	had	to	get	into	
debt	to	obtain	this	amount	of	money.	Gonzalo	proposed	them	to	go	to	the	Cajas	Populares	
and	get	a	loan	that	included	the	land’s	payment	and	their	contribution	to	the	project	(USD	
15,000),	arguing	that	the	governmental	resources	would	be	released	very	soon.	Following	the	
advice	of	a	notary	to	reduce	taxes,	Chava	specified	the	total	cost	of	land	being	only	USD	3,000.	
For	 the	 agreement’s	 signature,	 a	 local	 lawyer	 accompanied	Chava.	 The	 lawyer	was	
reluctant	to	modify	some	provisions	and	had	even	taken	the	freedom	to	include	some	of	them	
related	to	the	water	use	and	right	of	way.	Finally,	the	private	deed	Number	409	was	registered	
at	the	notary	office’s	Book	119,	which	ascribed	the	property	of	the	land	to	the	Asociación	-	the	
land	on	which	the	greenhouses	would	be	located.	The	document	was	registered	in	the	Public	
Property	Register	located	in	Morelia	(Michoacán),	a	prerequisite	which	allowed	the	Asociación	
to	obtain	a	credit	line	from	the	bank.	Once	the	deed	procedure	of	the	Asociación’s	land	had	
been	formalized,	a	copy	was	attached	to	the	bank	record,	and	now	Toscano	(bank)	saw	the	
project	to	be	more	real	and	thus	convincing.	The	same	thing	was	expressed	by	Toño	(ACEA),	
who	instructed	a	technician	(Vicente)	to	start	the	design	of	the	plans	for	the	real	locations	of	
each	one	of	the	sheds	that	would	be	located	on	the	land.	Both	visited	the	Asociación’s	land	
and	let	the	Asociación	know	that	they	considered	the	project	to	be	a	good	prospect.	
The	property	acquisition	was	unfavourable	for	those	who	had	wanted	to	locate	their	
greenhouse	in	the	locations	originally	proposed	(i.e.	Purépero,	Cortijo	Nuevo,	Puerta	Chica,	
Huaniqueo,	 Los	 Pinos,	 El	 Fresno).	 Some	 of	 them	modified	 their	 position,	 saying	 that	 they	
would	 be	 on	 the	 joint	 land,	 but	 in	 separate	 greenhouses.	 Abaco	 used	 the	 argument	 of	
profitability,	that	building	the	sheds	with	common	walls	could	save	materials.	This	idea	was	
later	 modified	 by	 larger,	 jointly	 administered	 sheds.	 The	 situation	 ignited	 some	 conflicts	
among	 the	 SPRs.	 Acquiring	 the	 land	 for	 the	 Asociación	 caused	 a	 change	 in	 the	 project´s	
perspective,	 now	 that	 institutions	 like	 Banco	 del	 Bajío	 gave	 financial	 and	 organizational	
security.	From	this	perspective,	concentrating	the	resources	of	the	Asociación	was	adjudicated	
as	effective	control	over	them,	at	least	from	a	financial	point	of	view	(as	it	minimized	the	risks	
of	the	project).	
The	groups	that	had	acquired	the	common	land	pressured	the	others	by	warning	them	
that	potential	risks	should	be	shouldered	outside	of	the	Asociación	and	its	resources.	At	the	
same	 time,	 some	 activities	were	 promoted	 that	 resulted	 in	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 about	 the	
control	of	 resources.	Until	 then	 the	Asociación,	as	a	 second	 level	 (USPR)	organization,	had	
allowed	some	independence	to	the	SPRs	in	terms	of	their	internal	organization	and	autonomy.	
Now	the	Asociación	would	be	subject	to	several	controls,	and	the	SPRs	would	pass	to	a	second	
level	decision-making	with	respect	to	the	structure	of	the	common	greenhouse.	
 
 
Conflicts	with	the	consulting	firms	
After	 the	 breakup	with	 JLB’	 firm,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	Asociación	 and	 them	was	
respectful	and	distant.	When	Abaco	started	collaboration	with	the	Asociación,	the	conflicts	
with	JLB‘s	firm	reappeared.	JLB	spread	a	negative	image	of	the	Asociación	within	governmental	
institutions,	characterizing	it	as	a	conflictive	organization.	In	order	to	‘clean’	the	Asociación’s	
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reputation,	Abaco	offered	–	without	a	request	from	the	Asociación	–	to	mediate	 in	the	so-
called	conflict	between	JLB’S	firm	and	the	Asociación.	At	first,	the	members	were	not	aware	
that	a	negative	campaign	against	them	was	being	carried	out.	
Abaco	 and	 JLB’S	 firm	met	 about	 the	 issue	 of	 the	Asociación.	 In	 the	minutes	 of	 the	
meeting,	they	specified	that	the	Asociación	had	to	pay	USD	30,000	for	the	work	and	effort	JLB’	
firm	had	carried	out	for	them.	At	this	point,	JLB’S	firm	put	forward	a	demand	(using	a	billing	
office)	which	threatened	that	all	the	goods	of	the	Asociación’s	partners	would	be	seized,	and	
again	Abaco	offered	its	services	to	negotiate	a	reasonable	‘discount’	with	JLB’S	firm	-	an	offer	
the	SPRs	rejected.	As	a	billing	strategy,	JLB’S	firm	communicated	by	phone	with	Gonzalo.	JLB‘s	
firm	explained	to	him	the	so-called	debts	the	Asociación	had	with	the	firm.	When	JLB	asked	
for	the	Asociación’s	president,	Gonzalo	skilfully	answered	JLB	that	I	was	the	current	president,	
not	Heredia.	JLB	thereupon	asked	me	to	communicate	with	him	and	to	come	and	see	him	in	
Mexico	City.	There,	he	said	that	during	the	negotiations	with	the	Asociación,	the	office	in	his	
charge	 had	 spent	USD	70,000	on	 tickets	 and	now	 required	 the	 corresponding	 repayment.	
Because	the	Asociación	rejected	to	pay,	JLB‘s	firm	threatened	with	suing	the	Asociación’s	and	
its	members	 and	 to	 list	 them	as	 debtors	 at	 the	Credit	 Bureau.105	 Besides	 this,	 JLB	 told	 he	
wanted	to	nab	the	project	and	withdraw	the	authorized	resources	from	PRODESCA.	
Later	on,	JLB	communicated	by	phone	with	Malla,	lawyer	and	advisor	to	the	Asociación.	
He	expressed	to	her	that	the	claim	against	the	Asociación	was	ready	and	that	he	could	show	
it	to	her.	Malla	told	him	that	the	legal	claim	could	not	proceed,	as	there	were	no	commitments	
to	his	firm	signed	by	the	Asociación.	JLB	allegedly	had	answered:	“If	it	is	war	you	want,	it	is	
war	that	you’ll	get”.	Gonzalo,	seemed	to	be	a	 little	worried	about	JLB’s	movements,	as	his	
threats	 could	 transpire	 to	 governmental	 institutions	 and	 obstruct	 project	 negotiations.	
Vicente	(ACEA)	and	Félix	(Abaco)	exchanged	some	strong	words	(05/12/04):	
		
Vicente:	─	JLB	has	a	modest	office	with	a	secretary	in	Mexico	City.	His	stuff	can	be	carried	
in	a	suitcase.	It	would	be	a	good	idea	(joking)	to	put	a	chip	on	JLB	and	to	monitor	his	failed	
projects,	and	then	give	them	continuity.	
Félix:	─	JLB	said,	“If	I	had	a	gun	in	my	hand,	and	I	would	be	in	front	of	Fidencio,	I	would	
kill	him!”	
		
Evidently,	Félix	intended	to	highlight	a	conflict	between	JLB	and	me	and	spread	this	perception	
among	the	Asociación's	partners.	A	few	days	later,	and	as	a	result	of	this	situation,	JLB’S	firm	
notified	the	governmental	institutions	and	Banco	del	Bajío	that	the	Asociación	had	a	debt	with	
that	firm.	In	those	days,	I	met	with	Toscano	(Banco	del	Bajío)	to	estimate	the	influence	JLB’S	
firm	could	have	and	the	obstacles	he	could	pose	to	the	Asociación’s	negotiations.	Toscano	was	
clear	by	saying	that	Banco	del	Bajío	was	not	worried	about	JLB	firm’s	insinuations.	To	counter	
the	effect	of	JLB’s	intervention	to	block	the	project’s	development,	Gonzalo	suggested	to	close	
lines	and	to	calm	things	down	with	the	State	government’s	institutions	while	maintaining	a	
																																																						
105	Financial	debts	are	registered	at	the	National	Credit	Bureau.	Although	there	were	no	legal	elements	for	this	
to	happen,	partners	recognized	the	capabilities	of	JLB	to	carry	out	his	threat.	
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very	close	communication	among	the	Asociación’s	members,	showing	the	intention	to	stay	
united.	 JLB‘s	 firm’s	 strategy	 did	 have	 an	 effect	 when	 his	 financial	 office	 pressured	 some	
members	 of	 the	 Asociación.	 Lira,	 accompanied	 by	 a	 lawyer,	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 delivering	
payment	 requests	 to	 the	 members	 of	 some	 SPRs	 (Marijo,	 Purépero,	 Biotecnológicos	 and	
Laredo).	Without	giving	any	legal	proof,	Lira	demanded	payment	of	USD	3,000.00	by	each	SPR.	
These	 events	 clearly	 confused	 and	 created	 conflicts	 among	 members	 and	 their	 families.	
Fortunately,	the	threats	to	designate	them	as	debtors	of	the	credit	bureau	did	not	have	any	
effect	 (apart	 from	 the	 fact	 that	most	members	 did	 not	 understand	 the	meaning	 of	 being	
classified	as	debtor	of	such	bureau).	
JLB’S	 firm	also	 intended	to	withdraw	the	authorized	resources	 (USD	12,500)	 for	 five	
SPRs	from	PRODESCA	(Alianza).	To	frustrate	this	intention,	Pedro	Loya	(a	SEDAGRO	technician)	
suggested	updating	SAGARPA’s	data	to	the	new	PSP	(Abaco).	Even	if	the	resource	would	be	
reclaimed	by	PSP,	it	would	then	require	authorization	by	the	SPRs	authorization	to	release	the	
funds	to	the	PSP.	The	resources	from	PRODESCA	had	a	close	expiration	date	and	were	destined	
for	training	and	production	purposes	in	the	greenhouse.	The	beneficiaries	(the	SPRs)	tried	to	
negotiate	with	 Abaco	 to	 get	 their	money	 back,	 and	 to	 reduce	 the	 expenses	 spent	 on	 the	
project.	Nevertheless,	Abaco	intended	to	assign	the	amount	(the	USD	12,500)	to	elaborate	a	
commercialization	 project.	 The	 Asociación's	 management	 committee	 clarified	 that	 the	
resources	from	PRODESCA	belonged	to	the	SPRs	which	negotiated	with	Alianza,	and	that	these	
would	not	serve	to	elaborate	any	project.	Abaco	conditioned	the	negotiation	of	replacing	a	
PRODESCA’s	 PSP	 in	 exchange	 of	 economic	 benefits,	 and	 the	 SPRs	 qualified	 the	 action	 as	
‘unethical’	blackmailing.	
In	fact,	Abaco	charged	its	services	in	cash,	immediately	and	unexpectedly.	For	example,	
at	the	beginning	of	May	2004,	Félix	(Abaco)	charged	the	Asociación	USD	2,000	in	addition	to	
travel	 allowances.	 To	 avoid	 conflicts	 that	 could	 affect	 project	 management,	 the	 partners	
authorized	this	payment.	However,	a	few	days	later,	Abaco	intended	to	charge	another	USD	
8,000	to	cover	expensive	dinner	bills.	Similarly,	Abaco	intended	to	charge	USD	10,000	to	the	
four	SPRs	that	decided	to	build	their	greenhouses	in	their	municipalities.	The	affected	SPRs	
did	 not	 agree	 with	 the	 additional	 payment,	 arguing	 that	 they	 had	 already	 paid	 their	
contribution	to	the	USD	12,000	of	the	joint	project	cost	that	was	being	used	to	manage	the	
resources;	 nevertheless,	 Abaco	 required	 payment	 by	 these	 four	 SPRs	 as	 a	 condition	 for	
negotiations	with	the	Asociación.	For	the	payments,	Abaco	pressed	the	treasurer	(Mare)	and	
Ampa	(Los	Pinos)	who	agreed	to	its	demands;	they	moved	fast	to	demand	members	to	pay	
the	corresponding	amounts	to	Abaco,	while	Esperanza	(secretary)	expressed	firmly	her	refusal	
to	authorize	more	money	to	Abaco.	Some	partners	did	not	agree	with	Abaco’s	charges,	and	
argued	that	there	were	inconsistencies	in	the	payments.	
In	the	contract	signed	with	the	Asociación,	Abaco	seemed	to	be	a	moral	person	without	
providing	evidence	of	it.	Malla	(Los	Pinos)	argued	that	working	with	moral	persons	gave	more	
certainty	to	the	project.	Institutions	like	FIRA	required	the	adviser’s	firm	of	the	Asociación	to	
be	registered	as	a	moral	person.	Malla’s	explanation	did	not	convince	Mare	nor	Ampa,	who	
insisted	on	the	payment	to	Abaco.	Cristi	who	supported	them	both	went	looking	for	Chema	
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at	his	home	–	as	he	had	been	sick	for	the	last	few	days	-	and	when	Chema	came,	the	situation	
was	calmed	down.	Mare	and	Ampa	required	that	the	management	committee	take	a	position	
concerning	 the	 requested	 payments.	 After	 probing	 the	 situation,	 Chema	 established	 a	
strategy,	talked	about	his	experience	managing	the	Celanese’s	Labour	Union,	and	suggested	
to	 first	 make	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 events,	 and	 then	 present	 a	 consistent	 alternative	 as	
management	committee.	
Mare	agreed	to	the	additional	USD	2,500	charged	to	the	 four	separate	groups,	and	
proposed	that	all	17	groups	within	the	Asociación	pay	the	USD	20,000.	Abaco	intended	the	
payment	to	be	taken	from	the	Asociación’s	contributions,	and	to	charge	internally	for	the	four	
SPRs.	 Some	 partners	 of	 the	 management	 committee	 were	 against	 the	 proposal	 and	 no	
agreement	 was	 reached.	Malla106	 stated	 that	 she	 refused	 to	 pay	 additional	 resources	 for	
services	already	contracted,	while	Ampa	and	Mare’s	SPR	pressed	the	assembly	to	negotiate	
the	amount	Abaco	requested	to	the	SPRs	from	Tlazazalca,	Panindícuaro	and	Huaniqueo,	and	
trying	to	make	the	municipal	presidencies	absorb	the	expenses.	Purépero	refused,	however.	
After	visiting	 the	 town	halls	of	Huaniqueo	and	Panindícuaro,	 they	agreed	 to	pay	 the	debt,	
while	Tlazazalca	was	on	standby.	Now	the	activities	of	the	Asociación	were	directed	to	get	the	
resources	to	Abaco,	and	this	activity	was	considered	a	priority	in	the	project’s	development	-	
without	noticing	though	that	this	implied	an	unfair	treatment	for	the	SPRs	involved,	and	who	
wished	to	establish	a	greenhouse	in	their	municipalities.	
Those	who	demanded	payment	were	only	visualizing	the	benefits	of	their	own	projects	
at	the	expense	of	others.	This	strategy	to	keep	control	of	resources	and	concentrate	them	in	
the	Asociación’s	property,	was	carried	out	formerly	by	the	SPRs	of	Chema	and	Jesús,	and	was	
later	 supported	 by	 Irma	 and	 Armando	 (Piedad	 Chiquita),	 Espinoza	 (Marijo),	Mare	 (Puerta	
Chica),	Cristi	(Biotecnológicos)	-	all	of	them	from	Zacapu.	Because	of	this	situation,	the	SPRs	
from	Purépero,	Huaniqueo,	Panindícuaro	and	Los	Pinos	considered	the	alternative	of	joining	
the	collective	land	in	Zacapu.	
On	the	other	hand,	a	 relationship	of	convenience	was	established	between	Vicente	
(ACEA)	and	Abaco.	Vicente	stated	that	Toño	(ACEA’s	owner)	was	quitting	the	business	to	get	
some	rest,	and	had	neglected	the	greenhouses’	quality.	By	promoting	a	deficient	image	of	the	
services	offered	by	ACEA,	Vicente	was	looking	to	enhance	himself	as	a	free	agent	and	open	
the	range	to	other	providers;	he	imagined	that	through	the	agreement	he	had	with	Abaco,	he	
would	 provide	 the	 supplies	 and	 Abaco	 would	 control	 the	 Asociación	 by	 making	 it	 fully	
dependent.	 Then,	 the	 advisors	 would	 negotiate	 the	 greenhouses’	 selling	 with	 a	 provider	
chosen	by	them,	moving	away	from	ACEA.	The	strategy	began	to	have	an	impact,	some	of	the	
members	 distrusted	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 ACEA	 greenhouses	 and	 the	 seriousness	 of	 its	
collaborators;	also,	 the	prices	 changed	among	different	greenhouse	models	which	created	
confusion	about	the	kind	of	greenhouse	the	Asociación	required.	The	greenhouses	offered	by	
JLB’S	firm	covered	all	the	needs	‘key	in	hands’,	and	the	ACEA	greenhouses	were	seen	as	‘rustic	
greenhouse’	full	of	investment	risks.	
																																																						
106	Malla	had	worked	in	BANRURAL	and	she	had	work	experience	in	firms.	
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In	early	June	2004,	Abaco	made	changes	in	the	greenhouse	equipment,	replacing	the	
gas	 heaters	 by	 diesel-fuelled	 heaters,	which	 increased	heating	 and	 irrigation	 costs	 to	USD	
600,000	 for	 the	 joint	project.	The	Spanish	suppliers	proposed	by	Abaco	would	provide	 the	
heating;	these	changes	increased	greenhouse	costs	to	USD	150,000	per	unit.	Abaco	blamed	
the	 ACEA	 provider	 for	 increasing	 the	 costs.	 Vicente	 agreed	 to	 the	 proposed	 changes	 and	
argued	that	ACEA	did	not	work	with	that	kind	of	heaters.	The	Asociación	followed	the	technical	
recommendation	 from	 Abaco.	 The	 next	 step	 of	 Abaco	 was	 to	 offer	 greenhouses	 for	 USD	
145,000	with	Richel	(France)	and	Inverca	(Spain),	claiming	a	better	quality	compared	to	ACEA	
greenhouses,	 and	 justifying	 their	 preference	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 visits	 to	 the	 Atacheo	
greenhouses.	Rafa	Lp	(SEPLADE),	who	was	influenced	by	the	project’s	instability,	advised	the	
SPRs	of	Salas	(Bajo	Invernadero)	and	Margarita	(Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres)	to	better	
quit	the	project.	
The	positioning	of	Abaco	in	the	Asociación	resulted	from	an	excessive	ambition	and	
changed	very	soon	the	“business”	relationship	it	had	with	Vicente,	who	even	went	to	the	point	
of	expressing	himself	against	Abaco.	Vicente	was	ready	to	denounce	the	lack	of	moral	integrity	
of	Félix	(Abaco)	at	an	Asociación’s	assembly.	These	events	showed	the	split	between	them.	An	
extraordinary	meeting	was	called	for	by	the	Asociación	on	April	7,	2004	where	the	need	for	
breaking	up	with	Abaco	was	expressed.	Ampa	defended	the	adviser’s	position,	while	other	
partners	like	Cristi	(Biotecnológicos)	and	Irma	(Piedad	Chiquita)	just	said	that	they	trusted	the	
management	committee	of	the	Asociación.	Vicente	(ACEA	technician)	said:	
		
Félix’	path	as	Abaco’s	representative	has	been	full	of	breaking	ups	of	projects	in	which	
he	had	participated.	This	firm	[Abaco]	tries	to	get	the	maximum	benefit	of	the	companies	
[organizations]	that	are	still	in	the	consolidation	phase.	Félix	is	a	greenhouse	seller,	that	
is	his	major	business	(Vicente,	Zacapu,	07/19/04).	
		
Abaco	 associated	with	 organizations	 that	 already	 had	 resources	 and	 advancements	 in	 the	
negotiations.	In	the	final	stage,	Abaco	seemed	to	generate	instability	and	conflicts,	when	the	
partners	had	already	invested	a	lot	in	the	project	and	would	not	want	to	abandon	it.	On	the	
other	hand,	 the	bonds	between	Félix	and	Toscano	(Banco	del	Bajío)	made	 it	easier	 for	 the	
former	to	be	a	part	of	the	Trust	Fund	of	the	Asociación.	Vicente	entrusted	to	me	a	talk	he	had	
had	 with	 Félix,	 in	 which	 the	 intention	 of	 bribing	 me	 was	 clearly	 expressed.	 Vicente	 now	
admitted	that	formerly	there	were	agreements	between	Abaco	and	himself	to	work	as	a	team,	
but	now	he	admitted	that	it	was	impossible	to	negotiate	with	Abaco.		Vicente	stated:	“Félix	
was	egocentric,	and	made	sure	that	the	Asociación’s	project	would	not	be	carried	out	if	they	
were	not	included.	Abaco	had	the	intention	of	visiting	the	institutions	and	generate	instability	
in	the	project.”	(Vicente,	Zacapu,	07/19/04).	
The	responsibility	of	the	management	committee	became	increasingly	greater	as	the	
project	headed	its	final	stages.	Among	others,	the	committee	had	to	evaluate	the	feasibility	
of	 completing	 the	 project	without	 Abaco,	 as	well	 as	 finding	 another	 advisory	 firm	 for	 the	
Asociación.	From	his	side,	Armando	(Piedad	Chiquita)	said	that	whatever	I	decided	would	be	
fine,	that	maybe	I	had	seen	things	the	others	had	not.	After	voting,	it	was	decided	to	end	the	
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working	 relationship	 with	 Abaco.	 This	 second	 breakup	 would	 have	 consequences	 for	 the	
collective.	
 
 
Organizational	conflicts	
Abaco	promised	a	well-paid	 job	to	Cristi	and	Ampa	 in	the	Asociación’s	administration.	But,	
since	both	of	 them	wanted	 to	be	 in	charge,	 rivalry	between	 them	ensued.	 In	 this	 context,	
Abaco	 spread	 the	 rumour	 of	 a	 so-called	 preference	 of	 the	 Asociación’s	 management	
committee	 for	Ampa,	 to	which	Cristi	 reacted	by	disqualifying	Ampa	professionally,	arguing	
that	Ampa	was	not	the	right	person	to	manage	the	Asociación’s	administration	as	she	was	
incompetent	and	an	irregular	partner	of	her	SPR	(Los	Pinos).	(Ampa	expressed	her	interest	in	
receiving	a	good	salary	by	being	in	charge	of	the	administration	and	leaving	the	position	as	
treasurer	of	the	Asociación.	Cristi	on	her	side	proposed	that	the	administrative	profile	must	
be	designed	by	a	specialized	office,	as	provided	in	the	quality	scheme	of	the	Asociación.	Cristi	
proposed	the	advisory	office	headed	by	Demetrio	Sosa,	a	friend	of	Cristi’s,	to	be	in	charge	of	
the	administrative	structure	of	the	Asociación,	with	clear	intentions	of	obtaining	a	favourable	
position	in	the	administration.	
Mare	(treasurer)	did	not	agree	with	Ampa	occupying	an	administrative	position	either.	
At	 some	 point,	 Mare	 required	 preparing	 a	 financial	 balance	 of	 the	 Asociación.107	 Ampa	
suggested	an	accountant	friend	of	hers,	who	was	asked	to	review	the	documents	and	prepare	
the	budget.	When	he	reviewed	the	financial	documents	of	the	Asociación	for	the	first	time	on	
April	6,	2004,	he	found	inconsistencies	and	legal	and	taxes	omissions.	At	that	moment,	the	
SPRs	 had	 not	 yet	 made	 their	 tax	 declaration	 at	 SHCP	 and	 this	 clearly	 showed	 a	 lack	 of	
compliance	 with	 tax	 obligations.	 After	 communicating	 with	 the	 bank,	 the	 accountant	
suggested	to	include	the	SPRs	on	the	accounting.	The	bill	was	up	to	USD	60.00	per	SPR	to	state	
a	zero	declaration;	the	package	included	an	individual	file	for	each	SPR.	Despite	the	low	cost,	
Mare	disqualified	the	proposal	arguing:	
		
If	the	recommendation	[of	the	accountant]	comes	from	Ampa,	we	must	take	it	as	a	red	
flag.	 I	 propose	 the	 Pátzcuaro	 company	 that	 charges	 USD	 1,000	 and	 delivers	 the	
documentation	of	the	17	SPRs	within	24	hours	(Mare,	Zacapu,	06/01/04).	
		
Ampa,	as	a	third	option,	proposed	a	couple	of	accountants	from	Zacapu,	whom	she	contacted	
a	day	before.	On	her	own,	she	delivered	to	the	office	a	copy	of	the	requirements	to	prepare	
the	 income	 statements	 of	 the	 bank.	 Mare	 considered	 that	 Ampa	 had	 compromised	 her	
function	as	 the	Asociación’s	 treasurer.	 This	 generated	a	hysteric	 reaction	 from	Mare,	who	
ended	 up	 crying,	 picking	 up	 her	 things	 and	 asking	 Malla	 (the	 alternate	 treasurer)	 to	 be	
discharged	 as	 the	 titular,	 as	 under	 those	 conditions	 she	 would	 not	 participate	 anymore.	
																																																						
107	This	process	formed	part	of	the	management	of	the	credit	line	to	the	Banco	del	Bajío.	
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Meanwhile,	Ampa	stayed	in	silence;	her	strategy	seemed	to	be	to	make	Mare	quit	from	the	
treasury,	aware	as	she	was	that	her	sister	Malla	would	put	her	in	control	instead.108
	
The	administrative	structure	of	the	Asociación	constituted	a	requirement	requested	by	
the	 bank.	 To	 that	 purpose	 an	 assembly	 was	 organized	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 June	 2004.	 The	
assembly	 gave	 a	 trust	 vow	 to	 the	 management	 committee	 to	 propose	 an	 administrative	
structure.	Ampa	invited	Abaco	without	informing	the	partners,	just	stating	that	the	presence	
of	 an	 adviser’s	 firm	 was	 required.	 Abaco	 offered	 their	 “integral”	 services	 including	
administrative	 training.	The	assembly	agreed	on	accepting	 the	proposal,	which	 considered	
USD	10,000	to	make	the	project	“integral”,	USD	15,000	for	credit	management,	and	USD	7,500	
to	design	the	administrative	structure.	Abaco	requested	the	management	committee	not	to	
follow	 the	 assembly’s	 decision,	 and	 furthermore	 demanded	 that	 I	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	
proposals’	review	to	choose	a	firm.	I	expressed	that	my	participation	would	be	the	partners’	
decision	and	that	no	firm	could	take	the	Asociación	as	a	hostage;	also,	I	told	them	that	we	
would	inform	them	about	the	result	of	their	proposal.	Abaco	abandoned	the	assembly	and	
Ampa	 also	 did,	 but	 later	 on	 she	 came	 back,	 just	 when	 the	 assembly	 authorized	 the	
management	committee	to	design	the	administrative	structure.	
Ampa	did	not	agree	with	 the	way	Abaco	was	 treated,	arguing	 that	 they	had	solved	
some	problems.	I	clarified	to	the	assembly	that	by	choosing	a	firm,	particular	interests	could	
be	affected.	The	partners	knew	about	Ampa’s	and	Cristi’s	aspirations	to	have	a	position	within	
the	Asociación’s	administration.	To	solve	 this	problem,	 the	assembly	should	be	 the	one	 to	
propose	 the	 administrative	 structure	 and	 to	 allow	 the	 management	 committee	 to	 invite	
advisors	to	present	their	alternatives.	
When	Jesús	and	Malla	entered,	they	strengthened	the	position	of	Armando	(SPR	La	
Piedad	Chiquita)	who	was	moderating	the	assembly.	The	general	opinion	was	that	they	should	
not	 put	 partners	 on	 administrative	 positions.	 The	 case	 was	 mentioned	 of	 a	 Zacapu	
pasteurizer109,	and	how	a	very	bad	administration	had	forced	it	to	close.	Irma	pointed	out	that	
the	partners	had	become	employees	of	the	company,	even	the	accountant	(Irma’s	sister)	was	
on	the	payroll	of	the	company	-	and	she	was	trying	to	avoid	this.	Trujillo	(Cortijo	Nuevo)	added	
that	he,	when	being	in	charge	of	the	waste	disposal	department	of	Zacapu,	he	once	had	to	
take	out	workers	who	had	privileges	in	the	town	hall’s	current	administration.	He	thought	that	
the	 ability	 conferred	 upon	 the	 management	 committee	 should	 be	 used	 to	 modify	 the	
administrative	structure,	if	necessary.	In	opposition	to	her	sister	Ampa,	Malla	defended	the	
position	of	not	mixing	partners’	business	with	the	SPR,	while	Mare	did	not	agree	either	with	
the	idea	of	the	people	familiar	to	the	partners	to	become	administrators,	and	Marco,	a	partner	
of	Mare’s	SPR,	suggested	to	both	of	them	to	rethink	the	issue.	Only	Manuel	(SPR	Las	Delicias)	
considered	the	aspiration	of	both	Cristi	and	Ampa	appropriate.	
																																																						
108	Before	the	arrival	of	Mare,	Ampa	had	conducted	the	finances	of	the	Asociación,	she	appeared	in	the	bureau	
of	credit.	The	file	presented	to	the	Bank	involved	all	partners,	and	Ampa	did	not	appear	as	a	partner	of	the	
SPR	of	Los	Pinos.	
109	Irma	told	how	her	sister	had	been	a	manager	in	an	SPR	for	milk	pasteurization,	were	Mare’s	father	had	been	
the	 treasurer.	 The	 pasteurizer	 received	 government	 resources	 and	 had	 internal	 problems,	 derived	 from	
conflicts	of	interest	among	the	members	and	management.	
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With	the	purpose	of	protecting	the	investment,	it	was	unanimously	decided	to	exclude	
family	 relations	 from	 the	 Asociación's	 administration.	 The	 task	 of	 consolidating	 the	
administrative	structure	was	assigned	to	Malla.	Ampa	expressed	that	she	could	not	believe	
the	meeting	was	turning	its	back	on	her	and	felt	very	offended	by	the	situation.	She	did	not	
understand	that,	despite	her	time	invested,	the	Asociación	did	not	assign	her	a	position	in	the	
administration.	As	much	as	Cristi,	Ampa	looked	for	a	position	in	the	Asociación,	just	because	
of	her	support	to	the	organization.	René	Sosa	(the	SEPLADE	technician)	linked	this	event	to	
earlier	cases:	“During	the	past	10	years	Ampa	and	Cristi	have	failed	to	consolidate	a	job;	in	the	
beginning	 they	 supported	 the	 actions,	 and	 then	 they	 asked	 to	 be	 supported	 themselves”.	
Malla	also	considered	this	to	be	the	case.	
Even	if	it	was	very	clear	that	Cristi	was	looking	for	personal	benefits	too,	unlike	Ampa,	
she	seemed	to	understand	the	assembly’s	agreement	very	quickly.	The	next	day	Ampa	also	
had	second	thoughts	and	considered	it	to	be	a	mistake	to	make	her	personal	interests	visible	
at	 the	 assembly,	 and	 was	 aware	 that	 it	 could	 affect	 her	 aspirations	 to	 an	 administrative	
position.	Malla	suggested	Ampa	to	present	an	administrative	proposal	 together,	but	Ampa	
refused	the	offer.	These	conflicts	would	have	consequences	for	the	Asociación	because	Mare,	
Ampa,	 Cristi	 and	 Malla	 were	 in	 charge	 of	 fundamental	 tasks	 in	 the	 project.	 After	 what	
happened,	 Ampa	 felt	 herself	 unprotected	 and	 she	 needed	 to	 team	 up	with	 someone	 she	
trusted.	I	tried	to	calm	her	down	by	clarifying	that	there	were	different	stages	in	the	project,	
that	the	administrative	phase	should	be	discussed	in	due	time,	that	the	important	thing	was	
to	 consolidate	 the	 project,	 and	 that	 it	 would	 be	 the	 partners’	 decision	 to	 define	 the	
administrative	structure.	Now	the	confrontation	between	them	was	very	clear.	Cristi	was	very	
cold-blooded	and	rude	to	Ampa,	who	intended	to	take	Malla	off	the	organization	and	blocked	
her	 in	 a	 clear	way.110	Malla,	 from	 her	 side,	 did	 not	want	 to	 have	 a	 prejudice	 against	 the	
Asociación’s	partners	at	that	moment.	When	Chema	rejoined	the	Asociación	after	his	illness,	
he	expressed	his	support	 to	Malla,	considering	her	more	competent	 than	Ampa	(both	had	
known	each	other	for	a	long	time).	
Mare,	who	confirmed	that	Malla	was	serious,	expressed	her	doubts	and	worries	about	
the	project;	for	several	minutes,	the	members	of	the	management	committee	listened	to	her	
because	she	was	sincere	in	expressing	the	pressure	she	felt	to	have	to	represent	her	task	as	a	
treasurer,	how	she	had	analysed	the	situation	and	come	to	the	conclusion	that	there	were	
personal	 interests	 that	 defined	 the	 project.	 She	 talked	 about	 Abaco,	 and	 how	 they	 were	
looking	to	increase	the	fear	of	failure.	Mare	also	mentioned	JLB’S	firm	intentions	to	block	the	
Asociación	in	the	negotiations.	Gonzalo	thought	that	there	were	talks	going	on	between	JLB’S	
firm	and	Abaco	to	stir	up	conflict	and	that	a	greenhouse	provider	was	involved	(he	did	not	tell	
which	one).	He	said	he	came	to	these	conclusions	after	seeing	some	minutes	sent	by	Abaco,	
and	suggested	to	stay	together	until	they	would	receive	the	resources.	
For	some	weeks	Chema	fell	ill	again	and	stayed	at	home,	but	Mare,	Cristi,	and	Ampa	
gave	him	their	versions	of	the	events	about	breaking	up	with	Abaco.	At	the	end	of	June	2004,	
																																																						
110	To	select	an	alternate	for	Treasurer,	Ampa	had	voted	in	favour	of	Cristi	and	not	of	Malla.	
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during	 a	meeting	 to	 ask	 Esperanza	 to	 talk	 to	 SPR	 La	 Jabonera	 to	 pay	 its	 contribution,	 she	
refused,	arguing	that	she	had	to	do	other	activities.	During	this	assembly,	Chema	pointed	at	
the	 failures	 of	 Esperanza	when	 taking	 the	minutes	 of	 the	 assembly.	 Chema	was	 asked	 to	
suggest	the	nomination	of	an	alternative	to	Esperanza	as	secretary,	and	Armando	was	chosen.	
Esperanza	 seemed	disappointed	 and	 little	motivated	 as	 she	 did	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 project	
anymore.	Esperanza	said	that	the	partners	of	her	SPR	were	not	motivated	and	that	it	was	a	
risky	thing,	so	she	asked	me	to	talk	to	them	in	Purépero.	Then	Chema	told	me	that	he	had	
thought	about	some	things,	among	others	the	Asociación’s	dynamic	support	by	the	women.	
Chema	was	right	in	being	worried,	as	he	had	not	any	experience	in	female	teams,	and	neither	
did	I.	
Abaco	had	shown	how	 it	 could	 influence	 the	behaviour	of	 the	 female	partners	and	
attract	their	support.	In	many	occasions,	I	had	listened	to	the	comments	of	the	women	in	the	
Asociación	(Cristi,	Mare,	and	Irma):	they	considered	Félix	a	handsome	man,	and	they	liked	his	
expressions	 and	 gestures,	which	 influenced	 them.	Others	with	 a	 stronger	 personality,	 like	
Malla	 and	 Esperanza,	 seemed	 not	 to	 bother	 and	 expressed	 their	 concern	 noticing	 the	
influence	 of	 Félix	 on	 their	 companions.	 Félix	 once	 expressed	 that	 the	 key	 to	 influence	 in	
Zacapu	was	through	gossip.	The	Asociación’s	former	president,	Heredia	was	said	to	think	that	
“the	women	from	Zacapu”	were	part	of	the	causes	of	the	Asociación’s	splitting	up.	
 
 
Associations,	displacements	and	network	rearrangement	
While	 the	 trust	 fund	was	 tried	 to	be	 created,	 expecting	 the	 contribution	of	 10	percent	 of	
greenhouse	 cost	 (USD	 15,000	 for	 each	 SPR)	 to	 be	 deposited	 before	 the	 end	 of	 July	 2004,	
SEPLADE	argued	that	after	that	date	they	would	not	be	able	to	stop	the	process,	and	the	SPRs	
that	did	not	get	the	credit	line	would	be	excluded	from	the	project.	For	this	reason,	Ampa	and	
Mare	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 SPRs,	 demanding	 their	 respective	 contributions,	
particularly	 the	 SPRs	 of	 La	 Piedad	 Chiquita,	 Bajo	 Invernadero,	 Comanja,	 Movimiento	
Ciudadano	de	Mujeres,	La	Jabonera	de	Tlazazalca,	Cortijo	Nuevo	and	Huaniqueo.	The	ways	in	
which	 pressure	 was	 exercised	 caused	 tension	 within	 the	 Asociación;	 some	 of	 them	 even	
proposed	 to	 deny	 those	 SPRs	 the	 right	 of	 voting	 in	 the	 assembly.	 This	 process	 would	
differentiate	the	SPRs	that	had	the	economic	resources	to	contribute	to	the	project	from	those	
who	did	not.	Mare	was	being	rude	with	Irma,	who	did	not	have	available	resources.	Chema,	
Jesús,	and	Víctor	(Maldonado)	agreed	with	me	in	making	a	pact	with	each	SPR	to	specify	the	
deadlines.	
From	my	point	of	view,	the	contribution	was	unjustified	until	the	credit	line	from	the	
bank	was	authorized.	Gonzalo	agreed	with	this;	however,	some	officials	(like	René	of	FOMICH	
and	Abraham	from	FIRA)	considered	that	one	way	to	test	the	commitment	of	the	partners	to	
the	 project	 was	 through	 their	 financial	 contribution.	 Following	 this	 approach,	 regional	
development	imposed	conditions	that	would	exclude	some	actors	and	favour	others.	Still,	the	
organizing	 incompatibility	 of	 some	 of	 the	 SPRs	 obstructed	 the	mobility	 of	 others	who	 did	
invest	 in	 the	 project.	 For	 example,	 the	 SPRs	 of	 Cortijo	 Nuevo,	 Bajo	 Invernadero	 and	
Movimiento	 Ciudadano	 de	 Mujeres	 one	 day	 accepted	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 Asociación’s	
	120	
management,	 and	 a	 few	 days	 later	 threatened	 with	 their	 withdrawal.	 The	 inconsistent	
behaviour	 of	 these	 SPRs	 affected	 project	 planning,	 so	 Chema	 and	 Jesús	 demanded	 these	
societies	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 required	 commitments	 to	 the	 Asociación,	 and	 analyzed	 the	
situation	of	the	SPRs	that	were	moving	away	from	the	project.	Chema	proposed	not	to	give	
back	the	contributions	to	any	of	the	SPRs	that	choose	to	move	out,	his	main	argument	being	
the	necessity	of	completing	the	payment	for	the	Asociación’s	 land.	Besides,	by	keeping	the	
contributions	in	the	Asociación	account	would	give	more	certainty	in	credit	line	negotiations.	
Through	Malla	we	pleaded	to	the	SPRs	that	wished	to	get	their	contributions	back	–	
and	this	caused	disagreement	with	Chema.	For	example,	Trujillo	(Cortijo	Nuevo)	complained	
about	 paying	 interest	 for	 a	 credit	 he	 had	 taken	 up	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 his	 contribution.	 The	
members	of	Cortijo	Nuevo	did	not	want	to	continue	with	the	project,	and	Trujillo	expressed	
his	withdrawal	before	 the	assembly,	 requesting	 the	 return	of	his	 contribution.	Chema	and	
Jesús	(Trujillo’s	companions	on	the	Zacapu	town	hall)	thought	that	Trujillo	had	been	irregular	
and	 should	 be	 expelled	 from	 the	 Asociación.	 The	 letter	 sent	 by	 the	 Salas’	 SPR	 (Bajo	
Invernadero)	was	also	read,	which	stated	that	they	also	quitted	the	Asociación.	Then	Gracian	
presented	the	withdrawal	of	the	Puerta	Chica	SPR	on	grounds	that	there	wasn’t	any	progress	
and	that	the	necessity	of	an	advisory	firm	to	support	the	negotiations	was	put	aside.	He	talked	
about	the	exit	of	Abaco,	and	requested	their	contribution	to	be	returned.	The	assembly	stated	
that	these	things	did	not	justify	their	withdrawal,	and	reminded	them	that	commitments	were	
made	to	buy	the	land.	Chema	had	good	thoughts	about	the	SPR	Puerta	Chica;	he	considered	
they	 had	 a	 strong	 fighting	 spirit	 because	 they	 all	 wanted	 to	 participate.	 Irma	 and	 others	
considered	that	by	their	withdrawal	the	Asociación	was	being	affected,	and	this	could	start	
the	“stampede”	of	other	SPRs	in	the	Asociación.	It	was	agreed	to	give	an	answer	within	a	few	
days	to	the	SPRs	that	put	forward	their	wish	to	withdraw.	
For	 several	 days,	 the	 SPRs	were	 approached	 to	 finally	 agree	on	 the	 return	of	 their	
contribution.	The	next	assembly	served	to	release	tensions	and	to	look	for	the	cause	of	their	
frustration.	 Ampa	mentioned	 that	 some	 differences	 among	 the	Asociación's	 partners	 had	
been	overcome	and	that	now	things	were	moving	forward	in	benefit	of	the	project.	From	the	
Asociación’s	standpoint	this	would	allow	maintaining	the	project’s	negotiation	with	the	bank	
and	the	institutions.	
The	first	replacement	of	the	partners	in	an	Asociación’s	SPR	had	occurred	in	2003	with	
La	 Piedad	 Chiquita.	 The	 procedure	 implied	 organizing	 an	 assembly	 between	 the	 former	
partners	and	the	new	ones,	to	introduce	them	and	give	them	the	SPR’s	representation.	In	the	
same	meeting,	the	former	partners	presented	their	withdrawal	so	the	transfer	of	SPR	actions	
took	place	immediately	and,	finally,	the	act	of	the	assembly	was	registered	in	front	of	public	
notary.	A	year	later	(May	2004)	a	similar	situation	occurred	in	Comanja’s	SPR,	as	Pancho	quit	
as	 its	 representative	 and	 René	 Guizar	 took	 over,	 while	 Rosario	 stayed	 as	 treasurer	 and	
Sebastián	Loya,	brother	of	Pedro	Loya	and	Baltazar	from	Tiríndaro,	joined.	On	June	24th,	2004	
the	 economic	 contribution	was	 returned	 to	 SPR	 Puerta	 Chica	 and	 the	 replacement	 of	 the	
partners	took	place,	with	Martín	representing	the	new	partners	who	were	Carátacua.	With	
the	withdrawal	of	Mare	(Puerta	Chica)	as	treasurer,	her	task	was	officially	transferred	to	Malla.	
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The	Bajo	 Invernadero	group	represented	by	Salas	 left	 its	position	 to	a	SPR	 from	the	Bellas	
Fuentes	community,	represented	by	Juan	Luis.	The	rapporteur	endorsed	the	replacements,	
which	were	then	formally	registered	with	the	notary	public.			
With	the	replacement	process	inside	the	SPRs,	it	was	intended	to	keep	consistency	in	
the	 organization	 of	 the	 Asociación.	 The	 translation	 process	 modified	 the	 SPR	 internal	
structure,	thus	avoiding	a	revalidation	of	the	records	as	a	new	SPR.	Gonzalo	suggested	that	
achieving	cohesion	with	 the	new	groups	would	be	done	 in	a	 similar	way	as	 the	organizing	
process	that	had	involved	the	pioneer	SPRs	in	the	project.	Nevertheless,	the	perception	of	the	
new	members	towards	the	project	caused	a	rearrangement	and	detachment	of	other	actors	
and	formerly	associated	resources,	generating	a	new	version	of	the	Asociación.	This	changed	
the	project	perspective	among	the	new	partners	and	promoted	some	exchanges	among	those	
already	 participating.	 Displacements	 in	 the	 actor-network	 show	 that	 the	 repertoire	 of	
translation	is	not	only	designed	to	give	a	symmetrical	and	tolerant	description	of	a	complex	
process	 which	 constantly	 mixes	 together	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 entities.	 It	 also	 allows	 an	
explanation	of	how	a	few	obtain	the	right	to	express	and	to	represent	the	many	silent	actors	
of	the	social	and	natural	worlds	they	have	mobilized	(Callon,	1986:19).	
 
 
Conflicts	resulting	from	getting	the	credit	line		
The	 credit	 line	amount	established	on	 the	project	document	was	USD	2.3	million,	 and	 the	
negotiations	 were	 with	 Banco	 del	 Bajío.	 Some	 institutions,	 such	 as	 FIRCO,	 expected	 the	
Asociación	to	have	the	authorization	of	the	credit	line	to	release	the	resources.	At	the	end	of	
June	2004,	Banco	del	Bajío	met	with	the	Asociación’s	partners	at	Zacapu.	Even	if	the	Asociación	
was	the	agent	for	the	credit,	the	bank	required	to	establish	specific	agreements	among	each	
SPR	and	the	Asociación	in	order	to	support	the	latter.	Thus,	the	contractual	obligations	and	
rights	agreed	with	the	bank	would	be	also	the	responsibility	of	the	17	SPRs.	
The	 negotiation	 of	 the	 credit	 line	 also	 included	 several	 joint	 guarantors111	 and	 a	
statement	 of	 financial	 position,	 without	 any	 guarantee	 required;	 the	 joint	 guarantor	 was	
considered	a	moral	support,	more	than	an	economic	one.	Because	of	the	reticence	of	some	
of	the	partners	to	be	the	joint	guarantor	for	the	Asociación,	Toscano	(the	bank	agent)	argued	
that	if	we	were	sure	about	our	project,	we	could	bet	on	the	credit.	Irma,	Armando,	Manuel	
and	 Esperanza	 agreed	 on	 working	 with	 joint	 guarantors,	 under	 the	 condition	 of	 having	 a	
contingency	 fund	during	at	 least	 two	years;	 the	 fund	would	allow	softening	payments	and	
interests	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 project.	 Then	 the	 bank	 proposed	 to	 consider	 a	 liquid	
guarantee	of	one	to	one,	the	release	of	the	FIRCO,	FIRA,	and	FINCA	resources,	and	to	elaborate	
agreements	between	the	Asociación	and	the	SPRs.	
To	 reduce	 investment	 risks,	 the	Asociación	 proposed	 to	 the	bank	 to	 start	with	 five	
greenhouses,	which	Toscano	considered	appropriate.	He	asked	to	visit	the	Asociación’s	land,	
where	the	greenhouses	would	be	installed,	and	be	allowed	to	review	the	water	permissions.	
During	 the	 trip	 to	 Carátacua,	 Toscano	 asked	 about	 the	 specialized	 technician	 on	 tomato	
																																																						
111	The	partners	of	each	SPR	support	others	in	their	SPR.	
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cultivation,	and	we	explained	to	him	that	it	would	be	Valadez,	who	had	already	collaborated	
with	 the	Asociación	 in	 the	project	 elaboration	phase.	After	 giving	his	 approval	 to	 the	 site,	
Toscano	came	back	to	the	Asociación’s	assembly	and	gave	us	the	good	news	that	in	a	few	days	
we	would	get	the	bank’s	proposal	about	the	specific	amount	of	the	authorized	credit	line.	He	
suggested	signing	the	agreements	with	Valadez	for	the	final	picture	of	the	project,	with	the	
SPRs	involved,	and	that	picture	would	not	change	anymore.	
Toscano	parted	and	everything	stayed	in	harmony	in	the	Asociación.	The	happiness,	
and	the	feeling	of	certainty	could	be	perceived	after	so	many	years	of	hard	negotiations;	the	
end	of	the	road	became	visible.	When	the	assembly	ended	and	the	partners	were	leaving	the	
place,	Cristi	and	Ampa	avoid	leaving	the	place.	Then,	Félix	(Abaco)	appeared	and	started	to	
detract	 ACEA	 company	 works	 from	 La	 Piedad	 greenhouses,	 ensuring	 that	 there	 was	
inappropriate	management	of	the	cultivation	by	Valadez	from	inappropriate	conditions	of	the	
greenhouse.	Félix	said:	“We’ve	talked	with	Toscano	and	he	puts	as	a	condition	to	release	the	
loan	 that	 the	Asociación	 signs	with	 the	 same	advisory	office	 that	prepared	 the	project,	 to	
follow	up	and	consolidate	the	trust	fund”	(Felix,	SEPLADE	hall,	5/7/2004).	
I	spoke	to	the	partners	to	inform	them	that	the	assembly	was	finished	and	that	the	
bank’s	 representative	 had	 spoken	 directly	 with	 them	 on	 the	 meeting.	 The	 members	
abandoned	the	meeting	room,	while	outside	Ampa	and	Cristi	tried	to	gather	money	to	cover	
the	expenses	for	bringing	Félix	from	Querétaro.	The	amount	they	asked	for	was	about	USD	
900.	They	pressured	the	Tlazazalca	group,	which	gave	them	USD	50.	Esperanza,	Cristi,	Manuel,	
Armando	and	Irma	were	in	favour	of	collaboration.	Eliseo,	representing	SPR	Deyna	SPR,	said	
that	he	did	not	have	money.	Malla	was	against	payment.	Ampa	and	Cristi	were	very	emotional	
and	tried	to	vote	to	decide	by	majority	–	even	if	we	were	dispersed	and	already	in	the	parking	
place.	
In	the	hall,	Félix	claimed	to	have	the	power	to	change	the	rules	whenever	he	wanted	
to,	and	that	the	bank	would	not	support	the	Asociación	 if	Abaco	did	not	participate.	Abaco	
clarified	that	they	would	not	support	the	Asociación’s	for	as	long	as	I	was	the	president.	Félix	
reacted	by	suggesting	to	go	and	eat	something	to	calm	things	down.	At	the	meal	were	present	
Ampa,	Armando,	Malla,	and	Zavala.112	Félix	proposed	to	save	USD	300,000	for	the	project	and	
leave	them	as	a	fund	for	the	Asociación.	Abaco	did	not	specify	how	the	saving	would	be	done.	
It	was	evident	that	he	was	trying	to	sell	us	something;	his	benefit	was	there,	he	mentioned	
something	like	“hidden	vices”,	and	to	achieve	it	the	credit	amounts	were	increased	to	“soften”	
the	occurrences.	Félix	said	that	this	was	very	usual	in	projects;	for	those	present	the	proposal	
did	not	hold	any	surprise.	Félix’s	lack	of	professional	ethics	was	very	clear	at	the	end	of	the	
meal,	when	we	were	coming	back	and,	in	front	of	his	colleague	Fernando,	he	asked	me:	“In	
what	colour	would	you	like	to	have	your	car?”,	with	the	clear	intention	to	buy	my	loyalty	to	
favour	 them	on	 their	 re-contracting.	 After	 looking	 at	 him	 straight	 in	 the	 eyes	 through	 his	
																																																						
112	Zavala	had	a	consultancy	office	in	Morelia,	and	we	asked	him	to	present	us	with	an	advice	during	the	visit	of	
the	Bank.	After	the	meeting	Malla	would	say	“Zavala	is	like	a	vane,	sometimes	supporting	Félix,	sometimes	the	
Asociación.	Although	Félix	excluded	him	in	an	evident	way”.	
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glasses,	Félix	said:	“We	all	need	a	piece	of	 the	cake”.	 I	 turned	around	and	 left	 (Restaurant	
Aleman,	5/7/2004).		
From	my	 point	 of	 view	Abaco’s	 interest	 did	 not	match	with	 the	Asociación’s.	 That	
afternoon	I	had	a	conversation	by	phone	with	Toño	(ACEA)	and	told	him	what	had	happened.	
Then	Toño	talked	with	Valadez,	who	criticized	Félix’s	attitude	which	had	caused	a	professional	
rupture	between	them.	To	validate	his	skills	 in	tomato	cultivation	using	ACEA	greenhouses,	
Valadez	invited	the	Asociación’s	partners	to	come	and	see	“La	Piedad”	greenhouses.	Two	days	
later	some	partners	visited	“La	Piedad”	and	found	that	the	greenhouses’	quality	was	up	to	
standard,	and	found	out	that	Bañales	(the	owner	of	La	Piedad)	was	happy	with	ACEA.	After	the	
visit,	 the	Asociación	 confirmed	 the	moral	 integrity	 of	 Valadez	 as	 technical	 advisor,	 as	 his	
technical	capacity	in	the	tomato	cultivation	under	hydroponics	had	been	proven	to	be	safe	
and	was	supported	by	greenhouse	companies	such	as	AGROS	in	Querétaro.	
On	June	30,	2004,	Banco	del	Bajío	authorized	50%	of	the	credit	line	for	the	initial	stage	
of	the	project.	The	amount	was	USD	1,275	million,	with	an	annual	interest	rate	of	12.9%113	and	
the	estimated	amount	destined	for	each	SPR	was	around	USD	75,000.	With	the	initial	stage	
completed,	the	rest	of	the	credit	would	be	managed.	As	the	 institutions	had	the	resources	
conditioned	to	 the	authorization	 from	other	 financial	 sources,	and	these	depended	on	the	
credit	line,	the	answer	to	the	bank	was	integrated	into	the	file	that	each	SPR	had	with	SEPLADE.	
After	 completing	 the	 files,	 the	 Asociación	 authorized	 the	 construction	 of	 five	
greenhouses	in	two	modalities	(Figure	6.1).	The	modality	considered	the	authorized	amounts	
by	Alianza,	joining	the	investment	with	the	contributions	of	the	Asociación	and	SUPLADER.	The	
bank	loan	would	be	used	as	working	capital114	and	the	payments	would	be	made	at	the	end	
of	each	productive	cycle,	estimated	at	six	months.	The	partners	supported	the	proposal	and	
agreed	on	starting	the	greenhouses’	construction	as	soon	as	possible.	To	expedite	the	process	
the	resources	would	be	assigned	to	the	producers,	as	was	done	in	Tanhuato.  
	
Figure	6.1	Investment	(in	USD)	required	for	building	a	half-hectare	greenhouse	
Source	 Modality	1	 Modality	2	 FIRCO	 and	 FOMICH	 would	 support	
the	Bank	loan’s	liquid	guarantee.	
 
Alianza	 28,000	 12,000	
SUPLADER	 25,000	 30,000	
ACEA	(10%)	 11,000	 11,000	
SPR	(10%)	 11,000	 11,000	
Subtotal	 75,000	 64,000	
Bank	(credit	line)	 35,000	 46,000	
Interest	rate	 4,515	 5,934	
	 110,000	 110,000	  
	
																																																						
113	This	type	of	preferential	rates	was	only	managed	by	FOMICH	(12%)	annual	on	social	loans.	
114	Seed,	labour,	fertilizer,	energy	payment	and	water.	
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The	Asociación	would	start	building	five	greenhouses,	with	SPR	Purépero,	SPR	Los	Pinos,	SPR	
El	Fresno,	SPR	Maldonado	and	SPR	Las	Delicias	as	the	candidates.	Those	SPRs	had	fulfilled	the	
requirement	 of	 the	 10%	 contribution	 to	 the	 project,	 so	 the	Asociación	would	 provide	 the	
support	and	authorized	credit	 line.	The	strategy	was	 to	start	using	 the	capital	 that	did	not	
generate	 interest	before,	and	using	the	 loan	to	equip	the	greenhouses	as	this	would	allow	
starting	the	production	stage	immediately.		
At	 SUPLADER’s	 meeting	 in	 Churintzio	 on	 July	 1st,	 2004,	 and	 after	 revising	 the	
corresponding	documentation	of	each	one	of	the	17	SPRS,	SUPLADER	agreed	on	starting	the	
five	greenhouses	proposed	by	the	Asociación.	Salvador	from	SEDAGRO	(executive	agency)	also	
supported	the	proposal.	To	process	the	negotiation,	SEPLADE	02	(through	Gonzalo)	requested	
the	release	of	the	authorized	resources	by	SUPLADER	to	the	State’s	SEPLADE.		On	1/7/2004	
the	project	negotiations	were	successfully	completed.	
	
	
Conclusion	
In	this	chapter	I	have	described	several	conflicts	resulting	from	the	different	perspectives	on	
the	 right	 strategies	 to	 follow	 in	 the	 greenhouses’	 project.	 As	 progress	 in	 the	 negotiations	
became	 noticeable,	 personal	 interests	 became	 more	 prominent.	 This	 was	 evident	 in	 the	
struggles	between	SPRs,	and	between	the	Asociación’s	president	and	Abaco.	The	temporary	
alliance	between	JLB‘s	firm	and	Abaco	was	strategic	and	convenient	to	both	parties	in	their	
search	for	profit	from	the	project	(either	as	 intermediary	advisors	or	as	sales	managers	for	
greenhouse	products).	As	 I	 have	 shown,	each	 firm	came	equipped	with	 its	own	networks,	
which	 included	greenhouse	companies,	agencies,	organizations	and	credit	negotiators.	The	
advisory	 firms	 did	 not	 share	 their	 networks,	 but	 only	 the	 services	 they	 offered	 to	 obtain	
resources	from	the	SPRs	in	exchange,	promising	them	to	compensate	the	elevated	costs	at	
the	 end	 of	 the	 project’s	 negotiations.	 This	 attitude	 was	 incompatible	 with	 some	 of	 the	
Asociación’s	members,	causing	the	withdrawal	of	some	and	the	inclusion	of	others.	After	a	
partial	rearrangement,	the	Banco	del	Bajío	agreed	to	provide	the	credit	line.	Finally,	a	pilot	of	
five	greenhouses	could	start.	
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CHAPTER	7	 FINAL	PHASE	OF	SUPLADER	IN	THE	ZACAPU	REGION		
	
	
	
Introduction	
After	 complex	 negotiations	 and	 conflicts	 within	 the	 Asociación	 a	 credit	 line	 that	
complemented	the	project	resources	was	obtained.	In	early	July	2004,	SEPLADE	Zacapu	sent	
the	request	to	release	the	authorized	funds	from	SUPLADER	in	order	to	start	the	first	phase	of	
building	five	greenhouses.	Within	the	Asociación,	the	battle	to	decide	the	final	participation	
scheme	 caused	 friction	 among	 those	 members	 that	 were	 able	 to	 finance	 the	 project	
(contributing	with	USD	15,000	each),	and	others	that	did	not	have	this	amount	of	money.		
At	this	time,	Gonzalo	left	his	position	as	SEPLADE	delegate	to	put	up	his	candidacy	for	
Zacapu’s	municipal	presidency.	Project	conditions	changed	in	the	relationship	with	the	new	
delegate,	and	the	Asociación	had	to	face	interventions	from	external	actors.	The	organizing	
experience	of	key	actors,	such	as	Chema	and	Jesús	who	had	participated	in	Celanese’s	Labour	
Union,	and	the	close	relationship	between	the	members	of	Zacapu’s	SPRs	allowed	them	to	
hold	onto	the	project.	Nevertheless,	in	order	to	finish	the	project,	it	was	necessary	to	keep	the	
actors	 and	 the	 resources	 together	 in	 the	 network,	 focusing	 on	 the	 building	 of	 the	 five	
greenhouses	as	the	pilot,	proposed	by	the	Asociación.	In	the	Asociación’s	game,	its	SPRs	were	
merely	interchangeable	elements	that	were	used	and	synchronized	to	achieve	one	single	goal:	
to	obtain	the	project	money	or	the	dough	(la	lana).	In	this	chapter,	the	perspectives	of	the	
different	actors	about	the	meaning	of	the	project	are	set	out.	
	
	
SEPLADE’s	delegate’s	replacement	and	its	consequences	for	the	Asociación		
In	order	 to	have	a	wider	understanding	of	 the	project,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	view	 the	political	
context.	The	PRD	political	system	of	Michoacán	was	to	be	continued	what	had	consequences	
for	every	region,	particularly	the	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	region	as	a	stronghold	of	the	PRD.	As	a	
result	of	the	political	processes	that	had	taken	place	in	the	re-election	of	the	local	councils	in	
the	 eight	municipalities	 that	 formed	 SUPLADER	 Zacapu,	 the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 process	
began	strengthening	their	networks.	At	the	same	time,	some	actors	that	had	obtained	political	
and	negotiation	experiences	in	the	Asociación’s	networks	decided	to	put	forward	their	own	
candidacies	for	the	public	elections.	There	were	also	the	promoters	of	development	that	were	
involved	with	SUPLADER,	like	civil	servants,	outgoing	municipal	presidents,	and	organizations.		
In	this	section,	the	events	and	conflicts	that	disrupted	the	project	are	explained.	In	the	
SEPLADE	of	Zacapu,	different	governmental	 trends	coexisted,	 ranging	 from	Julio	Moguel115	
who	 was	 close	 to	 Cárdenas	 Solórzano,	 Octavio	 Larios,	 with	 a	 PRI	 background,	 to	 Pedro	
Velázquez,	a	former	collaborator	of	the	President,	Vicente	Fox	(PAN),	when	he	was	governor	
																																																						
115	Advisor	to	the	Zapatista	Army	of	National	Liberation	(EZLN)	from	1994-1997;	he	participated	in	the	dialogue	
table	with	the	federal	government	for	the	San	Andres	Larrainzar	agreements	(1994-1996).	
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of	 Guanajuato.	 Some	 SEPLADE	 officers	 like	 Julio	 Moguel,	 Pedro	 Velázquez	 and	 Leoncio	
Lagunas	were	not	convinced	of	the	organizing	processes	regarding	the	Alternative	Agricultural	
Model	 (MAA)	 that	 Gonzalo	 had	 promoted	 in	 the	 region	 of	 Ciénega	 de	 Zacapu.	When	 he	
stepped	down	from	his	position	in	Zacapu,	SEPLADE	directors	saw	it	as	the	right	moment	to	
change	the	SEPLADE	strategy.	
The	 central	offices	of	 SEPLADE	appointed	 Leoncio	 Lagunas	as	 the	new	delegate	 for	
region	02.	Rita	(SEPLADE	Morelia)	was	named	as	Resident.		Lagunas	had	been	the	delegate	of	
region	03	(La	Piedad),	and	had	disagreements	with	Gonzalo.	These	had	started	years	before	
in	the	Federal	Congress,	when	Leoncio	was	personal	secretary	of	Enrique	Bautista,	ex-federal	
deputy	and	now	state	Government	Secretary;	an	entrepreneur	that	was	linked	to	the	federal	
deputy	at	the	time	from	PRD,	Cárdenas	Batel.	Before	Octavio	Larios,	Enrique	Bautista	was	the	
Secretary	of	SEPLADE.	His	ideology	highlighted	the	influence	of	de	facto	powers	in	Mexican	
society	and	showed	how	necessary	it	was	to	reconcile	with	them	to	achieve	social	change.	His	
perspective	did	not	fit	well	with	the	socialist	perception	of	Gonzalo,	who	promoted	bottom-
up	 development.	 As	 the	 new	 delegate,	 Leoncio	 Lagunas	 established	 alliances	 in	 the	MAA	
organizations	with	actors	that	went	against	Gonzalo	and	offered	them	the	opportunity	to	be	
beneficiaries	of	SUPLADER	resources.	An	alliance	was	established	with	Samuel	Campos,	for	
which	Chema	(Campos’	godfather	and	official)	would	serve	as	the	link.	Leoncio	Lagunas	and	
Francisco	(SEPLADE)	contacted	the	directors	of	Productos	Inocuos;	the	latter	now	supported	
the	new	delegate	and	did	not	acknowledge	the	favourable	parts	of	the	project	proposed	by	
Gonzalo.	
Organizations	 like	 Productos	 Inocuos	 that	 had	 been	 lagging	 in	 the	 processes,	 now	
reappeared	to	question	Gonzalo’s	performance	as	leader	of	SEPLADE	02,	but	also	his	expertise	
as	technical	secretary	of	SUPLADER.	During	his	management,	Gonzalo	had	not	used	the	first	
USD	200,000	from	the	2003	budget	for	the	Alternative	Model	projects	(see	Chapter	1),	even	
though	the	release	of	the	resources	depended	on	SEDAGRO	as	executing	institution,	since	it	
was	responsible	for	giving	technical	guarantees	for	the	project.	
Leoncio	arrived	with	the	intention	of	breaking	up	the	MAA,	and	most	of	the	municipal	
presidents	 agreed	 with	 this.	 But	 while	 in	 Coeneo	 it	 was	 decided	 to	 abandon	 it,	 the	 rest	
supported	their	own	SPR’s.	The	SPR	Movimiento	de	Mujeres	Ciudadanas,	which	had	recently	
been	consolidated,	Comanja	and	Bajo	Invernadero	which	had	been	restructured,	and	those	
associated	with	Gonzalo	were	left	out	of	SEPLADE.	
In	the	first	SUPLADER	meeting,	held	on	July	1,	2004	in	Churintzio,	he	goal	had	been	to	
dismantle	the	Alternative	Agricultural	Model,	with	close	to	USD	600,000	being	returned	to	the	
SUPLADER	funds.	Francisco	(from	SEPLADE),	Samuel	Campos	and	the	municipal	president	of	
Jiménez	 attacked	 the	 Asociación	 and	 suggested	 increasing	 the	 investments	 in	 roads.	 The	
partners	of	the	SPR	Invernaderos	y	Hongos	were	against	this	and	were	supported	by	Heredia	
and	the	municipal	president	of	Huaniqueo.	Thus,	a	favorable	vote	was	achieved	in	order	to	
keep	the	authorized	amounts	in	the	Invernaderos	y	Hongos’	projects;	the	rest	of	the	resources	
were	reassigned	for	other	purposes.	
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New	connections	in	the	network:	the	fight	for	the	Asociación’s	resources	
On	July	23,	2004,	 I	 talked	to	Chema	about	Abaco	and	SUPLADER.	Chema	had	been	visiting	
some	governamental	institutions	in	Morelia	and	ensured	me	that	the	SUPLADER	resources	for	
the	project	were	conditioned	so	that	Alianza	and	SEDAGRO	would	do	what	had	been	set	out	
in	the	project	agreements.	He	let	me	know	that	many	partners	had	gone	to	see	him	as	they	
were	worried	about	various	matters.	The	SPRs	that	were	close	to	Zacapu	were	in	contact	with	
Abaco,	which	hoped	to	strengthen	the	services	they	offered.	Ampa,	who	was	aware	of	these	
facts,	coordinated	with	Cristi	to	schedule	a	meeting	of	the	Asociación	 that	same	day.	Cristi	
scheduled	 this	 kind	 of	 informal	 meetings	 separate	 from	 the	 invitation	 sent	 out	 by	 the	
management	 committee	 and	 within	 only	 a	 few	 hours’	 notice,	 with	 the	 clear	 intention	 of	
excluding	representatives	and	manipulating	the	assembly.	Seven	groups	had	apparently	not	
been	invited	to	the	meeting,	Comanja,	Bajo	Invernadero,	Movimiento	de	Mujeres	Ciudadanas,	
Puerta	Chica,	Cortijo	Nuevo,	Tlazazalca,	and	Huaniqueo.	The	meeting,	using	the	same	style	as	
the	labour	union	in	which	Chema	had	participated	in	the	1960s	was	conducted	without	order	
and	with	several	attacks	from	Chema	addressed	at	Malla	and	me116	using	arguments	based	on	
speculations,	as	he	had	been	inactive	due	to	medical	reasons	during	the	events	mentioned.	
The	meeting’s	minutes	had	been	drafted	in	a	biased	way	by	Cristi	and	Ampa	since	they	
showed	support	for	Abaco,	but	the	minutes	were	considered	valid.	Chema	stated	that	I	was	
the	one	who	had	broken	away	from	Abaco.	The	report	was	questioned	by	Eliseo117	(who	was	
there	representing	Chema),	ensuring	that	Abaco	had	only	been	asked	for	a	written	proposal,	
but	that	the	vote	of	confidence	had	not	been	given.	
Malla’s	 impression	 was	 that	 Chema	 claimed	 that	 Eliseo	 was	 conspiring	 with	 the	
administrative	structure	of	the	Asociación.	The	bash	against	Abaco	was	made	through	Toño	
(ACEA)	and	Valadez;	Félix	resented	that	Valadez	had	left	Abaco	and	had	resolved	to	get	rid	of	
me	as	the	Asociación’s	representative.	The	only	information	leaked	by	Abaco	was	that	Valadez	
would	not	support	the	Asociación.	The	partners	were	overwhelmed	by	confusion	and	despair,	
as	 Félix	 knew	 that	 gossip	was	 used	 in	 Zacapu	 to	 discredit	 people.	 Immediately	 hereafter,	
Abaco	made	its	return	to	the	Asociación,	on	three	conditions:	i)	The	bank	would	give	support	
only	 if	 Abaco	 participated;	 ii)	 The	 supplier	 would	 be	 changed,	 arguing	 that	 there	 were	
deficiencies	in	the	ACEA	greenhouses	of	La	Piedad	(advised	by	Valadez);	and,	iii)	I	had	to	quit	
leadership	 of	 the	Asociación	 (see	 Chapter	 6).	 Abaco’s	 intention	was	 to	 get	me	 out	 of	 the	
managing	committee	in	order	to	consolidate	its	strategy	of	“going	for	the	dough".	Abaco	had	
convinced	Cristi,	Ampa	and	Mare,	and	they	explained	the	return	of	Abaco	to	Chema.	The	links	
between	 the	 SPRs	 of	 Maldonado,	 Marijo,	 Deyna,	 Puerta	 Chica	 and	 Las	 Delicias	 was	 very	
narrow	and	they	agreed	upon	Abaco’s	proposals.	
Ampa	was	betting	on	getting	the	Abaco	contract	in	this	fast-track	meeting,	but	to	do	
so	 she	 would	 have	 to	 pass	 the	 managing	 committee	 and	 directly	 influence	 the	 partners,	
																																																						
116	Chema	and	Malla	had	known	each	other	for	a	long	time;	she	was	a	friend	of	Chema’s	daughter.	
117	Chema’s	son-in-law	and	Deyna’s	partner.	
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challenging	the	authority	of	her	sister	Malla	(treasurer).	Following	Félix’s	instructions,	Ampa	
read	a	 letter	 in	which	she	mentioned	a	specific	date	 (in	 two	weeks’	 time)	to	complete	the	
contributions	 from	 the	 remaining	 SPRs.	 From	 the	 contributions,	 they	would	 pay	 Abaco	 to	
continue	with	the	project,	while	the	SPRs	that	did	not	pay	the	USD	15,000.	would	be	left	out.	
Ampa	and	Cristi,	with	Abaco’s	help,	included	a	topic	in	the	assembly’s	agenda,	which	
requested	them	to	“take	a	picture”	(to	know	how	many	SPRs	would	participate).	Irma	valued	
Ampa’s	work	since	the	project’s	beginning	and	asked	the	assembly	to	keep	her	in	charge	as	
treasurer.	Due	to	these	events,	Manuel	from	SPR	El	Fresno	presented	his	resignation,	and	the	
partners	of	the	SPR	also	quit	and	asked	to	recover	their	contributions.	Trujillo	and	Margarita	
also	left	the	Asociación	due	to	Ampa	and	Cristi’s	pressure.	I	had	a	conversation	with	Chema	
about	this:	
	
Fidencio:	It	is	not	advisable	to	put	pressure	on	the	SPRs;	the	contribution	is	not	required	
yet	by	the	bank	as	a	liquid	guarantee.	
Chema:	Is	it	advisable	to	allow	those	partners	that	do	not	want	to	continue	to	take	out	
the	money,	and	to	make	their	contribution	when	it	is	required?	
	
Chema	reconsidered	and	ensured	that	he	was	not	willing	to	give	the	money	back.	Esperanza	
affirmed	that	her	SPR	would	spend	the	money	on	the	project	and	that	it	was	best	not	to	give	
it	back.	Sensing	that	I	represented	an	obstacle	to	some	actors’	interests	I	expressed	that,	at	
no	point	in	the	project,	had	I	meant	to	be	an	obstacle,	and	that	it	was	my	intention	to	turn	the	
project	into	a	real	option	in	La	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	(even	though	at	that	moment	I	understood	
the	conflicts	and	external	interests	that	were	driving	us	apart).	I	said	that	the	meetings	were	
now	managed	 at	 the	 convenience	of	 some	people,	 and	 that	 some	 SPRS	 that	made	up	 the	
Asociación	were	excluded.	In	addition,	companies	and	people	were	being	discredited	without	
reason.	As	a	result	of	this,	I	handed	in	my	resignation	as	President	of	the	Asociación.	
Armando	was	the	first	one	to	react	and	he	gave	me	a	sincere	vote	of	confidence	to	stay	
in	charge,	so	that	Abaco	could	be	hired	and	they	could	get	started	with	the	building.	Esperanza	
also	supported	me	by	saying	that	I	was	the	one	that	had	motivated	the	Purépero	group;	she	
also	 gave	 me	 her	 vote	 of	 confidence.	 Manuel	 (Las	 Delicias)	 and	 Manuel	 (El	 Fresno)	 also	
supported	me;	Espinoza	did	the	same	and	gave	me	a	pat	on	the	back	saying,	“Chin	up!”.	The	
assembly	 did	 not	 accept	my	 resignation	 and,	 once	 again	 the	 hiring	 of	 Abaco	 failed.	 Some	
partners	however	(most	notably	Chema,	Ampa	and	Cristi)	would	not	give	up	their	attempts.	
On	July	28,	2004,	a	meeting	was	called	according	to	the	statutes,	in	writing	and	with	
prior	 notice,	 and	most	 of	 the	 partners	 attended.	 In	 a	 clear	 act	 of	 obstruction,	 Cristi	 and	
Armando	 forced	 Julio	 César,	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 SPR	 Biotecnológicos,	 to	 leave	 the	
assembly,	trying	to	prevent	that	the	necessary	quorum	(more	than	50%)	would	be	reached.	
The	SPRs	that	supported	Chema	agreed	not	to	attend	the	meeting	as	a	way	to	infringe	upon	
the	 decisions	made	 by	 the	majority,	 but	 the	 assembly	 still	 reached	 the	 required	 quorum.	
Armando,	Irma	and	Espinoza	attended	this	meeting.	The	bank’s	and	Valadez’s	proposals	were	
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analysed.	Armando	argued	that	Valadez’s	services	were	too	expensive118		and	the	credit	line	
implied	paying	 interest	on	 the	credited	amount	of	USD	1.2	million.	 I	 clarified	 that	 interest	
would	only	be	paid	on	the	credit	line	used,	the	amount	needed	to	start	the	five	greenhouses.	
Thus,	we	would	obtain	some	experience	in	the	production	of	greenhouses,	and	minimize	the	
risks.	Malla	considered	it	feasible	that	the	Asociación	would	administer	the	five	greenhouses,	
and	 argued	 that	 this	 would	 only	 be	 possible	 if	 all	 SPRs	 contributed	 the	 same	 amount	 of	
resources	 for	 the	 investment,	 to	 prevent	 an	 internal	 division	 within	 the	 Asociación.	 The	
proposal	was	voted	upon	and	approved	by	majority	of	10	votes.	Armando	voted	against	the	
proposal	and	Julio	César	abstained.	Then,	a	definitive	list	of	the	SPRs	that	would	be	included	
in	the	first	phase	was	drafted.	The	confirmation	accepting	the	credit	line	proposal	for	five	SPRs	
was	sent	to	the	bank.	Malla,	who	had	voted	in	favour,	after	talking	to	Ampa,	notified	that	she	
was	leaving	the	project.	
Ampa	and	Cristi	kept	Abaco	informed,	while	Abaco	had	plotted	with	Ampa	(SPR	Los	
Pinos)	to	push	her	sister	Malla	(the	Asociación	treasurer)	out	of	SPR	Los	Pinos.	Gonzalo,	in	the	
meantime,	 tried	 to	 recompose	 the	 Biotecnológicos	 group	 by	 talking	 to	 Ricardo	 about	 the	
proposal	approved	by	the	assembly.	Gonzalo	explained:	
	
If	 the	group	of	SPRs	that	 identifies	with	the	Asociación	builds	 the	greenhouses	on	the	
land	belonging	to	the	Asociación,	it	will	be	mortgaged.	The	President	of	the	Asociación	
supports	this	proposal	and	can	count	on	the	majority	of	the	SPRs,	and	the	block	of	five	
greenhouses	 will	 help	 to	 prevent	 Abaco	 from	 taking	 control	 of	 the	 project	 (Gonzalo	
30/07/04).		
	
According	to	Gonzalo,	the	resources	for	the	five	SPRs	would	be	released	in	a	few	days	and	he	
considered	it	feasible	to	continue	the	project	with	most	of	the	partners.	Espinoza	had	been	
away	from	Zacapu	for	some	time	and	was	not	aware	of	the	advancements.	Gonzalo	talked	to	
him	and	then	called	me	to	say	that	Espinoza	was	with	us.	I	then	confirmed	that	Espinoza	was	
interested	in	joining	the	pilot	with	the	five	groups.	
On	July	29,	2004,	Leoncio	Lagunas	called	for	a	meeting	outside	SUPLADER.	The	meeting	
was	attended	by	Francisco	(SEPLADE),	Salvador	(SEDAGRO),	and	Chema	representing	Samuel	
Campos	 (SUPLADER’s	 President),	Heredia	 (Productos	 Inocuos),	 Cristi	 and	Armando.	 Chema	
presented	a	list	of	the	Asociación’s	SPRs	and	the	authorized	amounts.	It	was	then	decided	who	
should	be	 supported	and	under	what	 conditions.	 It	was	 instructed	 that	 an	 additional	USD	
200,000	 authorized	 by	 SUPLADER	 for	 the	 greenhouses	 were	 in	 support	 of	 the	 resources	
Alianza	would	give.	This	meant	that,	from	the	SPRs	that	already	had	resources	authorized	by	
Alianza,	 the	corresponding	amount	from	SUPLADER	would	be	deducted,	and	this	would	go	
into	the	SUPLADER	fund.119	
																																																						
118	Valadez	charged	USD	2,000	monthly	for	advising	the	five	sheds.	
119	With	this	action,	the	blockade	to	get	the	money	from	SUPLADER	was	strengthened.	Francisco	now	defended	
the	position	that	the	money	of	SUPLADER	was	on	loan	for	the	greenhouses,	which	therefore	meant	they	had	to	
go	into	the	particulars	of	who	the	resources	were	going	to.	
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After	the	meeting	with	Leoncio	eight	SPRs	met,	in	the	presence	of	René	Sosa,	a	SEPLADE	
official,	and	Abaco.	Even	though	Julio	César	was	present	and	accredited	as	the	representative	
of	 the	 Biotecnológicos	 SPR,	 Armando	 and	 Cristi	 made	 him	 leave,	 saying	 he	 was	 “one	 of	
Fidencio’s	 people”	 and	 therefore	 he	 should	 not	 be	 there.	 Shortly	 afterwards,	 Julio	 César	
decided	to	leave	because,	as	he	said,	“I	did	not	know	how	to	act	in	that	situation”	(Julio	Cesar’s	
house,	29/07/2004).	In	the	meeting,	the	SPRs	decided	to	send	a	letter	to	Banco	del	Bajío	in	
which	they	manifested	their	disagreement	 in	participating	 in	the	credit	 line	offered	by	this	
institution	to	the	Asociación.	The	signatories	of	the	document	were	SPR	Maldonado,	Chema	
(Deyna),	Armando	(La	Piedad	Chiquita),	Espinoza	(Marijo),	Ricardo	(Biotecnológicos),	Trujillo	
(Cortijo	Nuevo),	and	Manuel	(Las	Delicias).		Manuel	argued:	
	
The	SPRs	that	signed	this	 letter	will	hire	Abaco’s	services,	and	we	will	pay	USD	7,500	I	
personally	 support	 the	proposal	 that	you	 [Fidencio]	made	 regarding	 the	project,	but	 I	
have	already	signed	the	letter,	and	I	am	going	to	try	Abaco’s	option	for	a	month.	I	hope	
that	my	decision	will	not	cause	any	problems	between	us.	(Manuel,	Zacapu,	30/07/04).	
	
Manuel	supported	the	project.	Just	like	the	SPRs	that	had	the	financial	resources,	he	wanted	
to	concretize	the	project	resources	as	soon	as	possible.	The	translation	mechanism	involved	
displacements	 and	 substitutions	 inside	 of	 the	 Asociación,	 implying	 that	 certain	 networks	
controlled	 others.	 These	 power	 relationships	 indicate	 how	 actors	 are	 associated	 and	
simultaneously	obliged	to	remain	faithful	to	their	alliances.		
Finally,	as	a	result	of	the	hiring	of	Abaco	by	some	of	the	SPRs	-	particularly	those	from	
Zacapu	-	a	second	rupture	occurred	within	the	Asociación.	After	sounding	out	the	municipal	
president’s	position	towards	the	project,	and	analyzing	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	inside	
the	SPRs,	I	agreed	with	my	friend	Celestino	that	we	should	focus	our	energy	on	understanding	
the	different	versions	of	the	project,	and	then	multiply	it	into	actions.	
 
 
Inconsistencies	in	institutional	planning	
After	the	changes	in	SEPLADE	02	(see	Chapter	6)	 it	became	necessary	to	find	out	what	the	
government’s	position	was	regarding	the	Asociación.	I	interviewed	Margarita	and	let	her	know	
that	the	SUPLADER	resources	 (MAA)	were	being	diverted	to	 finance	a	road.120	 I	knew	how	
Margarita	would	 react	 to	 this	 and	 how	 she	would	 let	 the	Morelia	 officials	 know	 about	 it,	
especially	Cárdenas	Batel’s	wife,	who	supported	Margarita	and	her	Cuban	comrades	from	the	
MAA.	Because	the	pressure,	SEPLADE	proposed	a	meeting	in	Zacapu	for	August	2,	2004,	with	
the	 intention	of	clarifying	the	conflict.	To	this	meeting	only	two	partners	 from	each	SPR121	
were	 invited	 in	 order	 to	 present	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 situation	 to	 Julio	 Moguel.	 Due	 to	 his	
relationship	with	the	Cárdenas	family,	Moguel	had	participated	as	social	and	rural	advisor	in	
Cárdenas	Solórzano’s	government	 in	Mexico	City,	 and	now	he	was	 in	 charge	of	SEPLADE’s	
																																																						
120	SUPLADER	used	the	resources	on	the	Zacapu-Jiménez	stretch	of	the	road.	
121	In	the	Asociación,	participation	had	been	open	without	restrictions	and	more	partners	were	able	to	attend.	
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Regional	Planning	and	Development.	Moguel	was	linked	to	Rafa	Lp	and	Margarita,	who	had	
meetings	 to	 discuss	 the	 “Nation’s	 Project”	 promoted	 by	 Cuauhtemoc	 Caárdenas	 within	
Margarita’s	SPR,	with	the	intention	of	consolidating	its	internal	organization.	Cristi,	who	was	
present	at	the	meetings,	told	Moguel	that	he	considered	the	Asociación’s	project	a	fiasco.		
	Before	the	meeting,	I	talked	to	Licha	(SPR	Movimiento	de	Mujeres	Ciudadanas),	who	
was	preparing	herself	for	the	following	Monday’s	meeting	in	SEPLADE	with	Moguel.	She	was	
with	three	other	women.	Each	woman	would	bring	more	people	and	when	Moguel	arrived,	
they	would	all	present	to	him	and	express	their	thoughts	about	it.	They	would	also	manifest	
against	 Samuel	 Campos	 (SUPLADER’S	 President)	 who	 was	 using	 presidential	 resources	 to	
benefit	the	council’s	employees	who	participated	in	the	project	(SPRs	Deyna,	Maldonado	and	
Cortijo	Nuevo).	Gonzalo	and	Licha	explained	to	the	women	how	the	support	for	the	projects	
had	developed	and	that,	even	if	Gonzalo	did	not	approve	of	the	type	of	actions	that	Licha	was	
preparing	(i.e.	bringing	people	into	the	meeting),	they	did	reckon	that	the	strategy	would	be	
an	advancement	towards	the	goal	they	were	aiming	for.	
During	 the	 meeting	 with	 Moguel,	 Productos	 Inocuos’	 members	 were	 present	 and	
showed	their	progress.	When	Cristi	and	Ampa	joined,	they	read	aloud	an	analysis	(made	by	
Abaco)	relating	to	the	credit	line	authorized	by	the	bank	for	the	Asociación,	and	stating	that	it	
could	possibly	inflict	damage	(losses)	to	the	project.	For	some	members	(including	me),	this	
version	 of	 the	 facts	 seemed	 distorted	 and	 rough.	 The	 management	 committee	 of	 the	
Asociación	affirmed	that	the	negotiation	had	been	satisfactory	(in	terms	of	starting	with	five	
greenhouses),	 and	 that	 the	 records	 had	 been	 ratified	 with	 SEPLADE.	 Leoncio	 (the	 new	
SEPLADE	Zacapu	delegate),	 in	his	attempt	to	pull	away,	said	that	he	did	not	know	anything	
about	the	project’s	 inception	phase	and	that	he	did	not	know	about	the	Asociación’s	 files.	
SEPLADE	 officials	 were	 aware	 of	 the	 events	 and	 took	 notes	 about	 the	 meeting’s	 details,	
particularly	René	Sosa,	who	often	instructed	Cristi	outside	the	room.	
When	 Licha	 entered	 the	 meeting	 with	 more	 than	 50	 women	 from	 marginalized	
communities	of	Zacapu,	demanding	respect	for	the	resources	assigned	to	regional	projects,	
Samuel	Campos	and	Leoncio	decided	to	abandon	the	meeting.	Chema,	who	had	remained	
representing	Samuel	Campos	and	was	together	with	Jesús,	was	attacked	by	the	women,	who	
called	them	“priistas	arrastrados”	(PRI	rogues),	while	they	denounced	the	sinecures	that	their	
buddy	Samuel	Campos	had	given	them	at	SUPLADER’s	expense.122	
Chema	managed	to	slip	away	with	Jesús	to	the	SEPLADE	hallway	where	he	talked	to	
Jesús	expecting	the	meeting	would	end	so	they	could	get	out	of	there.	After	listening	to	the	
different	versions	of	the	 involved	parties	and	accomplishing	the	meeting’s	requirements,	 it	
was	 agreed	 with	Moguel	 that	 SEPLADE	 would	 offer	 a	 solution	 during	 that	 week.	Moguel	
committed	to	take	the	bull	by	the	horns.	Licha	told	him	that	he	had	better	do	this	and	made	
him	give	them	his	word,	asking	him	not	to	let	them	down.	When	we	left,	Chema	came	over	to	
suggest	that	we	meet	later	on	and	we	agreed	to	meet	at	the	Zenón	Restaurant.	But	Chema	
																																																						
122	 The	 women	 present	 identified	 Chema	 as	 a	 PRI	 official	 in	 former	 municipalities;	 more	 than	 once	 had	
Chema	fled	away	from	this	group	of	women.	
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did	not	come	and	the	meeting	with	SEPLADE	was	not	confirmed	either,	so	that	was	the	last	
time	we	saw	Moguel.	Zavala	 (candidate	advisor	 to	 the	Asociación),	who	was	 in	 touch	with	
SEPLADE,	said	that	the	officials	had	complained	about	the	actions	of	Licha’s	group,	and	had	
said	that	I	had	messed	up	the	meeting.	Licha	and	her	group	would	say	that	“actually,	the	bull	
had	shown	to	be	too	brave	for	Moguel”.	
Two	days	later,	on	August	4,	2004,	Cristi,	Jesús,	Chema	and	Armando	(accompanied	by	
Abaco)	 visited	 Banco	 del	 Bajío,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 asking	 Toscano	 to	 ignore	 the	 credit	 line	
authorized	to	the	Asociación,	arguing	that	there	was	conflict	within	the	Asociación.	A	few	days	
later,	the	bank	indeed	withdrew	the	proposal	and	the	negotiations	stopped.	After	this,	the	
management	committee	of	the	Asociación	suspended	Chema	and	Jesús,	the	instigators	of	the	
events.	
On	August	5,	2004,	in	Villa	de	Jiménez,	the	next	SUPLADER	meeting	was	held	in	which	
a	political	offensive	against	the	Asociación	was	orchestrated.	Margarita	and	Leoncio	Lagunas	
aimed	to	make	the	withdrawal	of	Margarita’s	SPR	 (which	had	occurred	a	 few	days	earlier)	
known.	Margarita	intervened	to	read	and	give	Leoncio	Lagunas	her	resignation	letter	from	the	
Asociación.	She	requested	support	for	her	SPR	with	SUPLADER	resources	for	the	fungi	project,	
instead	of	the	greenhouse	project.123	The	management	committee	revealed	that	they	did	not	
have	a	problem	accepting	the	resignation	and	clarified	that	 they	had	previously	agreed	on	
replacing	this	SPR	in	an	assembly	on	July	19,	2004.	Margarita’s	reaction	was	in	agreement	with	
her	 new	 allies	 and	 disinterest	 towards	 her	 former	 colleagues;	 she	 was	 trying	 to	 fake	 the	
impression	of	meeting	with	those	that	disapproved	her	action,	and	was	thus	avoiding	them.	
Chema	(SPR	Deyna),	who	directed	the	SUPLADER	assembly,	argued	that	there	were	attempts	
to	use	the	name	of	the	Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	Mujeres	in	favor	of	Licha’s	SPR	which	has	
recently	been	incorporated	into	the	Asociación.	Licha	–	involved	in	similar	political	processes	
-	made	her	SPR’s	position	clear	to	SUPLADER.	Chema	now	seemed	nervous;	he	had	known	
Licha	for	a	long	time	and	knew	that	she	would	use	all	available	resources	within	her	reach	to	
get	the	appointed	funds	from	SUPLADER	to	benefit	her	SPR.		
Due	to	an	agreement	between	Chema	and	Leoncio,	the	agenda	was	given	in	advance	
so	 that	Abaco	could	participate	 in	 this	SUPLADER	meeting.	Several	members	of	SUPLADER	
were	against	giving	this	kind	of	information	to	the	firm.	Abaco’s	proposals	for	the	distribution	
company	and	the	packing	unit	were	too	technical	and	confused	the	attendees.	The	municipal	
president	of	Huaniqueo	did	not	understand	them	either,	and	asked	if	there	was	any	deficiency	
in	the	project	for	the	packing	unit	that	had	so	far	not	been	considered.		I	answered	that	there	
was	none,	and	that	Abaco	had	worked	with	us	and	stopped	doing	so	due	to	ethical	reasons.		
Abaco	argued	that	the	project	–	which	had	been	paid	for	-	had	deficiencies	 like	the	
commercialization	problem.	They	attacked	the	Asociación,	arguing	that	it	was	trying	to	take	
money	 from	 the	 government	 to	 build	 joint	 greenhouses,	 which	 according	 to	 them	
contravened	SUPLADER	regulations.	The	interesting	thing	about	this	argument	was	that	Abaco	
																																																						
123	This	SPR	had	been	involved	at	the	same	time	in	an	Asociación	that	produced	fungi	made	up	of	20	groups	led	
by	 the	 SPR	 of	 Margarita.	 Part	 of	 the	 resources	 for	 the	 fungi	 project	 (USD	 100,000)	 were	 committed	 by	
SUPLADER.	
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itself	had	proposed	this	option	to	the	Asociación.	When	I	pointed	at	a	version	of	the	project	
made	by	Abaco	and	indicated	the	page	where	they	had	suggested	joining	resources,	they	did	
not	 know	what	 to	 say.	With	 this,	Abaco	withdrew.	Chema	and	 Leoncio’s	 strategy	had	not	
worked,	as	I	had	been	fortunate	enough	to	arrive	a	little	earlier	to	talk	about	the	matters	in	
which	the	Asociación	could	get	sucked	into.	
After	 this	meeting,	SEPLADE	 informed	the	Asociación	 that	 it	 could	not	participate	 in	
SUPLADER	reunions,	as	it	was	not	a	member.	In	addition,	Leoncio	requested	that	the	Asociación	
should	move	out	of	the	SEPLADE	offices	by	August	6,	2004.	SEPLADE	changed	the	lock	on	the	
entrance	door	and	banned	the	Asociación	from	using	its	facilities	and	equipment,	even	though	
their	offices	were	spacious.	At	the	same	time,	access	was	given	to	the	SPRs	that	were	aligned	
with	Leoncio	Lagunas.	
SEPLADE’s	position	regarding	the	project	and	the	MAA	was	redefined	with	the	arrival	
of	 the	new	SEPLADE	Zacapu	delegate.	 For	 the	greenhouses	and	 fungi	projects,	 the	groups	
would	be	supported	by	whoever	could	bring	together	the	actions	that	worked	best	for	the	
government	officials.	These	directives	had	been	given	previously,	but	it	had	to	look	as	if	the	
decisions	regarding	the	project	were	inclusive	and	objective.	To	meet	the	commitments	with	
their	 new	 allies,	 SEPLADE	 officials	 now	 entered	 a	 phase	 that	 showed	 the	 firm	 hand	 of	
government	 secretary	 Enrique	 Bautista	 (and	 the	 inability	 of	 Cárdenas	 Batel	 to	 contain	 his	
excesses).124	
	
	
The	Government's	role	in	the	breaking	up	of	the	Asociación‘s	network	
After	the	meeting	with	SEPLADE,	a	positive	response	was	expected	for	the	attainment	of	the	
project,	but	some	actions	frustrated	the	progress	made.	There	was	a	strategy	to	remove	some	
SPRs	from	the	Asociación,	denying	them	the	support	from	SUPLADER	and,	at	the	same	time,	
supporting	the	SPRs	related	to	the	new	delegate	in	order	to	keep	the	Asociación's	resources.		
On	August	30,	2004,	Chema	processed	the	permission	to	create	a	new	organization	
named	 USPR	 Agrícola	 Tsakapú.	 A	 week	 later,	 on	 September	 7th	 Chema,	 Esperanza	 and	
Heredia,	as	representatives	of	some	of	the	societies	of	the	Asociación,	called	for	an	assembly	
on	September	18.	They	invited	the	ten	SPRs	that,	since	May	2004	were	no	longer	part	of	the	
Asociación,	not	acknowledging	the	new	representatives	of	Comanja,	Bajo	Invernadero,	Puerta	
Chica	 and	Movimiento	 de	Mujeres	 Ciudadanas,	 and	 notifying	 only	 the	 previous	 SPRs.	 The	
acknowledgment	of	the	representatives	of	these	societies	had	been	given	in	the	assembly	of	
July	19,	2004.	However,	the	SPR	Cortijo	Nuevo	and	Margarita	(of	Movimiento	Ciudadano	de	
Mujeres)	were	invited,	although	they	no	longer	participated	since	they	had	resigned	on	July	
2nd	and	August	5,	2004,	respectively,	while	the	SPR	Productos	Coenenses	was	invited	but	did	
not	legally	belong	to	the	Asociación.	It	looked	like	a	strategy	to	disintegrate	the	Asociación	by	
interfering	with	the	SPRs	that	were	part	of	Productos	Inocuos	who	had	been	managing	their	
own	 project	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 2004,	 after	 they	 had	 decided	 to	move	 away	 from	 the	
																																																						
124	On	April	20,	2006,	Bautista	encouraged	the	repression	against	the	mining	union	in	SICARTSA.	
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Asociación	voluntarily.	SEPLADE	officials	close	to	the	project	conspired	with	Heredia,	Lino	and	
Chema,	as	well	with	Abaco	and	JLB’s	firm	in	order	to	take	control	of	the	Asociación.	
The	government's	actions	–	and	the	noticeable	intervention	of	external	actors	in	the	
Asociación	-	represented	a	risk	for	the	partners’	contributions.	After	explaining	the	situation	
to	each	SPR,	I	suggested	that	they	discuss	in	their	SPRs	the	possibility	of	withdrawing	the	funds	
that	 allotted	 to	 each	 partner.	 This	 action	 required	 two	 signatures	 from	 the	management	
committee,	preferably	from	the	treasurer	and	the	president.	Esperanza,	as	secretary,	did	not	
support	 it,	as	she	was	now	on	Agrícola	Tsakapu’s	side;	while	Malla	had	an	internal	conflict	
with	her	SPR	(Los	Pinos).	
The	Los	Pinos	group	now	trusted	Ampa’s	ability	to	strengthen	Agrícola	Tsakapu.	I	took	
the	 assembly	 proceedings	 in	 which	 Malla	 was	 ratified	 as	 the	 Asociación’s	 treasurer,	 and	
Mare’s	resignation	was	put	before	to	the	notary,	Ernestina.	Later,	when	I	returned	to	pick	up	
the	 formal	 record,	 it	was	no	 longer	 there.	Ernestina	explained	to	me	that	Malla	had	come	
along	to	pick	it	up	and	cancel	its	formalization	-	which	Malla	denied	when	I	checked	with	her.	
On	September	17,	there	was	a	meeting	in	Churintzio	with	Heredia	(Productos	Inocuos	
president	and	former	Asociación	president),	during	which	the	assembly’s	proceedings	from	
May	2004	were	shown	to	him,	and	in	which	the	SPRs	that	called	for	the	meeting	had	left	the	
Asociación.	 Heredia	 insisted	 on	 going	 to	 the	meeting	 and	 assured	 that	 the	 new	 SEPLADE	
delegate	 (Leoncio	Lagunas)	and	Samuel	Campos	 (SUPLADER’s	President)125	would	be	 there	
too.	Francisco,	from	SEPLADE,	had	also	visited	him	to	negotiate,	as	had	Abaco	and	Cristi.	The	
SPRs	advised	by	JLB’S	firm	became	involved	too.	Heredia,	in	a	revengeful	tone,	claimed	that	
during	the	first	division,	I	had	been	an	ally	with	the	women	in	the	Asociación	to	preserve	the	
majority.	Presently,	he	had	associated	with	the	Asociación’s	opponents,	like	SEPLADE,	USPR	
Productos	 Inocuos,	 USPR	 Agricola	 Tsakapu,	 Abaco	 and	 JLB’s	 firm.	 The	 network	 would	 be	
reconfigured	by	recovering	Heredia’s	prior	leadership	of	the	Asociación	before	I	replaced	him.		
In	the	assembly	scheduled	for	September	18,	2004,	the	management	committee	of	the	
Asociación	 attended	 so	 that	 the	president	 could	 comply	with	 the	 subjects	 on	 the	 agenda.	
Nevertheless,	 when	 I	 tried	 to	 start	 the	 meeting,	 Chema	 and	 Jesús	 interrupted	 me	 in	 an	
aggressive	way,	saying	 that	 they	were	suspended	 in	 their	 rights	as	partners,	and	that	 they	
were	supported	by	representatives	of	other	SPRs	that	were	no	longer	part	of	the	Asociación.	
After	the	assembly	was	deemed	invalid,	various	SPRs	left.	Those	who	stayed	in	the	assembly	
named	 Chema	 as	 leader	 of	 the	 debate	 and	 Cristi	 as	 secretary	 (although	 she	 was	 not	 a	
representative	 of	 her	 own	 SPR).	 Chema	 asked	 the	 SPRs	 to	 identify	 themselves	 with	 their	
documents	of	incorporation	and	their	elector’s	credentials;	he	expressed	that	the	request	had	
been	fulfilled	to	his	full	satisfaction,	meaning	the	original	proceedings	of	the	Asociación	(first	
version)	would	be	taken	into	account	in	order	to	cover	up	the	anomalies	of	inviting	those	who	
were	no	longer	part	of	the	Asociación	to	the	assembly.	
																																																						
125	Municipal	president	of	Zacapu	and	SUPLADER.	
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This	assembly	was	attended	by	Samuel	Campos	and	Leoncio	Lagunas,126	SUPLADER’s	
president	 and	 secretary,	 respectively,	 whose	 institutions	 recognized	 the	 USPRs	 Productos	
Inocuos	and	the	Asociación.	There	was	a	record	in	the	SUPLADER	proceedings	that	they	had	
been	acting	independently	since	March	2004.	It	 is	necessary	to	highlight	that	 in	one	of	the	
items	 on	 the	 assembly’s	 proceedings,	 a	 reference	 was	 made	 to	 the	 “abandonment”	 of	
Fidencio	who	until	that	time	was	president	in	charge;	while	some	lines	down	I	was	mentioned	
as	acting	president	and	Malla	was	named	as	acting	treasurer	in	charge.	With	this,	it	became	
evident	 that	 there	 were	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 acknowledgments	 of	 appointments	 that	
followed	the	creation	of	the	Asociación,	including	the	moment	when	Chema’s	SPR	had	entered	
the	Asociación.	
In	 this	 same	meeting,	 Jesús	mentioned	 the	 plot	 named	 Fracción	de	 la	Mesa	 Prieta	
located	in	Carátacua,	Coeneo	municipality	that	was	acquired	by	the	Asociación,	stating	that	“a	
purchase	agreement	with	 the	Asociación’s	 representatives	has	been	reached”.	Afterwards,	
Chema	 proposed	 the	 sale	 of	 the	 plot	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 USD	 110,000;	 this	was	 approved	
unanimously	and	“El	Derecho	al	Tanto”127	was	offered	to	the	attendees,	without	there	being	
any	intention	to	purchase	it	expressed	by	any	of	the	attendees.	
Following	this,	 the	 financial	contribution	of	 the	Asociación	was	discussed	 in	general	
terms.	 Irma	proposed	 returning	 the	contributions	 to	 the	partners,	which	was	unanimously	
approved.	 At	 the	 end,	 Jesús	 and	 Chema	 admitted	 that	 the	 SPRs	 they	 belonged	 to	 were	
suspended	and	requested	a	vote	for	the	non-	suspension	of	their	rights	in	the	Asociación.	They	
said	that	nobody	among	those	presents	has	been	 in	favor	of	excluding	the	10	SPRs	as	was	
agreed	in	the	assembly	of	May	11,	2004.	Gracian	and	Mare	tried	to	sell	their	shares	to	other	
partners	and	–	in	an	unprecedented	way,	since	it	was	unanimously	approved	that	selling	was	
not	allowed.	Nor	were	new	members	of	the	Puerta	Chica	SPR	allowed	to	join,	in	order	to	cover	
the	substitution	of	partners	made	by	that	SPR	on	July	14,	2004.	The	acceptance	of	partners	
was	the	autonomous	right	of	each	SPR,	and	the	Asociación	should	only	be	notified	when	its	
representation	had	changed.	
Similarly,	Adrian	(ex-partner	of	Puerta	Chica	SPR)	proposed	that	Heredia’s	and	Lino’s	
positions	of	president	and	secretary	of	the	Asociación	would	be	restored,	and	the	position	of	
me	as	acting	president	abolished.	His	proposal	was	approved	unanimously.	It	is	important	to	
mention	that	Heredia	and	Lino	had	already	been	relegated	from	their	positions	on	March	23,	
2004,	the	agreement	of	which	was	ratified	on	April	28,	2004).	Moreover,	their	SPRs	were	no	
longer	part	of	the	Asociación	as	of	May	11,	2004	onwards.	This	demonstrates	the	intention	of	
not	acknowledging	the	agreements	made	in	assemblies	after	March	5,	2004,	in	which	five	SPRs	
were	accepted,	including	Deyna	(represented	by	Chema).	The	assembly’s	proceedings	from	
September	18,	2004,	were	taken	to	be	formalized	by	Cristi	on	September	29	and,	despite	there	
being	several	irregularities,	Ernestina	(the	Notary	Public)	signed.	In	that	document,	it	was	said	
																																																						
126	The	officers	left	the	assembly	after	realizing	that	the	meeting	was	being	filmed.	
127	According	to	the	law	of	commercial	companies,	the	partners	of	the	Asociación	would	have	preference	at	the	
occasion	of	the	sale	of	the	plot,	and	a	relevant	notification	would	be	sent	to	those	not	present.	
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that	Cristi	knew	that	the	document	did	not	meet	the	requirements	but	that	she	had	insisted	
in	its	formalization.			
The	 actions	 described	 that	 were	 undertaken	 by	 actors	 that	 had	 previously	 been	
dissociated	from	the	Asociación,	and	presently	supported	by	institutions	such	as	SEPLADE,	in	
coordination	with	Abaco	and	JLB's	firm,	were	clearly	intended	to	dismantle	the	Asociación‘s	
network	with	the	intention	of	transferring	its	resources	to	other	USPRs	like	Agricola	Tsakapu	
and	Productos	Inocuos.	I	considered	these	events	unlawful,	because	disassociated	actors	could	
appear	as	Asociación	members	in	a	meeting,	and	after	changing	the	representatives,	pursue	
the	project	money	of	the	Asociación,	empting	its	Bank	accounts	and	selling	the	plot.	These	
actions	show	us	the	ambiguity	of	the	law	and	the	rights	applied	to	organizations	such	as	the	
Asociación.	
	
	
Looking	for	rearrangements	within	the	network	
The	previous	section	has	shown	that	there	had	been	an	agreement	previous	to	the	assembly	
in	order	to	take	the	Asociación’s	control,	their	contributions,	and	the	land.	Gonzalo	stated	that	
from	now	on	actions	would	be	legal.	The	recovery	of	the	assembly’s	act	in	which	Malla	was	
ratified,	the	impugnation	of	the	assembly	of	September	18th,	and	the	defence	of	the	property	
of	the	plot	would	tilt	the	legal	scales	to	the	Asociación’s	favour.	According	to	the	Asociación’s	
statutes,	we	only	had	15	workdays	to	express	nonconformity	with	the	assembly	-	which	would	
be	the	best	legal	possibility	to	defend	the	Asociación’s	interests.	This	seemed	to	be	the	right	
choice.	Yet,	when	Malla	as	a	lawyer	and	Asociación	treasurer	was	consulted,	she	suggested	to	
try	to	annul	the	assembly	and	to	let	the	peremptory	period	pass.	During	those	15	days	Chema,	
noticeably	nervous,	threatened	and	pressured	SPR	Los	Pinos	(Malla’s	SPR).	Malla	knew	how	to	
assail	the	last	assembly	of	the	Asociación,	and	retreat	to	an	earlier	stage,	recovering	the	rights	
and	resources	for	the	Asociación.	She	said	that	Ampa	was	looking	for	a	job	which	Abaco	had	
offered	 her	 at	 the	Asociación,	 but	 that	 she	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 take	 it	 if	 I	 remained	 as	
president.	Malla	explained:	
	
Abaco	analysed	the	needs	and	weaknesses	of	each	partner	of	 the	Asociación;	 starting	
there	 they	 took	 us	 aside	 and	 came	 to	 the	 table	 already	 prepared.	 Ampa	 felt	 in	 that	
moment	that	Abaco	knew	how	to	negotiate	to	obtain	the	project’s	resources.	It	was	very	
sad	because	the	resources	were	already	there	thanks	to	the	hard	work	that	Ampa	and	
Fidencio	had	put	in	from	the	beginning.	I	mean,	Ampa	never	valued	the	work	done	by	the	
Asociación	and	gave	all	credits	to	Abaco.	(Malla	28/09/2004)	
	
Ampa,	aware	of	the	events,	affirmed	that	Chema	threatened	them	by	saying	that	“If	you	dare	
to	 impugn	 the	 assembly	 of	 September	 18,	 you’ll	 know	what	 I’m	 capable	 of”	 (Ampa,	 Villa	
Jiménez,	 28/09/2004).	 This	 was	 intimidating	 for	Malla,	 as	 it	 appeared	 that	 she	 had	 been	
followed	several	times	by	suspicious	people	when	she	was	returning	to	her	home.	El	Campeón	
(SPR	Laredo),	told	that	Chema	and	other	people	invited	him	to	a	luxury	restaurant	at	Zacapu	
–	one	he	did	not	know	before.	
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They	offered	me	USD	2,000	to	support	them	in	the	negotiations	to	favour	them.	After	I	
refused	the	offer,	they	said	to	me	directly	not	to	mingle	with	the	Asociación’s	business’	
(El	Campeon,	Coeneo,	29/09/2004).	
	
Enrique	Bautista,	the	government’s	secretary	of	Michoacán,	ordered	to	bring	El	Campeón	to	
Morelia’s	offices	and	tried	to	intimidate	him,	showing	him	a	document	that	the	Asociación	had	
delivered	about	the	institutions	involved	in	the	project,	and	explaining	to	him	the	irregularities	
of	the	project.	Then	SUPLADER	was	infiltrated	with	agents	from	the	government’s	secretary	
sent	by	Enrique	Bautista	who	were	present	at	every	meeting.	Meanwhile	a	 group	of	 SPRs	
headed	by	Chema	(Deyna)	and	René	(SEPLADE)	met	with	the	municipal	president	of	Coeneo	
(Polo,	a	member	of	SPR	Laredo),	after	which	the	municipal	police	of	Coeneo	was	regularly	sent	
to	intimidate	El	Campeón	and	to	watch	over	the	Asociación’s	land	–	which	was	under	Agricola	
Tzakapu’s	 control.	 In	order	 to	protect	 partners	 like	El	 Campeón	 and	Malla,	 the	Asociación	
denounced	the	event	and	made	Enrique	Bautista	responsible	for	the	security	of	its	partners.	
From	his	side,	Chema	put	pressure	on	the	SPRs	of	Huaniqueo	and	El	Fresno	to	continue	with	
Agrícola	 Tsakapu,	 as	 they	 wanted	 to	 leave.	 Huaniqueo’s	 president	 considered	 that	 SPR	
Huaniqueo	 should	 stay	with	 the	Asociación.	Malla	 explained	 to	 the	 representatives	 of	 Las	
Delicias	and	El	Fresno	about	the	Asociación’s	dissolution:	
	
The	Asociación’s	settlement,	as	Abaco	foresees,	will	take	years;	while	the	SPRs	will	get	no	
answer,	Abaco	 intends	 to	 lengthen	 the	process	 to	make	 them	depend	on	Abaco.	This	
company	ignores	the	troubles	related	to	settling	a	company128	which	is	an	action	that	can	
involve	many	beneficiaries	(Malla,	Zacapu,	1/10/2004).		
	
Once	the	impugnation	period	was	over,	the	money	from	the	contributions	was	retrieved	from	
the	bank	accounts.	Moreover,	in	a	second	assembly	called	by	the	pretended	representatives,	
it	was	proposed	to	sell	the	plot	of	land,	for	which	the	right	of	first	refusal	would	be	notified,	
as	promoted	by	Heredia,	Lino,	and	Mare	on	September	30,	2004.	In	case	none	of	the	partners	
exercised	their	right	of	first	refusal	(valued	at	USD	1,100,000),	Agrícola	Tsakapu	(which	had	
obtained	its	legal	constitution	on	October	18,	2004)	would	take	it.		
The	intention	of	taking	the	land	in	Fracción	de	la	Mesa	Prieta,	an	Asociación’s	property,	
was	not	realized	due	to	an	excessive	taxation	of	almost	30%.	So,	another	legal	process	was	
started	 by	 Chava	 (Jesús’	 brother),	 in	 collaboration	 with	Agrícola	 Tsakapu.	 The	 pretended	
management	committee	(Lino	and	Heredia)	aligned	with	the	demand	and	found	a	solution	
favoring	the	plaintiff,	which	celebrated	a	bailment	with	Agrícola	Tsakapu.	
After	these	events,	Ampa	expected	her	group	to	be	included	into	Agrícola	Tsakapu	in	
order	to	release	the	project’s	resources	and	recover	her	bank	contribution.	Félix	from	Abaco,	
now	in	charge	of	the	project,	explained	to	Ampa	that	she	was	too	late	to	join	that	USPR,	which	
caused	a	 split	between	 the	 two.	Now	SPR	Los	Pinos	 tried	 to	 recover	 its	 contribution	 (USD	
																																																						
128	Malla	had	participated	in	the	liquidation	process	of	BANRURAL. 
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15,000)	on	legal	terms,	promoting	the	annulment	of	the	assembly	of	18/09/2004,	and	legally	
suing	those	who	took	Los	Pinos’	contributions	out	of	the	Bank.	After	long	deliberation,	this	
action	did	not	take	place.	
The	 land’s	 deed	 was	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Asociación,	 signed	 by	 its	 president	 as	
representative.	 The	 Asociación’s	 land	 was	 located	 in	 the	 municipality	 of	 Coeneo.	 To	
strengthen	the	members	of	Agrícola	Tsakapu,	the	government	functionaries	agreed	with	Polo	
-	the	new	municipal	president	-	to	proceed	fast	with	the	negotiations.	In	exchange,	he	would	
leave	the	project	and	act	against	me	in	front	of	SUPLADER.	
Polo	 accepted	 and	 became	 the	 architect	 of	 much	 pressure	 on	 the	 Asociación’s	
partners,	using	the	municipal	police	to	harass	El	Campeón	and	the	suburb	where	he	lived.	In	
an	attempt	to	recover	the	Asociación’s	land,	several	partners	visited	the	place,	most	of	them	
women.	The	public	 forces	of	Coeneo	and	Zacapu	were	expecting	us	 to	clash	with	Agrícola	
Tsakapu’s	partners	and	intended	to	evict	us.	At	the	moment	of	the	eviction,	we	showed	the	
land’s	document	to	the	authorities,	and	Chema	showed	a	gratuitous	bailment	signed	by	the	
former	owner.	Therefore,	to	prove	our	right	we	went	to	the	public	prosecutor	at	Zacapu,	who	
said	the	Asociación	was	right.	Nevertheless,	the	police	forced	us	to	abandon	the	place	after	a	
short	visit	to	the	greenhouse’s	premises.		
On	October	22,	2004,	Licha	wrote	a	document	to	the	governor	in	which	she	denounced	
the	irregularities	in	the	greenhouse	issue;	the	letter	was	also	sent	to	the	Controller´s	Office	of	
Michoacán	State129).	The	result	was	a	quick	answer	from	the	governor’s	auxiliary	secretary,	
handing	the	case	to	Octavio	Larios	as	SEPLADE’S	responsible.	
	
	
The	dough	(la	lana),	but	not	for	everyone:	the	release	of	SUPLADER	resources	to	key	actors	
During	the	conflict,	the	Asociación	was	ignored	by	SUPLADER.	Even	though	the	Asociación	had	
invested	almost	USD	60,000	in	the	project,	the	department	now	ignored	its	existence.	As	Malla	
put	it:	
	
SEPLADE	involved	all	of	us	in	a	greenhouse	project	that	is	still	existing,	but	this	is	not	our	
fault.	We	 have	 spent	 thousands	 of	 USD	 on	 this	 project:	 USD	 12,000	 for	 JLB,	 9,000	 for	
Abaco,	 3,000	 for	 the	 biologists	 [advisers],	 SPR	 constitutions,	 protocols,	 etc.	 The	
Asociación	invested	a	lot	of	money	to	carry	out	the	project	and	SEPLADE	cheated	us	by	
saying	that	we	did	not	comply	with	the	requirements	-	which	is	false,	as	we	fulfilled	all	of	
them	(Malla,	Villa	Jiménez,	16/11/2004).	
	
SEPLADE	thought	that	the	SPRs’	expedients	–	the	ones	still	in	the	Asociación	–	were	incomplete,	
despite	the	number	of	documents	delivered	-	all	of	them	according	to	the	regulations.	This	
was	not	new:	before	Gonzalo	left	SEPLADE,	the	partners	asked	him	what	else	they	had	to	do	
																																																						
129	in	charge	of	Hilda	Abascal,	who	was	close	to	Martha	Sahagún	de	Fox,	wife	of	the	then	president	of	México	
Vicente	Fox.	
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to	release	the	resources	and	he	always	added	new	requirements,	particularly	those	related	to	
the	credit	line	offered	by	the	bank.	
Now	with	Leoncio	Lagunas	something	similar	happened.	On	September	8,	2004,	the	
last	version	of	the	Asociación's	document	was	reviewed	and	delivered	to	Resident	Rita,	who	
formally	received.	But	at	the	end	of	the	month	SEPLADE	stated	that	there	did	not	exist	any	file	
of	the	Asociación’s	SPRs	at	SEPLADE.	We	requested	copies	of	the	assembly	acts	of	SUPLADER	
02	but	Leoncio	Lagunas	refused	our	request,	even	if	it	was	his	duty	to	give	them	to	us.	Since	
then,	only	the	expedients	of	the	SPRs	he	chose	were	considered.	
SUPLADER	met	behind	closed	doors	on	November	19,	2004	and	approved	the	projects	
that	 Leoncio	 Lagunas	 considered	 acceptable.	 USPR	 Productos	 Inocuos	 had	 obtained	 the	
endorsement	of	one	SOFOL130	as	guarantee	for	their	social	contribution.	In	that	meeting,	the	
money	for	Productos	Inocuos	and	Agricola	Tsakapu	were	authorized.	
Meanwhile,	 Salvador	 (SEDAGRO)	asked	me	 to	meet	him	 in	a	 restaurant	 in	Morelia.	
There,	Salvador	assured	me	that	the	Asociación’s	resources	could	be	authorized	for	the	pilot	
plan	for	the	five	greenhouses,	the	requirement	being	that	all	of	us	would	be	the	beneficiaries	
and	 that	 some	 SPRs	 would	 have	 to	 make	 their	 contributions.	 With	 this,	 he	 made	 me	
understand	that	a	tacit	agreement	was	necessary	“for	the	money	to	flow”.	This	did	not	seem	
ethical	so	 I	 refused,	replying	that	 I	would	consult	the	partners	first.	Like	Abaco	before,	the	
SEDAGRO	officer	made	his	conditions	(a	share	of	the	project	money	-	la	lana)	clear	in	order	to	
deliver	 the	 resource	 for	 the	 greenhouses.	 Because	 of	 SPRs’	 partners	 refusal	 to	 act	 in	
accordance	with	the	regulations,	the	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	were	not	validated	by	SEDAGRO;	
the	argument	used	was	that	there	were	no	case	files	in	SEPLADE,	so	the	authorized	resources	
for	those	SPRs	were	destined	to	the	SUPLADER	fund	and	redistributed	to	finance	other	SPRs’	
projects.	
In	 December	 2004,	 Lino	 and	 the	 SPRs	 -	 advised	 by	 JLB’S	 firm	 -	 were	 authorized	 by	
SEDAGRO	to	build	a	USD	310,000	greenhouse.	The	producers	would	contribute	USD	280,000	
for	a	grand	total	of	USD	840,000	(through	SOFOL).	JLB	and	Lino	would	deposit	all	the	money	
from	the	institutions	in	a	popular	fund,	and	then	JLB	would	have	achieved	his	objective:	take	
the	money	and	disappear.	Given	the	situation,	Lino	asked	for	a	SUPLADER	extension;	Salvador	
(SEDAGRO)	supported	him,	arguing	that	additional	resources	had	also	been	authorized	to	the	
SPRs	following	Abaco’s	advice,	and	what	had	happened	with	JLB	was	not	Lino’s	fault.	SUPLADER	
authorized	the	extension	even	when	no	construction	had	started	yet.	
Projects	from	the	SPRs	of	USPR	Agrícola	Tsakapu	were	also	validated.	They	appeared	
on	Alianza’s	reports	for	amounts	close	to	USD	1	million	-	with	Chema	as	the	only	beneficiary.	
Chema	 had	 regularly	 been	made	 beneficiary	 of	 sums	 of	money:	 in	 2003,	 for	 example,	 he	
received	USD	75,000	from	Alianza	(PAPIR)	to	be	spent	in	Coeneo;	also,	in	2004	he	received	USD	
158,000	 from	 Fomento	 Agrícola	 to	 be	 spent	 in	 Zacapu.	 To	 put	 this	 in	 perspective:	 As	 a	
comparison,	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 2004	Alianza	 para	 el	 Campo	 only	 spent	 USD	 11,000	 in	 the	
municipalities	of	Coeneo	and	 Jiménez.	 To	 collect	 these	 sums	of	money,	 authorization	was	
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needed	 from	 the	 planning	 organizations	 (SEPLADE	 and	 SUPLADER),	 the	 executive	 agency	
(SEDAGRO)	and	SAGARPA.	
	SUPLADER	authorized	USD	20,000	to	Chema	and	his	SPR	in	2004,	while	Chema	spent	
USD	114,000	as	responsible	for	the	Autoempleo	program.	The	amount	of	public	resources	in	
which	Chema	was	involved	between	2003	and	2004	accumulated	almost	USD	293,000.	If	we	
add	to	this	the	implementation	of	the	goats	and	sheeps’	program,	the	amount	exceeds	USD	
300,000.	Similar	examples	can	be	found	among	other	SUPLADER	beneficiaries.131	
Félix,	from	Abaco,	had	referred	to	“hidden	effects”.	These	were	reflected	in	the	change	
of	objective	by	Alianza	and	SEPLADE,	proposing	to	build	one	collective	greenhouse	unit	by	
investing	USD	1.1	million,	also	using	the	resources	that	were	destined	for	nine	other	SPRs.	The	
contribution	producers	should	make	to	USPR	Agrícola	Tsakapu	was	over	USD	224,000	per	SPR,	
which	meant	a	total	of	USD	2.4	million.	The	project	(nine	greenhouses	of	half	a	hectare	each)	
was	 validated	 by	 SEDAGRO.	 What	 had	 actually	 been	 constructed	 was	 equivalent	 to	 an	
investment	of	only	one	unit	of	two	hectares,	but	at	a	cost	of	USD	350,000	-	which	meant	a	
price	 inflation	of	 600%.	 To	 implement	 the	project,	 the	 institutions	did	not	 check	 the	 legal	
status	of	the	land,	which	was	the	property	of	the	SPRs	of	the	Asociación	and	listed	as	such	at	
the	Public	Registry.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 Productos	 Inocuos	 (the	 SPRs	 linked	 to	 Heredia),	 beneficiaries’	
contributions	were	around	USD	281,000,	for	a	total	of	USD	1.5	million.	The	partners	argued	
that	a	storm	had	destroyed	their	greenhouse	structures	while	they	were	being	built	and	the	
financial	investment	had	thus	been	lost.	
These	examples	show	how	the	project	money	or	the	dough	(la	lana)	obtained	through	
the	loan	destined	to	the	Regional	Development	Fund	for	the	Zacapu	region	became	a	public	
debt	while	bringing	personal	benefits	to	a	few.	The	regional	development	intended	for	the	
region	as	a	whole	boiled	down	to	actor’s	strategies	and	manoeuvres	supported	by	private	and	
public	institutions	and	firms.	They	perceived	the	greenhouse	project	and	pursuit	of	the	money,	
networks	and	associations	as	paths	to	achieve	their	own	development.		
 
In	August	2005,	an	assembly	of	the	Asociación	was	called	where	also	some	of	the	SPRs	of	
Agrícola	 Tsakapu	were	 invited.	 The	majority	 agreed	 to	 recover	 the	 contributions	 of	 the	
partners	and	the	land.	The	management	committee	(formed	by	myself,	Malla,	and	Rosario	
from	Comanja’s	group)	led	the	process	to	nullify	the	assembly	of	September	18,	2004.	This	
was	achieved	in	a	few	months.	Land	ownership	was	transferred	to	become	a	part	of	the	
capital	 assets	 of	 the	 eight	 SPRs	 that	 wanted	 it	 that	 way,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	Agrícola	
Tsakapu	had	already	built	on	the	contested	property.	Even	when	the	State	government	was	
notified	about	the	ownership	of	the	land,	it	authorized	a	greenhouse	construction	of	two	
hectares	by	Agrícola	Tsakapu.	
To	understand	the	changes	in	SEPLADE	(starting	with	the	new	delegate’s	arrival),	it	is	
necessary	to	go	to	the	beginning	of	Cárdenas	Batel’s	government.	At	that	moment	Enrique	
Bautista	was	the	secretary	of	SEPLADE,	and	it	was	then	that	he	included	the	functionaries	that	
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were	still	in	charge	in	his	team.	This	structure	allowed	SEPLADE	to	be	the	political	springboard	
that	Enrique	Bautista	needed.	On	his	part,	Leoncio	Lagunas	(SEPLADE	delegate	 in	the	Bajío)	
promoted	the	candidature	of	Enrique	Bautista	by	using	the	resources	that	belonged	to	the	
Zacapu	 region.	 Once	 the	 SUPLADER	 projects	 were	 approved	 by	 SEPLADE,	 Enrique	 Bautista	
presented	himself	at	each	project	inauguration,	with	clear	political	proselytism	intentions.	
	
	
Conclusion	
The	MAA	program	was	planned,	designed	and	intended	to	be	executed	at	a	regional	level	by	
SEPLADE	 02	 with	 SUPLADER	 funds.	 But,	 although	 SUPLADER	 was	 founded	 as	 a	 regional	
development	 body,	 it	 was	 reduced	 to	 a	 space	 for	 political	 games	 as	 a	 result	 of	 actors’	
appropriation.	 During	 Enrique	 Bautista’s	 (PRD)	 campaign	 as	 candidate	 for	 the	Michoacán	
government,	the	greenhouses’	project	was	reborn	by	deviating	the	resources	from	SUPLADER	
02.	This	involved	Enrique	Bautista	with	a	network	of	collaborators	from	the	State	government,	
using	 SUPLADER	 and	 the	 regional	 delegate,	 Leoncio	 Lagunas,	 as	 change	 agent.	 With	 the	
replacement	 of	 Gonzalo	 by	 Leoncio	 Lagunas	 as	 SEPLADE’s	 delegate,	 the	 Asociacion‘s	
displacement	took	place	when	the	actor’s	associations	and	networks	pushed	the	Asociación	
out	of	the	project.	Actually,	these	factions	and	coalitions	produced	two	new	USPRs	-	Productos	
Inocuos	and	Agricola	Tsakapu	–	that	were	both	part	of	the	former	organization.	Even	though	
many	interventions	had	shaped	earlier	splits	and	the	demarche	processes,	I	think	that	this	last	
SUPLADER	intervention	defined	the	project	results	in	the	end.					
USPR	Agricola	 Tsakapu	 were	 used	 as	 a	 case	 in	 point	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 regional	
development	was	indeed	possible.	However,	the	internal	conflicts	that	caused	the	retreat	of	
the	 Huaniqueo	 and	 Purépero’s	 SPRs	 were	 not	mentioned.	 Neither	 were	 the	 irregularities	
related	to	the	land	acquisition	or	the	power	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	Chema	and	Jesús	–	
the	first	being	one	of	the	political	agents,	while	the	latter	concentrated	the	greenhouses	on	
his	fields.	Jesús	had	thus	in	effect	accumulated	the	power	of	the	USPR	Agrícola	Tsakapu	and	
the	State.	Meanwhile,	 and	despite	 the	 legal	processes	obstructing	 the	actions	of	 the	SPRs	
linked	to	the	USPR	Asociación,	the	land	was	still	the	property	of	the	eight	societies	united	in	
the	Asociación.	
	Apparently,	the	municipal	presidents	and	government	officials	redirected	their	efforts	
to	 support	 the	SUPLADER	municipalities,	although	 in	practice	 they	were	only	 interested	 in	
their	 own	 agenda.	According	 to	 actors	 such	 as	 Pedro	 (SEPLADE),	 the	 rest	 of	 SUPLADER	of	
Michoacán	 had,	 from	 the	 beginning,	 used	 the	 resources	without	 the	 actors’	 organization,	
which	meant	that	the	disbursements	could	lead	to	the	expected	goals	in	due	time	by	applying	
institutional	 planning	 from	 the	 top	 down	 -	with	 Zacapu	 as	 the	 exception.	 Before	merging	
SUPLADER	 Zacapu	with	 SUPLADER	 Bajío,	 the	 authorized	 resources	 for	 the	 region	 had	 been	
exerted	through	a	direct	disbursement	on	newly	agreed	works	–	roads,	for	example.	This	way,	
SUPLADER	 funds	were	diverted	 from	the	project	 (MAA)	and	spent	 in	a	 short	 time.	Previous	
plans	were	cancelled	and	the	project	was	adjusted	to	benefit	certain	municipalities.	 It	was	
expected	that	the	new	actions	would	be	distanced	from	a	fragmented	Asociación	 that	had	
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inherited	 the	money-related	 problems.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 remaining	 resources	 of	 the	
Ciénega	region	(USD	10	million)	were	moved	to	the	Bajío	region.		
The	 asociación´s	 game	 continued	 with	 different	 actors,	 and	 different	 projects.	 In	
Chapter	5	we	have	learned	about	the	dissociation	of	the	Asociación	leading	to	the	formation	
of	USPR	Productos	Inocuos.	This	chapter	has	described	how	some	of	the	Asociación’s	funds	
were	 appropriated	 and	 assigned	 to	 another	 USPR,	 Agrícola	 Tsakapu.	 This	 initiative	 was	
initiated	by	a	new	coalition	between	Abaco,	SEPLADE	and	SEDAGRO	officials,	USPR	Productos	
Inocuos,	and	with	the	collaboration	of	some	of	the	SPRs	in	the	Asociación	(SPR	Los	Pinos	and	
SPR	Biotecnológicos)	as	well	as	the	municipal	president’s	members	of	SUPLADER.	Factions,	as	
Swartz	et	al	(1966)	argue,	are	the	result	of	conflicts	and	come	about	as	a	strategy	to	control	
or	break	up	network	resources.	Factions	emerge	as	an	alternative	proposal	to	manage	and	
reorganize	the	processes	with	a	common	purpose.	In	general	terms,	collective	practices	are	
actions	legitimized	by	a	group,	and	represented	by	the	organization	(Nuijten,	1998).	But	this	
case	study	has	shown	that	the	multiple	projects	of	the	actors	are	not	adequate	to	permanently	
articulate	 previously	 agreed-upon	 action.	 Fights	 and	 disagreements	 within	 the	Asociación	
promote	splits	that	impact	its	formal	representation.	
The	reunion	of	Zacapu’s	SPRs	in	Agrícola	Tsakapu	 is	 in	 line	to	Chassen-Lopez	(2004)	
who	 states	 that	 actor’s	 relations	 can	 often	 count	 on	 their	 historical	 collaboration	 and	
economic	investments	to	contract	the	services	of	legal	agents	and	consulting	firms.	A	strategy	
used	 by	 this	 new	 network	 was	 to	 monopolize	 the	 Asociación’s	 resources,	 looking	 to	
disarticulate	it,	even	if	they	failed	to	do	so.		
Organizing	processes	were	split	due	to	internal	and	external	factors,	highlighting	the	
many	 expectations	 that	 generated	 the	 various	 projects	 and	 commitments	 made	 during	
collective	 management.	 The	 game	 of	 the	 SPRs	 triggered	 a	 set	 of	 strategies	 and	 multiple	
practices.	 First,	 they	 tried	 to	 obtain	 the	 funding	 for	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 through	 the	
management	of	Gonzalo	as	SEPLADE	delegate.	Then,	after	his	replacement,	they	sought	to	
obtain	the	money	directly	through	negotiations	with	the	new	delegate,	Leoncio	Lagunas.	The	
organizations,	 associations,	 and	 networks	 involved	 in	 development	 planning	 are	 thus	
conditioned	by	the	actors’	strategies	to	access	the	dough	(la	lana).		
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CHAPTER		8		 CONCLUSION	AND	DISCUSSION	
	
	
	
Introduction	
This	 study	 is	about	 the	 implementation	of	a	 regional	development	program	 in	Michoacán,	
Mexico.	 The	 program	 aimed	 to	 introduce	 greenhouses	 for	 the	 production	 of	 tomatoes	
through	 hydroponic	 systems,	 and	was	 promoted	 by	 the	 Subcomité	 de	 Planeación	 para	 el	
Desarrollo	 Regional	 (SUPLADER).	 The	 main	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 study	 the	
development	 intervention	processes	 linked	to	the	greenhouse	project	of	the	SUPLADER	02	
program	in	the	Zacapu	region	of	Michoacán.	I	have	tried	to	reach	this	objective	by	asking	the	
following	research	question:		
How	do	stakeholders	organize	themselves	around	the	greenhouse	project,	and	how	do	
they	redefine	the	local	government’s	vision	of	planned	development?		
From	this	main	research	question,	I	derived	the	following	sub-questions:		
1. How	and	when	do	actors’	agency	become	evident	in	collective	negotiations?		
2. How	do	the	different	interfaces,	which	arise	from	the	interaction	between	different	
actors	involved	in	the	greenhouse	project,	unfold?		
3. How	do	network	resources	contribute	to	the	support	of	actors’	projects?		
In	order	to	answer	these	questions,	I	carried	out	ethnographic	research	in	the	Zacapu	region	
of	Michoacán	from	2003	to	2005,	using	an	Actor-Oriented	Approach	(Long	2001).		
This	 research	 centres	 on	 the	 efforts	 to	 materialize	 the	 greenhouse	 project.	 The	
beneficiaries	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 were	 organized	 in	 Societies	 for	 Rural	 Production	
(SPRs).	In	order	to	be	eligible	to	access	project	resources,	the	SPRs	needed	to	create	a	higher-
level	 organization,	 a	 Union	 of	 Societies	 for	 Rural	 Production	 (Unión	 de	 Sociedades	 de	
Producción	Rural)	or	USPR.)	The	SPRs	that	are	the	focus	of	this	this	thesis	were	united	in	a	USPR	
called	 Unión	 de	 Invernaderos	 Ruta	 de	 la	 Libertad	 (which	 I	 have	 called	 the	 Asociación	
throughout	the	thesis).		Some	of	the	intended	beneficiaries,	acting	as	representatives	of	the	
SPRs,	 had	 previous	 experience	 in	 organizing	 and	 participating	 in	 projects	 similar	 to	 the	
greenhouse	 project	 promoted	 by	 SUPLADER,	 which	 meant	 that	 they	 could	 count	 on	 an	
extensive	network	of	relations	within	governmental	agencies	and	private	institutions.	These	
networks	and	associations	played	an	important	role	in	the	negotiation	processes	between	the	
Asociación	and	various	collective	and	individual	actors,	often	challenging	the	government’s	
top-down	views	on	 regional	development	with	more	democratic,	 but	highly	unpredictable	
actions.	 The	 main	 concepts	 I	 used	 to	 analyse	 my	 data	 are	 agency,	 knowledge,	 interface,	
associations,	and	organizing	process.	In	reflexively	answering	the	research	questions,	I	have	
tried	 to	 contribute	 to	 debates	 about	 development	 intervention	 and	 underlying	 organizing	
processes,	particularly	in	the	case	of	highly	complex	interactions	between	public	and	private	
actors	at	multiple	levels	who	all	aim	to	benefit	from	a	development	project.	
Because	of	my	agronomic	knowledge,	administrative	experience	and	origin	from	the	
region,	I	was	invited	to	become	closely	involved	with	the	implementation	of	the	greenhouse	
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project,	in	the	end	even	as	the	president	of	the	Asociación.	Therefore,	this	thesis	is	also	the	
result	of	a	participatory	action	research	(Reason	&	Bradbury,	2008;	Brydon-Miller,	et	al.,	2003)	
and	 clearly	 shows	 auto-ethnographic	 elements	 (Blanco,	 2012;	 Chang,	 2008).	 The	 actors	
involved	in	the	implementation	of	the	project	knew	I	intended	to	write	a	PhD	thesis	about	the	
whole	process,	to	which	they	did	not	object.	Still,	I	have	anonymized	their	names	because	of	
potential	sensitivities.		
I	 am	quite	 aware	of	 the	ethics	 of	my	 close	 involvement	with	 the	 actors	 inside	 and	
around	the	Asociación.		As	President	of	the	Asociación,	I	of	course	had	a	strong	position	in	co-
designing	its	trajectory.	But	I	was	part	of	a	management	committee	of	three,	and	relationships	
were	quite	open	(Ch.	5).	Still,	relationships	were	not	always	easy,	 like	the	partnership	with	
JBL’s	technical	consultancy	firm.	It	was	also	a	clear	strategy	of	the	Ministry	of	Planning	and	
State	Development	(SEPLADE)	to	enrol	me	in	the	project	as	a	means	to	counter	the	influence	
of	JBL’s	consultancy	firm	(Chapter	3).	This	partnership	ended	when	11	SPR	split	off	from	the	
28	SPRs	of	the	Asociación,	and	continued	working	with	JBL’s	firm.	The	remaining	17	SPRs	in	
the	Asociación	decided	to	hire	another	firm,	Abaco.	This	firm’s	intention	of	bribing	me	became	
an	 issue	 (Chapter	 6).	 Sensing	 that	 I	 represented	 an	 obstacle	 to	 some	 actors’	 interests,	 I	
expressed	that	at	no	point	in	the	project	had	I	meant	to	be	an	obstacle,	and	that	it	was	my	
intention	to	make	the	project	a	success	in	La	Ciénega	de	Zacapu.	When	it	appeared	that,	in	
addition,	companies	and	people	were	being	discredited	without	reason,	I	decided	to	hand	in	
my	resignation	as	President	of	the	Asociación.	But	many	actors	expressed	their	trust	in	me,	
and	I	stayed.	
	
Six	different	elements	of	the	main	research	question	have	served	as	thematic	axes	to	
structure	the	thesis.	First,	the	national	and	regional	vision	of	planned	development	and	the	
instrumental	role	of	SUPLADER	in	achieving	development	objectives	(Chapters	1	and	2).	Two,	
stakeholder	 participation	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 (Chapters	 2	 and	 3).	 Three,	 actors’	
articulation	with	organizational	processes	(Chapters	3	and	4).	Four,	the	positioning	of	State	
institutions	 involved	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 (Chapter	 5)	 and,	 finally,	 the	 elements	 that	
together	redefine	the	process	of	planned	development	(Chapters	6	and	7).		
Below,	I	first	present	my	conclusions,	and	then	discuss	development,	intervention,	the	
participatory	approach,	network	and	actors’	associations,	followed	by	the	relevance	of	this	
thesis,	 and	 the	 possible	 weakness	 of	 my	 close	 involvement	 with	 the	 greenhouses’	
development	project.	The	chapter	ends	with	some	recommendations.		
	
	
Conclusions	
From	the	results	of	my	study	described	in	the	previous	chapters,	I	have	drawn	the	following	
conclusions.	 First,	 the	development	project	 for	 the	establishment	of	28	greenhouses	 in	 La	
Ciénega	 (Zacapu)	 resulted	 from	 very	 complex	 negotiations	 caused	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	
autonomous	 actors	 who	 had	 very	 different	 perspective	 on	 local	 development.	 Planners,	
implementers	and	State	actors	often	assume	that	those	involved	in	development	programs	
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and	projects	share	a	similar	perspective	on	local	development.	This	assumption	is	based	on	a	
definition	of	the	"subjects"	of	development	as	people	who	can	be	changed	or	influenced,	and	
not	as	actors	who	make	their	own	decisions	and	are	capable	to	modify	them	-	often	using	
networks	of	knowledge	and	power	that	were	established	before	and	outside	the	project,	as	
evidenced	 in	 this	 case	 study.	Of	 course,	 the	 actors	who	 promulgate,	 develop,	 orchestrate	
regulations	 and	 authorize	 resources	 for	 projects,	 are	 also	 capable	 of	 redesigning	 project	
processes	 as	 they	 are	 implemented.	 In	 this	 sense,	 planned	 intervention	does	not	 obey	 an	
anticipated	logic.	Rather,	it	is	negotiated,	reconfigured	and	shaped	en	route	by	participating	
actors	and	their	networks.	When	necessary,	these	actors	condition	and	promote	changes	in	
the	various	fields	or	arenas	that	are	directly	or	indirectly	related	to	the	project.	In	Chapters	3	
and	6,	the	project’s	outlook	was	modified	according	to	different	consulting	firms’	proposals.	
My	study	thus	underscores	Mosse’s	(2005)	approach	to	development	processes	(see	below).	
The	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project	 and	 the	 Asociación‘s	
interaction	with	SUPLADER	deconstructs	the	centralist	perspective	of	regional	development	
programs,	which	perceives	the	task	of	the	State	and	its	representatives	as	if	they	were	abstract	
entities	which	act	as	mere	"transporters"	of	meaning	and	resources	in	intervention	processes.		
Instead,	actors	can	compete,	share	and	distribute	the	resources	intended	for	development,	
oftentimes	mobilizing	their	networks	with	the	intention	of	benefitting	from	them.	A	process,	
however,	 that	 provokes	 negotiations	 and	 ruptures	 as	 well	 as	 agreements	 and	 new	
entanglements	that	result	from	social	interfaces.	
	
The	 second	 conclusion	 follows	 from	 the	 first,	 namely	 that	 the	 intervention	process	
involves	actor	negotiations	and	network	enrolment	which	may	disrupt	or	frustrate	planned	
objectives,	substituting	these	by	those	of	 the	actors	caught	up	 in	 the	process.	SUPLADER’s	
development	planning	-	which	originally	saw	beneficiaries	as	generic	and	faceless	subjects	-	
changed	 during	 the	 project,	 and	 heterogeneity,	 dynamic	 and	 other	 complexly	 managed	
elements	were	included.	Evidently	the	actors,	far	from	being	abstract	figures,	were	connected	
by	networks	that	strategically	enrolled	other	-	public	and	private,	collective	and	individual	-	
actors	in	pursuit	of	the	money	allocated	for	the	SPRs’	projects.	Even	though	the	money	or	the	
dough	 (la	 lana)	disbursed	 for	 the	project	had	a	 specific	 (planned)	objective,	 in	practice	 its	
allocation	was	renegotiated	to	cover	a	multiplicity	of	the	network’s	projects	and	interests,	and	
which	were	not	always	primarily	greenhouse-related.	Sometimes,	actions	only	 justified	the	
protocol	to	argue	for	development	and	obtain	the	money;	this,	however,	did	not	necessarily	
meet	proposed	planners’	goals.		
This	case	study	shows	how,	in	order	to	achieve	their	objective	of	accessing	the	money,	
the	actors	involved	in	the	greenhouse	project	formed	strategic	coalitions	and	created	strong	
links	between	them	and	the	representatives	of	the	various	governmental	agencies	and	private	
consulting	firms	such	as	JBL’s	and	Abaco’s.	Though	stable	in	appearance,	this	confrontation	of	
forces	became	a	dynamic,	temporary	and	fragile	process	in	practise,	constantly	changing	the	
correlation	 of	 forces	 depending	 on	 the	 use	 of	 resources	 by	 the	 actors	 partaking	 in	 the	
negotiations.	Actors’	participation	thus	redefined	what	was	originally	designed	as	a	form	of	
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‘top-down’	planning	by	creating	and	transforming	social	spaces	that	were	appropriated	by	the	
actors	involved	in	order	to	link	them	to	their	own	specific	projects.	
	 Related	to	this	point	is	the	fact	that	the	strategies	of	individuals	and	their	networks	to	
reach	their	objectives	that	are	not	necessarily	in	line	with	a	priori	project	objectives.	The	MAA	
project	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 “real”	 stakeholders,	 their	 historicity,	 or	 actors’	 networks,	
resources,	organizing	practices,	or	differential	development	perspective.	The	Asociación	was	
constituted	by	heterogeneous	 SPRs;	 each	 SPR	 represented	one	project.	 In	 the	planning	of	
projects,	like	the	one	described	in	this	study,	organizations	such	as	a	Rural	Production	Society	
(SPR)	or	the	Asociación	are	often	considered	to	give	certainty	and	coherence	to	a	project.	It	is	
assumed	that	the	organization	can	be	established	before	the	project,	but	in	fact	the	reverse	is	
the	case.	The	project	outcome	becomes	unpredictable	because	it	depends	on	the	–	sometimes	
conflictive	 -	 needs	 and	 demands	 of	 multiple	 actors.	 In	 the	 greenhouse	 case	 regulations,	
assembly	agreements,	funding	applications,	authorizations,	records,	and	validations	were	all	
expected	to	contribute	to	the	project’s	cohesion.	However,	in	practice	actors	representing	the	
government	 institutions	 and	organizations	dismissed	 the	documents,	 relegating	 them	 to	 a	
second	plane,	and	instead	favoured	informal	agreements	between	actors.	For	example,	during	
the	change	of	staff	in	Zacapu’s	SEPLADE,	those	SPR	records	that	were	regarded	as	unrelated	
by	the	new	delegate	were	“misplaced”.	Fulfilling	the	validations	imposed	by	the	officials	on	
duty,	 or	 fulfilling	 the	 obligation	 to	 provide	 the	 records	 of	 a	 complete	 dossier,	 were	 the	
bargaining	chips	used	during	the	negotiation	with	the	USPRs	(see	Chapters	5	and	6).	In	the	
process,	several	SPRs	aborted	their	efforts,	convinced	as	they	were	that	complying	with	the	
specified	requirements	and	carrying	out	a	successful	start	did	not	guarantee	the	release	of	
project	 resources.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 only	 by	 mustering	 the	 "appropriate"	 networks	 and	
connections	would	they	get	hold	of	the	desired	benefits	(see	Chapter	7).		
	
The	 third	conclusion	 is	 that	project	 implementation	 triggered	other	dynamic	and	historical	
processes,	 some	 of	 them	 related	 to	 knowledge	 and	 cultural	 practices	 (see	 Chapter	 4)	 or	
political	and	organizing	practices	(see	Chapter	7).	All	of	these	transformed	actors’	lifeworlds.	
I	am	convinced	that	the	actors	involved	in	the	project,	even	if	they	did	not	obtain	“the	dough”	
(la	lana),	changed	their	perspective	on	alliances	and	trust,	and	this	provided	them	with	new	
means	for	developing	future	projects.	The	actors	involved	in	the	greenhouse	project	were	not	
passive	against	State	hegemony,	and	created	their	room	for	manoeuvre;	these	included	acts	
of	 resistance	to	gain	sovereignty	and	autonomy.	 In	 this	sense,	 they	exemplify	Fuentes	and	
Mantilla’s	statement	that	"there	is	no	pure	or	total	domination	that	cannot	be	transformed"	
(2010:3).	The	processes	associated	with	the	greenhouse	project	shaped	the	relations	between	
the	 actors,	 implementers,	 and	 planners	with	 others	 involved	 in	 the	 project,	 including	 the	
researcher	himself	(Long	and	Liu,	2009).	
	
My	last	conclusion	is	that	developing	the	SPRs	was	key	for	“getting	the	dough”.	The	main	goal	
set	by	the	actors	involved	with	the	greenhouse	project	was	to	obtain	the	necessary	funds	to	
carry	out	the	project,	hence	the	title	of	this	thesis:	“Going	for	the	dough”	(en	pos	de	la	lana).	
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At	the	beginning,	some	actors	considered	pursuing	project	money	a	goal	in	itself,	instead	of	a	
means	to	achieve	development.	When	many	SPRs	were	dissociated	(by	displacement)	from	
the	Asociación,	the	dough	became	the	reward	for	the	investments	of	the	remaining	SPRs	in	
the	project	 (see	Chapters	6	and	7).	 	Throughout	 the	case	 I	developed	 in	 this	 thesis,	actors	
dynamically	interacted	with	each	other	in	order	to	act	strategically,	joining	associations	and	
interacting	with	institutions	and	organizations	in	order	to	access	project	money.	In	this	game,	
the	winning	formula	would	get	the	prize,	while	the	rules	were	unwritten	and	everything	was	
permitted,	while	even	the	referees	and	sponsors	participated	in	the	game	(see	Chapter	7).		
	
	
Discussion	
In	 2002	 the	 State	 Development	 Plan	 included	 guidelines	 and	 general	 directions	 for	 La	
Ciénega’s	 development.	 The	 Agricultural	 Alternative	Model	 (MAA)	 was	 based	 on	 a	 Cuban	
development	model.	The	MAA	was	backed	by	governor	Lázaro	Cárdenas	Batel	and	by	SEPLADE	
officials	who	 implemented	 the	alternative	model	 in	La	Ciénega,	 supported	by	some	Cuban	
experts.	
As	Diego	(2007)	points	out,	development	change	agents	may	transform	the	lifeworld	
of	project	stakeholders	through	certain	ideological	stances;	in	the	case	of	Michoacán	through	
a	socialist	 ideology.	The	expectations	of	Cárdenas’	new	government	closely	resonated	with	
the	social	 transformations	set	 in	motion	by	his	grandfather	and	former	Mexican	President,	
Lázaro	 Cárdenas	 del	 Río.	 Development	 must	 be	 understood	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 political,	
economic,	and	cultural	 interests	of	those	behind	 its	design	and	 implementation	(Ferguson,	
1994).	This	was	clearly	the	case	with	the	democratic	change	of	government	led	by	Cárdenas	
Batel,	which	was	supported	by	Gonzalo	as	a	delegate	for	SEPLADE	02	in	La	Ciénega.		
According	to	post-development	scholar	Escobar	(2011),	interventions	in	so-called	Third	
World	countries	typically	originate	in	so-called	developed	countries	that	pass	on	modernizing	
elements	 to	 an	 underdeveloped	 country	 deemed	 to	 lack	 the	 capacity	 and	 capability	 of	
improving	 the	 lives	 of	 development	 beneficiaries.	 Interestingly,	 La	 Ciénega’s	 development	
initiatives	came	from	Cuba,	a	nation	economically	less	developed	than	Mexico.	In	addition,	
SUPLADER’s	 investment	 was	 not	 linked	 to	 any	 developed	 establishment	 (Ferguson,	 1994)	
wishing	to	orchestrate	an	intervention.	Actually,	Michoacán’s	Administration,	in	an	effort	to	
consolidate	 the	 development	 proposed	 for	 the	 ten	 regions	 of	 Michoacán,	 requested	 the	
SUPLADER	funds	from	the	Inter-American	Bank	for	Development	(BID).		
An	alternative	perspective	that	contributes	to	the	understanding	of	development	and	
intervention	processes	is	provided	by	Mosse	(2005).	Mosse	argues	that	policies	to	promote	
development	 are	 associated	 to	 organizational	 demands	 and	 needs	 to	 maintain	 existing	
relationships,	rather	than	focused	on	promoting	a	previously	defined	policy.	However,	in	the	
case	of	La	Ciénega,	the	agents	of	change	-	including	the	Michoacán	Congress	-	supported	and	
pushed	through	the	development	initiative	suggested	by	the	planners.	It	is	necessary,	then,	to	
deepen	 the	 "motives	 for	 development",	 identifying	 the	 processes	 that	 spur	 development	
interventions	as	well	as	the	strategic	governmental	policies	and	programs	that	shape	regional	
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development.	I	argue	that	this	can	best	be	achieved	by	focusing	on	the	network	of	actors	that	
promotes	these	motives	-	including	private	development	firms	and	organizations	with	links	to	
governmental	institutions.		
As	the	case	study	shows,	due	to	the	different	perceptions	of	development	brought	into	
the	 arena	 by	 an	 increasing	 diversity	 of	 stakeholders,	 collective	 participation	 was	
problematizing	 if	 not	 jeopardizing	 the	 planning	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project.	 Although	 the	
greenhouse	project	was	finally	launched,	participating	actors	did	not	connect	or	identify	with	
the	"reasons	for	development"	given	by	the	planners.	Instead,	actors	identified	“the	dough”	
as	the	means	to	achieve	their	development,	perceiving	the	project	as	an	individual	endeavour	
instead	of	a	collective	one,	despite	the	fact	that	the	collective	of	the	Association	was	used	as	
a	means	to	these	individual	missions.	
As	a	result	of	actors’	practices,	some	networks	became	more	articulated	and	therefore	
gained	strength;	these	practices	eventually	turned	the	project’s	outlook	into	actor-network	
needs.	The	manoeuvres	displayed	by	grassroots	actors	in	this	study	are	therefore	more	in	line	
with	 Mosse’s	 (2005)	 analysis	 and	 contradict	 the	 interpretations	 of	 planned	 development	
intervention	 by	 Escobar	 (2011)	 and	 Ferguson	 (1994).	 As	 I	 show,	 actors	 (through	 their	
strategies	and	use	of	resources)	are	very	much	able	to	mould	and	twist	planned	development	
efforts	to	suit	their	diverse	needs	and	desires.	The	beneficiaries	and	their	networks	turned	out	
to	be	clever	enough	to	circumvent	resource	shielding	mechanisms,	and	were	very	capable	of	
creating	alliances	and	joining	other	actors	to	find	the	"shortcuts"	that	led	to	“the	dough”.	In	
Chapter	 7,	 new	 and	 ancient	 allies	 were	 re-associated;	 Heredia	 for	 example	 (as	 former	
president	of	the	Asociación)	accepted	the	new	rules	proposed	by	Abaco	and	SEPLADE	(Leoncio	
and	Francisco).	The	project	benefitted	by	obtaining	“the	dough”.		
By	 complying	 with	 the	 rules	 within	 their	 institutions,	 planners,	 implementers	 and	
development	workers	facilitated	a	network	of	complicities	of	which	they	were	themselves	a	
part.	Complicity	led	to	the	authorization,	management	and	setting	up	of	projects	that	were	
not	feasible	from	a	technical	and	economic	perspective	(see	Chapters	3,	6	and	7).	The	network	
that	mobilized	the	officials	to	favour	a	project	that	was	not	in	line	with	the	regulations	–	which	
were	 based	 on	 the	 necessity	 of	 successfully	 implementating	 a	 politically	 motivated	
development	model	for	Ciénega	de	Zacapu.	The	authorizations	for	the	project	implied	to	mask	
and	 accomplish	 a	 planned	 intervention	 project	 that	 justified	 development,	 hiding	 the	
networks’	 agreements	 and	 actors’	 negotiations.	 This	 collaboration	 occurred	 between	 the	
officials	 of	 the	 institutions	 linked	 to	 the	 SPRs,	 and	who	were	 simultaneously	 part	 of	 both	
networks.		
Diego	(2010)	states	that,	due	to	different	 interested	factions,	 the	 implementers	are	
more	likely	to	redirect	the	execution	of	a	program	or	a	government	project	than	the	officials	
at	 State	 level.	 Likewise,	 Long	 (2007)	has	 argued	 that	 such	mid-level	 development	workers	
need	to	implement	all	manner	of	regulations,	but	that	they,	at	the	same	time,	may	become	
involved	 in	 negotiations	 to	 find	 alternatives	 to	 the	 normativity	 they	 represent.	 These	
practices,	which	are	often	unrelated	to	the	original	planning	process,	have	a	resemblance	with	
the	rural	credit	businesses	mentioned	by	Gordillo	 (1999),	 for	example	when	 implementers	
	 149	
pretend	that	a	crop	 is	damaged	and	then	collect	 the	 insurance.	Yet	 for	 the	official	and	his	
network,	these	practices	imply	a	personal	or	collective	profit.	This	room	for	manoeuvre	shows	
that	the	State	is	a	complex	web	of	entanglements	between	relations	and	resources.	
In	our	case,	the	complexity	of	this	web	is	reflected	in	the	organizing	processes	behind	
the	 technological	 changes	 that	 came	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 greenhouses	 and	
hydroponic	production.	JBL’s	firm	and	Abaco	understood	this.		For	the	former,	the	greenhouse	
represented	 a	 cutting-edge	 technology	 that	 allowed	 for	 capacities	 to	 be	 idealized	 and	
scenarios	to	be	created;	for	the	latter,	the	project	represented	a	complex	network	of	relations	
and	resources.	The	Asociación	succeeded	in	drawing	together	individual	projects	that	were	
intertwined	but	different	at	the	same	time.	The	notion	of	network	allows	to	understand	this	
entanglement	of	technology,	actors	and	resources,	while	the	notions	of	actor	and	interface	
are	key	to	understand	discontinuities	of	values,	interests,	knowledge	and	power	(Long,	2007).	
Yet,	the	notion	of	actor	or	interface	cannot	be	attributed	to	individuals	only;	they	are	as	well	
a	characteristic	of	their	networks.	
Because	networks	 decompose	 and	 recompose,	 interfaces	 also	 find	 themselves	 in	 a	
continuous	and	dynamic	process	of	modification.	The	 sum	total	of	 the	different	 interfases	
strengthen	the	actor-network	experience	at	subsequent	interface	situations.	In	the	present	
study,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Asociación	 granted	 accreditation	 to	 experienced	 actors	 for	
representing	them	during	management	negotiations.	However,	after	the	representatives	had	
shared	 the	 agreements	 with	 the	 collective,	 the	 network	 had	 to	 confirm	 or	 reject	 these	
accreditations,	which	could	either	lead	to	even	more	negotiation	or	to	discontinuity	(Chapter	
7).	In	this	sense,	there	is	no	full	mastery	of	a	proposed	course	of	action	once	this	proposed	
course	meets	a	network.	Instead,	the	interface	situation	can	best	be	seen	as	an	occasion	that	
generates	new,	alternative	courses	of	action	to	the	parties	involved.	Sometimes,	these	new	
alternatives	require	‘translation’	(e.g.	drawing	up	agreements,	sign	them,	store	them	digitally,	
or	 have	 the	 State	 formalize	 them).	 These	 non-human	 network	 “facilitators”	 are	 the	 silent	
witnesses	of	development	intervention.	
	
	
Social	relevance	of	the	study 
This	 study	 reveals	 the	dynamic	practices	and	concurrent	use	of	 resources	 that	accompany	
development	in	a	region	of	Michoacán,	Mexico.	It	seeks	to	show	how	these	dynamics	are	best	
interpreted	through	the	use	of	an	actor-oriented	approach.	In	Mexico,	only	a	handful	of	case	
studies	 make	 use	 of	 such	 an	 ethnographic,	 actor-oriented	 approach	 to	 understand	
development	intervention	processes.	The	approach	shows	that	when	resources	are	added	to	
an	 existing	 network,	 the	 network	 is	 reconfigured	 without	 interrupting	 its	 main	 purpose,	
namely	to	devise	strategies	in	pursuit	of	project	resources.	
In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 portray	 development	 as	 processes	 involving	 negotiations	 between	
actors.	I	interpret	regulations	and	rules	of	operation	intended	to	shield	resources	as	open	to	
manipulation	by	those	responsible	for	applying	them.	In	the	case	portrayed	in	this	thesis	at	
least,	it	appears	that	even	the	more	restrictive	rules	can	be	bent	by	efforts	to	profit	from	the	
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flow	of	money.	I	believe,	therefore,	that	‘development’	and	the	means	to	obtain	“the	dough”	
are	as	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	Only	by	apprehending	the	full	dynamics	of	this	two-sided	
process	can	one	fully	address	processes	that	involve	both	organizational	strengthening	and	
transparent	governance.	Focusing	on	one	side	of	the	coin	runs	the	risk	of	misunderstanding	
the	 practical	 value	 and	 meaning	 of	 the	 project’s	 “success”	 or	 “failure”	 to	 the	 lives	 of	
development	actors.	
	
	
Possible	weaknesses	of	the	results 
Accompanying	actors	while	carrying	out	research	has	created	bonds	of	trust	between	myself	
as	a	researcher	and	the	actors	I	collaborated	with,	but	who	were	subject	to	the	research	at	
the	same	time.	These	trust	relations	were	essential	to	understand	the	situations	in	which	they	
were	 involved,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 but	 also	 elsewhere.	
However,	 since	my	objectives	often	differed	 from	 those	of	 the	 actors	 and	 their	 networks,	
these	 bonds	 remained	 fragile	 and	 in	 need	 of	 continuous	 examination	 and	 readjustment.	
Sometimes,	 and	 inevitably,	 I	 was	 identified	 as	 a	 useful	 network	 actor	 who	 needed	 to	 be	
enrolled.	On	other	occasions,	when	I	was	an	obstacle	to	the	goals	of	actors	like	Abaco	–	goals	
that	I	did	not	ethically	agree	with	-	I	was	subject	to	an	attempt	of	bribery	and	slander.	In	both	
cases,	affinity	to	the	case	certainly	generated	a	detailed	understanding	of	the	processes	at	
stake.	However,	empathy	may	also	have	biased	or	limited	interaction	with	the	collective	or	
individual	 actors	 who	 were	 not	 associated	 with,	 or	 perhaps	 opposed,	 to	 the	 networks	 I	
became	involved	in.	Indeed,	since	I	constantly	engaged	in	the	processes	I	studied,	I	became	a	
part	 of	 the	 research	object	 itself.	 This	may	have	 jeopardised	my	neutrality.	 Even	 though	 I	
continuously	reflected	on	the	relationship	I	had	with	my	co-actors	in	the	greenhouse	project,	
I	may	be	 criticised	 for	being	 impartial,	obtrusive,	 and	 subjective	both	 in	my	description	of	
events	and	their	interpretation.	In	the	descriptions	of	the	research	chapters,	however,	I	have	
documented	my	involvement	as	openly	and	completely	as	possible,	based	on	research	data	
and	digital	recordings	that	can	be	consulted.		
Actively	 becoming	 a	 part	 of	 the	 research	object	 of	 course	diverges	 from	orthodox,	
textbook	methodologies	and	epistemological	canons.	As	I	argued	in	the	introduction,	though,	
these	issues	are	always	present	in	research	because	of	the	performative	nature	of	research	
itself	 (Law	&	Urry,	 2004).	 Here,	 the	 only	 antidote	 is	 a	 healthy	 dose	 of	 reflexivity	 and	 the	
realization	that	one	is	always	locally	and	historically	bound.		
	
Recommendations	 
"Following	the	actor"	as	a	methodological	tool	can	lead	to	accessing	unexpected	information.	
It	implies	that	the	researcher	has	to	be	flexible	in	terms	of	the	central	objective	of	the	research	
and	allow	it	to	shift.	Also,	progress	cannot	be	guaranteed	if	the	contingent	elements	that	are	
deemed	necessary	to	understand	the	locally	and	historically	situated	actions	of	actors	are	not	
taken	 into	 account.	 For	 those	 researchers	 who	 have	 previous	 links	 to	 the	 study	 area,	 I	
recommend	 to	 strengthen	 a	 historical	 and	 critical	 perspective.	 Incorporating	 alternative	
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research	methods	 such	as	auto-ethnography,	allowed	 to	 include	personal	experiences	and	
autobiographical	reflections.	To	"newcomers"	or	foreigners	to	the	area	I	advise	to	seriously	
look	 into	 sources	 of	 local	 knowledge,	 both	 prior	 to	 and	 during	 fieldwork,	 in	 order	 to	
understand	local	dynamics.	An	alleged	advantage	of	studying	a	region	one	is	well	acquainted	
with	is	that	the	researcher	has	access	to	established	networks	that	facilitate	research.	A	clear	
disadvantage	is	that	one	goes	into	the	field	equipped	with	all	kinds	of	assumptions	and	biases	
that	may	hinder	the	interpretation	of	events.	Even	when	“following	the	actor”,	one	still	has	to	
watch	out	where	one	wishes	to	go	in	terms	of	research	objective.	
In	relation	to	my	involvement	with	the	greenhouse	actors	I	consider	myself	a	kind	of	
intervenor-intervened	(cf.	Verschoor	1994).	Sometimes	this	was	in	a	more	passive	way,	for	
example	 when	 I	 was	 first	 enrolled	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 project,	 the	 project	 was	 already	
underway	and	I	had	been	enrolled	to	a	local	network	(see	Chapter	2).	Sometimes	this	was	in	
a	more	active	way,	for	example	when	strategizing	about	possible	ways	to	secure	the	project.	
And	sometimes	I	partook	in	the	flow	of	events,	 ‘merely’	accompanying	others	to	wherever	
they	 cared	 to	 take	me.	Participatory	Approach	Research	 (PAR)	was	used	when	 I	had	been	
enrolled	in	specific	actions.	Using	Actor-Oriented	Approach	in	parallel	with	PAR	implies	‘going	
with	 the	actors’,	 sharing	commitments	and	goals.	 I	needed	to	be	closely	 involved	with	 the	
trajectory	of	 the	greenhouse	projects,	 in	order	 to	unravel	such	 intervention	processes	and	
‘hidden’	practices.	As	part	of	the	collective,	I	had	to	learn	-	from	inside	-	and	more	accurately	
perceive	actors’	views	and	practices	as	sources	of	understandings.	The	research	techniques	I	
employed	gave	me	a	good	comprehension	of	social	phenomena.	For	social	science	researchers	
in	 general,	 I	 recommend	 using	 an	 actor-oriented	 approach	 to	 carry	 out	 development	
intervention	studies.	
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Capacidades	del	Sector	Rural,	A.C.	
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Development	in	the	Rural	Sector	
MAA	 Modelo	Alternativo	Agropecuario	 Alternative	Model	of	Agriculture		
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Support	 Program	 to	 Access	 the	 Rural	
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PRI	 Partido	Revolucionario	Institucional	 Institutional	Revolutionary	Party	
PRODESCA	 Programa	 de	 Desarrollo	 de	
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SUPLADER	 Subcomité	 de	 Planeación	 para	 el	
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USPR	 Unión	 de	 Sociedades	 de	 Producción	
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Union	of	SPRs	
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SUMMARY		
	
This	 study	 follows	 a	 planned	 development	 intervention	 involving	 greenhouse	 production	
systems	 for	 tomatoes.	 The	 intervention	 played	 out	 in	 Mexico,	 where	 the	 Planning	 Sub-
Committee	for	Regional	Development	(SUPLADER)	promoted	a	strategy	for	the	"development"	
of	the	Zacapu	region	in	Michoacán,	from	2002	to	2005.	The	intervention	is	illustrated	through	
a	detailed,	in-depth	ethnographic	case	study	of	the	way	in	which	the	Unión	de	Invernaderos	
Ruta	de	la	Libertad	(a	USPR	or	Union	of	Rural	Producers	Association)	sought	to	materialize	a	
greenhouse	project.	
Using	an	actor-oriented	perspective	(Long,	2001;	Nuijten,	2001;	Diego,	1997)	and	the	
concepts	of	actor’s	agency,	networks,	associations,	collectives	and	organizing	processes,	the	
study	 aims	 to	 understand	 the	 character	 of	 intervention,	 and	 shows	 how	 programs	 and	
development	projects	serve	different	purposes	–	purposes	which	symbiotically	relate	to	the	
prevailing	social	conditions.	As	a	general	conclusion,	I	argue	that	what	is	called	“the	dough”	
(la	 lana)	 is	 what	 drives	 the	 dynamics	 of	 development	 intervention.	While	 important,	 it	 is	
central	to	understand	the	different	roles	“the	dough”	plays	in	these	intervention	settings:	for	
planners,	it	is	the	means	to	accomplish	development,	whereas	for	project	beneficiaries	it	is	a	
goal	in	itself.	
Chapter	1	elaborates	on	the	general	context	of	planned	intervention	in	Michoacán’s	
Zacapu	 region,	delineates	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	presents	 the	main	 research	question	
(How	do	stakeholders	organize	themselves	around	the	greenhouse	project,	and	how	do	they	
redefine	the	view	of	planned	development	by	the	local	government?)	and	elaborates	on	the	
methodology	employed.		
Chapter	 2	 describes	 the	 organizing	 processes	 underlying	 implementation	 of	 the	
greenhouse	 project	 in	 the	 Zacapu	 -	 Ciénega	 region.	 It	 explains	 how,	 in	 order	 to	 acquire	
resources	 for	 the	 project,	 stakeholders	 organized	 into	 groups,	 forming	 Rural	 Production	
Associations	(SPRs)	and	Unions	of	Rural	Producers’	Associations	(USPRs).	As	a	result,	a	total	of	
28	 SPRs	 were	 formed.	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 members	 of	 these	 SPRs	 had	 extensive,	 prior	
experience	 in	 organizing	 and	 participating	 in	 programs	 similar	 to	 those	 promoted	 by	
SUPLADER.		
Chapter	3	describes	the	practices	of	the	eight	groups	(SPR)	who	got	no	resources	from	
SUPLADER	 and	 seek	 to	 compensate	 for	 an	 initial	 investment	 from	 the	 Alliance	 for	 the	
Countryside	 (Alianza).	To	complete	 the	project	 file,	 the	groups	were	 linked	to	government	
agencies,	municipalities	and	communities	as	well	as	with	external	agents	(firms)	to	use	the	
register	as	a	professional	services	provider	(PSP)	and	enter	the	file	to	the	Alianza	program.	In	
addition,	power	differences	and	conflict	relationships	were	evident	(Lukes,	1974);	conditions	
that	led	to	negotiation	(Diego,	1997).		
Advisor	firms	were	considered	necessary	for	the	negotiations	since	their	capabilities	
were	required	and	considered	essential	for	the	expected	benefit	of	the	Asociación,	although	
they	appeared	to	be	a	very	powerful	party.	Despite	the	regulations	established	by	the	State	
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to	 exercise	 governmental	 programs,	 the	 parties	 responsible	 for	 exercising	 them	 applied	
ambiguous	criteria.		
Chapter	4	describes	the	development	of	an	 ideal	configuration	of	greenhouses	that	
included	 technological,	 social	 and	 cultural	 elements	 associated	 with	 safety	 practices,	
automation	and	demanding	consumers	 located	 in	an	 international	market.	This	perception	
was	far	from	the	project	conditions	of	greenhouses	in	La	Ciénega;	however,	it	did	not	prevent	
generating	 expectations	 among	 the	 SPRs.	 For	 these	 actors,	 the	 greenhouse	 became	 an	
alternative	livelihood,	income,	and	development	opportunity.	
	To	interpret	the	processes	described	I	used	Latour’s	(2008)	notion	of	a	sociology	of	
associations;	 this	 allowed	 me	 to	 interpret	 how	 actor-networks	 were	 incorporated	 in	 the	
greenhouse	project.	
Chapter	5	describes	a	breakaway	attempt	from	the	Asociación	spearheaded	by	17	SPRs	
that	chose	to	build	their	greenhouses	with	an	alternative	hardware	supplier	(ACEA).	To	obtain	
the	 necessary	 funds	 new	 negotiations	 were	 started	 with	 a	 range	 of	 agencies.	 The	 move	
eventually	strengthened	the	Asociación	and	its	institutional	embeddedness.		
In	Chapter	6,	the	Asociación	is	shown	to	be	a	heterogeneous	collective	with	different	
agendas.	This	resulted	in	several	conflicts,	some	of	them,	involving	the	advisory	offices	that	
intended	to	take	the	resources	(“the	dough”)	from	the	project.	Nonetheless,	a	regional	bank	
authorized	a	cash	disbursement	for	the	initial	stage	of	the	greenhouse	project.	
Chapter	 7	 presents	 the	 final	 stage	 of	 SUPLADER	 Zacapu’s	 greenhouse	 project.	 After	
complex	negotiations	and	conflicts	within	the	Asociación,	complementary	credit	was	obtained	
for	the	construction	of	the	greenhouse.	However,	during	a	municipal	election	campaign	key	
figures	 in	 charge	 of	 implementation	 changed	 position;	 this	 led	 to	 a	 change	 in	 project	
conditions,	and	the	Asociación	had	to	face	interventions	from	external	actors.	The	negotiation	
game	restarted	and	triggered	a	new	set	of	strategies	(amongst	others	to	obtain	money	directly	
through	 the	 new	 SEPLADE	 delegate).	 Eventually,	 some	 of	 the	 Asociación’s	 funds	 were	
reappropriated	 and	 assigned	 to	USPR	Agrícola	 Tsakapu	 and	 different	 factions	 (vying	 for	 of	
resources)	resulted	fom	this.		
Chapter	8	provides	the	discussion	and	conclusion	to	this	thesis,	with	insights	that	build	
on	 Mosse’s	 (2005)	 argument	 that	 policies	 to	 promote	 development	 are	 associated	 to	
organizational	demands	and	needs	to	maintain	existing	relationships	(rather	than	promoting	
a	 previously	 defined	 policy).	 However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 La	 Ciénega,	 the	 agents	 of	 change	
(including	the	Michoacán	Congress)	supported	and	pushed	through	planners’	development	
initiatives.	In	line	with	Ferguson	(1994),	I	conclude	that	development	must	be	understood	in	
relation	 to	 the	 political-economic-cultural	 interests	 of	 those	 behind	 its	 design	 and	
implementation.	 Rather	 than	 linear,	 hegemonic	 and	 rigid,	 however,	 actors’	 practices	 and	
strategies	mould	and	twist	planned	development	intervention	to	suit	their	needs	and	desires.	
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RESUMEN	
	
Este	estudio	se	refiere	a	una	intervención	de	desarrollo	planificado	que	implica	sistemas	de	
producción	de	tomates	en	invernadero.	La	intervención	se	lleva	a	efecto	en	México,	donde	el	
Subcomité	de	Planeación	para	el	Desarrollo	Regional	(SUPLADER)	promovió	del	2002	al	2005	
una	estrategia	para	el	"desarrollo"	de	 la	 región	de	 la	Ciénega	de	Zacapu	en	Michoacán.	La	
intervención	se	ilustra	a	través	de	un	estudio	de	caso	etnográfico	detallado,	de	la	forma	en	
que	la	Unión	de	Invernaderos	Ruta	de	la	Libertad	(una	Unión	de	Sociedades	de	Producción	
Rural	(USPR))	intentó	materializar	un	proyecto	de	invernaderos.	
Con	una	perspectiva	orientada	al	Actor	 (Long,	2001)	y	 los	conceptos	de	agencia	del	
actor,	redes,	asociaciones,	colectivos	y	procesos	organizativos,	el	estudio	tiene	como	objetivo	
entender	 el	 carácter	 de	 la	 intervención,	 y	 muestra	 cómo	 se	 entrelazan	 las	 normativas	 y	
propósitos	 de	 los	 diferentes	 programas	 y	 proyectos	 de	 desarrollo;	 propósitos	 que	 se	
relacionan	simbióticamente	a	las	condiciones	sociales	imperantes.	Como	conclusión	general,	
sostengo	que	lo	que	se	llama	“la	lana”	(el	dinero)	impulsa	la	dinámica	de	intervención	para	el	
desarrollo.	Aunque	es	importante	entender	los	diferentes	roles	que	juega	"la	lana"	en	estos	
contextos	 de	 intervención:	 para	 los	 planificadores,	 es	 el	 medio	 para	 lograr	 el	 desarrollo,	
mientras	que	para	los	beneficiarios	del	proyecto	puede	ser	un	objetivo	en	sí	mismo.	
El	capítulo	1	muestra	el	contexto	general	de	la	intervención	planeada	en	la	región	de	
Zacapu	 de	 Michoacán,	 delimita	 el	 marco	 teórico,	 presenta	 la	 pregunta	 de	 investigación:	
¿Cómo	los	actores	se	organizan	alrededor	del	proyecto	de	invernaderos	y	cómo	redefinen	la	
visión	de	desarrollo	planeado	por	el	gobierno	local?	y	explica	la	metodología	empleada.		
El	 capítulo	 2	 describe	 los	 procesos	 de	 organización	 subyacentes	 del	 proyecto	 de	
invernaderos	en	Zacapu	-	región	de	la	Ciénega.	Explica	cómo,	con	el	fin	de	adquirir	los	recursos	
para	el	proyecto,	los	actores	se	organizan	en	grupos,	formando	asociaciones	de	producción	
Rural	(SPRs)	y	Uniones	de	Sociedades	de	Producción	Rural	(USPRs).	Como	resultado,	un	total	
de	28	SPRs	fueron	formadas.	En	su	mayor	parte,	los	miembros	de	estas	SPRs	tuvieron	previa,	
y	amplia	experiencia	en	organizar	y	participar	en	programas	similares	a	los	promovidos	por	el	
SUPLADER.		
El	 capítulo	 3	 describe	 las	 prácticas	 de	 los	 ocho	 grupos	 (SPR)	 que	 no	 consiguieron	
recursos	 de	 SUPLADER	 y	 tratan	de	 compensar	 con	una	 inversión	 inicial	 de	Alianza	 para	 el	
Campo	(Alianza).	Para	completar	la	gestión	del	proyecto,	los	grupos	se	vincularon	con	algunas	
agencias	 gubernamentales,	 municipios	 y	 comunidades,	 así	 como	 con	 agentes	 externos	
(despachos	 y	 empresas),	 quienes	 utilizaron	 su	 registro	 como	 Proveedor	 de	 Servicios	
Profesionales	(PSP)	para	acceder	al	programa	de	Alianza.	Las	relaciones	de	poder	y	de	conflicto	
(Lukes,	1974)	fueron	evidentes;	condiciones	que	llevaron	a	la	negociación	entre	los	actores	
(Diego,	1997).		
El	 capítulo	4	describe	el	desarrollo	de	una	configuración	 ideal	de	 invernaderos	que	
incluyó	elementos	tecnológicos,	sociales	y	culturales	asociados	con	las	prácticas	de	seguridad,	
automatización	 y	 consumidores	 exigentes	 en	 un	 mercado	 internacional.	 Esta	 percepción	
estaba	lejos	de	las	condiciones	reales	del	proyecto	de	invernaderos	en	La	Ciénega;	por	este	
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motivo,	se	generaron	distintas	expectativas	entre	las	SPRs.	Para	estos	actores,	el	invernadero	
se	convirtió	en	una	oportunidad	y	alternativa	de	sustento,	ingresos	y	desarrollo.	
Para	interpretar	los	procesos	descritos	usé	la	noción	de	la	sociología	de	las	asociaciones	
de	Latour	 (2008);	ésta	me	permitió	 interpretar	cómo	 los	actores-red	se	 incorporaron	en	el	
proyecto	de	invernaderos.	
El	 capítulo	 5	 describe	 una	 tentativa	 encabezada	 por	 17	 SPRs	 integrantes	 de	 la	
Asociación	 que	 decidieron	 construir	 sus	 invernaderos	 con	 un	 proveedor	 alternativo	 de	
invernaderos	 (ACEA).	Para	obtener	 los	 fondos	necesarios	para	 la	construcción,	 se	 iniciaron	
nuevas	negociaciones	con	una	serie	de	organismos.	El	movimiento	contribuyó	a	consolidar	a	
la	Asociación	y	su	arraigo	institucional.		
En	 el	 capítulo	 6,	 la	 Asociación	 se	 muestra	 como	 un	 colectivo	 heterogéneo	 con	
diferentes	agendas.	Esta	heterogeneidad	dio	lugar	a	diversos	conflictos,	algunos	de	ellos,	con	
los	 despachos	 consultores	 que	 pretendieron	 apropiarse	 de	 los	 recursos	 ("la	 lana")	 del	
proyecto.	Derivado	de	las	gestiones,	un	banco	regional	autorizó	una	línea	de	crédito	para	la	
etapa	inicial	del	proyecto	invernaderos.	Este	requisito	fue	especificado	en	la	planeación	del	
proyecto.	
El	 capítulo	 7	 presenta	 la	 etapa	 final	 del	 SUPLADER	 que	 afecta	 al	 proyecto	 de	
invernaderos	de	La	Ciénega.	Después	de	complejas	negociaciones	y	conflictos	dentro	de	 la	
Asociación,	se	obtuvo	el	crédito	complementario	para	la	construcción	de	los	invernaderos.	Sin	
embargo,	 con	 la	 campaña	electoral	municipal	 cambiaron	 las	 reglas	del	 juego,	 así	 como	de	
algunos	actores	involucrados;	esta	situación	modificó	las	condiciones	del	proyecto,	teniendo	
la	 Asociación	 que	 hacer	 frente	 a	 las	 intervenciones	 de	 agentes	 externos.	 El	 juego	 de	 las	
negociaciones	 se	 reinició,	 activando	 un	 nuevo	 conjunto	 de	 estrategias	 (entre	 otras	 para	
obtener	 el	 financiamiento	 directamente	 a	 través	 del	 nuevo	 delegado	 de	 la	 SEPLADE).	
Finalmente,	algunos	de	los	fondos	de	la	Asociación	fueron	re-apropiados	y	asignados	a	la	USPR	
Agrícola	 Tsakapu	 y	 a	diferentes	 facciones	que	 competían	por	 los	 recursos,	 redefiniendo	 la	
escena.	
El	 capítulo	 8	 proporciona	 la	 discusión	 y	 conclusión	 de	 esta	 investigación,	 en	 él	 se	
presentan	ideas	para	construir	y	discutir	lo	que	Mosse	(2005)	identifica	como	políticas	para	
promover	el	desarrollo,	y	que	están	asociadas	a	las	demandas	organizativas	y	son	necesarias	
para	 mantener	 las	 relaciones	 existentes	 (en	 lugar	 de	 promover	 una	 política	 previamente	
definida).	 Sin	 embargo,	 en	 el	 caso	 de	 La	 Ciénega,	 los	 agentes	 de	 cambio	 (incluyendo	 el	
Congreso	 de	Michoacán)	 apoyaron	 y	 empujaron	 la	 iniciativa	 de	 los	 planificadores	 para	 el	
desarrollo	 regional.	 De	 acuerdo	 con	 Ferguson	 (1994),	 concluyo	 que	 el	 desarrollo	 debe	
entenderse	 en	 relación	 con	 los	 intereses	 político-económico-culturales	 de	 los	 actores	 que	
pueden	ser	afines	o	confrontados	con	el	diseño	e	implementación	de	los	programas	para	el	
desarrollo.	 esta	 interacción	 no	 es	 lineal,	 hegemónica	 ni	 rígida,	 sino	 que,	 las	 prácticas	 y	
estrategias	 de	 los	 actores	moldean	 y	 redirigen	 la	 intervención	 para	 el	 desarrollo	 prevista,	
adaptándola	a	sus	necesidades	y	deseos.	
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